Tag: Saudi Arabia
Why a negotiated Gaza peace isn’t happening
Israel has been backing away from the Gaza peace plan the Americans say it proposed. After indicating it welcomed the proposal, Hamas is asking for major changes. Here are the good reasons why a negotiated peace in Gaza is not possible right now:
- No mutually hurting stalemate.
- No mutually enticing way out.
- No guarantee of post-settlement security for the belligerents.
Any of these factors might change. But for now all the usual pre-conditions for a successful negotiation are missing.
No mutually hurting stalemate
Neither Hamas nor Israel is hurting enough to prefer negotiations over continued fighting. Military leader Yahya Sinwar thinks civilian casualties help Hamas. He is prepared to continue fighting, as he believes he has the Israelis where he wants them. Israeli officials are letting everyone know the war might last until the end of this year. Prime Minister Netanyahu figures that will postpone an Israeli election that might bring down his government. He imagines an election only after he can claim credit for a complete Israeli victory.
There isn’t even a stalemate. The Israelis are continuing their offensive into Rafah. Hamas is resorting to guerilla tactics in several parts of Gaza. The military situation is still dynamic. It is far from the kind of stasis that would convince belligerents think they can gain more from talking than fighting.
No mutually enticing way out
Even if there were a mutually hurting stalemate, it is hard to imagine a mutually enticing way out that could convince the belligerents to try to negotiate a deal. Israel wants to destroy Hamas’ military and governing capabilities. Hamas might give up the governing role, but it cannot give up its military capability without surrendering completely. Hamas wants to destroy Israel. No one in Jerusalem will agree to that.
Hamas and Israel did live side by side since 2007, albeit with repeated attacks and small wars (compared to the current one). But going back to that from the current situation seems impossible. Hamas isn’t going to trust Israel to leave it alone. Israel isn’t going to trust Hamas to leave the Jewish state alone.
No guarantee of post-settlement security for the belligerents
The only way to square that circle is with outside military and police forces committed to keeping the peace. Tens of thousands would be required. The 4000 police would need to be Arabic-speaking. The 32,000 soldiers would need to be well-equipped and trained. These would need to operate in coordination with 7500 local troops and 4500 local police. Where do you get those in Gaza? Wouldn’t any you find there likely be Hamas-affiliated, one way or the other? The Palestinian Authority has fewer than 10,000 police in the West Bank. What percentage of those could be moved to Gaza?
These are among the issues Tony Blinken is criss-crossing the Middle East to discuss. The Gulfies will likely be willing to write checks, but will the Saudis, Qataris, or Emiratis be putting thousands of their police and soldiers into Gaza? The Egyptians won’t want to either. They controlled Gaza until 1967 and were glad to give it up. They don’t want to re-acquire it.
Scholarship demonstrates that belligerents won’t want to negotiate a settlement that spells doom to themselves. Both Israel and Hamas have reason to fear a settlement without a heavy enforcement presence would do just that.
Wishing Tony Blinken well
I do hope Tony Blinken succeeds, despite the odds. But the circumstances suggest he won’t. The Hamas/Israel war seems destined to continue without a negotiated settlement, until there is a mutually hurting stalemate, a mutually enticing way out, and security for whatever remains of the belligerents. Nothing less will allow a successful negotiation.
Victory by one side or the other is still a possibility. But not one likely to happen soon.
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What’s missing from the Gaza peace plan
The Israeli proposal for “General Principles for an agreement between the Israeli side and the Palestinian side in Gaza on the exchange of hostages and prisoners and restoring a sustainable calm” in Gaza seems stalled, despite President Biden’s concerted efforts. What are its prospects?
Security, security, security
In real estate, it’s all about location, location, location. In post-war stabilization and reconstruction, it’s all about security, security, security.
The first security concern is that of the belligerents. They won’t agree to an end to the fighting if they think their own security will be at greater risk. This is especially true in the current case, as Israel has vowed to eliminate Hamas and Hamas’ strategic goal is the elimination of Israel. If Israel is responsible for security in Gaza after the ceasefire, Hamas has good reason to fear the Israel Defense Force will continue to target it, especially its leaders.
The second security concern focuses on civilians. The international community should not be interested in a ceasefire that fails to improve conditions for non-Hamas affiliated Gazans. They need not only to be housed and fed but also protected from gangs and chaos. That requires some sort of police force and rudimentary justice system. Without them, civilians have no recourse when a guy with a gun steals their food, water, shelter, and property.
The third security concern is the region. If war ends in Gaza only to start up between Lebanese Hizbollah and Israel, the Middle East will have gained little. The broader war the region has long feared is already brewing. Iran’s allies and proxies in Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria have all been attacking Israel. The missile and drone tit for tat between Iran and Israel in April suggested what a broader war might entail.
The gaping hole in the draft agreement
The peace plan lacks provisions for the first two categories of security. It details the time lines for hostage/prisoner exchanges, withdrawal of Israeli forces, humanitarian relief, return of Gazans to the north, and other requirements. But it refers only vaguely to Egypt, Qatar, and the US as “guarantors” of the agreement. That means little if it doesn’t include provision of security, or at least a leadership role in doing so.
But it is hard to see what those three countries can realistically do about security. Whoever does that will need to speak Arabic. The US has individuals but no military or police units who speak Arabic. Qatar’s army has fewer than 12,000 soldiers. It is hard to picture Doha providing more than 10% to a peacekeeping presence in Gaza. It is much more likely to write the necessary checks. Egypt has many more soldiers, but Cairo does not want to deploy troops in Gaza, for fear of ending up in charge there, as it was until 1967.
Using Jim Dobbins’ numbers for a heavy peace enforcement operation, Gaza would require something like 32,000 troops and 4000 police, in addition to 7500 local troops and 5500 local police. As the available local forces in Gaza would be mostly Hamas-affiliated, which Israel will not allow, the international presence will have to be beefed up accordingly.
I just don’t see how to fill that gaping hole. Are the Saudis, Emiratis, and Kuwaitis going to deploy large parts of their armies to Gaza?
The other security requirement
The third security requirement is the regional one. This need not be in the plan, but it has to be real. The US has worked hard to prevent the wider regional war, but Israel and some of Iran’s friends seem increasingly eager for one. Israel wants to move Hizbollah back from its border so that tens of thousands of civilians can return to their homes in the north. The Houthis want to demonstrate their importance in the region and gain additional aid from Iran.
The Iranians will elect a new president June 28. The Supreme Leader will retain control of foreign and security policy. But that election will likely provide some indication of the direction Tehran wants to take in the future. If the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has its way, which seems likely, the regional situation could deteriorate quickly.
Prove me wrong
I’ll be glad to be wrong. I hope this peace plan succeeds. But I wouldn’t bet on it.
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Equality is for everyone
This week I joined dozens of colleagues in signing this letter to President Biden about Gaza. I suppose some would say it reflects the herd mentality of the Washington foreign policy establishment. I prefer to think it reflects a judicious appraisal of a bad situation likely to worsen if Israel continues its large-scale assault at Rafah.
That said, let me offer a speculation or two.
Elite Arab attitudes have changed
Arab sympathies are predominantly with the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. That has not and will not change. But it is all the more striking that consultations between the US and key Arab states have continued despite Israeli abuses in Gaza and the West Bank. It seems to me clear that Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Jordan, and others want to be seen as supporting the Palestinians but welcome the damage the Israelis are doing to Hamas. They may doubt the feasibility of completely destroying Hamas’ military capabilities. But there is no talk of an oil boycott or other escalation.
To the contrary, the Saudis have made it clear they want to pursue normalization with Israel once conditions permit. Discussion of that option is continuing even during the Gaza war. It is now half a dozen years since I met Israelis carrying lots of electronics in the Riyadh business class lounge. They were likely helping with internal security in the Kingdom. The Saudis also want a defense agreement and civilian nuclear cooperation with the US. That’s what “normalization” is really about.
Nor are the Arab states expressing any sympathy for wiping Israel off the map. That may still be a day dream in the Arab street, but only Iran, Hizbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis–the axis of resistance–are really backing “from the river to the sea.” I have no doubt but that some of them are serious. But it isn’t happening. Iran is in economic crisis and political ennui, Hizbollah is trying not to get into all-out war with Israel, and Hamas is hiding underground. Only the Houthis are flexing their capabilities, which are however limited for now in their reach and impact to shipping in the Red Sea.
The Israelis are doing from the river to the sea
The Israeli settlers on the West Bank, who object to Arabs saying “from the river to the sea,” are doing it. They are on a killing and displacement spree, taking advantage of the Netanyahu government’s tolerance for violence against Palestinians. The displacement so far is not massive. Things could get a lot worse. Certainly that is the settlers’ intention. They get ample support from more Orthodox Jewish communities in the US, but their really important political backing extends as well to some American Christian evangelicals.
The Biden Administration has begun to react. It has started to sanction Israeli settlers who perpetrate violence on the West Bank against Palestinians. But the Administration needs to do much more, focusing on the political leadership that condones such abuse as well as the American Jewish and Christian networks that support and finance it. Terrorism is terrorism. Blocking American financing for violent settlers should be a priority.
American Jewish attitudes are changing too
The settlers claim religious justification for their claims to what they call “Judea and Samaria.” But liberal American Jews couldn’t care less about that. And most American Jews are more liberal, if I can use that term to encompass nonpracticing as well as Reform, Reconstructionist, and Conservative Jews. They have generally supported the idea of a Jewish homeland. But one that is more secular than religious and treats its Arab citizens as equals and Arab neighbors with respect. You’ll find some of the people who signed the above letter in this category.
Let me speak though only for myself. I want to see an end to warfare between Jews and Arabs. That will only be possible with mutual respect for Palestinian and Jewish rights, whether in one state or two. I still think two is more feasible than one. But admittedly two become more difficult with the extension of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. That is one of many reasons they should be stopped and rolled back.
Also critical is treatment of Palestinian citizens of Israel, as many of what we used to call Israeli Arabs today prefer to be called. They constitute more than 20% of the country’s population. Equality for them is vital to Israel’s claim to be a democratic state and a free society. But you don’t have to look far to find ample evidence that the reality is far from the ideal. Separate but equal never worked in the US. It won’t work in Israel either. It is high time for Israeli practice to rise to the level of Jewish ideals. Human dignityt and therefore equality is for everyone.
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What is needed to stop the fighting in Gaza
As Shibley Telhami underlines, the priority right now is to end the fighting in Gaza. But war is an enterprise with political objectives. So we need to consider what the parties involved want and what might bring the fighting to a negotiated end.
Hamas objectives
Hamas’s heinous mass murder and mayhem on October 7 likely had several objectives: to claim leadership of the Palestinian movement, to counter the Israeli occupation both in the West Bank and Gaza, to garner credit for a spectacular act of “resistance,” and to block impending Saudi normalization of relations with Israel. Israeli right-wing infringement on the Haram al Sharif (Temple Mount) in Jerusalem and settler violence against Palestinians on the West Bank provided an attractive opportunity. All Hamas’ main objectives were at least partially achieved on the day.
But the successes came with consequences. The Israelis have responded by destroying much of Gaza and displacing most of its population, with devastating humanitarian consequences. The IDF has killed, wounded, or captured many Hamas fighters. Saudi Arabia has not entirely forsaken normalization and none of the Arab world has done much more than talk smack about the Israelis. Only Iran and its partners (mainly Lebanese Hizbollah, Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq) have provided any military support. They would like to use this occasion to drive the US out of the Middle East, regardless of the harm to Palestinians.
Palestinian objectives
The war has predictably and understandably rallied Palestinians to their cause, more in the West Bank than in Gaza. On the use of violence, support for Hamas, and disdain for the Palestinian Authority (especially President Mahmoud Abbas) attitudes have hardened. No doubt the Hamas military leadership is celebrating that as success, but the Palestinians desperately need aid and relief. Small anti-Hamas demonstrations have started up and could grow. Ordinary folks unaffiliated with Hamas will want an end to the war sooner rather than later.
Armed groups are not monolithic. Some in Hamas will be starting to worry about survival. As the Israelis push south, they will kill, wound, and capture more militants as well as civilians. Hamas’ “resistance” ideology can survive that push and even prosper, if need be among organizational successors. But its current leadership and at least some of its cadres will be worrying about their own lives and fortunes. Once physical survival becomes unlikely, some will turn to negotiations. They will hope a pause or end to the war will do what continuing seems unlikely to do. Consolidating Hamas’ position as the leader of the Palestinians and the main negotiating interlocutor with Israel would spell success.
Israeli objectives
Israel’s announced objectives are to destroy Hamas so that nothing like October 7 can ever happen again and to free the hostages Hamas and other more militant groups in Gaza still hold. The war is still far delivering those outcomes.
Prime Minister Netanyahu knows that perfectly well. He welcomes it. A hardened Hamas and divided Palestinians help him to justify continuing the war and hold onto power. Israelis so far have not wanted to replace Netanyahu while the fighting continues. Palestinian division, the growth of West Bank sympathy with Hamas, and a hardened Hamas help him to claim that Israel has no viable negotiating partner.
But Israel is a pluralistic society, so not everyone shares Netanyahu’s objectives. The right-wing of his governing coalition (and perhaps Netanyahu tacitly) is using the war as thinly veiled cover for collective punishment, including by blocking humanitarian assistance, supporting the IDF in loosening its targeting, and encouraging the expulsion of Palestinians from both the West Bank and Gaza. While they complain that Palestinians talk about “from the river to the sea,” violent Jewish settlers in the West Bank are doing it.
Many in the much-diminished liberal Israeli opposition want to prioritize hostage release. Opponents of Netanyahu, they prefer negotiations sooner rather than later, as they recognize the risks to the hostages of delay. They presumably also understand that negotiations now will allow Hamas to survive. Many will think that inevitable even if the war continues.
American objectives
The US government, in particular President Biden, shares the Israeli objectives of destroying Hamas so that it can no longer attack Israel and ensuring release of the hostages. Most of the Congress supports those objectives, with some also supporting Netanyahu’s remaining in power and collective punishment of the Palestinians.
But President Biden also wants to be re-elected. The widening regional conflict threatens an unwanted war with Iran. The Gaza war is weakening his support among younger people countrywide and among Muslims, most consequentially among Arabs in the “swing” state of Michigan. It no longer suffices to claim, accurately, that the US is the biggest funder of humanitarian assistance for Gaza and that Washington is pressing the Israelis to let more in.
That has made at least a pause in the fighting a priority. It also makes renewed talk of a two-state solution important, because that is the one area in which the Americans can agree with the change in Palestinian attitudes. It in addition provides a welcome area of agreement with Arab and Muslim states, in particular Saudi Arabia:
The spoiler is Netanyahu, as he has made clear in his reaction to the Hamas proposals:
He is dead set against a Palestinian state and has said so. He has also rejected President Biden’s suggestion that the issue can be fudged. It is true, as Biden claimed, that there are many varieties of “states,” some with limited sovereignty, but Netanyahu won’t accept any of them.
The elephants aren’t leaving the room
This puts Biden in a tough spot. He needs Netanyahu and his right-wing sidekicks gone. Only then will it be possible to pursue some sort of more permanent ceasefire. A pause would be an important first step, but negotiations won’t end the fighting until its main protagonist has departed from power. Only Israelis can engineer that. None seem willing yet.
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Quit and change course before you lose
A cold-eyed look at the Gaza war is overdue.
During the atrocious October 7 attack on Israel, Hamas killed as many as 1200 civilians, kidnapped over 200, raped an unknown number, and and committed crimes against humanity.
The Hamas attack did not however threaten the existence of the Israeli state, which struck back quickly. The attack was “existential” in the imagination of some Israelis as well as some Palestinians, but not in its real consequences.
The Israeli attack on Gaza has killed upwards of 23,000 Palestinians, 15,000 or so of them civilians and most presumably women and children. Israel has detained thousands and destroyed about half the built structures in Gaza. The International Criminal Court will decide whether Israeli conduct constitutes genocide.
Israel hasn’t lost, but it hasn’t reached its objectives either
The outcome thus far is obviously not to Israel’s advantage. The Israeli attack aimed to destroy Hamas, which Israel had previously helped to finance and sustain, as a military and governing entity. Israel has also aimed to free the hostages. It has so far fallen short of both goals. Hamas has gained support both in Gaza and the West Bank. Nor have the Israelis achieved their secondary objective of releasing the hostages, upwards of 140 of whom remain in captivity.
It will not be easy for Israel to change course. Prime Minister Netanyahu can remain in power only if the war continues. He is resisting international pressure, including from President Biden, to desist. The end of the war will open a political process certain to hold him responsible for the intelligence and military failures that allowed the Hamas attack to be successful.
Other options
A growing number of Israelis favors prioritizing hostage release over destroying Hamas. This could only be achieved in a negotiated exchange with Hamas (and possibly other Palestinian factions in Gaza) for Palestinians detained in Israel. There is no guarantee however that Hamas can or will deliver all the hostages. Nor do the Israelis want to release all their imprisoned Palestinians, at least some of whom are responsible for killing Israeli Jews.
There is little apparent support in Israel for the course President Biden is proposing. He wants steps towards a Palestinian state that would sweeten the deal for the Palestinian Authority. A reformed PA would take over governing Gaza. Biden believes that would incentivize the Arab Gulf monarchies to finance post-war stabilization and reconstration. It would also allow progress on normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel. The Israelis and Arabs who would support that course are well-intentioned but relatively few.
Some Israelis want to de-populate Gaza as well as the West Bank, claiming both as Israeli territory. This course would be sure to create a permanent threat to Israeli security in Egyptian Sinai. It would also destabilize Jordan, which would have to receive many of the West Bank Palestinians. Jordan’s pro-Western monarchy is vital to Israeli security. Any alternative would likely be far more radical and supportive of the Palestinians, who already constitute more than 50% of Jordan’s population. So forced displacement would be entirely counter-productive. That however doesn’t mean the Israelis won’t try to do it. The settlers and security forces are pressuring some West Banker Palestinians to leave.
What’s most likely?
At some point, the Israelis are likely to accept a ceasefire and try to negotiate a hostage deal. Two questions arise. Will they do so before the destruction in Gaza becomes unfixable? Will Hamas release the hostages and risk Israel re-starting the war thereafter?
Leverage in a negotiation comes from having an alternative to a negotiated solution. The alternative for Israel is to pursue Hamasees it regards as responsible for October 7 by other than conventional military means. Israel could conduct a campaign of targeted air strikes and assassinations. That is not a bad alternative. Doing it soon would maximize the odds of Gulf financing for PA takeover, stabilization, and reconstruction in Gaza.
The alternative for Hamas is to fight on, risking a war of attrition that it might not be able to sustain even if it does serious damage to Israel and PA credibility. Hamas will try to retain at least the Israeli soldiers it has captured, but getting rid of the civilians would increase sustainability. Keeping pregnant women and children captive and alive is not what most fighters want to be doing.
Bottom line
Both Israel and Hamas need to think about quitting and changing course before they lose. The sooner they do it the better. I’d prefer Biden’s two-state option, but the prisoner exchange is the more likely first step. It will be a difficult negotation and likely an incomplete exchange initially. But if it comes with a ceasefire and enhanced humanitarian relief for Gaza’s civilians, it would be a good thing. Certainly better than mass displacement.
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Has the sunset of the West begun?
Pantelis Ikonomou writes:
After the collapse of then existing socialism in 1991, the clash of ideologies seemed finished. Francis Fukuyama’s “The End of History” became a bestseller.
It did not take long for him to admit the error of his prophecy. At the same time, humanity was realizing that hopes for global peace were false. History continued to flow, yet more violently and at higher human costs.
The US is to blame
The undeniable protagonist of the new hot war era was the winner of the 45-year Cold War: the American-led democratic West. The Warsaw Pact dissolved, but NATO continued to exist and to progressively encircle Russia, the collapsed adversary.
The US, with or without NATO, led a series of wars that go on to this day: the Gulf War (1991), the devastating bombardments of Yugoslavia (1995 and 1999), the military interventions in Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), Libya (2011), Syria (2014) and the latest, indirect but decisive US involvement in Ukraine (2022) and the slaughter in Gaza (2023).
Human values ​​and democratic principles are not the driving force of this on-going violence. It is the superpower’s eternal greed to achieve and maintain global hegemony.
What’s next?
In periods of crises, political change is critical. Is there a basis for hope?
Although history’s next games remain unknown, we will get to know one of them relatively soon. Recent polls in the US sugest that the presidential election next November will likely get Donald Trump, or a Republican politician with similar views, back on the top of the global American superpower.
The entire world, including the European democratic West, should not forget ex-President Trump’s unorthodox, unpredictable, and thus perilous persona.
Flash back
In 2016, president-elect Trump announced his doctrine for world order: “America First”. Its main pillar was the dissolution of the EU. He strongly urged European countries to follow the example of Brexit.
The head of the Munich Security Conference, Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, called this “a non-military declaration of war.” The response of the then President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, was characteristic: “Europe is threatened from all sides, including the USA.” Then German Chancellor Angela Merkel wondered whether “we will be able to cooperate with the US in the future or will we retreat into parochial policies.” At the same time, she underlined the importance of international multilateral institutions, such as the EU and the UN, which Trump defiantly discredited.
Trump also encouraged US allies Japan and South Korea, and indirectly Saudi Arabia, to acquire nuclear weapons. This violated American obligations, as well as the binding commitments of the countries in question to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Trump publicly described NATO as “obsolete.” He even proposed a retreat to bilateral agreements, a proposition Russia would support.
Hence, there are well-founded doubts worldwide about the future posture of the US in defending the security, principles, and interests of the democratic West as well as abiding by historic alliances and international treaties.
Is the West at a geopolitical turning point? Has the sunset begun?
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