Tag: Saudi Arabia
An opportunity that may be missed
The Middle East is in a rare period of rapid change. The Assad regime in Syria is gone. Its successor is still undefined and uncertain. Israel has crippled Iran’s Hamas and Hizbollah allies. It is trying to do likewise to the Houthis in Yemen. Egypt is on the sidelines, preoccupied with civil wars in Libya and Sudan. A weakened Iran is contemplating whether nuclear weapons would help to restore its regional influence.
The global powers that be are not anxious to get too involved. Russia, stretched thin, let Syria go. The United States is inaugurating a president known to favor withdrawal from Syria. He will support almost anything Israel wants to do. China is doing its best to guarantee access to Middle East oil but wants to avoid political involvement. The European Union has a similar attitude.
So what will be the main factors in determining the future of the Middle East? Who has power and influence in the region and outside it?
Turkiye
The Turks are so far the big winners in Syria. They are getting an opportunity to send back Syrian refugees and will try to decimate their Syrian Kurdish enemies. They have influence over the ruling Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leadership in Damascus, whom they supplied and unleashed.
When it comes to reconstruction in Syria, Turkish companies are experienced and nearby. Turkish pockets aren’t as deep as American or Chinese pockets. But they are deep enough to get things started fast, especially if World Bank money is put on the table.
The Turks will try to convince the Americans to leave. They’ll argue that they can and will suppress Islamic State and other terrorists. They may even promise to allow the Kurds to continue their local governance structures. But they would want the Syrian Kurds to cut their ties to Kurdish terrorists inside Turkey.
The Turks will want a not-too-Islamist government in Damascus, something akin to their own. Syria has an enormously diverse population. HTS governance in Idlib was autocratic. But that was during the civil war. It will be much harder to impose that on Damascus after liberation from Assad. Syrians want their freedom. Turkiye has an interest in their getting it. Only inclusive governance will permit the return of refugees.
The Gulf
Some of the big money for reconstruction in Syria will come from the Gulf. The Saudis may be willing, if they gain some political influence in the bargain. How they use that influence will be important. In the Balkans 30 years ago they sponsored Wahabist clerics and mosques. Mohammed bin Salman has marginalized those within Saudi Arabia. We can hope he will not export them now. But he will, like the Turks, want a strong executive in Damascus.
What Syria needs from the Gulf is support for inclusive, democratic governance. The UAE will weigh in heavily against Islamism, but the Emirates are far from democratic or inclusive. Qatar, more tolerant of Islamism, will prefer inclusion, if only because the Americans will pressure them to do so.
Israel
Prime Minister Netanyahu has not achieved elimination of Hamas in Gaza. But he has weakened it. The Israelis have been far more successful in Lebanon, where they have dealt heavy blows to Hezbollah. They are also destroying many Syrian military capabilities. And they have seized UN-patrolled Syrian territory in the Golan Heights and on Mount Hermon.
Israel had already neutralized Egypt and Jordan via peace agreements. Ditto the UAE and Bahrain via the Abrahamic accords, though they were never protagonists in war against Israel. It would like similar normalization with Saudi Arabia. Now Israel controls border areas inside Lebanon and Syria. Repression on the West Bank and attacks on the Houthis in Yemen are proceeding apace.
Netanyahu is resisting the end of the Gaza war to save his own skin from the Israeli courts and electorate. Whether he succeeds at that or not, his legacy will be an “Israeli World.” That is a militarily strong Israel surrounded by buffer zones. But he has done serious damage to Israeli democracy and society.
Iran
Iran is weakened. That will encourage it to quicken the pace of its nuclear program. It won’t go all the way to deploying nuclear weapons. That would risk giving the Israelis an excuse for a massive attack, or even a nuclear strike. Nor can Ankara adopt the Israeli policy of opaqueness, as it is a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. That requires openness to inspections. So transparency about its nuclear threshold status is the likely policy.
Bottom line
Turkiye, Israel, and the Gulf (especially Saudi Arabia) are the big winners from the current Middle East wars. They would be even stronger if they were to cooperate. All have an interest in preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons, in stabilizing Syria, and in preventing terrorist resurgence. So does the US. There is an opportunity, but one that may be missed.
Democracy doesn’t favor a serious peace
The headlines today say Hamas and Israel have reached a Gaza ceasefire deal that will
- allow exchange of hostages/prisoners,
- get Israeli troops to withdraw, and
- infuse humanitarian assistance.
All that is good.
What it is
But it is still only a ceasefire, not even a formal end to hostilities never mind a peace settlement. The ceasefire is to last seven weeks, during which negotiations on future arrangements for Gaza are to continue. As Tony Blinken put it yesterday:
The ceasefire deal itself requires the Israeli forces to pull back and then, assuming you get to a permanent ceasefire, to pull out entirely. But that’s what’s so critical about this post-conflict plan, the need to come to an agreement on its arrangements, because there has to be something in place that gives Israelis the confidence that they can pull out permanently and not have a repeat of the last, really, decade.
That is a good reminder. A ceasefire won’t last if there is no mutually enticing way out of the conflict. What might that be?
The rub
Therein lies the rub. The obvious way out would be a demilitarized Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. It could be run by a successor to the hapless Palestinian Authority. The current Israeli government is dead set against that. Even if Prime Minister Netanyahu could accept it, which is doubtful, his coalition partners would not. A new Israeli government will be needed for any post-war settlement that appeals to most Palestinians.
But this government has been successful in doing what Israelis wanted in Gaza and Lebanon. It has diminished Hamas and all but disemboweled Hizbollah. It has also weakened Iran. Netanyahu would likely win a new election, but have no clear path to a parliamentary majority. Nor would anyone else. The pattern of indecisive Israeli elections would continue. There is no sign of a majority that favors a Palestinian state. Democracy does not favor a serious peace settlement.
Trump’s challenge
This is a big problem for the newly elected Trump Administration. It has assembled a mostly pro-Israel diplomatic team. It is difficult to picture Ambassador Huckabee bludgeoning the Israelis into accepting a Palestinian state. Trump’s threat that “all hell will break lose” absent an agreement was intended to threaten Hamas, not Israel.
Trump could turn the table and speak out for a Palestinian state. He did it at least once in his first term. But then he deferred to the Israelis:
If the Israelis and the Palestinians want one state, that’s OK with me. If they want two-state, that’s OK with me. I’m happy if they’re happy.
That is not resounding support for a Palestinian state.
The Saudi factor
It will be up to Riyadh to make it happen. Saudi Arabia wants normalization with Israel as well as a defense and nuclear agreements with the United States. It would be willing to help finance Gaza reconstruction. But it has to get a “concrete, irrevocable steps in a three to five year time horizon” to a Palestinian state in the bargain.
Israel wants normalization with the Saudis as well. Can fragmented Israeli democracy, American pro-Israel diplomats, and a Saudi autocrat combine to produce a Palestinian state? Anything is possible.
Wrong and wrong, maybe wrong again?
I could of course be wrong again. But that’s the gloomy picture I am seeing on the day after an election gone wrong.
I was 100% wrong about the outcome of this election. I expected Harris to win the battleground states. She lost them. I expected her to win the popular vote by a wide margin. It’s not yet clear, but it appears she lost it.
I should have known better
I spent the last week in deep red Hall County, Georgia, doing “voter protection” for the Georgia Democratic Party. That entails monitoring paper ballot processing as well as helping adjudicate ambiguously marked ballots. I also duplicated a few dozen so that the scanner can read them. This is done in cooperation with Republicans and County election officials. Yesterday I was a poll watcher in a precinct whose voters include both a retirement community and mostly Mexican immigrants. The electoral mechanism both in the county government center and at the polling place was professional, efficient, and thus boring.
The demographics were more interesting. Hall is a county of more than 42,000 people that depends heavily on two industries. Chickens are first. Medicine is second. Both industries use large numbers of Mexican immigrants. There are not many native-born Americans feeding and slaughtering the chickens or tending the bed pans. Nor I imagine would you get on well doing construction, another thriving sector, if you didn’t speak Spanish.
By the time I got to the polling center yesterday about 11 am the early rush was over. Mid-day belonged mainly to the retirees, many of whom looked like they were patrons of the medical center. The late afternoon saw a rush of mostly younger Mexican Americans. A young US-born Mexican American poll worker provided translation whenever needed. I observed no tension of any sort between the two demographics. The mostly retired poll workers were impeccably correct and helpful to the immigrants, all of whom were US citizens. I hope they all recognized the symbiosis between the two communities.
My precinct voted more than 60% for Trump. Symbiosis doesn’t extend to the ballot box. I have no doubt about where most of the Trump and Harris votes came from.
It’s identity politics
Trump has found a way to make voting for him a question of identity. His racist dog whistles were vital to his first election. His macho man displays are vital to this second, as they shifted male votes in his direction. I find both difficult to understand, as I don’t regard white, male identity as anything more than an arbitrary classification. You could just as well call me short and old, with much more physical evidence to back the claim. I’m not proud of being white, male, short, or old.
I am proud of being an American. To me, that means having lots of individual rights and collective responsibilities. During my lifetime, I have seen the rights expanded. Younger people, Blacks, Latinos, women, and LGBTQ Americans now enjoy far more freedom than they did in my 1950s childhood. It seems to me the responsibility of white males to adjust to those changes. “All men are created equal” is not ambiguous (even if it should now read “all people”). “Make America Great Again” is a slogan that appeals to those who want to return to segregated, male-dominated, heterosexual America. I don’t share that aspiration.
I expect Trump to try to fulfill many of his promises. He made them to cater to interest groups that own him. He will try to deport large numbers of undocumented immigrants and end asylum. As President, Trump will impose more tariffs, raising the cost of living and inducing retaliation by other countries. He will fire large numbers of civil servants. His allies in Congress will try to end abortion country-wide and repeal Obamacare. They will give more tax relief to the rich and burden the middle class. Trump will welcome cryptocurrencies and try to manipulate the Federal Reserve, undermining monetary stability. His Supreme Court nominees will be people prepared to adjust their jurisprudence to his policy preferences.
I could be wrong again
As bad as I think the re-election of Trump is for America, I fear it is worse for the world. Trump will do at least some of what he has promised. We will see an end to American support for Ukraine and surrender of part of it to Putin. That will encourage Russia to try again in Moldova or the Baltics. He will withdraw American troops from South Korea and Japan, encouraging them to get their own nuclear weapons.
The Balkans, which concern many of my readers, will not be top priority. But Trump’s re-election will encourage ethnonationalists throughout the region. If Ukraine is partitioned, why shouldn’t Serbia to try to capture northern Kosovo and Republika Srpska? Why shouldn’t Kosovo join Albania? Washington might even help. War will be a real possibility. Ethnic cleansing and state collapse will follow. All the while, the Trump family will be benefiting financially from Jared Kushner’s Saudi-financed investments in Serbia and Albania.
In the Middle East, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu will get Trump’s full support. The new Trump Administration will not restrain Israel in Gaza, the West Bank, or Lebanon. Trump will likely encourage military confrontation with Iran. That is the only option left to deter Iran from getting nuclear weapons. Trump will try to get the Saudis to recognize Israel. They will string him along. It remains to be seen whether they will accept Netanyahu’s “less than a state” for Palestine. That proposition is essentially the continuation of the status quo: one state with unequal rights. It is what many call “apartheid.”
I could of course be wrong again. But this is the gloomy picture I am seeing on the day after an election gone wrong.
The regional war is likely to intensify
With Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu about to address the US Congress, it is time for an assessment of where things stand currently in the Middle East. Israel is fighting Arab opponents on four fronts. In Gaza, it is fighting Hamas and killing a lot of civilians. In the north, Israel is fighting Hizbollah and sometimes Syria. In the south Yemen’s Ansar al Allah (the Houthis in a word) has taken up the cudgels against Israel and shipping in the Red Sea. And on the West Bank, settlers and the security forces are fighting Palestinian civilians.
Iran stands behind it all
Iran supports all of Israel’s opponents, the “axis of resistance,” in the Middle East and North Africa. It supplies training and equipment as well as some degree of central coordination and financing. Hamas, Hizbollah, the Houthis may each have their own interests and initiatives, but they are broadly consistent with Iran’s denial of the legitimacy of the Israeli state and its objective of destroying it in favor of a one-state solution on the entire territory of Palestine.
From Tehran’s perspective, the fighting is a good deal. It is confronting its sworn enemy using non-Iranian forces not on Iranian territory. Only once, in April, has Iran tried to attack Israel with its own missiles and drones, in response to an attack on an Iranian diplomatic facility. Israel responded, but in a way that did not escalate the direct tit for tat.
The fourth front
The fourth front in the current fighting is the West Bank. There Israel is not only fighting armed resistance, some of which might or might not be connected to Iran. It has unleashed Israeli settlers, who are establishing new outposts, destroying Palestinian property, and killing Palestinians. 2023 was an especially bad year but 2024 is not far off the pace.
The West Bank fighting redounds to Iran’s benefit as well. It keeps Israeli security forces busy and makes it difficult for the Palestinian Authority, a secular organization with little connection to Tehran, to claim it can effectively govern.
Arab states are mostly maintaining the peace
Egypt and Jordan are maintaining their peace agreements with Israel. Saudi Arabia is continuing to pursue a similar accommodation, albeit one that would necessarily open a path to a Palestinian state. It would also need to give Saudi Arabia a formal US security guarantee of some sort. Iraq talks tough but is not either willing or capable of joining the fight. Turkey has suspended trade with Israel and speaks up for the Palestinians, but it is unwilling to go further. Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan are more or less maintaining their “Abrahamic” agreements with Israel, though Khartoum may rethink that after its civil war.
Qatar is acting as a mediator, along with Egypt, in talks that engage both Hamas and Israel. While often accused of supporting Hamas, Doha views its relations with Hamas as fulfilling requests of the US government, as does Cairo. Egyptian President Sisi is no friend of the Muslim Brotherhood, which gave birth to Hamas.
Hamas has survived, many hostages haven’t
The immediate cause of the current fighting was Hamas’ ferocious, unconventional attack on Israel last October 7, which killed about 1200 people. Israelis understood that to be an existential threat. Its ferocious conventional response has killed in the past 8 months about 40,000 Palestinians and others, according to the Hamas health ministry.
Israel’s main objective is to eradicate Hamas’ military and governing capabilities. Hamas appears to have survived the intense bombing campaign and numerous ground incursions. While there are signs of dissatisfaction with Hamas among Gazans, polling has not confirmed that sentiment.
Israel also seeks release of hostages seized on October 7. Netanyahu claims military pressure will achieve that. Many Israelis prefer a deal. Hamas or other Palestinian groups still hold about 120. More than 100 were released in exchange for Palestinian prisoners held in Israel. Few have been rescued. Dozens have been killed.
No agreement means the regional war will intensify
Prime Minister Netanyahu, apparently against the wishes of many in his government, has refused to sign on to a proposed ceasefire agreement with Hamas that the Americans say originated with Israel. Hamas claims to have agreed, but it appears to be asking for changes as well. There is no sign of a real agreement emerging.
Many in Israel wanted Netanyahu to sign on before coming to Washington. He did not do that. It seems unlikely he will sign on during his visit, if only because doing so would help the Democrats. Netanyahu has allied himself firmly with Donald Trump. I expect his address in Congress to be more of the same fire and brimstone that he preaches in Israel.
The result will be more fighting in all four directions. The Houthis are unbowed. Lebanese Hizbollah is less belligerent but will have little choice if Israel continues to kill its commanders. Hamas hopes its continuing resistance will give it traction not only in Gaza but also on the West Bank, where the settlers can be expected to continue rampaging.
Hamas reportedly agreed in Beijing this week to join the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), recognizing it as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people (a key provision of the Oslo accords with Israel). Such reconciliation agreements have not stuck in the past. If this one does, it could put the Palestinians in a better position to negotiate with Israel, or it could incentivize the Israelis to continue the fighting. Or both. Stay tuned.
Why a negotiated Gaza peace isn’t happening
Israel has been backing away from the Gaza peace plan the Americans say it proposed. After indicating it welcomed the proposal, Hamas is asking for major changes. Here are the good reasons why a negotiated peace in Gaza is not possible right now:
- No mutually hurting stalemate.
- No mutually enticing way out.
- No guarantee of post-settlement security for the belligerents.
Any of these factors might change. But for now all the usual pre-conditions for a successful negotiation are missing.
No mutually hurting stalemate
Neither Hamas nor Israel is hurting enough to prefer negotiations over continued fighting. Military leader Yahya Sinwar thinks civilian casualties help Hamas. He is prepared to continue fighting, as he believes he has the Israelis where he wants them. Israeli officials are letting everyone know the war might last until the end of this year. Prime Minister Netanyahu figures that will postpone an Israeli election that might bring down his government. He imagines an election only after he can claim credit for a complete Israeli victory.
There isn’t even a stalemate. The Israelis are continuing their offensive into Rafah. Hamas is resorting to guerilla tactics in several parts of Gaza. The military situation is still dynamic. It is far from the kind of stasis that would convince belligerents think they can gain more from talking than fighting.
No mutually enticing way out
Even if there were a mutually hurting stalemate, it is hard to imagine a mutually enticing way out that could convince the belligerents to try to negotiate a deal. Israel wants to destroy Hamas’ military and governing capabilities. Hamas might give up the governing role, but it cannot give up its military capability without surrendering completely. Hamas wants to destroy Israel. No one in Jerusalem will agree to that.
Hamas and Israel did live side by side since 2007, albeit with repeated attacks and small wars (compared to the current one). But going back to that from the current situation seems impossible. Hamas isn’t going to trust Israel to leave it alone. Israel isn’t going to trust Hamas to leave the Jewish state alone.
No guarantee of post-settlement security for the belligerents
The only way to square that circle is with outside military and police forces committed to keeping the peace. Tens of thousands would be required. The 4000 police would need to be Arabic-speaking. The 32,000 soldiers would need to be well-equipped and trained. These would need to operate in coordination with 7500 local troops and 4500 local police. Where do you get those in Gaza? Wouldn’t any you find there likely be Hamas-affiliated, one way or the other? The Palestinian Authority has fewer than 10,000 police in the West Bank. What percentage of those could be moved to Gaza?
These are among the issues Tony Blinken is criss-crossing the Middle East to discuss. The Gulfies will likely be willing to write checks, but will the Saudis, Qataris, or Emiratis be putting thousands of their police and soldiers into Gaza? The Egyptians won’t want to either. They controlled Gaza until 1967 and were glad to give it up. They don’t want to re-acquire it.
Scholarship demonstrates that belligerents won’t want to negotiate a settlement that spells doom to themselves. Both Israel and Hamas have reason to fear a settlement without a heavy enforcement presence would do just that.
Wishing Tony Blinken well
I do hope Tony Blinken succeeds, despite the odds. But the circumstances suggest he won’t. The Hamas/Israel war seems destined to continue without a negotiated settlement, until there is a mutually hurting stalemate, a mutually enticing way out, and security for whatever remains of the belligerents. Nothing less will allow a successful negotiation.
Victory by one side or the other is still a possibility. But not one likely to happen soon.
What’s missing from the Gaza peace plan
The Israeli proposal for “General Principles for an agreement between the Israeli side and the Palestinian side in Gaza on the exchange of hostages and prisoners and restoring a sustainable calm” in Gaza seems stalled, despite President Biden’s concerted efforts. What are its prospects?
Security, security, security
In real estate, it’s all about location, location, location. In post-war stabilization and reconstruction, it’s all about security, security, security.
The first security concern is that of the belligerents. They won’t agree to an end to the fighting if they think their own security will be at greater risk. This is especially true in the current case, as Israel has vowed to eliminate Hamas and Hamas’ strategic goal is the elimination of Israel. If Israel is responsible for security in Gaza after the ceasefire, Hamas has good reason to fear the Israel Defense Force will continue to target it, especially its leaders.
The second security concern focuses on civilians. The international community should not be interested in a ceasefire that fails to improve conditions for non-Hamas affiliated Gazans. They need not only to be housed and fed but also protected from gangs and chaos. That requires some sort of police force and rudimentary justice system. Without them, civilians have no recourse when a guy with a gun steals their food, water, shelter, and property.
The third security concern is the region. If war ends in Gaza only to start up between Lebanese Hizbollah and Israel, the Middle East will have gained little. The broader war the region has long feared is already brewing. Iran’s allies and proxies in Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria have all been attacking Israel. The missile and drone tit for tat between Iran and Israel in April suggested what a broader war might entail.
The gaping hole in the draft agreement
The peace plan lacks provisions for the first two categories of security. It details the time lines for hostage/prisoner exchanges, withdrawal of Israeli forces, humanitarian relief, return of Gazans to the north, and other requirements. But it refers only vaguely to Egypt, Qatar, and the US as “guarantors” of the agreement. That means little if it doesn’t include provision of security, or at least a leadership role in doing so.
But it is hard to see what those three countries can realistically do about security. Whoever does that will need to speak Arabic. The US has individuals but no military or police units who speak Arabic. Qatar’s army has fewer than 12,000 soldiers. It is hard to picture Doha providing more than 10% to a peacekeeping presence in Gaza. It is much more likely to write the necessary checks. Egypt has many more soldiers, but Cairo does not want to deploy troops in Gaza, for fear of ending up in charge there, as it was until 1967.
Using Jim Dobbins’ numbers for a heavy peace enforcement operation, Gaza would require something like 32,000 troops and 4000 police, in addition to 7500 local troops and 5500 local police. As the available local forces in Gaza would be mostly Hamas-affiliated, which Israel will not allow, the international presence will have to be beefed up accordingly.
I just don’t see how to fill that gaping hole. Are the Saudis, Emiratis, and Kuwaitis going to deploy large parts of their armies to Gaza?
The other security requirement
The third security requirement is the regional one. This need not be in the plan, but it has to be real. The US has worked hard to prevent the wider regional war, but Israel and some of Iran’s friends seem increasingly eager for one. Israel wants to move Hizbollah back from its border so that tens of thousands of civilians can return to their homes in the north. The Houthis want to demonstrate their importance in the region and gain additional aid from Iran.
The Iranians will elect a new president June 28. The Supreme Leader will retain control of foreign and security policy. But that election will likely provide some indication of the direction Tehran wants to take in the future. If the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has its way, which seems likely, the regional situation could deteriorate quickly.
Prove me wrong
I’ll be glad to be wrong. I hope this peace plan succeeds. But I wouldn’t bet on it.