Tag: Saudi Arabia
Hangups: why and who
The Syria peace talks did not begin as projected in Geneva today, though they are likely to convene before the end of this week. Secretary of State Kerry is doing his damndest to make it happen. What are the hang ups? Is he wise to press so hard?
There are two big hangups: why talk and with whom. Or in diplomatese: the agenda and the shape of the table.
Why is the bigger issue. The Syrian opposition, backed by Washington, wants to talk about transition of power away from Bashar al Asad to a “governing body with full executive powers.” That 2012 formula has been repeated ad infinitum since, either explicitly or implicitly (by reference to the June 2012 United Nations communique in which it first appeared). The regime has made it clear it will not negotiate about transition in Geneva. Nor did it last time the UN tried for a political solution, two years ago. Bashar al Asad’s delegation will stick with an anti-terrorist pitch, backed by the Russians and Iranians. The military gains the regime has made against its opponents since Russia’s intervention in the fall mean it is feeling little pressure to yield.
While the Russians never tire of saying that they are not wedded to Bashar al Assad, everything they do suggests the opposite. There is good reason for this. Moscow has no hope of a welcome in Syria by a serious successor to the regime, so the Russians are sticking with what they’ve got.
Iran even more so. Tehran has risked Hizbollah, Iraqi Shia militias it supports and Revolutionary Guard forces in Syria, certainly losing thousands. Though Syrians in my experience are little inclined to sectarianism, the approximately three-quarters of the population that is at least nominally Sunni is not going to easily forget what Iran and its proxies have done to prop up a dictator. Nor will the Alawites and Shia who have backed the regime want to find out what the majority population is inclined to do in retaliation. So having Iran at the table, entirely justified by its role in the conflict, is no easy formula for a solution.
In addition, there are other “who” problems. The fragmentation of the Syrian opposition, often cited as a serious obstacle, is not such a big problem this time around. With Saudi sponsorship, the main opposition forces other than al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al Nusra and the Islamic State have chosen a High Negotiation Commission (HNC), headed by former regime Prime Minister Hijab, and a negotiating team. The main body of the opposition is, in fact, remarkably unified this time around, at least for the moment.
The problem is that there are forces claiming to be opposition that lie outside the HNC, which does not recognize them as such. They come in two flavors: Kurdish and so-called “internal” opposition, both heavily favored by Moscow.
The Kurds who count are affiliated with the Kurdish PYD militia who are fighting in northern Syria against the Islamic State with US support. Washington doesn’t want them excluded from the talks, even if they are affiliated with the Kurdish militia waging a rebellion inside Turkey. Moscow agrees, not least to give Turkey grief.
Moscow also backs elements of the “internal” opposition who aren’t regarded by the opposition forces represented in the HNC as real opposition. Russia is trying to force internal opposition figures into the HNC delegation, likely in exchange for allowing some of what Moscow regards as extremist groups also to join. From Moscow’s point of view, the more unmanageable and fractious the HNC presence in Geneva, the better. The last thing Moscow wants is for the Syrians to choose their own delegation, which would be heavily anti-Russian.
The HNC seems determined to reject Kurdish participation in its delegation, not least because the Kurds often clash with opposition brigades represented there and collaborate with the regime in territories the Kurds largely control. But of course that may mean separate Kurdish representation, which in some ways is precisely what the mostly Arab HNC should not want to see. Separate Kurdish representation in the talks could well favor Kurdish ambitions for a separate federal unit within Syria, like the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq. The Syrian Kurds are calling theirs “Rojava.”
With all these complications, is Secretary Kerry wise to insist?
Richard Gowan argues that there are reasons to proceed, despite the odds: possible progress on humanitarian issues, keeping a peace process alive because it may eventually lead somewhere, and most of all the need Washington and Moscow are feeling to limit their recent competition and try for some cooperation in the aftermath of the Iran nuclear deal. Even a failure, in this view, has the virtue of trying.
My own inclination is towards skepticism, not least because failure at this point will likely mean another tw0-year hiatus. Secretary Kerry is a far greater risk-taker than most of his predecessors. He tried with Israel and Palestine far beyond the point at which others would have given up. The result is an impasse that may last a long time. He pressed forward with Iran on nuclear issues to good effect. Will his Syria effort look more like the former or the latter? More likely the former, with catastrophic consequences for millions of Syrians.
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Peace picks January 25-29
Government closing today, but still lots of good events later in the week:
- U.S.-Russia Cooperation in Syria | Wednesday, January 27th | 9:00-10:30 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | After a year that has seen increased turmoil in the Middle East, there is growing attention in the region from outside powers. A distinguished Russian delegation, led by Vitaliy Naumkin, will present their views on the geopolitical challenges in the region. In particular, they will discuss Russia’s role in resolving the Syrian crisis, and outline opportunities for collaboration with the United States. Vitaly Naumkin is the head of the Center for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences. Other speakers include Vassily A. Kuznetsov, head of the Centre for Political Systems and Cultures at Moscow State University, and Irina Zvyagelskaya, professor at Moscow State University.
- Local Responses to Libya’s Instability | Wednesday, January 27th | 2:30-4:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Since its 2011 revolts and the overthrow of former ruler Muammar Qaddafi, Libya has experienced a series of weak governments, internal fighting factions, and extremist violence. In the attempts to resolve Libya’s complex political and security challenges, the voices of Libyan citizens often go unheard. Please join the Atlantic Council for a discussion with Jeffrey Vanness and Jakob Wichmann. Wichmann will present his findings from a nationwide survey conducted in Libya in August and September 2015, and Vanness will respond to the survey’s results from a US government perspective. The survey includes representative samples for Tripoli, Misrata, and Benghazi, allowing for a comparison of perceptions and demonstrating differences in attitudes in Libya. The survey, conducted through phone interviews with 2,507 Libyan respondents, was commissioned by the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Topics explored include political efficacy and engagement, preferences for the future constitution, gender issues, perceptions of local and national actors, evaluation of public services, perceptions of armed groups, and responses to insecurity. Jeffrey Vanness serves as Democracy and Governance Field Advisor with the Elections and Political Transitions Division of USAID’s Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance. Jakob Wichmann is a consultant for Social Impact and a partner at JMW Consulting. Karim Mezran focuses on the politics of North Africa at the Atlantic Council, where he is the lead expert on Libya.
- Saudi Arabia’s Regional Role and the Future of U.S.-Saudi Relations | Wednesday, January 27th | 2:30-4:00 | Project on Middle East Democracy | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Saudi Arabia has long been one of the United States’ closest allies in the Middle East, among the largest recipients of U.S. arms sales globally, and perceived as a crucial partner in the war on terrorism. Nonetheless, there have always been serious questions regarding the costs of the U.S.-Saudi military relationship, which have become more pronounced over the past year. The Saudi military intervention in Yemen has resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians, and recent executions in the Kingdom, including of nonviolent dissidents, have renewed longstanding concerns about the state of human rights in the Kingdom. In addition, concerns remain about Saudi support for extremist networks in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere, as well as the impact of Saudi militarism on divisions throughout the region. How has Saudi Arabia’s role in the region changed in recent years, and what has driven these changes? What relationships have various factions in Saudi Arabia had with extremist movements throughout the Middle East and North Africa? What impact does U.S. military support for Saudi Arabia have on the Kingdom’s role in the region, as well as on human rights concerns within the country? How have recent events, such as the ongoing conflict in Yemen, Saudi’s role in the Syrian conflict, and mass executions within Saudi Arabia, affected the U.S.-Saudi relationship? And what might we expect for the future of bilateral relations? The panel includes Nadia Oweidat, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation, Andrea Prasow, Deputy Washington Director of Human Rights Watch, and Stephen Seche, Executive Vice President of the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington.
- The Impact of Low Oil Prices on the Middle East | Thursday, January 28th | 9:00-10:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center on Thursday, January 28 from 9:00 am – 10:30 am for a panel discussion on the impact of low oil prices in the Middle East. The collapse in crude oil prices since mid-2014 has shaken the foundation of global energy markets, with sweeping economic and political implications for the Middle East. Amidst falling oil revenues, governments from the Gulf to Iraq and beyond face fiscal crises, market upheaval, disruption of traditional ways of doing business, challenges to longstanding fuel subsidy programs, and slumping economic growth. In the midst of this volatile landscape, energy producers in the region face an uncertain future that will have ramifications in the years to come. The discussion will touch on the following questions and more: How are low prices impacting the economic health of and internal political dynamics in Saudi Arabia? What is the future of Saudi Aramco? How are other major producing countries across the GCC, Iraq, Iran, and North Africa adapting and faring in today’s price environment? Are fiscal constraints inducing major changes in government policies and/or driving macroeconomic and energy policy trends across the Middle East? To what degree are low oil prices driving geopolitical calculations in the region? Panelists include Denise Natali, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Jean-Francois Seznec, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Global Energy Center, and Jamie Webster, Senior Director of HIS Energy Downstream Research. Annie Megdalia, Deputy Director of the Global Energy Center, will moderate.
- Women and Extremism: A Tale of Two Experiences | Thursday, January 28th | 3:30-4:30 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Women are often the victims of terrorism and extremism by states and international actors. At times, they are also the perpetuators of violence and terrorism. This discussion will focus on the intersection between women and extremism at a time of increasing volatility in the Middle East and around the world. Join us as we explore how women are recruited and used by terrorist organizations, and how women become trapped in cycles of violence and conflict. Our panel of experts will look at ways to address the problem and how to engage women and girls in conflict prevention and resolution. Speakers include Farah Pandisth, Adjunct Senior Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, Timothy B. Curry, Deputy Director of Counterterrorism for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, Co-founder and Executive Director of the International Civil Society Action Network, Fatima Sadiqi, Fellow at the Wilson Center, and Tara Sonenshine, Distinguished Fellow at George Washington University. Join the conversationon Twitter by following @WPSProject.
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Is Saudi-Iranian de-escalation possible?
On Tuesday the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW) presented a panel discussion, ‘The Saudi-Iranian Confrontation: What Lies Ahead.’ The participants considered the implications of the Saudi Arabian execution of Nimr al-Nimr, the assault on the Saudi Embassy in Iran, and the Saudi government breaking diplomatic ties with Iran. Participants included David Ottaway, a former correspondent for The Washington Post and current senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Barbara Slavin, the acting director of the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council, and Randa Slim, a non-resident senior fellow at the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute. Hussein Ibish, a senior resident scholar of AGSIW, moderated the panel.
Ibish began the discussion asking why Saudi Arabia took the initiative to carry out the execution of a significant Shia cleric. The three panel members agreed that this was intended to be a message of strength. Ottaway said that the Saudi government believed Nimr encouraged secession, striking a regime nerve. Slim added that the execution was a message to Iran that even someone of particular importance to Shia Islam could be killed because it was in Saudi Arabia’s best domestic interest.
The attack on the Saudi Embassy by Iranian protestors in Tehran exposed a split in President Rouhani’s regime. Slavin commented that the attack showed that the Rouhani government is not in control of all aspects of the Iranian government. Slim explained that Iran looked as if it had failed to protect Shiites in Saudi Arabia, so Iranians needed a power move to demonstrate their discontent. The Saudi response to the attack on the embassy was to break diplomatic and trade ties. Though the Saudis and Iranians escalated, the panelists agreed that direct violence against one another is not an objective of either regime. Proxy wars are certainly not out of the picture, though. Ottaway interpreted the cutting of diplomatic ties as the Saudi government taking a hard-hitting approach to anyone or any ideainternal or external, that threatens their power.
Resentment between the two nations remains strong. Ottaway, in particular, expressed concern about potential accidents that could intensify the current tension. Flying over disputed airspace, resources, and inflammatory comments could all push bilateral relations past the point of repair.
The discussion ended with the panelists pondering if there could be a potential agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, or if another Cold War scenario is possible. Ottaway believes that if a hot button issue, such as the agreement on a Lebanese president by both Saudi Arabia and Iran is possible, then perhaps they could work out other issues. He added that the Syrian negotiations, with both Saudi Arabia and Iran working together for the same peacekeeping goal, could result in parallel talks between the two regimes. Slim suggested that as long as Iran has a problem with Saudi Arabia, then it will have a problem reaching out to the rest of the Sunni Arab world. Slavin said Iran is looking forward to trading with its Arab neighbors, so the Tehran is more open to repairing the damage.
A question pertaining to collateral damage to the region as a whole. Slim talked about how sectarian tensions will prevent the issues of better governance and citizens’ demands from getting the attention they merit. The panelists agreed the most damage will be done to human rights in the region, with the focus on sectarian conflict increasing. No external force has the power or will to make human rights the main issue on the regional agenda. As the conflict between Iranian and Saudi regimes escalates, regional security will continue to suffer. That’s what likely lies ahead.
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What to do about Syria?
On January 5, CFR hosted a panel discussion entitled “What to do About Syria” which also aired on HBO. The discussion was designed to resemble a National Security Council meeting. Panelists included Philip Gordon, Senior Fellow, CFR, Paul Pillar, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University, and Michael Doran, Senior Fellow, the Hudson Institute. Richard Haass, President, CFR, moderated the discussion.
Paul Pillar stated that none of the multiple sides in the Syrian conflict appears poised to win in the near future. The Russian military intervention that began in September has shored up the regime. The regime still controls roughly 1/4 of the country in a North-South strip. There are non-ISIS opposition areas, largely in the northwest but also near the Golan, as well as large areas of ISIS control in the east and Kurdish control in the north. There are hundreds of opposition groups and many coalitions. Over the past year, ISIS has had neither a net loss or a net gain of territory in Syria, but has lost territory on balance when Iraq is included.
Pillar explained that on the diplomatic front, the Vienna process led to the International Syria Support Group, whose members agree on the need for a ceasefire and political settlement. The Saudis held a meeting in Riyadh in December and agreed that Assad did not have to leave until after negotiations are held. The US adopted UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which calls for a ceasefire. The recent suspension of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran shouldn’t have a huge impact beyond the enmity we already knew existed.
Philip Gordon described the current situation as a dynamic stalemate. The attrition of regime forces is unlikely to cause the regime’s collapse because of outside support from Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. The main battle in Syria doesn’t involve ISIS; it’s between the regime and the non-ISIS opposition. The Vienna Process is a positive step. However, the diplomatic gaps between the Saudis and the Iranians remain large.
Michael Doran believes that the US has essentially dropped its demand that Assad leave by pushing his departure so far into the future that it will not happen on Obama’s clock. This frees up the Obama administration to discuss deconfliction with Russia and Iran, a shift the Saudis dislike.
Gordon summarized US policy in Syria as such: since 2011, when Obama declared that Assad must go, US policy has been to strengthen the moderate opposition, in order to pressure the regime to negotiate. So far that hasn’t worked, but it remains US policy. Doran is right that the
definition of what a political transition would look like has evolved. As it became clearer that Russia and Iran would prop up Assad, diplomats examined other types of transitions that might be more feasible. There has been an effort to unify the opposition but it remains fragmented because our partners support different groups. We have tried to build the capacity of the opposition groups, but it has not been enough; they are fighting a professional military backed by Russia and Iran. The president has authorized force against ISIS, using the legal basis that ISIS threatens the Iraqi government; Obama lacks a legal basis to target the regime.
Doran spoke of the limits of our support for the non-ISIS opposition. Iran and Russia have backed the regime and there has not been comparable activity from our side. The train and equip program failed because we found few recruits willing to fight ISIS exclusively. We also work with the Kurds who are aligned with the PKK. We have alienated our Sunni allies. Our position on Assad is critical to mobilizing Sunni support against ISIS. The US would also need ground forces, perhaps in a 1:5 ratio with our allies.
Gordon clarified that the US does support the opposition militarily and politically. We just don’t provide specifics.
Pillar stated that even though the US is a superpower, it may not be able to satisfactorily solve Syria. It’s not in the US’s interest to take sides in the Sunni-Shia conflict. We should place more emphasis on the diplomatic track because tamping down the war is most important.
Gordon outlined two policy options going forward. First, the US could take out Assad militarily, but this could generate more refugees and cause a power vacuum. The better option is to prioritize a ceasefire to stop the war; this is more important than a political transition. Gordon clarified that he is not proposing an alliance with Russia and Iran, but ending the conflict roughly along the lines of the current reality on the ground. Local areas would gain autonomy, but this would stop short of a partition, so as not to set a precedent of carving out new states in the region.
Doran questioned Gordon’s attachment to the integrity of Syria, but largely agreed with his vision for an end state. However, he reiterated that such an arrangement wouldn’t be possible without ground forces. Haass proposed that the US think seriously about supporting an independent Kurdistan as part of a deal, since the Kurds are the most effective fighting force against ISIS.
Pillar highlighted potential positive effects of the Russian military intervention. Russia will draw the ire of radical Sunnis, and Russia will gain more leverage over Assad. Russia also has an interest in tamping down the conflict; it doesn’t want to prop up a beleaguered Assad forever.
An audience member asked how we might prevent revenge attacks once the conflict ends. Pillar pointed out that under Gordon’s autonomous regions proposal, groups would have a diminished ability on the ground to carry out revenge attacks. Haass contended that, contrary to Western notions of pluralism, a future map of Syria must reflect more homogeneity than heterogeneity.
Gordon addressed an audience question about why the US sees fighting ISIS as in its national interest versus fighting the regime. The US has identified ISIS as a threat because it kidnaps Americans and seeks to destabilize regional partners. We have identified discrete steps we can take to degrade and destroy ISIS. Taking out Assad would require an effort like the invasion of Iraq; we should not minimize the cost and consequences of such an effort. The notion that taking out Assad would yield a positive outcome requires a larger suspension of disbelief than the notion that the Iranians and Russians might agree to a ceasefire if the US drops its demand that they abandon Assad.
Another audience member asked whether we need the Saudis to agree that ISIS is a fundamental threat to their existence. Pillar contended that it would be ideal if the Saudis would follow their own interests more intelligently. In the past, the Saudis have faced the threat posed by Al Qaeda; persistent diplomacy and tough love talks will be required to get them to do the same with ISIS. Gordon noted that it is difficult to explain to countries what we think their interests should be. Saudi Arabia is more concerned about Iran than ISIS and Turkey is more concerned about the Kurds. Doran contended that the Saudis and the Turks have defined their interests correctly; we are wrong about what their interests are.
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Gulf style
Saudi Arabia’s decision to break diplomatic relations with Iran raises the question of how much worse things can get. It depends of course on Riyadh’s and Tehran’s objectives and what they are willing to risk to gain them.
Marc Lynch at Monkey Cage today suggests the Saudi motives for escalating its conflict with Iran by executing Shia cleric Nimr al Nimr are three: to isolate and contain Iran even as the nuclear deal proceeds, to distract from foreign policy failures and to rally regional Sunni support. He regards domestic repression as a relatively unimportant factor, which I find hard to credit. Only four of those executed last weekend are known to be Shia. The other 43 were presumably Sunni, many of them extremists responsible for attacks that occurred a decade or more ago. Someone is surely trying to send a strong signal to Sunni extremists about the consequences of targeting the Kingdom.
But let’s examine the international factors and their consequences.
Executing a nonviolent Shia cleric isn’t a likely way to isolate or contain Iran. But Tehran helped the Saudi cause when it allowed Riyadh’s embassy to be sacked. That’s a surefire way of getting negative diplomatic attention, especially from the US and UK. Score one own goal for Riyadh. The Supreme Leader also threatened Saudi Arabia with God’s wrath. That puts him in good company with some right-wing American politicians who are likewise convinced that God acts on their behalf (and maybe even at their behest).
Riyadh is getting some regional support. Bahrain, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates have downgraded their relations with Tehran. That doesn’t count for much more than an improved field position in my book. Nor are the executions likely to distract much from foreign policy failures, and then only temporarily. The wars in Syria and Yemen are not going well from the Kingdom’s perspective. Riyadh is going to have to throw even more money and hardware into them, while encouraging others to do likewise, if it wants to have a serious impact.
The US failed to condemn the Saudi executions, though it regretted their contribution to increasing sectarian tensions in the region. Friends don’t condemn friends, I guess. It certainly would not have helped Washington’s relations with Riyadh, which are already tense because the Saudis are feeling sold out in the Iran nuclear deal. The question is how much longer friendship will trump honesty. The Americans are in no position to object to executions per se, but no one in Washington thinks much of the Saudi justice system. At least from what is readily available in public, it is hard to picture how anything al Nimr said would justify the death penalty.
The blowup between Iran and Saudi Arabia puts at risk the UN-sponsored Syria peace talks, which are scheduled to being January 25 in Geneva. But it also makes them all the more important. You wouldn’t know it from the headlines, but the Saudis and Iranians have a common enemy in the Islamic State. If only they could agree on how to fight it.
On BBC Five Live last night I was asked whether the current downward spiral could lead to war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It’s hard to rule that out, as breaking diplomatic relations can be a prelude to war and feelings are certainly running high. But both countries seem much keener to fight on third-country turf than on their own. Iran has Revolutionary Guard forces commanding and training in Syria, but most of the actual fighting is done by Hizbollah on Tehran’s behalf. The Saudis are bombing Houthi forces in Yemen, but they seem to have kept their ground forces mostly out of the fight. Some naval dueling in the Gulf, possibly involving tankers, might be in the offing, but proxy war through intermediaries is more the Gulf style.
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A bad way to start the new year
2015 was a disastrous year for the Middle East. Uncivil war in Syria raged on, with Russia pitching in on behalf of the Assad regime. Yemen also descended into full-fledged war, with Saudi Arabia pitching in on behalf of President (or former President, depending whose side you are on) Hadi. Libya’s UN-brokered peace agreement seems far from implementation, with two parliaments, two governments and many militias, as well as a growing Islamic State presence. The Islamic State lost territory in Syria (to Kurds) and in Iraq (to Kurds Yezidis, Shia militias and Iraqi government forces), but it would be hard to claim the tide of war has changed direction. Egypt continues to crack down on not only the Muslim Brotherhood and more extremist Islamist threats but also on moderate secularists. Israel and the Palestinians are at an impasse, one in which deadly violence on both sides is escalating.
Can it get worse?
The weekend’s events answer that question: yes. Friday Saudi Arabia, current chair of the UN Human Rights Council, executed 47 people, one of whom was a Shia cleric whose commitment to nonviolence seems uncontested, even if he was no friend of the (Sunni) monarchy. Yesterday Iranians responded by sacking part of the Saudi Embassy, a move that will remind the world of how little the Islamic Republic can be relied upon to protect diplomatic facilities. Today the Saudis claimed that Iran executed hundreds last year with little legal basis. The Iranians are promising that God will punish the Saudi monarchy.
We are clearly in the midst of a downward spiral that could well end in more sectarian bloodletting. Iran can pump more weapons and fighters (both Hizbollah and its own Revolutionary Guards) into Syria. Saudi Arabia can beef up support for insurgents there and escalate its attacks on the Houthis in Yemen. The more regional conflict and chaos, the stronger the Islamic State and Al Qaeda grow in Syria, Yemen, Libya and Afghanistan, even if they are losing territory in Iraq and northern Syria. Instability breeds instability.
President Obama wants to keep the United States out of the fray, except to attack those who directly threaten the homeland. That means the Islamic State as well as Al Qaeda and its affiliates. His astoundingly disciplined refusal to engage otherwise leaves a vacuum that militants expand to fill. Those who think the President indecisive or irresolute have misunderstood. He is determined not to get drawn back in to the Middle East. Watching the Iranians and Saudis go at it should be enough to make many Americans sympathize.
But not doing things is just as much a policy as doing them. It has consequences. The downward spiral is unlikely to stop of its own accord. The Middle East is a high wire act without a net. There is no regional security framework or even a loose association like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to help de-escalate. The Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation is far too weak a reed. The Gulf Cooperation Council is an adversary of Iran, not a neutral. Neither Europe nor the U.S. has had much success in getting the Islamic Republic and the Kingdom to temper their conflict.
It is difficult to see how this ends well. It may well be we are heading for a conflagration with much more catastrophic consequences than we have seen so far. Only when the Saudis and Iranians see that happening are they likely to stop. And then it may be too late.
We haven’t seen much yet of 2016. Just enough to know it is a bad way to start a new year.
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