Tag: sanctions
Irredentism is not limited to Russia
I am pleased to publish this piece, which I co-authored with SAIS colleague Sinisa Vukovic:
One of us has been critical of US State Department praise for President Vucic of Serbia. Some American diplomats are accepting the notion that he is genuinely pro-European and concerned only with the welfare of Serbs in neighboring countries. That is a mistake, especially in the midst of the Ukraine war. His reasoning about Serbia’s responsibilities and relations with its neighbors bears a distinct resemblance to Vladimir Putin’s justifications for aggression:
– Protection of ethnic kin, based on the assumption that the President of Russia or Serbia is responsible to defend Russians or Serbs wherever they live.
– Exaggeration of the threats Russians/Serbs face in other countries and calls for preventive action, including interference in the internal politics of neighboring countries.
– Use of gross disinformation to exaggerate urgency, while attributing the reports to others so as to maintain plausible deniability.
– Exploitation of the Orthodox Church to claim ethnic unity in the face of alleged religious persecution.
– Abuse of linguistic identity to claim that anyone who speaks Russian/Serbian is protected by Moscow/Belgrade.
These and other examples indicate that Vucic, like Putin, rejects civic identities and the notion that sovereignty stops at a state’s borders.
Vucic has moved definitively away from liberal democracy and back towards repressive ethnonationalism. The press is not free in Serbia and dissent is increasingly perilous. Vucic has befriended Vladimir Putin, refused to align with EU sanctions on Russia, and even now is allowing Air Serbia to double service Moscow. Vucic claims to support Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as he must because of Serbia’s claims to Kosovo, but he is doing little to support Kyiv.
Like Putin, who advocates a “Russian world,” Vucic has also attached himself to people who believe in creating a broader ethnonationalist polity than the territory Serbia currently occupies, the “Serbian world.” He habitually refers to his own role vis-a-vis “Serbs” (Serbi) not Serbians or citizens of Serbia (Srbijanci).
Here is some of the evidence for Vucic’s irredentist ambitions:
Serbian world
September 26, 2020, (then) Minister of Defense Aleksandar Vulin started talking it up:
Vucic must create the Serbian world. Belgrade must gather in itself and around itself all Serbs, and the President of Serbia is the President of all Serbs.
(Vučić treba da stvara srpski svet. Beograd mora da u sebi i oko sebe okupi sve Srbe, a predsjednik Srbije je predsjednik svih Srba)
On April 9, 2021, Vulin specified:
Current geopolitical circumstances do not favor the idea of unification of all areas where Serbs live, but this will inevitably happen in ten, twenty or fifty years…wherever they live, in Serbia, Montenegro, Republika Srpska. What we need is the situation where the care for all Serbs, wherever they live, is managed from one center, and that is Belgrade, and I see nothing controversial about it.
During his party convention, July 18, 2021, Vulin explained the rationale behind Serbian world:
The people that has experienced genocide in Jasenovac, that has experienced Oluja [the Croatian military Operation Storm in 1995], and the March pogrom [in 2004 in Kosovo] does not have the right to surrender its fate to the hands of others, that others decide about the future of their children. People whose experience postulates that when it does not have its own soldier, its own police officer, its own judge, it does not have the rights…Serbia needs to have an army that can defend Serbia and Serbs wherever they live.
Effectively, he is calling for protection of Serbs by creation of Greater Serbia, the idea that drove Slobodan Milosevic to war at least four times.
On the same day Vucic reacted:
The official state policy is that Serbia’s state borders are inviolable, and we do not care about others’ borders. We have to protect our own, and unequivocally demonstrate what is our policy.
No doubt having gotten an earful from Western diplomats, Vucic backed off a bit the next September:
In that notion [Serbian world] there is nothing threatening, nothing that would endanger anyone else… it does not talk about borders or anything else, and besides, it is not part of the official state policies.
But it is
It is state policy and Vucic must know it. The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia, that the Parliament adopted in December 2019, is centered around the following premise:
Protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity, military neutrality, safeguard of Serbian people outside of the Republic of Serbia’s borders, European integration, and efficient rule of law
(očuvanje suverenosti i teritorijalne celovitosti, vojna neutralnost, briga o srpskom narodu van granica Republike Srbije, evropske integracije i efikasna pravna država)
Regarding the safeguard of Serbian people living outside of Serbia’s borders, the Strategy specifies it “is an existential matter for the survival of the Republic of Serbia.”
It’s dangerous to Bosnia, Montenegro, and Kosovo
The same Strategy also exclaims:
Preservation of Republika Srpska is one of the foreign policy priorities of the Republic of Serbia
(“Očuvanje Republike Srpske jedan je od spoljnopolitičkih prioriteta Republike Srbije”)
To explain what is meant by this, Vulin (again as MoD) stated in May 2019:
Republika Srpska has always been a priority of the Government and the President of the Republic of Serbia. Republika Srpska may not have its own army, but Serbian people heve their own army.
(“Republika Srpska je uvek prioritet politike Vlade i predsednika Republike Srbije. Republika Srpska nema svoju vojsku, ali srpski narod ima svoju vojsku.”)
This is essentially a pledge to intervene militarily in Bosnia if the RS is threatened, something Milosevic declined to do.
Vucic agrees:
We are one people, as President Milorad Dodik said. There is no such thing as Croatian Serbs or Bosnian Serbs. My father is not a Bosnian Serb, he is a Serb. He may be from Bosnia, but he is not any other Serb but only a Serb.
The threat to intervene is not only against Bosnia. Responding to Montenegrin President Djukanovic’s accusations that Serbia is expansionist, Vucic stated:
Djukanovic should know that I will always defend Serbs, and I will always defend Serbia. I have not alternative, but my own country and my own people
On Kosovo, the risk is even clearer: Vucic mobilized the Serbian army when Kosovo insisted on implementation of an agreement concerning cross-boundary/border recognition of license plates (!).
Serbia is serious
I take Serbia seriously. Its vast re-armament (with Russian and Chinese as well as Western weapons) serves its national security purposes, which are clearly not limited to the current territory of Serbia. No one watching Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine should fail to recognize the risks in the Balkans.
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Stevenson’s army, March 14
– Talks and fighting over Ukraine.
– WSJ says US won’t exempt Russia from sanctions to save Iran deal.
– Various sources say Russia has asked China for military aid.
– NYT assesses how the war might end.
– WaPO reports return of earmarks.
– SAIS & WIlson Center have upcoming event on Ukraine & the Balkans.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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This is how bad things could get
Russia is expanding its bombing in Ukraine to the west and deploying its artillery for intensified barrages on Kyiv. Poland is reaching the limits of its capacity to take in refugees. So are other near neighbors. Moscow is accusing the US of supporting biological and chemical warfare research in Ukraine. Russian forces have already taken control of several nuclear power plants. Moscow has also thrown a monkey wrench into negotiations on re-entry of the US into the Iran nuclear deal.
How bad could things get?
Pretty bad. Here are some guesses:
- The Russians could lay siege to Kyiv and obliterate its governing institutions, displacing many of those who remain of its 2.9 million pre-war population.
- They could also destroy what remains of Ukraine’s air force and its ability to operate. That is presumaby the purpose of their attacks on airfields in the west.
- Poland could limit the intake of refugees, forcing many to remain displaced and vulnerable inside Ukraine.
- Russia often accuses its adversaries of doing things it intends to do. Mocow’s obviously false accusations about biological and chemical weapons may presage Moscow’s use of them.
- Russian forces have already risked disaster in occupying nuclear power plants. Their continued operation depends on Ukrainians and electricity supplies that are at risk. A meltdown like the one at Chernobyl in 1986 would be far more catastrophic under current conditions.
- Moscow may de facto scupper the nuclear deal and try to trade with Iran despite US sanctions. That would allow Tehran to proceed with enrichment and nuclear weapons research.
- Putin is using the war in Ukraine to impose a dictatorial regime inside Russia, making dissent and protest ever more difficult.
All the while, Russia will continue to attack population centers, medical facilities, and schools throughout Ukraine. This “Grozny” strategy is a war crime, but then so is the war of aggression Moscow launched without provocation.
Sanctions aren’t likely to work quickly
The NATO Alliance meanwhile continues sitting on its military hands while Russia crosses multiple red lines. The EU and US are imposing more sanctions on trade and investment, but those rarely if ever change an aggressor’s mind quickly. You are far more likely to get what you want from them when you negotiate lifting them rather than when you impose them. The day when that might be possible is far off.
Military responses have been ruled out
President Biden has so far prioritized prevention of a wider war. He has repeatedly emphasized that Americans will not fight in Ukraine. The Pentagon has apparently blocked transfer of military aircraft from Poland to Ukraine on grounds that might cause Russia to attack Poland and trigger NATO’s mutual defense commitment. The US can’t send the best air defense systems because they require trained personnel that Ukraine doesn’t have and can’t produce in short order.
The Americans and other NATO allies are sending massive arms shipments to the Ukrainians, whose commitment to fighting for themselves should not be doubted. But it may not suffice. Ultimately, Russia has resources, technology, manpower, and immorality that Ukraine cannot equal. We are all likely to suffer the consequences.
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Stevenson’s army, March 10
– NYT has more on why US rejected Polish offer of MiGs.
– AP reports from Warsaw on the issue.
-Atlantic Council has good analysis of risks of various options of aid to Ukraine, but note that co-author Barry Pavel was co-signer of letter urging “limited no fly zone”.
– Fred Kaplan outlines a possible deal to end the fighting. If only…
-WaPo notes that Putin isn’t so isolated.
– A writer warns of the problems of supporting a Ukrainian insurgency.
This was mentioned in class: a CNAS study that found economic sanctions had meaningful effects only 40% of the time.
– Conservative won close election in South Korea.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, March 7
– NYT says US has approached Venezuela about buying oil.
– WaPO says US is planning in case there is a Ukrainian govt in exile.
– WSJ says Russians are recruiting Syrians for Ukraine war.
– K St Lobbyists for Russia out of luck.
– Politico has more on the interagency fight over trade policy
– A student told me of Treasury Oct 2021 report on sanctions policy.
– Amy Zegart analyzes effects of Ukraine info ops.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Timing matters, but no one has a good clock
While Russian forces in Ukraine continue to advance, the invasion is moving slower than Moscow wanted. Internatioinal sanctions are just beginning to bite. The question now is how long it will take for Russians to realize that they need to get rid of President Putin.
Ukrainian resistance is strong, but the Russian forces are overwhelming
The Ukrainians are fighting hard. Their mobile and agile territorial defense is doing a lot of damage to the heavily armed but slow-moving and much less agile Russian forces. Moscow has admitted to losing 500 soldiers. Likely the number is far greater. Russian media are still portraying the war a “special military activity” at the invitation of the secessionist “republics” of Luhansk and Donestk rather than as an full-scale, unprovoked invasion. Most Russians will understand that it is risky to say anything else.
Even heroic resistance cannot immediately overcome overwhelming force. The Russian army is now shelling population centers, targeting civilian institutions, and seizing nuclear power plants. Yesterday’s firefight and fire at the largest concentration of nuclear plants in Europe suggests how little the Russian army cares about imperiling millions of people.
International sanctions are also strong, but their full impact will not be immediate
The US and EU have imposed unprecedented sanctions intended to cripple Russia’s economy. Some consequences are immediate: interest rates have spiked in Russia, the ruble has tanked, and the stock market is closed to avoid catastrophic losses. Russians are unable to withdraw money from banks while prices have skyrocketed. Foreign investors are fleeing. Foreign airlines are shut down. Many local airlines flying Boeings and Airbuses will be unable to get spare parts, making travel even within Russia (which spans 11 time zones) problematic.
While some of the effects of sanctions are apparent right away, many others will take time to manifest. Within a year or so, Russians will lose a big slice of their real incomes. The Russian government, which depends heavily on oil and natural gas revenues, will be straitened. Even in the current tight oil market, buyers are refusing to purchase Russian products, which are selling at a 20% discount. Russian foreign currency reserves were massive before the invasion, but about half are now frozen. It will take time to exhaust the rest.
Ukraine’s fate depends on how quickly people in Russia react
The key variable is how quickly Russians react. The oligarchs are already feeling the pinch, but Putin has them on a short leash. The usual elite Russian coup is unlikely. Demonstrations in Russia have so far attracted thousands and perhaps tens of thousands, most of whom are the usual suspects. Academic scholarship suggests that mobilizing on a sustained basis about 3.5% of the population will bring results (but there are exceptions in both directions):
That would mean about 5 million people, or at least ten times the number mobilized so far. Some would not be the usual suspects, who don’t number that many.
Putin will do what he can to prevent that from happening. Popular protest is his worst nightmare. The war in Ukraine not only portends a long insurgency and ferocious occupation but also an end to anything resembling free speech and association inside Russia. Its “democracy,” imperfect as it was, will become a full-fledged draconian autocracy.
Timing matters
The damage Putin will do depends then on timing. If something like those 5 million Russians get to the streets soon, we could see an abrupt reversal of Ukraine’s fate. But if they don’t, Ukraine will become Putin’s laboratory for how to subjugate a population of more than 40 million, most of whom want to live in Europe rather than a newly constructed Russian empire. There is no telling when or if the protests in Russia will reach critical mass. Timing matters, but no one has a good clock.
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