Tag: Saudi Arabia
Stevenson’s army, October 22
– At TV town hall, Biden vows to defend Taiwan, then WH tries to walk back statements.
– Reuters says US has had 3 hypersonic missile tests lately.
– Jake Sullivan talked to MBS about Israel.
– Study says Twitter tilts right.
Democrats sometimes gerrymander their own. Here’s an outrageous story about a stealthy redrawing of a district for PG County council to screw a former councilman, term-limited a few years ago, who wants to run now. [I know and like Eric Olson, who used to represent us.]
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Charlie issued as well as Friday catchup:
– FP says Turkey wants to buy Russian fighters.
–Turkey threatens ouster of foreign ambassadors.
– FP reports split in Democrats over Taiwan.
– Fred Kaplan has different take on Chinese missile.
– FP says AUKUS worries ASEAN.
-Politico says administration opposes Space National Guard.
– But Senate appropriators added $500 million for Space Force.
– Facebook is really upping its lobbying.
– New reports show climate change threats to national security.
– Why are so many senior Democrats retiring?
– Some members still want to be bipartisan.
History lesson:WaPo says Congress didn’t do good job investigation the 1812 attack on the Capitol.
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Stevenson’s army, October 18
– FT says China tested a hypersonic missile.
– US & Canada sent FONOPs through Taiwan Strait.
– Congress rejected DOD reprogramming, protecting big contractors.
– DOD approves $6 billion in new Saudi arms sales.
– David Sanger assess new cold war.
– Intercept has Facebook’s blacklist.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Iraq’s election: a mixed bag is better than a mess
My Middle East Institute colleagues have already elegantly parsed the October 10 Iraqi election results and their implications. It’s a mixed bag: Moqtada al Sadr, who already controls more seats than anyone else in parliament gained, as did former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki; Shia militia politicians, more moderate Shia, and Sunni Islamists weakened; Sunni secularists, independents, regional advocates, and both the leading Kurdish party and a newish one gained. Turnout was low, due in part to a boycott encouraged by activists who had previously campaigned for the early poll. What it all means for election of the President, Parliament speaker, and Prime Minister won’t be known for weeks if not months.
Just as interesting to me is the process: it came off pretty well, with little violence and intimidation by Iraqi standards. Almost two decades after the American invasion, Iraqis have grown accustomed to something like a democratic regime, albeit more than a little tainted with lack of voter enthusiasm, corruption, patronage, sectarianism, and armed groups only nominally under state control. Politics is a rough sport in Iraq, but not now a deadly one, unless you are a demonstrator fired on by sectarian militias.
The main issues are now economic. The American presence, down to a couple of thousand troops plus contractors, is no more discussed than Iranian influence, exercised in part through the Popular Mobilization Forces and their politicians. Kurdistan’s independence aspirations have faded but still simmer. Even with oil prices at a 7-year peak, the new government will face big challenges in maintaining and growing oil and gas production while steering the economy towards non-hydrocarbon development and adjusting to global warming, which threatens to make parts of the country uninhabitable.
If the next government can even begin to meet those challenges, Iraq could play an important role in a Middle East that is adjusting to the prospect of reduced American attention. As a Shia and Arab majority country with a large Kurdish population and many other smaller minorities, a prosperous Iraq could be a multivalent force for stability and coexistence, helping to bridge divides among Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. The current Prime Minister has made some good but still tentative steps in that direction. It is no secret that the Americans and Europeans will hope he is able again to form a government, unlikely as that may seem in a volatile political environment. They also liked his two predecessors, both of whom are, at least for now, down and out.
It is hard to be optimistic about the prospect of serious economic reform in Iraq, which has so far failed to turn its oil wealth into benefits–or even electricity and water–for ordinary citizens. Moqtada’s minions have not governed in the past in transparent and accountable ways. The country lacks an independent judiciary and much of its press is under the control of major politicians. But if law and order prevail, the next government will have an enormous opportunity both domestically and internationally to enable Iraq to benefit both its own citizens and the region. A mixed bag is better than a mess.
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Stevenson’s army, October 10
– NYT has long article on growing US-China tension over Taiwan.
– Xi calls for peaceful reunification.
– Nuclear proliferator A Q Khan dies at 85.
– CRS has recent backgrounders on Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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US withdrawal makes everyone in the Middle East recalibrate
I have long believed the US is overcommitted in the Middle East, given its declining interests in the region, and needed to draw down. I confess I did not anticipate how clumsily we would manage to do it. I also did not fully anticipate how others would react. The American withdrawal has set off a cascade of efforts at improving relations both within the region and with external powers, mainly China and Russia. Not all the improvements are in the US interest, but several are interesting.
First example: the Abrahamic accords. The Saudis, Emiratis, and Bahrainis have understood for some time that the American commitment to their autocracies was weakening. The failure of Washington to react to the drone attack on Saudi oil infrastructure in 2019 confirmed that perception. They needed to think about replacing Washington’s security guarantees, which in any event were aimed at external enemies, while the main threat is in these three countries increasingly internal. They have turned to Israel for the technology required to guarantee that their monarchies remain stable.
But, you may object, Saudi Arabia hasn’t yet recognized Israel, as the UAE and Bahrain have. On that, I only have anecdata, but it is compelling. Sitting in a business class lounge in Riyadh some 2+years ago, I found myself surrounded by 40-something males speaking Hebrew. They carried an unusual number of hard-sided cases. When I asked the Israeli next to me why I was hearing so much Hebrew in Riyadh, he smiled coldly and said: “If I told you, I would have to kill you.” I concluded they were techies carrying lots of electronics after providing assistance to Saudi internal intelligence agencies. I suspect Israel’s improving relations with Egypt have a lot to do with internal security as well, inaddition to President Sissi’s attitude toward the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas.
Second I would cite the response to Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter plane in 2015. It initially caused tension in the bilateral relationship, but Turkey had a problem: the US and NATO were not backing Ankara up and instead the Americans were beginning to ally with Kurds, whom President Erdogan regards as terrorists and mortal enemies. Soon Ankara was apologizing, relations between Ankara and Moscow were improving and Turkey was participating in the Russian-sponsored Astana process for ceasefire/surrenders of the Syrian opposition to the Assad regime. Russian and Turkish troops have even patrolled together in both Idlib and northern Syria, though the relationship remains parlous.
Third are the tentative efforts by Saudi Arabia and Iran to come to some sort of modus vivendi. This has included high-level meetings in Baghdad as well as trips to Tehran and Riyadh. The Saudis and Iranians have no territorial dispute and many symmetrical interests, including not allowing an adversary to rile their respective Shia and Sunni minorities and maintaining their theologically-based and increasingly nationalist autocracies. A mutual stand-down from bilateral tensions could benefit both.
Fourth is the at least partial resolution of a conflict internal to the Gulf Cooperation Council. The Saudis and Emiratis have essentially given up on their latest effort to bring Qatar to heel. Doha weathered the embargo and other sanctions better than the Kingdom and the Emirates anticipated, with assistance from Turkey, Iran, and the US, which wasn’t (yet) interested in abandoning its largest base in the region, Al Udeid. There was no point in continuing a fruitless campaign whose only real impact was to weaken the Gulf Arabs.
Fifth example: OPEC+. After a price war in 2020, the Saudis and Russians found common cause in maintaining higher oil prices, which are essential to both their national budgets. Riyadh and Moscow would prefer prices around $100/barrel, but they can’t push much above $70 or so because that would bring on unconventional sources in the US and elsewhere, especially in a low-interest-rate environment. So they are more or less content to leave prices where they have lingered for much of the epidemic, hoping that stronger growth later will bump up both interest rates and oil prices.
There are other examples: rapprochement between Turkey and the UAE, the UAE push for reconciliation with Syria, and Turkey’s sometime courting of Iran. The point is that US withdrawal is causing everyone to recalibrate and look for alternatives to American support that seems increasingly unlikely. I might like recalibration to push Israel into a more positive attitude toward Palestine, but that seems a bridge too far. Still, US withdrawal is getting the Middle East pregnant with possibilities.
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Stevenson’s army, September 12
– Stanford’s Amy Zegart says CIA post-9/11 has been too involved in military activities, weakening its core mission of avoiding strategic surprise.
– WaPo notes the new bipartisan duo working to reform US war powers laws
– Pentagon has regained control of 6% of IP addresses secretly given to Florida company.
– LA Times says US has removed Patriot missiles from Saudi Arabia.
– FBI released highly redacted report on Saudi involvement in 9/11 attacks. Just look at the redactions!
– Oversight: foreign policy committees hear from SecState Blinken on Mon & Tues in open sessions. SASC hears from Brown & Milley behind closed doors. Check out schedules.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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