Tag: Saudi Arabia
Reform, not revolution
On Friday, the Middle East Institute and Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) hosted Tarek Masoud, the Sultan of Oman Associate Professor of International Relations at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, to discuss a new book he co-authored, The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform. I. William Zartman, SAIS Professor Emeritus, moderated the discussion. Masoud concentrated on deriving policy implications for the US from his structural analysis of why some Arabic-speaking Muslim-majority countries experienced revolts in 2011, why some regimes were able to rebuff protests, and why the results of revolts have been dismal, with the tentative exception of Tunisia.
The talk comes at a fortuitous moment, as the Nobel Peace Prize winner was just announced on Friday as the Tunisian Quartet, which contributed vitally to achieving democratic progress and stability since the mass mobilization that sparked the so-called Arab Spring and led to the departure of Tunisia’s autocrat, President Ben Ali. But personality is the least of it. Masoud and his co-authors take the position in their book that the Arab Spring was “a drama whose script was written long before its dramatis personae took the stage.” That is, there are deeply entrenched structural causes that determined the success or failure of Arab Spring movements.
Masoud suggested five policy implications.
First is that the absence of democracy in the Arab world is overdetermined; there are several decisive reasons why there hasn’t been a wave of democratic transitions. Many people have made a (questionable) cultural argument The most persuasive in Masoud‘s view is economic underdevelopment. Development generates competing political and social forces that are vital to preventing a single hegemonic power. This is one reason for Tunisia’s relative success, evidenced by the civil society-generated Quartet.
Second, Masoud views policies directed at establishing democracy as wrongheaded. What the Arab world needs are states that are durable, no matter what the regime. The effectiveness of many Arab states, which govern by fear and patronage, is rated low by the World Bank. Masoud highlighted the recent provenance of many of them, especially Yemen, as well as Muammar Qaddafi’s strikingly libertarian attitude towards governance, which led him to dismantle many Libyan state structures and atomize society. Tunisia in 2010 had a relatively effective government in 2010.
The third implilcation was simply stated: US military intervention often collapses the state, which is not useful.
Fourth: there is no pragmatic way forward without incorporating elements from the former regimes into future governments. Otherwise, there is the risk of alienating a significant cohort, which will seek to cause the new order from which it is excluded to collapse. Tunisia was advantaged in this respect as well. Its current president was associated with the previous regime.
In Syria, Masoud thought it will be necessary to reach some sort of compromise with Bashar al-Assad if a political solution is going to be achieved. Like other hereditary regimes, his is one in which the coercive and executive apparatus is tightly intermeshed. This has caused many of the monarchies to be more stable than Egypt or Libya, where there was a separation. But once armed conflict begins, this intermeshing may ensure that Assad will not stop fighting until there is no one left to fight.
The fifth and final implication is that the US should seriously consider working with Russia and Iran in Syria. Arguably, the three have more in common in this conflict than the US does with Saudi Arabia or Qatar. Saudi Arabia has made it its project to undermine many different states, through the funding and arming of radical Islamists – and it is exactly this type of radical Islamism that the US is seeking to combat on a global scale. Syria needs a strong state and a stable society, not increased weaponization and battlefields drawn on ideological lines.
Though Masoud expressed hope for the region, and a desire for justice for Syria, the study he has conducted in this book with his co-authors has been one focused on the structural constraints set in place decades ago that governed political action during the Arab Spring and continue to do so now. Exploring these constraints has led him to call for a conservative policy towards the Arab world, where the state is more likely to collapse towards a state of nature than transition to democracy. We need to build states and promote economic development in the hope of producing more lasting stability.
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Peace picks, October 5-9
- Toward a “Reaganov” Russia: Assessing trends in Russian national security policy after Putin | Monday, October 5th | 10:00 – 11:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | During their recent speeches before the United Nations General Assembly, Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Barack Obama traded strong words on issues from Ukraine to arms control to Syria. The exchange between the two presidents unfolded as questions about Russia’s long-term foreign policy ambitions and grand strategy return to the forefront of policy debate. To better understand what lies ahead in Russian foreign and security policy, analysts must explore variances between Russian strategic culture and the agenda put forward by President Putin. Disentangling these differences will be crucial for U.S. policy planning of the future. Brookings Senior Fellow Clifford Gaddy joins Michael O’Hanlon, author of “The Future of Land Warfare,” to discuss their research on the issue, focusing on five possible paradigms for the future of Russian grand strategy. Former ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer, presently the director of the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative at Brookings, will also participate in the panel.
- United States and China: Trends in Military Competition | Monday, October 5th | 12:00 – 1:00 | RAND Corporation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Over the past two decades, China has poured resources into upgrading its military. This modernization, coupled with China’s increasingly assertive position in the waters surrounding the mainland, has caused concern in Washington and capitals across Asia. Recently, a team of RAND researchers led by Eric Heginbotham released The U.S.-China Military Scorecard report. This study is the broadest and most rigorous assessment to date of relative U.S. and Chinese military capabilities based entirely on unclassified sources. Join us to discuss the evolution of Chinese military capabilities in specific domains (air and missile, maritime, space, cyber, and nuclear) and the overall trend in the regional military balance over time; how Chinese relative gains could affect the strategic decision-making of Chinese leaders; steps the United States can take to limit the impact of a growing Chinese military on deterrence and other U.S. strategic interests. Eric Heginbotham is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation specializing in East Asian security issues.
- Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East | Tuesday, October 6th | 10:00 – 11:30 | Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Join The Center for Transatlantic Relations in a discussion on nuclear Middle East. This discussion with feature Yair Evron, professor emeritus, Department of Political Science, Tel-Aviv University and senior research associate for the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel-Aviv. Additionally, Ambassador Robert E. Hunter, senior fellow for Center for Transatlantic Relations will participate in the discussion.
- The Pivotal Moment: How the Iran Deal Frames America’s Foreign Policy Choices | Tuesday, October 6th | 12:00 – 1:00 | The Heritage Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | At the core of the debate over the Iran deal are two distinct visions of what American foreign policy should be. In contrast to the politicized efforts to frame foreign affairs as a choice between isolationism, regime change, or some nebulous choice in between, the controversy over the efficacy of the Vienna Agreement represents the real difference between the alternatives being offered to the American people. This discussion aims to frame the distinctions between progressive and conservative foreign policy and the choice they represent for the nation as it considers what kind of statecraft to expect from the next administration. Speakers include: Colin Dueck, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute, and Kim Holmes, Distinguished fellow, The Heritage Foundation.
- Children of Monsters: An Inquiry into the Sons and Daughters of Dictators | Tuesday, October 6th | 1:00 | Institute of World Politics | REGISTER TO ATTEND |Have you ever wondered what it would be like to be the child of a Stalin or Hitler, a Mao or Castro, or Pol Pot? National Review’s Jay Nordlinger asked himself this. The result is Children of Monsters: An Inquiry into the Sons and Daughters of Dictators, an astonishing survey of the progeny of 20 dictators. Some were loyalists who admired their father. Some actually succeed as dictator. A few were critics, even defectors. What they have in common, Nordlinger shows, is the prison house of tainted privilege and the legacy of dubious deference.
- India and Pakistan: From Talks to Crisis and Back Again | Wednesday, October 8th | 8:30 – 10:00 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The last few months have witnessed nascent efforts to restart high-level bilateral talks between Delhi and Islamabad dashed again by political maneuvering in both capitals. In addition, there has been an uptick in violence along the Line of Control in Kashmir and muscular signaling from both sides. Why has the latest effort between India and Pakistan to talk about the myriad issues between them fallen apart? What can we discern about the approach of Indian Prime Minister Modi toward Pakistan? How do civil-military politics in Pakistan inform its approach toward India? Are the two states doomed to a perpetual state of ‘not war, not peace,’ or is there hope for a way forward? Huma Yusuf , Wilson Center, and Aparna Pande, Hudson Institute, will discuss. Carnegie’s George Perkovich will moderate.
- What can Myanmar’s Elections tell us about Political Transitions? | Wednesday, October 7th | 9:30- 11:00 | Advancing Democratic Elections and Political Transitions consortium | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Elections are critical junctures in many transitions, providing clarity on whether a political transition is advancing or retreating – and Myanmar’s November 8, 2015 parliamentary elections promise to be such a watershed moment for the country’s potential democratic transition. Speakers Include: John Brandon, Senior Director at The Asia Foundation, Jennifer Whatley, Division Vice President, Civil Society & Governance at World Learning, Robert Herman, Vice President for Regional Programs at Freedom House, Jonathan Stonestreet, Associate Director of the Democracy Program at The Carter Center, Eric Bjornlund, President of Democracy International.
- A Saudi Arabian Defense Doctrine for a New Era | Thursday, October 8th | 10:00 – 11:30 | CSIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Saudi Arabia has in recent years consolidated its place as the preeminent Arab leader, regional stabilizer, and critical bulwark against terrorism and a nuclear Iran. The Kingdom’s growing security responsibilities require rapid and substantial military investments. Prince Sultan bin Khaled Al Faisal and Nawaf Obaid, visiting fellow and associate lecturer at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, will outline a comprehensive Saudi Arabian Defense Doctrine for a new era and explain why the Kingdom is likely to double down on defense and national security capabilities in the next decade.
- The EU Migration Crisis | Thursday, October 8th | 2:30 – 4:00 |Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND |Dean Vali Nasr and The Human Security Iniative of the Foreign Policy Insitute Invite you to a panel discussion on The EU Migration Crisis. Speakers include: Michel Gabaudan, president, Refugees International, Reka Szemerkeny, Ambassador, Hungary, Peter Wittig, Ambassador, Germany.
- Democracy Rebooted: The Future of Technology in Elections | Friday, October 9th | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | As technology plays an increasingly dominant part of our lives, its role in elections has come under scrutiny. We are at a crucial moment to review the policies that influence elections and the technology we use to execute them. Why can we call a car, book a hotel, and pay bills on our phones, yet elections are often still implemented with pen and paper? Legitimacy, access, credibility, and trust are the issues that will require policymakers and technologists to carefully script the implementation of technology in our elections. Speakers include: Governor Jon Huntsman, Chairman Atlantic Council, Secretary Madeline Albright, David Rothkopf, CEO and Editor-in-Chief FP Group, Pat Merloe, Director, Electoral Programs, National Democratic Institute, Mark Malloch Brown, Former Deputy Secretary General, UN, Matthew Masterson, Commissioner, Electoral Assistance Commission, Tadjoudine Ali-Diabacte, Deputy Director, Electoral Assistance Division, UNDPA, Justice Jose Antonio Dias Toffolio, President, Supreme Electoral Court, Brazil, Manish Tewari, Former Minister of Information, India.
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Russia in Syria
Anastasia Levchenko of Sputnik International, which thinks Putin at the UN showed Obama who is in charge, asked me some questions the day before yesterday. I replied:
Q: Russia is currently not planning to participate in any military operations on the territory of Syria or other countries, Putin said. “But we are thinking of how to intensify our work both with President [Bashar] al-Assad and our partners in other countries,” Putin said in the interview.
Should this statement calm down Western states, or are they hyping the topic of allegedly possible military presence of Russia in Syria out of political reasons, to have political pressure on Moscow?
A: President Putin is splitting hairs. Installing a major base at Latakia is already a significant military operation. If he means that Russia does not intend to conduct offensive operations, I’ll be surprised if he can keep to that pledge. Extremists will attack the Russian base. How will Moscow react?
Put it this way: if the US had just installed an air base with a couple of thousand personnel in Ukraine to support what it regards as the legitimate Kiev government, would Moscow view that as escalation of the conflict there?
Q: Putin also mentioned that the opinion that the resignation of Bashar Assad would contribute to the fight against the Islamic State extremist group is nothing but “anti-Syrian propaganda.” He recommended Western partners to forward their wishes regarding Assad’s resignation to the Syrian population, who are the ones to decide the future of the country.
Do you agree that it is propaganda, or can Assad’s resignation indeed contribute to the fight against the Islamic State?
A: The Syrian people have been voting with their feet in peaceful demonstrations and with arms against Bashar al Assad for more than four and a half years. The issue for the US is not his resignation, but rather a negotiated political transition in which he loses power. No one in the West talks simply of his resignation. That is a straw man Putin invented.
Q: The Syrian conflict can only be resolved by strengthening existing government institutions, encouraging them to engage in a dialogue with opposition groups and by carrying out political reforms, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated.
In this context, what do you think of the establishment of a coordination structure to fight the Islamic State militants by Russia, Syria, Iran and Iraq?
A: I think Iraq can use all the help it can get. If this helps, so be it.
As for Syria, a large part of the non-extremist opposition is not interested in strengthening Bashar al Assad and will fight so long as it sees no clear end of him.
Russia needs to worry a bit more than it has about appearing to align itself in Syria against the majority Sunni population.
Q: In the interview Putin also said he had personally informed the heads of Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia about the establishment of a coordination structure.
Do you think these countries might be interested in joining the structure? Who else? Any Western countries?
Q: I doubt Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia will join this coordination structure. They are much more likely to urge in response a strengthened Western Coalition. I understand they are meeting in New York with the US at this very moment.
Then yesterday Umid Niayesh of the Azerbaijani Trend News Agency also asked some questions. I answered:
Q: Russia has decided to play more active role in Syria, sending military equipments and troops to support Syrian government which is also a close ally of Tehran.
How can it affect the balance of power in the Middle East?
A: I don’t think this Russian deployment of a couple of thousand troops and a couple of dozen warplanes affects the balance of power in the Middle East in any significant way. It is intended to shore up Bashar al Assad, whose forces have been weakening and appeared to be unable to stem the advance of insurgents southwest from Idlib towards Latakia and Tartous, where Russia maintains port facilities.
I note the contrast between President Putin’s claim in an interview in the US last weekend that Russia will not conduct military operations in Syria but only support the Syrian government and the widely reported strikes by Russian warplanes against Islamic State targets, which are inconsistent with his statement. It seems to me Russia has put itself on the slippery slope towards much greater involvement in the Syrian war, with significant casualties likely.
Q: Can it lead to formation of a new coalition, with Iran and Russia as its main actors?
A: Iran and Russia have been together in supporting Bashar al Assad for the past four and a half years. Their effort to help him suppress the insurgency has so far failed. Many in the West see the Russian move as competitive with Iran, to beef up Moscow’s influence in Damascus.
Q: How will it affect the regional countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia?
A: Not much. Turkey is mainly concerned with the Kurdish forces on its border and wants to create a protected area in northern Syria, one not controlled by Kurds, to which it can repatriate some refugees. Neither of those concerns is much affected by the Russian deployment. Saudi Arabia has supported the insurgency against Assad and the Western anti-ISIS Coalition. I expect it to keep on doing those things.
Q: May it lead to change of US policy towards the region?
A: I didn’t hear anything in President Obama’s speech yesterday to suggest that. He is clearly willing to talk with Iran and Russia about Syria but we are still a long way from agreement on what to do.
Q: Mohammad Nahavandian, chief of staff of President Hassan Rouhani, has said that further cooperation between the US and Iran on fighting terrorism in the region could be possible if the United States fulfills its commitments in the Iran nuclear deal to lift sanctions. On the other hand Khamenei has emphasized that the two parties’ co-op will never go beyond nuclear issue. What do you think? Is it possible that Tehran and Washington cooperate in regional issues?
A: Sure, it is possible Tehran and Washington may cooperate on regional issues, as they have in the past on Afghanistan. But it is unlikely in Syria because their understanding of Bashar al Assad’s role there is dramatically different. Tehran (and Moscow) see him as essential to fighting ISIS. Washington thinks there will be no end to the insurgency and ISIS so long as he remains in power.
I can’t help but note the apparent contradiction in my remarks about the Russian base, but the questions asked were different. In the first interview, the question was about Putin’s remark minimizing the significance of the base, so I responded emphasizing its significance, in particular for possible Russian casualties. In the second interview, the question was about changing the military balance in the Middle East. The base is a significant escalation in Syria, but it does little to change the overall military balance in the Middle East, where the US and its allies are overwhelmingly dominant in conventional military strength.
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Gulf jitters
Kuwait University Professor Abdullah al Shayji published Sunday his latest Gulf News commentary criticizing the Iran nuclear deal. I’ve written him this note in response:
I certainly understand your concern about Iranian subversion and terrorism in Bahrain and Kuwait. Your police and prosecution have done well to identify perpetrators of the latest incident and bring them to court quickly for what I trust will be a fair trial.
But I find your position on the nuclear deal ill-founded. Let me innumerate the reasons why, in response to points you make in this piece:
1. You can hardly say it was done behind your backs. We’ve all known about these negotiations for more than two years, and the basic parameters of the deal were made public in April. I don’t know what diplomatic exchanges there were prior to that, but I’d be willing to bet they happened.
2. Your concern about Iran being only 6 to 12 months from a nuclear weapon 15 years from now ignores the fact that Iran was closer than that (3 months according to the Americans) before the April interim agreement. It makes no sense to be more concerned about something that might happen 15 years from now rather than something that had already happened, and is now being reversed.
3. I would join you in hoping the Administration will calm Gulf jitters, but I would also suggest that the Gulf states need to cooperate more in order to counter Iran militarily in the region and through vigorous law enforcement at home. The failure of the GCC to get serious about integrating its capabilities and collaborating seriously, especially in Syria, is a source of considerable disappointment in Washington.
4. You suggest that Gulf jitters could lead to a nuclear arms race. Rapid Iranian progress on nuclear technology over the last decade and more did not, so it is hard to understand how a roll-back of their program and a 15-year freeze on many of its efforts should. Iran was severely punished with sanctions for its nuclear ambitions. I doubt any Gulf state would want to run a comparable risk, especially now that Iran is losing much of what it had gained.
5. The lifting of sanctions is a necessary part of the agreement, but I agree with you that it will provide Tehran with ample resources to make more trouble in the region. That was going to happen anyway, as the multilateral sanctions were slowly decaying and would likely have evaporated if an agreement had not been reached.
President Obama has made it clear he is not relying on moderation of Iranian behavior on non-nuclear issues and is prepared to counter them when and where he can. Those in the Gulf concerned about Iranian behavior might worry more about how to do that more effectively and less about their past disappointments. Some specific proposals are in order.
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The Iran deal’s regional impact
On Monday, an all-MEI panel discussed After the Iran Deal: Regional Repercussions and Dynamics. Panelists included Robert S. Ford, senior fellow and former US Ambassador to Syria, Thomas W. Lippman, scholar, Gönül Tol, director of the Center for Turkish Studies, and Alex Vatanka, senior fellow. Paul Salem, vice president for policy and research moderated.
Vatanka stated that reformists, moderates, the Iranian public and most of the Iranian media are in favor of the deal. Some hardliners criticize the deal, but they’ve opened a previously taboo debate about the pros and cons of Iran’s nuclear program.
Khamenei has been vague, but this shouldn’t be taken as opposition; Khamenei rarely unequivocally supports anything. Those close to Khamenei are defending the deal. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) hasn’t come out against it but they and their subsidiaries worry that the deal will hurt them financially. Rouhani needs to reassure them that they won’t lose out as foreign firms enter the market.
The Rouhani Administration is a Western-educated team with cohesive thinking on the country’s direction. Like China, they may try to open up economically and deal with political reform later. Zarif believes that Western companies must invest in Iran to render the deal more stable. Khamenei appears to accept economic reform but has made the resistance economy part of his legacy. It is unclear what he wants from the deal. Is he looking to prevent the possibility of war, eliminate sanctions, or make new friends? If many reformists lose their seats in the next Majlis elections, it means that Khamenei is unwilling to let a reform agenda go farther. If the Majlis accepts the deal and Congress rejects it, Iran can portray themselves as the good guys.
There are contradictions regarding Iran’s regional relations. The deputy foreign minister recently stated that Iran wanted to talk with the Saudis about Yemen and Bahrain, but then an ayatollah at a Friday sermon put Saudi Arabia, Israel and ISIS in the same category. If the reformists reconcile too much with the Saudis, the hardliners will brand them as pro-Saudi agents.
Lippman said that despite US declarations of an unshakeable commitment to the Gulf, Gulf Arabs were publicly skeptical until recently. Now the GCC countries publicly (if not privately) believe the US commitment. Beginning at Camp David, they decided that the Iran deal was done and that they weren’t going to do “a full Bibi.” They will work with the US and each other to confront regional problems.
The Saudis won’t race to a bomb; they care about self-preservation, which includes full integration into the world economy. The Saudis can’t afford to become nuclear outlaws.
Tol stated that understanding Turkish fear of the Kurds is key to grasping Turkish politics. It also plays a role in Turkey’s stance vis-a-vis Iran. Turkey shares the West’s objectives regarding Iran’s nuclear program but has promoted engagement rather than isolation, voting against UN sanctions in 2010. Iran is a large market for Turkish goods and the two countries have close energy ties. However, Turkey worries that a nuclear Iran could change the regional balance of power. All political parties in Turkey welcomed the deal and the sanctions relief.
Turkey has three main concerns about Iran:
- Iran is a destabilizing force in Iraq and opposes Turkey in Syria.
- Closer ties between Washington and Tehran could come at Turkey’s expense, focusing too much attention on the fight against ISIS and undermining Turkey’s anti-Assad efforts;
- Iran’s support for the PKK and PYD.
Ford asserted that the problems in Iraq and Syria don’t revolve around the US and Iran but around local grievances. The pressures against the Iraqi state are increasing. Low oil prices are contributing to the Kurdish drive for independence. Progress on Sunni-Shia reconciliation is lacking. Iran is partially responsible because of its ties to militias that are considered terrorist organizations by the US. Iran is unlikely to give up these allies, whose political leaders are ruthless and capable. It is unclear if the US and Iran can work together in Iraq. ISIS can recruit as long as the conflict between the Sunnis and the militias continues. If Iran cedes control of the militias to President Abadi, that could help.
Assad is losing and the opposition is advancing on the Alawite homeland. There are diplomatic visits between Syria, Russia, and Iran; Syria’s foreign minister recently visited Tehran and likely
also Oman, which serves as an intermediary with the Saudis. There are also reports that Iran is about to put forward a peace plan with a unity government, constitutional amendments to protect minorities, and future internationally supervised elections. Ford thinks this won’t succeed because the Turks haven’t signed on and their closeness with the armed opposition gives them a veto.
The Russians and Iranians are urging the US to stop pushing against Assad and start working with him, but Assad is about to lose his supply lines. There were recent anti-Assad protests in Alawite-majority Latakia province. Assad doesn’t have the capacity to take on ISIS if it can’t hold the Damascus suburbs. The Iranians have to recognize that Assad is losing but they will almost certainly use at least a small portion of the money from sanctions relief to shore-up Hezbollah and Assad. This will cause a short-term increase in violence.
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A nervous region wary of the nuclear deal
On Wednesday, the Conflict Management Program at SAIS and MEI hosted a talk entitled After the Deal: A Veteran Journalist’s View from Tehran. Speakers included Roy Gutman, McClatchy Middle East bureau chief, and Joyce Karam, Washington bureau chief for Al-Hayat. Daniel Serwer of both SAIS and MEI moderated. Both speakers emphasized the dynamics that caused regional players to be wary of Iran.
Early last Spring, Gutman traveled to Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Turkey.
In Israel, he observed that the major national security concern wasn’t the Iranian nuclear program, but rather Iran’s conventional threat through the buildup of Hezbollah forces. Israelis were disappointed that the US was leaving a security vacuum in Syria for Iran to fill. The Israeli position on the Iran deal is difficult to understand; Israeli politicians oppose it, but Israel’s foreign policy elite considers Iranian conventional forces a larger threat.
Jordanian officials also worried about regional chaos and Iranian influence. They were baffled by the half-hearted US response to Assad, as well as its airstrike-only response to ISIS.
Egypt is preoccupied by terrorism and the upheaval in Libya, but Egyptian officials are also concerned about Iran’s growing influence and US inaction.
Officials in every government (aside from Turkey’s) spoke of collusion between Turkey and extremists. The Turks think the Iranians know that the US is not a determined counterpart. They believe the US is appeasing Iran.
Gutman then traveled to Tehran to gauge the mood there. Iran has come in from the cold after 36 years, but Tehran resents the last 36 years of US policy. Change in Iran won’t happen fast. Khamenei has said that Iran’s policy towards the “arrogant” US government won’t change and that Iran will keep supporting its regional allies.
Israel views Hezbollah’s buildup as a direct threat, but Iranian officials told Gutman that the Tehran holds the trigger on Hezbollah’s weapons and won’t pull it unless Israel threatens Lebanon or Iran. However, a former Iranian diplomat admitted that Iran has no vital interest in Lebanon or the Palestinians. Iran also appears to have no vital interest in Yemen, but likes seeing Saudi Arabia embroiled in an unwinnable war. Iran is unalterably opposed to the breakup of Iraq into three states.
Iranian officials don’t think the deal is perfect, but still see it as a win-win for both sides. They view themselves as MENA’s most powerful and stable state. They are glad that US has accepted them as a regional player and negotiating partner.
After the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, Iran filled the vacuum. The Iraqi Army collapsed on Iran’s watch. Iran does not acknowledge its responsibility for this and ascribes the rise of ISIS to others. They also believe that foreign forces fought in Deraa and refused to acknowledge Assad’s role in fomenting terrorism by releasing terrorists from prison. Iranian officials also stated that all sectors of Lebanese society back Hezbollah’s deployment in Syria. Iran needs a reality check.
Iran opposes the creation of a safe zone/no-fly zone in Iraq and has threatened to send basijis into Syria if this happens. Iranians don’t understand the scope of Syria’s humanitarian catastrophe or Iran’s role in it. There are too many disagreements between the US and Iran to form a regional security agreement now. The US needs a policy for Syria; if we don’t have a policy, others will fill the vacuum. The US also needs an official version of what happened in Syria to counter the Iranian invented view of history.
Karam noted that the Arab response to the deal is less monolithic than Israel’s, but the GCC and Israel view Iran’s regional behavior similarly. The UAE, Oman, and Turkey quickly welcomed the deal because they have good trade relations with Iran. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar were more cautious. The Saudis don’t view the deal as US abandonment, but they fear increased Iranian regional meddling. Arab public opinion has shifted drastically since 2008, when 80% of Arabs viewed Iran positively. Now only 12% do. The Arab street is suspicious of the deal. The US explained the deal to Arab governments, but not to their people. The Arab street wonders whether the money Iran will gain from sanctions relief will go to funding Iranian students, or to Qassem Suleimani and more chlorine gas, barrel bombs, and Hezbollah fighters for Assad. Assad is a costly budget item for Iran. When will Iran realize that Assad can’t win? Nevertheless, Hezbollah keeps getting more involved in Syria.
Karam stated that the Gulf countries obtain commitments from the US at talks like Camp David, but then nothing gets done. The US is four years behind on Syria and needs an official policy.
Serwer noted in conclusion that the regional issues would be far worse if Iran had, or were about to get, nuclear weapons.
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