Tag: Saudi Arabia
Wrong and wrong, maybe wrong again?
I could of course be wrong again. But that’s the gloomy picture I am seeing on the day after an election gone wrong.
I was 100% wrong about the outcome of this election. I expected Harris to win the battleground states. She lost them. I expected her to win the popular vote by a wide margin. It’s not yet clear, but it appears she lost it.
I should have known better
I spent the last week in deep red Hall County, Georgia, doing “voter protection” for the Georgia Democratic Party. That entails monitoring paper ballot processing as well as helping adjudicate ambiguously marked ballots. I also duplicated a few dozen so that the scanner can read them. This is done in cooperation with Republicans and County election officials. Yesterday I was a poll watcher in a precinct whose voters include both a retirement community and mostly Mexican immigrants. The electoral mechanism both in the county government center and at the polling place was professional, efficient, and thus boring.
The demographics were more interesting. Hall is a county of more than 42,000 people that depends heavily on two industries. Chickens are first. Medicine is second. Both industries use large numbers of Mexican immigrants. There are not many native-born Americans feeding and slaughtering the chickens or tending the bed pans. Nor I imagine would you get on well doing construction, another thriving sector, if you didn’t speak Spanish.
By the time I got to the polling center yesterday about 11 am the early rush was over. Mid-day belonged mainly to the retirees, many of whom looked like they were patrons of the medical center. The late afternoon saw a rush of mostly younger Mexican Americans. A young US-born Mexican American poll worker provided translation whenever needed. I observed no tension of any sort between the two demographics. The mostly retired poll workers were impeccably correct and helpful to the immigrants, all of whom were US citizens. I hope they all recognized the symbiosis between the two communities.
My precinct voted more than 60% for Trump. Symbiosis doesn’t extend to the ballot box. I have no doubt about where most of the Trump and Harris votes came from.
It’s identity politics
Trump has found a way to make voting for him a question of identity. His racist dog whistles were vital to his first election. His macho man displays are vital to this second, as they shifted male votes in his direction. I find both difficult to understand, as I don’t regard white, male identity as anything more than an arbitrary classification. You could just as well call me short and old, with much more physical evidence to back the claim. I’m not proud of being white, male, short, or old.
I am proud of being an American. To me, that means having lots of individual rights and collective responsibilities. During my lifetime, I have seen the rights expanded. Younger people, Blacks, Latinos, women, and LGBTQ Americans now enjoy far more freedom than they did in my 1950s childhood. It seems to me the responsibility of white males to adjust to those changes. “All men are created equal” is not ambiguous (even if it should now read “all people”). “Make America Great Again” is a slogan that appeals to those who want to return to segregated, male-dominated, heterosexual America. I don’t share that aspiration.
I expect Trump to try to fulfill many of his promises. He made them to cater to interest groups that own him. He will try to deport large numbers of undocumented immigrants and end asylum. As President, Trump will impose more tariffs, raising the cost of living and inducing retaliation by other countries. He will fire large numbers of civil servants. His allies in Congress will try to end abortion country-wide and repeal Obamacare. They will give more tax relief to the rich and burden the middle class. Trump will welcome cryptocurrencies and try to manipulate the Federal Reserve, undermining monetary stability. His Supreme Court nominees will be people prepared to adjust their jurisprudence to his policy preferences.
I could be wrong again
As bad as I think the re-election of Trump is for America, I fear it is worse for the world. Trump will do at least some of what he has promised. We will see an end to American support for Ukraine and surrender of part of it to Putin. That will encourage Russia to try again in Moldova or the Baltics. He will withdraw American troops from South Korea and Japan, encouraging them to get their own nuclear weapons.
The Balkans, which concern many of my readers, will not be top priority. But Trump’s re-election will encourage ethnonationalists throughout the region. If Ukraine is partitioned, why shouldn’t Serbia to try to capture northern Kosovo and Republika Srpska? Why shouldn’t Kosovo join Albania? Washington might even help. War will be a real possibility. Ethnic cleansing and state collapse will follow. All the while, the Trump family will be benefiting financially from Jared Kushner’s Saudi-financed investments in Serbia and Albania.
In the Middle East, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu will get Trump’s full support. The new Trump Administration will not restrain Israel in Gaza, the West Bank, or Lebanon. Trump will likely encourage military confrontation with Iran. That is the only option left to deter Iran from getting nuclear weapons. Trump will try to get the Saudis to recognize Israel. They will string him along. It remains to be seen whether they will accept Netanyahu’s “less than a state” for Palestine. That proposition is essentially the continuation of the status quo: one state with unequal rights. It is what many call “apartheid.”
I could of course be wrong again. But this is the gloomy picture I am seeing on the day after an election gone wrong.
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The regional war is likely to intensify
With Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu about to address the US Congress, it is time for an assessment of where things stand currently in the Middle East. Israel is fighting Arab opponents on four fronts. In Gaza, it is fighting Hamas and killing a lot of civilians. In the north, Israel is fighting Hizbollah and sometimes Syria. In the south Yemen’s Ansar al Allah (the Houthis in a word) has taken up the cudgels against Israel and shipping in the Red Sea. And on the West Bank, settlers and the security forces are fighting Palestinian civilians.
Iran stands behind it all
Iran supports all of Israel’s opponents, the “axis of resistance,” in the Middle East and North Africa. It supplies training and equipment as well as some degree of central coordination and financing. Hamas, Hizbollah, the Houthis may each have their own interests and initiatives, but they are broadly consistent with Iran’s denial of the legitimacy of the Israeli state and its objective of destroying it in favor of a one-state solution on the entire territory of Palestine.
From Tehran’s perspective, the fighting is a good deal. It is confronting its sworn enemy using non-Iranian forces not on Iranian territory. Only once, in April, has Iran tried to attack Israel with its own missiles and drones, in response to an attack on an Iranian diplomatic facility. Israel responded, but in a way that did not escalate the direct tit for tat.
The fourth front
The fourth front in the current fighting is the West Bank. There Israel is not only fighting armed resistance, some of which might or might not be connected to Iran. It has unleashed Israeli settlers, who are establishing new outposts, destroying Palestinian property, and killing Palestinians. 2023 was an especially bad year but 2024 is not far off the pace.
The West Bank fighting redounds to Iran’s benefit as well. It keeps Israeli security forces busy and makes it difficult for the Palestinian Authority, a secular organization with little connection to Tehran, to claim it can effectively govern.
Arab states are mostly maintaining the peace
Egypt and Jordan are maintaining their peace agreements with Israel. Saudi Arabia is continuing to pursue a similar accommodation, albeit one that would necessarily open a path to a Palestinian state. It would also need to give Saudi Arabia a formal US security guarantee of some sort. Iraq talks tough but is not either willing or capable of joining the fight. Turkey has suspended trade with Israel and speaks up for the Palestinians, but it is unwilling to go further. Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan are more or less maintaining their “Abrahamic” agreements with Israel, though Khartoum may rethink that after its civil war.
Qatar is acting as a mediator, along with Egypt, in talks that engage both Hamas and Israel. While often accused of supporting Hamas, Doha views its relations with Hamas as fulfilling requests of the US government, as does Cairo. Egyptian President Sisi is no friend of the Muslim Brotherhood, which gave birth to Hamas.
Hamas has survived, many hostages haven’t
The immediate cause of the current fighting was Hamas’ ferocious, unconventional attack on Israel last October 7, which killed about 1200 people. Israelis understood that to be an existential threat. Its ferocious conventional response has killed in the past 8 months about 40,000 Palestinians and others, according to the Hamas health ministry.
Israel’s main objective is to eradicate Hamas’ military and governing capabilities. Hamas appears to have survived the intense bombing campaign and numerous ground incursions. While there are signs of dissatisfaction with Hamas among Gazans, polling has not confirmed that sentiment.
Israel also seeks release of hostages seized on October 7. Netanyahu claims military pressure will achieve that. Many Israelis prefer a deal. Hamas or other Palestinian groups still hold about 120. More than 100 were released in exchange for Palestinian prisoners held in Israel. Few have been rescued. Dozens have been killed.
No agreement means the regional war will intensify
Prime Minister Netanyahu, apparently against the wishes of many in his government, has refused to sign on to a proposed ceasefire agreement with Hamas that the Americans say originated with Israel. Hamas claims to have agreed, but it appears to be asking for changes as well. There is no sign of a real agreement emerging.
Many in Israel wanted Netanyahu to sign on before coming to Washington. He did not do that. It seems unlikely he will sign on during his visit, if only because doing so would help the Democrats. Netanyahu has allied himself firmly with Donald Trump. I expect his address in Congress to be more of the same fire and brimstone that he preaches in Israel.
The result will be more fighting in all four directions. The Houthis are unbowed. Lebanese Hizbollah is less belligerent but will have little choice if Israel continues to kill its commanders. Hamas hopes its continuing resistance will give it traction not only in Gaza but also on the West Bank, where the settlers can be expected to continue rampaging.
Hamas reportedly agreed in Beijing this week to join the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), recognizing it as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people (a key provision of the Oslo accords with Israel). Such reconciliation agreements have not stuck in the past. If this one does, it could put the Palestinians in a better position to negotiate with Israel, or it could incentivize the Israelis to continue the fighting. Or both. Stay tuned.
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Why a negotiated Gaza peace isn’t happening
Israel has been backing away from the Gaza peace plan the Americans say it proposed. After indicating it welcomed the proposal, Hamas is asking for major changes. Here are the good reasons why a negotiated peace in Gaza is not possible right now:
- No mutually hurting stalemate.
- No mutually enticing way out.
- No guarantee of post-settlement security for the belligerents.
Any of these factors might change. But for now all the usual pre-conditions for a successful negotiation are missing.
No mutually hurting stalemate
Neither Hamas nor Israel is hurting enough to prefer negotiations over continued fighting. Military leader Yahya Sinwar thinks civilian casualties help Hamas. He is prepared to continue fighting, as he believes he has the Israelis where he wants them. Israeli officials are letting everyone know the war might last until the end of this year. Prime Minister Netanyahu figures that will postpone an Israeli election that might bring down his government. He imagines an election only after he can claim credit for a complete Israeli victory.
There isn’t even a stalemate. The Israelis are continuing their offensive into Rafah. Hamas is resorting to guerilla tactics in several parts of Gaza. The military situation is still dynamic. It is far from the kind of stasis that would convince belligerents think they can gain more from talking than fighting.
No mutually enticing way out
Even if there were a mutually hurting stalemate, it is hard to imagine a mutually enticing way out that could convince the belligerents to try to negotiate a deal. Israel wants to destroy Hamas’ military and governing capabilities. Hamas might give up the governing role, but it cannot give up its military capability without surrendering completely. Hamas wants to destroy Israel. No one in Jerusalem will agree to that.
Hamas and Israel did live side by side since 2007, albeit with repeated attacks and small wars (compared to the current one). But going back to that from the current situation seems impossible. Hamas isn’t going to trust Israel to leave it alone. Israel isn’t going to trust Hamas to leave the Jewish state alone.
No guarantee of post-settlement security for the belligerents
The only way to square that circle is with outside military and police forces committed to keeping the peace. Tens of thousands would be required. The 4000 police would need to be Arabic-speaking. The 32,000 soldiers would need to be well-equipped and trained. These would need to operate in coordination with 7500 local troops and 4500 local police. Where do you get those in Gaza? Wouldn’t any you find there likely be Hamas-affiliated, one way or the other? The Palestinian Authority has fewer than 10,000 police in the West Bank. What percentage of those could be moved to Gaza?
These are among the issues Tony Blinken is criss-crossing the Middle East to discuss. The Gulfies will likely be willing to write checks, but will the Saudis, Qataris, or Emiratis be putting thousands of their police and soldiers into Gaza? The Egyptians won’t want to either. They controlled Gaza until 1967 and were glad to give it up. They don’t want to re-acquire it.
Scholarship demonstrates that belligerents won’t want to negotiate a settlement that spells doom to themselves. Both Israel and Hamas have reason to fear a settlement without a heavy enforcement presence would do just that.
Wishing Tony Blinken well
I do hope Tony Blinken succeeds, despite the odds. But the circumstances suggest he won’t. The Hamas/Israel war seems destined to continue without a negotiated settlement, until there is a mutually hurting stalemate, a mutually enticing way out, and security for whatever remains of the belligerents. Nothing less will allow a successful negotiation.
Victory by one side or the other is still a possibility. But not one likely to happen soon.
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What’s missing from the Gaza peace plan
The Israeli proposal for “General Principles for an agreement between the Israeli side and the Palestinian side in Gaza on the exchange of hostages and prisoners and restoring a sustainable calm” in Gaza seems stalled, despite President Biden’s concerted efforts. What are its prospects?
Security, security, security
In real estate, it’s all about location, location, location. In post-war stabilization and reconstruction, it’s all about security, security, security.
The first security concern is that of the belligerents. They won’t agree to an end to the fighting if they think their own security will be at greater risk. This is especially true in the current case, as Israel has vowed to eliminate Hamas and Hamas’ strategic goal is the elimination of Israel. If Israel is responsible for security in Gaza after the ceasefire, Hamas has good reason to fear the Israel Defense Force will continue to target it, especially its leaders.
The second security concern focuses on civilians. The international community should not be interested in a ceasefire that fails to improve conditions for non-Hamas affiliated Gazans. They need not only to be housed and fed but also protected from gangs and chaos. That requires some sort of police force and rudimentary justice system. Without them, civilians have no recourse when a guy with a gun steals their food, water, shelter, and property.
The third security concern is the region. If war ends in Gaza only to start up between Lebanese Hizbollah and Israel, the Middle East will have gained little. The broader war the region has long feared is already brewing. Iran’s allies and proxies in Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria have all been attacking Israel. The missile and drone tit for tat between Iran and Israel in April suggested what a broader war might entail.
The gaping hole in the draft agreement
The peace plan lacks provisions for the first two categories of security. It details the time lines for hostage/prisoner exchanges, withdrawal of Israeli forces, humanitarian relief, return of Gazans to the north, and other requirements. But it refers only vaguely to Egypt, Qatar, and the US as “guarantors” of the agreement. That means little if it doesn’t include provision of security, or at least a leadership role in doing so.
But it is hard to see what those three countries can realistically do about security. Whoever does that will need to speak Arabic. The US has individuals but no military or police units who speak Arabic. Qatar’s army has fewer than 12,000 soldiers. It is hard to picture Doha providing more than 10% to a peacekeeping presence in Gaza. It is much more likely to write the necessary checks. Egypt has many more soldiers, but Cairo does not want to deploy troops in Gaza, for fear of ending up in charge there, as it was until 1967.
Using Jim Dobbins’ numbers for a heavy peace enforcement operation, Gaza would require something like 32,000 troops and 4000 police, in addition to 7500 local troops and 5500 local police. As the available local forces in Gaza would be mostly Hamas-affiliated, which Israel will not allow, the international presence will have to be beefed up accordingly.
I just don’t see how to fill that gaping hole. Are the Saudis, Emiratis, and Kuwaitis going to deploy large parts of their armies to Gaza?
The other security requirement
The third security requirement is the regional one. This need not be in the plan, but it has to be real. The US has worked hard to prevent the wider regional war, but Israel and some of Iran’s friends seem increasingly eager for one. Israel wants to move Hizbollah back from its border so that tens of thousands of civilians can return to their homes in the north. The Houthis want to demonstrate their importance in the region and gain additional aid from Iran.
The Iranians will elect a new president June 28. The Supreme Leader will retain control of foreign and security policy. But that election will likely provide some indication of the direction Tehran wants to take in the future. If the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has its way, which seems likely, the regional situation could deteriorate quickly.
Prove me wrong
I’ll be glad to be wrong. I hope this peace plan succeeds. But I wouldn’t bet on it.
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Equality is for everyone
This week I joined dozens of colleagues in signing this letter to President Biden about Gaza. I suppose some would say it reflects the herd mentality of the Washington foreign policy establishment. I prefer to think it reflects a judicious appraisal of a bad situation likely to worsen if Israel continues its large-scale assault at Rafah.
That said, let me offer a speculation or two.
Elite Arab attitudes have changed
Arab sympathies are predominantly with the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. That has not and will not change. But it is all the more striking that consultations between the US and key Arab states have continued despite Israeli abuses in Gaza and the West Bank. It seems to me clear that Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Jordan, and others want to be seen as supporting the Palestinians but welcome the damage the Israelis are doing to Hamas. They may doubt the feasibility of completely destroying Hamas’ military capabilities. But there is no talk of an oil boycott or other escalation.
To the contrary, the Saudis have made it clear they want to pursue normalization with Israel once conditions permit. Discussion of that option is continuing even during the Gaza war. It is now half a dozen years since I met Israelis carrying lots of electronics in the Riyadh business class lounge. They were likely helping with internal security in the Kingdom. The Saudis also want a defense agreement and civilian nuclear cooperation with the US. That’s what “normalization” is really about.
Nor are the Arab states expressing any sympathy for wiping Israel off the map. That may still be a day dream in the Arab street, but only Iran, Hizbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis–the axis of resistance–are really backing “from the river to the sea.” I have no doubt but that some of them are serious. But it isn’t happening. Iran is in economic crisis and political ennui, Hizbollah is trying not to get into all-out war with Israel, and Hamas is hiding underground. Only the Houthis are flexing their capabilities, which are however limited for now in their reach and impact to shipping in the Red Sea.
The Israelis are doing from the river to the sea
The Israeli settlers on the West Bank, who object to Arabs saying “from the river to the sea,” are doing it. They are on a killing and displacement spree, taking advantage of the Netanyahu government’s tolerance for violence against Palestinians. The displacement so far is not massive. Things could get a lot worse. Certainly that is the settlers’ intention. They get ample support from more Orthodox Jewish communities in the US, but their really important political backing extends as well to some American Christian evangelicals.
The Biden Administration has begun to react. It has started to sanction Israeli settlers who perpetrate violence on the West Bank against Palestinians. But the Administration needs to do much more, focusing on the political leadership that condones such abuse as well as the American Jewish and Christian networks that support and finance it. Terrorism is terrorism. Blocking American financing for violent settlers should be a priority.
American Jewish attitudes are changing too
The settlers claim religious justification for their claims to what they call “Judea and Samaria.” But liberal American Jews couldn’t care less about that. And most American Jews are more liberal, if I can use that term to encompass nonpracticing as well as Reform, Reconstructionist, and Conservative Jews. They have generally supported the idea of a Jewish homeland. But one that is more secular than religious and treats its Arab citizens as equals and Arab neighbors with respect. You’ll find some of the people who signed the above letter in this category.
Let me speak though only for myself. I want to see an end to warfare between Jews and Arabs. That will only be possible with mutual respect for Palestinian and Jewish rights, whether in one state or two. I still think two is more feasible than one. But admittedly two become more difficult with the extension of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. That is one of many reasons they should be stopped and rolled back.
Also critical is treatment of Palestinian citizens of Israel, as many of what we used to call Israeli Arabs today prefer to be called. They constitute more than 20% of the country’s population. Equality for them is vital to Israel’s claim to be a democratic state and a free society. But you don’t have to look far to find ample evidence that the reality is far from the ideal. Separate but equal never worked in the US. It won’t work in Israel either. It is high time for Israeli practice to rise to the level of Jewish ideals. Human dignityt and therefore equality is for everyone.
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What is needed to stop the fighting in Gaza
As Shibley Telhami underlines, the priority right now is to end the fighting in Gaza. But war is an enterprise with political objectives. So we need to consider what the parties involved want and what might bring the fighting to a negotiated end.
Hamas objectives
Hamas’s heinous mass murder and mayhem on October 7 likely had several objectives: to claim leadership of the Palestinian movement, to counter the Israeli occupation both in the West Bank and Gaza, to garner credit for a spectacular act of “resistance,” and to block impending Saudi normalization of relations with Israel. Israeli right-wing infringement on the Haram al Sharif (Temple Mount) in Jerusalem and settler violence against Palestinians on the West Bank provided an attractive opportunity. All Hamas’ main objectives were at least partially achieved on the day.
But the successes came with consequences. The Israelis have responded by destroying much of Gaza and displacing most of its population, with devastating humanitarian consequences. The IDF has killed, wounded, or captured many Hamas fighters. Saudi Arabia has not entirely forsaken normalization and none of the Arab world has done much more than talk smack about the Israelis. Only Iran and its partners (mainly Lebanese Hizbollah, Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq) have provided any military support. They would like to use this occasion to drive the US out of the Middle East, regardless of the harm to Palestinians.
Palestinian objectives
The war has predictably and understandably rallied Palestinians to their cause, more in the West Bank than in Gaza. On the use of violence, support for Hamas, and disdain for the Palestinian Authority (especially President Mahmoud Abbas) attitudes have hardened. No doubt the Hamas military leadership is celebrating that as success, but the Palestinians desperately need aid and relief. Small anti-Hamas demonstrations have started up and could grow. Ordinary folks unaffiliated with Hamas will want an end to the war sooner rather than later.
Armed groups are not monolithic. Some in Hamas will be starting to worry about survival. As the Israelis push south, they will kill, wound, and capture more militants as well as civilians. Hamas’ “resistance” ideology can survive that push and even prosper, if need be among organizational successors. But its current leadership and at least some of its cadres will be worrying about their own lives and fortunes. Once physical survival becomes unlikely, some will turn to negotiations. They will hope a pause or end to the war will do what continuing seems unlikely to do. Consolidating Hamas’ position as the leader of the Palestinians and the main negotiating interlocutor with Israel would spell success.
Israeli objectives
Israel’s announced objectives are to destroy Hamas so that nothing like October 7 can ever happen again and to free the hostages Hamas and other more militant groups in Gaza still hold. The war is still far delivering those outcomes.
Prime Minister Netanyahu knows that perfectly well. He welcomes it. A hardened Hamas and divided Palestinians help him to justify continuing the war and hold onto power. Israelis so far have not wanted to replace Netanyahu while the fighting continues. Palestinian division, the growth of West Bank sympathy with Hamas, and a hardened Hamas help him to claim that Israel has no viable negotiating partner.
But Israel is a pluralistic society, so not everyone shares Netanyahu’s objectives. The right-wing of his governing coalition (and perhaps Netanyahu tacitly) is using the war as thinly veiled cover for collective punishment, including by blocking humanitarian assistance, supporting the IDF in loosening its targeting, and encouraging the expulsion of Palestinians from both the West Bank and Gaza. While they complain that Palestinians talk about “from the river to the sea,” violent Jewish settlers in the West Bank are doing it.
Many in the much-diminished liberal Israeli opposition want to prioritize hostage release. Opponents of Netanyahu, they prefer negotiations sooner rather than later, as they recognize the risks to the hostages of delay. They presumably also understand that negotiations now will allow Hamas to survive. Many will think that inevitable even if the war continues.
American objectives
The US government, in particular President Biden, shares the Israeli objectives of destroying Hamas so that it can no longer attack Israel and ensuring release of the hostages. Most of the Congress supports those objectives, with some also supporting Netanyahu’s remaining in power and collective punishment of the Palestinians.
But President Biden also wants to be re-elected. The widening regional conflict threatens an unwanted war with Iran. The Gaza war is weakening his support among younger people countrywide and among Muslims, most consequentially among Arabs in the “swing” state of Michigan. It no longer suffices to claim, accurately, that the US is the biggest funder of humanitarian assistance for Gaza and that Washington is pressing the Israelis to let more in.
That has made at least a pause in the fighting a priority. It also makes renewed talk of a two-state solution important, because that is the one area in which the Americans can agree with the change in Palestinian attitudes. It in addition provides a welcome area of agreement with Arab and Muslim states, in particular Saudi Arabia:
The spoiler is Netanyahu, as he has made clear in his reaction to the Hamas proposals:
He is dead set against a Palestinian state and has said so. He has also rejected President Biden’s suggestion that the issue can be fudged. It is true, as Biden claimed, that there are many varieties of “states,” some with limited sovereignty, but Netanyahu won’t accept any of them.
The elephants aren’t leaving the room
This puts Biden in a tough spot. He needs Netanyahu and his right-wing sidekicks gone. Only then will it be possible to pursue some sort of more permanent ceasefire. A pause would be an important first step, but negotiations won’t end the fighting until its main protagonist has departed from power. Only Israelis can engineer that. None seem willing yet.
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