Tag: Saudi Arabia
Religion as power
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a panel discussion March 19 about religious authority in the Middle East and its implications for US policy. The panel included Courtney Freer, Research Fellow at Middle East Center, Annele Sheline, Zwan Postdoctoral Fellow, Sharan Grewal, Fellow at Center for Middle East Policy, andYusuf Sarfati, Director of the Middle Eastern and South Asian Minor Program.
The following cases are a synopsis of studies showing the magnitude of religious authority in different Middle Eastern countries.
Turkey
Sarfati pointed out that though a layman, President Erdogan some Turks see him as commanding religious authority. His authority comes from a combination of his public performance of piety, charisma and his status as a graduate of an Islamic school, in addition to being leader of an Islamist party. At the same time, there is a wide segment of the society that does not trust him as a religious authority. There are many other outstanding religious figures who are not as well ranked as Erdogan but have gained trust as religious authorities such as Mehmet Gomez and Hayrettin Karaman, among others. Fethullah Gulen and Abu-Bakar Al Baghdadi are the least trusted and generally viewed negatively in Turkey. Unlike many other Muslim countries, religious authority in Turkey is confined to its borders and not influenced by religious authorities in Arab countries. Many Turks don’t approve religious leaders and show skepticism of religious authority. Official Islam and political Islam overlap. People believe in Islamism and support a state religion as two sides of the same coin.
Tunisia
Founded by Sheik Rachid Ghannouschi, Grewal argues that the Islamic party the Ennahda (Renaissance) has been the primary Islamic political party in Tunisia. It became a dominant political player after 2011, performing well in elections, but it is not widely seen as an authority in religious matters. Despite their linkage with and dependence on the Tunisian state, traditional religious authorities like the grand mufti and Imam of Zaytuna mosque have substantial popularity. Surprisingly, the Islamic State continues to wield considerable religious authority in Tunisia, even while domestic Salafi-Jihadis groups like Ansar-al Sharia do not.
Morocco
Sheline stated that the King Mohammed VI is considered the highest religious authority. This status reflects a taboo against questioning his authority as the Commander of Faithful. He has succeeded in establishing his religious credentials through state messaging. The King’s authority goes beyond the religious sphere. He bolsters Morocco´s soft power and strengthens strategic relationships with key allies. In the context of the war on terror, a demonstrable heritage of moderate Islam is a valuable commodity. Following 9/11 the government supported Sufism in hopes that it could serve as a counterbalance to extremist forms of Salafism. The palace’s promotion of moderation contributes to its liberalizing image while maintaining security and stability, making it an ideal partner in the eyes of the US and EU. The US should support the King’s initiative to promote moderate Islam without making it public, as that could undermine his religious standing.
Saudi Arabia
Freer asserted the most trusted religious leaders are among the official religious establishment. Shaykh Saad Bin Nasser Al-Shethri, who serves as advisor to the Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman is the most trusted. Also, Abdullah Al-Sheikh, the head of the Permanent Committee for Islamic Research and Issuing Fatwas, enjoys wide religious authority. Consensus exists among nationals and non-nationals due in part to the official state religious narrative. It holds considerable sway in the religious sector and society more broadly. The more institutionalized indigenous religious influence is, the more likely constituents are to adhere to their authority. While in other Middle East states, religious groups have mobilized support through their provision of social services, the Saudis do not, because of the welfare system in place. The wealthy rentier status of Saudi Arabia negates the effects of income levels on opinions about religion and religious authority.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Neutrality of sorts
The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) hosted a discussion on March 11 about how Pakistan navigates the Saudi Arabia-Iran rivalry, with Alex Vatanka, Senior Fellow at Middle East Institute. He was joined by Ankit Panda, Senior Editor at The Diplomat and Karen Young, Resident Scholar at American Enterprise Institute.
Panda spoke about the competition of Saudi Arabia and Iran in South Asia, mainly in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan has historically sought to play a neutral role in the Saudi-Iranian conflict. It remained neutral in the Saudi-led Decisive Storm campaign against the Houthis in Yemen. The 5000 troops Pakistan sent to Saudi Arabia were intended to protect the Kingdom’s borders, not to get involved in Yemen’s war. In a bid to avoid heightened tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran following the Saudi Arabia’s execution of prominent Shia Sheikh, Nimr Al-Nimr, Pakistan tried to mediate between the two countries. While its neutrality has been successful so far, it will not prevent Pakistan, if forced to pick sides, from supporting Saudi Arabia over Iran, which was unhappy with Pakistan joining the Islamic Military Counterterrorism coalition (MCTC) led by Saudi Arabia.
Looking at the relationship from an economic perspective, Young claims that Saudi Mohammed bin Salman (MBS)’s visit to South Asia targeted mainly India and China, not only Pakistan. In Islamabad, he had two goals:
- to strengthen military relations and build a regional anti-terrorism coalition;
- to gain access to nuclear technology.
Pakistan exports light weapons to Saudi Arabia and benefits from a Saudi loan of $3 billion for oil and gas supplies. More than two million workers from Pakistan and Bangladesh live in Saudi Arabia. Before his visit to Islamabad, Saudi MBS released 200 Pakistani prisoners.
Vatanka gave an overview of Iran’s perspective on the MBS visit to Pakistan. Pakistan’s neutral position since the eighties between Saudi Arabia and Iran is calculated to avoid fighting with the Arabs against Iran. Islamabad does not criticize what Iran is doing in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen or object to its recruitment of fighters from its population, which is 20% Shia. From the Iranian perspective, MBS’s visit entailed animosity towards Iran. But it produced more noise than substantial results. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Iran can not do much to help Pakistan in terms of arms, money, or foreign policy. Tehran and Islamabad have talked for twenty-five years about their pipeline connection, which is yet to be completed.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace Picks March 11-15
1. A city-based strategy for rebuilding Libya | Tuesday, March 12 | 9:00 am – 11:00 am | Brookings Institute | Register Here | The overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 unleashed a long period of instability in Libya. Although elements of governance and a functional economy remain, Libya’s central institutions are weak, with militias and other non-state actors competing for state spoils, such as oil. This internal crisis has significant security ramifications for Libya and beyond: Besides presenting a potential source of terrorism, Libya’s ungoverned spaces have contributed to the unregulated flows of people from the Middle East and Africa to Europe. However, in recent years, the United States has been largely absent from international–including U.N.-led–efforts to restore governance in Libya. In their new report outlining recommendations for the United States and other outside actors on a new policy in Lybia, it focuses on the country’s economic, political, and security activity on its major cities, with the United States reinstating its embassy and ambassador. John R. Allen, the president of the Brooking Institute, will provide opening remarks, and Karim Mezran, Federica Saini Fasanotti and Frederic Wehrey will join Jeffrey Feltman and Alice Hunt Friend in a discussion moderated by Michael E. O’Hanlon.
2. How Pakistan Navigates the Saudi Arabia-Iran Rivalry Libya | Tuesday, March 11 | 1:00 am –2:30am |United States Institute of Peace |Register Here | The deepening relationship between Pakistan and the Gulf states comes at a period of high tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran, whose border with Pakistan has also been the site of periodic clashes and whose past efforts to launch a gas pipeline project linking the two countries remains stalled. A February 13th terrorist attacked, which killed 27 members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and was linked to Pakistani-based militants, only further escalated tensions between the two countries. While Prime Minister Khan has professed a desire to serve as a mediator between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Pakistan faces an increasingly challenging diplomatic balancing act. A discussion analyzing the current Pakistani government’s relations with Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Gulf States, and implications for regional security in South Asia and the greater Middle East, with Ankit Panda for the Diplomat, Karen Young for American Enterprise Institute and Alex Vatanka for Middle East Institute. Ambassador Richard Olson will moderate the discussion.
3. How Russia is surviving Western Sanctions | Monday, March 11 | 2:00 – 3:00 pm | Wilson Center | Register here | Despite uncertainty in the world economy and sanctions, Russia’s economy is set for a broad-based economic recovery. Policies to boost public spending, notably investment, should contribute. Martin Gilman will explore why the Russian authorities have been able to marginalize the impact of the US-instigated sanctions. Gilman will underscore how the most recent legal case involving Baring Vostok could have a much more chilling effect on economic prospects. The panel will be one-one discussion with Martin Gilman of Higher School of Economics in Moscow.
4. Plan País: Building the New Venezuela – A Roadmap for Reconstruction | Monday, March 14 | 5:00pm -6:30pm | Atlantic Council | Register Here | Venezuela is at a turning point. Interim President Juan Guaidó has received the backing of both the Venezuelan people and more than sixty countries. Looking ahead to the democratic transition, the interim government is focused on the reconstruction of Venezuela’s economy and public sector. Here, the Venezuelan National Assembly has proposed Plan País as the most promising opportunity yet to steer Venezuela out of its crisis. Beyond domestic support, Plan País will require the help of the international community and multilateral cooperation for successful implementation. “How would Plan País rebuild Venezuela, and what would be the role of the Inter-American Development Bank and other multilateral development banks,” will feature panelists Ángel Alvarado of Miranda State National Assembly of Venezuela, Alejandro Grisanti of Ecoanalítica, Paula García Tufro of Atlantic Council, Diego Area of Atlantic Council.
5. Dialogues on American Foreign Policy and World Affairs: A Conversation with Jake Sullivan| Friday, March 15 | 11:30am – 12:45 pm | Hudson Institute | Register Here | Hudson Institute will host Jake Sullivan, former national security adviser to Vice President Joe Biden, for a one-on-one discussion with Hudson Institute Distinguished Fellow Walter Russell Mead on U.S. national security threats and opportunities. Mead will explore Mr. Sullivan’s perspective on the future of the Middle East; Russia and Transatlantic relations; the challenge of a rising China; and other concerns facing American policymakers today and in the years ahead. Speakers include Jake Sullivan of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Walter Russell Mead of Hudson Institute.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Similar interests, opposing views
The Middle East Institute (MEI) held a panel discussion on February 26 about potential future geopolitical scenarios in the Middle East with Ambassador Gerald Feierstein, Senior Vice President at MEI and Rolf Mützenich, Member of German Bundestag and Deputy Parliamentary Leader for Foreign Policy, Defense, and Human Rights.
Feierstein gave an overview of Trump priorities in the Middle East: defeating the Islamic state and violent extremism around the world, containing Iran’s ballistic missile program and interference in internal affairs of its neighbors, and advancing an Israel/Palestine “deal of the century.” According to Feierstein, the US and EU allies hold similar views on challenges Iran poses to regional security and stability.
But there are different views on the way to address those challenges, and in particular whether to reimpose sanctions on Iran. On the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the US and Germany agree on the importance of resolving it but disagree on whether the Administration was correct in its decision to formalize the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. While the US has cut off fund for UNRWA, Germany made a big move by stepping in to replace it.
Regarding the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, Feierstein dwelt on the long history of cooperation between the US and Saudi Arabia in establishing peace and security in the region. During the 1960s, Washington and Riyadh worked together to contain the expansion of the Soviet communism. In the 1980s, they stood up against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Today, they still share fundamental interests on global economy security, the energy market, resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and concern over Iran. Despite these shared interests, the US and Saudi Arabia hold different values, especially in attitudes towards their citizens, reflected in their views of the Khashoggi affair.
Mützenich emphasized that solving the current crisis in the Middle East requires that people participate in socio-economic progress, not the conclusion of big arms deals. It is imperative to encourage the governments of the region to respect human rights and invest in their people, particularly young people. The killing of Khashoggi aroused a dispute in the EU over arms exports to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. While Chancellor Merkel decided to no longer export arms to Saudi Arabia, France and Britain did not.
Mützenich expressed concern about ran’s behavior in the region, stressing the importance of international community pressure on Iran’s elite.
The deal with Iran was a great success because it limited Iran’s nuclear capabilities. There is no viable alternative.
While agreeing that the response to ISIS needs to be military, Mützenich argues that ISIS can only be defeated by social and economical inclusion. In Europe, there is a wide debate on whether human rights are a core value or just rhetoric. It was not only Merkel’s position to stop providing arms to Saudi Arabia; the issue was even raised during the negotiations over the coalition government. Ironically, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has allowed women to drive, but women who fought for this right are still behind bars. Mützenich welcomed discussions in the US Congress to try to make the Administration change its position on exporting arms to Saudi Arabia.
There are no grandiose solutions for the big problems facing our world, but humanitarian aid for internally displaced people and refugees can make a difference. The German BundeStag allocates every year €2 billion to humanitarian aid.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Dim future
The Wilson Center held a panel discussion on February 26 exploring the future of the US-Iran relationship . The panel included Robin Wright, journalist and USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow, Michael Singh, Managing Director and Senior Fellow at Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and Robert Malley, President and CEO of the International Crisis Group.
Wright claims that Iranian Foreign Minister Jawad Zarif wanted to resign for several reasons. Internally, jealous rivals surround him and sought to impeach him in the parliament (but the issue never came to a vote). He is realist but does not represent the majority; the Supreme Leader and the hardliners are on top of him. Zarif was upset for not being invited when Bashar Assad turned up in Tehran for a meeting with the Supreme Leader. Externally, he failed to sustain the nuclear deal and prevent the Trump administration re-imposition of sanctions. He was also unable to respond to the pressure of Western governments to release a dual national American detainee in Iran or get Iranian banks to comply with international banking standards that were imposed post 9/11.
Singh pointed out that US administrations from Jimmy Carter until now had some engagement with Iran, but it was President Obama who took relations in a different direction with the nuclear agreement. At odds with US policy and interests, Iran does not operate according to conventional norms. It resorts to proxy wars in Lebanon, Yemen, and Bahrain. These destabilizing actions in the region seek to keep Israel and Saudi Arabia focused on border problems and not Iran itself. Iran has wanted the US out of the region. Obama sought a balance of power in the Middle East between US friends and Iran. That did not happen, and more chaos is coming . While there are shared interests between the US and Iran on counter-narcotics in Afghanistan and ensuring a stable government in Iraq, the ways they pursue those interests tend to be diametrically opposed.
Malley asserted that Democrats and Republicans have engaged with Iran using a mix of coercion and engagement. Both have failed to establish normal relations with Tehran. Even Trump tried to meet Rouhani at the UN. Historically, the US relationship with Iran was not built on a strong basis: take for instance the hostage crisis, the ousting of Mosaddegh, and US support for the Shah.
Most importantly, the Iran-Iraq war, in which almost every country including the US backed Iraq, had a psychological impact on Iran’s attitude toward the US and the region, which is not only polarized between Iran and Saudi Arabia but also between Iran and Israel. Iran wants to play a key major role, but the US has deep strategic interests in oil, support for Israel, and counter-terrorism. Iran believes US backing for Tehran’s foes is an obstacle to its natural weight in the region: Iraq in the past or Saudi Arabia and Israel today.
According to Malley, the one agreement that could have sustainably changed Iranian behavior is the JCPOA. It was better to have that agreement, defuse the nuclear crisis, and prevent a catastrophic war. The JCPOA succeeded because there was pressure and a realistic outcome that Iran and the US with difficulty could accept. Without it, the future is dim.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Doha impressions
I’ve been slow to write my impressions of Doha, where I spent four days last week after four days in Riyadh the week before (my impressions there are reported here). It’s fitting though that I should publish on Qatar the very day that its soccer team won the Asian Cup, defeating Japan 3-1 after triumphing in the semifinal 4-nil over arch-nemesis United Arab Emirates (in addition to beating Saudi Arabia).
The Qataris are riding high, at least in their own estimation and not only on the soccer field. They have more than survived what they term the blockade by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt imposed in June 2017. After an initial panic that emptied grocery stores, cut off family and other personal ties with compatriots, and caused a sharp fall in central bank reserves, the Doha government triggered a successful emergency response planned since the 2014 flare-up of their frictions with the Saudis and Emiratis.
The costs have been high, but the plan stabilized the situation and enabled Qatar to take advantage of its natural gas-derived wealth to make alternative arrangements and also begin to stimulate domestic production to replace imports. People recount the story of flying in 3000 cows for milk production with smiles on their faces. Saudi food supplies, which dominated the market before the “blockade,” are no longer missed.
Relations with Iran and Turkey have improved. Turkey is often credited as having prevented a Saudi invasion early in the Gulf crisis by deploying 3000 troops. The massive US air base at Al Udeid is seldom mentioned, but Qataris clearly treasure their close relations with Washington. Outreach around the world to other countries has grown. Qataris regard the Gulf crisis as a “blessing in disguise,” a phrase heard repeatedly. It compelled Qatar to diversify and strengthen its ties around the world.
The result is pride and allegiance, including (from my limited contact) among the 90% of the population that is expats. Qataris and foreign experts think the government has done well and that the country’s star is rising. Portraits of the Emir, once ubiquitous, are still much in evidence, despite government instructions to remove them. World Cup 2022 preparations are said to be going well. Criticism of labor conditions on the many construction projects has declined, as accidents have proven much less common than some had predicted. The $6-7 billion of direct World Cup spending is only a drop in the bucket, as the government is building another $200 billion or so in new infrastructure. That’s on top of already lavish spending over the last two decades.
The ideological underpinnings are not, of course, democratic. Qatar is an autocracy that does not permit political organizations of any sort. But a lot of people we talked with are convinced that the traditional system of tribal consultations enables the top to hear from the bottom and the bottom to register its discontents. There is talk of elections this year or next for a newly empowered Shura Council, which now issues legislation on behalf of the Emir. But there are also concerns that elections will give the largest tribes dominance that the current system does not permit, thus reducing the diversity of voices and narrowing the political base of the monarchy.
Why did tiny, non-democratic Qatar support the Arab Spring and in particular the Muslim Brotherhood? The most common answer is that Doha supported the political forces it thought Egyptians, Syrians, Yemenis, Tunisians, Libyans, and others wanted. It has dialed back on that support and blocked private financing of radical groups, monitored by the US Treasury.
Doha claims to be a strong supporter of economic and military integration through the Gulf Cooperation Council, whose work has been disrupted. But Qataris want to conduct an independent foreign policy, not one dictated by Saudi Arabia or least of all by the UAE, which is believed to still resent Qatar’s choice to remain independent and not join the other sheikhdoms. Bahrain is the paradigm for what the Qataris do not want: a country forced to follow in the Kingdom’s footsteps wherever it goes.
What about Al Jazeera, the TV news channels that spare only Qatar and not its Gulf neighbors from criticism? Qatar’s neighbors view Al Jazeera Arabic in particular as promoting rebellion and extremism. At least some Qataris are willing to contemplate modifications in editorial policy, but all assume Al Jazeera is not going away, as the Saudis and Emiratis would like. Though said to be privately owned, it is under the government’s thumb and can be reined in when and if need be.
At times in Doha and Riyadh, I felt I was in a hall of mirrors: both claim leadership in modernizing the Arab world, both see the Gulf conflict as a struggle over what one Saudi termed “seniority” in the region and many Qataris termed Saudi/Emirati “hegemony.” In both Saudi Arabia and Qatar these days conservatism is bad, diversity is welcome, dialogue and consultation are promoted, and freedom to organize political activity is restricted. These are absolute monarchies with the deep pockets required to buy their way into the 21st century.
RSS - Posts
