Tag: Saudi Arabia
An unhappy Eid
For most Muslims, today marks the begining of Eid al Fitr, the feast thats end the month of Ramadan. It won’t be an Eid Mubarak (Blessed Eid) for lots of people: there is war in Syria, Iraq, Gaza/Israel, Sudan and Libya, renewed repression in Egypt and Iran, instability in Yemen. The hopes of the Arab spring have turned to fear and even loathing, not only between Muslims and non-Muslims but also among Shia, Sunni and sometimes Sufi. Extremism is thriving. Moderate reform is holding its own only in Tunisia, Morocco and maybe Jordan. Absolutism still rules most of the Gulf.
The issues are not primarily religious. They are political. Power, not theology, is at stake. As Greg Gause puts it, the weakening of Arab states has created a vacuum that Saudi Arabia and Iran are trying to fill, each seeking advantage in their own regional rivalry. He sees it as a cold war, but it is clearly one in which violence by surrogates plays an important role, even if Riyadh and Tehran never come directly to blows. And it is complicated by the Sunni world’s own divisions, with Turkey and Qatar supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia opposing it.
The consequences for Arab civilians are dramatic. Well over 100,000 are now dead in Syria, half the population is displaced, uncounted more are dead in Iraq and millions more displaced. Egypt has largely reversed the liberation of its aborted 2011 revolution but still faces more violence than before it. Libya has been unable to tame or dissolve its militias, which are endangering its population and blocking its transition. While the total numbers killed in the Gaza war are far smaller than in Syria or Iraq, the percentage of civilians among the victims–and the broader impact on the civilian population–is causing anti-Israel revulsion worldwide.
Greg wants the United States to favor order over chaos. The trouble is it is hard to know which policies will do what. Will support for Iraq Prime Minister Maliki block the Islamic State, or will it incentivize extremist recruitment and make matters worse, perhaps even causing partition? The military government in Egypt, with which Greg thinks we should continue to engage, is arguably creating more problems with extremists in Sinai and the western desert than it is solving with its arbitrary and draconian crackdown against liberals as well as Islamists. The Obama administration is inclined to support America’s traditional allies in the Gulf, as Greg suggest, but what is it to do when Qatar and Turkey are at swordpoints with Saudi Arabia ?
Many Arab states as currently constituted lack what every state needs in order to govern: legitimacy. The grand failure of the Arab spring is a failure to discover new sources of legitimacy after decades of dictators wielding military power. The “people” have proven insufficient. Liberal democracy is, ideologically and organizationally, too weak. Political Islam is still a contender, especially in Syria, Iraq and Libya, but if it succeeds it will likely be in one of its more extreme forms. In Gaza, where Hamas has governed for seven years, political Islam was quite literally bankrupt even before the war. Their monarchies’ ability to maintain order as neighbors descend into chaos is helping to sustain order in Jordan and Morocco. Oil wealth and tribal loyalties are propping up monarchies in the Gulf, but the demography there (youth bulge and unemployment) poses serious threats.
The likelihood is that we are in for more instability, not less. Iran and Saudi Arabia show no sign of willingness to end their competition. They will continue to seek competitive advantage, undermining states they see as loyal to their opponent and jumping in wherever they can to fill the vacuums that are likely to be created. Any American commitment to order will be a minor factor. This will not, I’m afraid, be the last unhappy Eid.
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Regional ripples from a nuclear deal
As gradual progress is made towards a potential nuclear deal with Iran, many question the implications that this agreement would have for the surrounding region. On Monday, the Woodrow Wilson Center hosted “The Iranian Nuclear Deal and the Impact on its Neighbors” to analyze the regional repercussions of a possible bargain. Abdullah Baabood, Director of the Gulf Studies Center at Qatar University, and David and Marina Ottaway, Senior Scholars at the Woodrow Wilson Center, discussed relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and neighboring Iraq, while Bijan Khajehpour, Managing Partner of Atieh International, analyzed the regional economic aspects of a nuclear deal.
The prospect of a nuclear bargain with Iran poses a great challenge for the GCC. According to Abdullah Baabood, each of the six GCC countries has a great stake in the Iranian nuclear deal and has many concerns regarding regional security, the economy, and the environment.
However, negotiations have been taking place secretly between Iran and the US, much to the dismay of the GCC. This is particularly insulting as the US is an important ally to the region, and a deal with Iran would be a major foreign policy issue with implications far beyond simply arms control. There is fear that Iran and the US will strike a grand bargain, resulting in the US leaving the region and Iran coming to dominate it.
The GCC fears this deal because it does not know how to interpret Iran’s status and whether or not it will strictly abide by the rules of the nuclear agreement. There is a great deal of unease about Iran spreading its wings throughout the Gulf and expanding its influence without restriction.
David Ottaway further analyzed the tumultuous relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia over the past several decades. The two countries have a history of intense rivalry for regional dominance that is currently at its peak. However, there have been attempts recently to initiate dialogue between the foreign ministers. The main issue in these upcoming conversations will be determining the true meaning of détente for both the Iranians and the Saudis and exactly how to handle the challenge of energy and oil, as well as sectarian divides.
With the current situation in Iraq, Marina Ottaway highlighted the need to consider how the instability will affect a nuclear deal with Iran. The current sectarian division in Iraq could pose a threat to Iran, which has continued to back Prime Minister Maliki and ultimately has more influence than the US, due to its location. However, volatility is highly unfavorable for Iran and is not ideal for contracting a regional settlement in regards to its nuclear program.
Bijan Khajehpour then discussed the economic implications within the region, assuming there will be a comprehensive nuclear bargain with Iran. There are four areas of either convergence or divergence between Iran and its neighbors. This includes:
- The energy sector
- Regional trade and cross-border investment activity
- Competition for economic and technological dominance
- International investment
The energy sector is a fundamental concern because of the growing demand for oil and gas reserves within the region. While the Persian Gulf holds nearly half of the world’s oil reserves, most states lack natural gas resources, with the exception of Iran and Qatar. Other countries will need to import gas in the near future. “Keeping pressure on Iran’s natural gas sector is to the detriment of the whole region,” Khajehpour concluded, highlighting why energy efficiency will be a point of contention with the progress of an Iranian nuclear bargain.
There is still fierce ideological and strategic competition between Iran and the surrounding region over a possible nuclear deal. It has never been clearer to Iran’s neighbors that they must get involved in this bargain to have their vital interests addressed.
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Due for a rethink
As US policy towards the Middle East is floundering, the Center for American Progress (CAP) released a timely report Monday entitled “US Middle East Policy at a Time of Regional Fragmentation and Competition,” based on field research in four countries. At CAP to discuss the results of the report were Peter Mandaville of George Mason University, Haroon Ullah of the State Department, and Brian Katulis, CAP Senior Fellow and coauthor of the report.
Islamists are at the center of the regional struggle, but fissures within and between different groups are multilayered and run deep. The Sunni-Shia rivalry is only one element of the conflicts embroiling the Middle East. The intra-Sunni rivalry is another, if less prominent, aspect. The division between rich and poor countries is an additional ingredient, as wealthier states tend to fight out proxy battles in weaker and more divided nations.
In Egypt, for instance, Qatar and Turkey threw their support behind the Muslim Brotherhood, while Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are backing the new military regime. Saudi Arabia sees the Muslim Brotherhood as a potential competitor, rather than just another disjointed Salafist group. A key dynamic is between countries with more resources and less division at home, who fear the success of an alternate model of governance. This complicates US policy, as it is difficult to execute a cohesive strategy in the region while Qatar and Saudi Arabia are locked in a struggle over Egypt’s future.
Mandaville said that the US must look beyond the Sunni-Shia frame to recognize that we are witnessing a potential unraveling of the entire post-Ottoman order. The aftermath of 9/11, coupled with Arab uprisings of 2011, has seen a withering away of post-WWI arrangements. The upheaval is comparable to what we saw in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, when groups whose identities had been in check during the Cold War emerged and began questioning, and ultimately restructuring, the existing order.
One of the major weaknesses of US policy in the region is our tendency to oversimplify the debate. Whether or not American troops should have stayed in Iraq misses the larger picture. American diplomatic engagement needs to be better informed about the regional dynamics of movements in the Arab world. Even after many years, the Arab nationalist-Islamist divide is still not well understood. Americans are good at understanding groups who want to attack us, but we need to peer further into what drives these conflicts in the first place.
Katulis suggested that Obama has bungled his attempts to reengage with the Muslim world. By addressing them as a separate community, he signaled that they are a single constituency, one that should be handled with kid gloves, an approach comparable to George W. Bush’s. The implication is that all Muslims subscribe to a single, transnational identity, a message that is echoed by groups like al Qaeda.
Political Islam has always existed in the background. Partial openings in the political and media environment after the Arab uprisings have allowed some Islamist groups to come to the fore. Islamism, as a point on the political spectrum, has broadened significantly. Despite Egypt’s best efforts to silence Islamists, they are here to stay. Ullah noted that, while President Sisi wants to dismantle the Muslim Brotherhood’s comparative advantage in Egypt and revert to the weaker Sadat-era Brotherhood, this is not possible in modern media environment.
He also noted one positive development in America’s attitude towards political Islam, pointing to Assistant Secretary of State Patterson’s comments last week:
Some people in this region conflate Islamists with terrorists and desire to eliminate the Islamists entirely from the political scene. Our difficult fight against violent extremists is made more complicated by this viewpoint. The need for compromise is underscored by political experience in the Arab world as well as our own.
One of the myths the report attempts to debunk is the so-called moderation thesis. This is the false belief that Islamists will moderate their positions if they join the political fray. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood failed to accommodate more moderate positions. Islamist groups have fared better in other countries in the region, including Tunisia’s Ennahda party, partly because they had to contend with a large secular/liberal bloc. Nonetheless, many mainstream Islamists have internalized only the procedural spirit of democracy, without embracing pluralism.
Another myth is that socioeconomic conditions are the primary drivers of extremism. Research has found no causal link between poverty and extremism. The key constituency for Egypt’s Salafist al Nour Party, for instance, is that country’s urban-based middle class.
One persistent challenge to foreign policy is US counterterrorist doctrine, which relegates violence committed by Muslims to the “terrorist” category. This neglects the fact that in places like the Sahel, conflicts are based on ethnic, rather than religious, differences. In Obama’s speech at West Point, he called for additional funding of counterterrorism programs, but the real problem in many of these countries stems from long-running ethnic conflicts.
Mandaville noted that the US government still thinks about the world in terms of the blocs that arose during the Cold War. We would do well to shed these outdated notions of the Middle East, although it will be difficult in light of our current investments in the Gulf and rising sectarianism in the region. As Iraq and Syria descend into sectarian-fueled chaos, it is time for the US to reexamine its strategy in region.
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Hedging all the way to the bank
It is always difficult to write about a place that you visit for only a week or so, but Qatar poses unique problems: Qatari citizens represent perhaps 10% of the population. The rest are foreigners, brought in from India, Pakistan, Kenya, Nepal, Spain and virtually every other place on earth. They make up the vast bulk of the work force, often living here in group dormitories while they send money home to their families. An Indian restaurant manager told me he could double his salary coming here (and there are no taxes). A Nepali told me he misses the green and the mountains, but living here is okay. A Spaniard rated it higher than that. Palestinians, Syrians and Egyptians (hiding out here from the restored military regime) also gave Qatar the thumbs up. Of course there is little risk to a foreigner in giving the place high marks, but the responses seemed genuine.
I’ve garnered a few data points on the Qataris themselves. This really is an absolute monarchy at the national level, where a few people make all the key decisions. There is no system or habit of consultation with tribal leaders, as in Bahrain. Only at the municipal level are there elections, but the issues there are strictly local ones.
Among the 200,000 or so Qataris, everyone knows everyone else’s family ties, even if they don’t know the individuals. Some families are more prestigious than others, but others may be wealthier (e.g., those that spent time in Iran after a war with Bahrain and came back with trading and other business skills). Sectarian relations are less problematic than in Bahrain because both the monarchy and the majority are Sunni. Most men content themselves with one wife. Most women cover in public, but to varying extents. The presence here of South Asians is regarded wryly: before natural gas made Qatar wealthy, Qataris used to go to Pakistan and India to work.
Many view the monarchy, which has no religious function, as reasonably wise and benevolent, which isn’t surprising given the sky-high per capita GDP. Even the scandal regarding Qatar’s successful 2022 bid to host the World Cup does not appear to be generating a lot of interest. The international press coverage of World Cup labor practices has raised consciousness about the unfairness of tying immigrant visas to specific employers (which we happen also to use in the US). Support for education and infrastructure is very much in evidence: new roads, mass transit and universities seem ubiquitous. So too are giant shopping malls, luxury apartments, fancy restaurants, and Ferraris parked by the curb. Cranes and yachts everywhere:
I am reminded of a radio ad for a men’s clothing store from many years ago: “money talks and nobody walks.” There are sometimes sidewalks, but only the foreigners use them. Electricity and water are free, for everyone. I turned off the air conditioning in my hotel room upon arrival and haven’t turned it back on. Few complain about the heat outside because no one goes there, though most Qatari men dress in thobes and assure me it is much more comfortable. It is often still above 100 degrees Fahrenheit at midnight.
Qatar does not yet have anything like Bahrain’s fabulous national museum, which displays ample evidence of its pre-Islamic civilization. I am told a national museum is under construction. But Doha already has a fabulous Museum of Islamic Art that reminds a Westerner of how much brighter the so-called dark ages were in Muslimdom than in Christendom. Here is just a random sample that had the virtue of not being behind glass:
A large portion of the iconic museum’s holdings are Persian and Turkish, but there is lots of good stuff from North Africa, Syria, Iraq and on into central Asia. The message is clear: Qatar is not just a tiny kingdom, but a vanguard of civilization for the entire Islamic world, transcending national, ethnic and sectarian distinctions.
Doha, which houses 80% of the kingdom’s population, is more Brasilia than Amsterdam, at least from a visitor perspective. Its forests of oddly shaped and designed twenty- and thirty-story office buildings flashing light shows at night give way on the outskirts to low rise villas behind high walls. The Souq Wakif is pleasant enough, but clean and orderly to those who have enjoyed the market places in Cairo, Damascus or Aleppo (in better times). Doha’s version feels more like a pleasant World’s Fair pavilion. At the high end of commerce there is “The Pearl,” an artificial island of fasionable shops, luxury apartments and big yachts.
While the world is focused on the collapse of Iraq, less than 500 miles northwest, Doha seems calm almost to a fault. Has someone here helped to finance the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) that is wrecking havoc there? Or are they financing the more moderate Islamists tring to counter ISIS? I’m not likely to discover the answer to that question, as the Qataris who know such things haven’t been accessible to me.
Reserved to a modest fault, the kingdom nevertheless prides itself on getting along with everyone (especially Iran in addition to the US) and generally succeeds, except for the Saudis, who are arch rivals, at least for now. Hedging is the classic diplomatic strategy of small countries. Qatar’s rulers are good at it. The place is thriving.
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Survey says
Tuesday Jay Leveton presented the results of the 2014 ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller survey at the American Security Project. It focuses on Arab youth perspectives, concerns and aspirations throughout the region. The survey consisted of 3,500 face-to-face interviews conducted over the past year across sixteen countries in the Middle East. The sample was split equally between males and females ranging from 18 to 24 years old. Leveton highlighted the top ten findings:
- Arab youth are embracing modern values. 46% of Arab youth believe that traditional values are outdated and belong in the past. This number has risen from only 17% in 2011, demonstrating a shift away from traditional values. This change is also reflected in the decreasing influence of parents, family, and religion on Arab youth.
- They remain confident in their national government’s abilities. Arab youth show approximately 60% confidence in the government’s ability to address living standards, economic stability, war, unemployment and terrorism. There is great surprise in this confidence, specifically in countries that have suffered from economic hardship or political instability following the Arab Spring. Approval of the impact of the Arab Spring has declined from 72% in 2012 to 54% in 2014, most likely due to the continuous civil unrest and political instability in countries such as Egypt and Syria.
- They are increasingly concerned about the rising cost of living and unemployment. 63% of Arab youth are concerned about growing living expenses, while 42% expressed significant worry over unemployment. Approximately half are apprehensive about their own national economy. However, 55% of youth in countries outside of the GCC are concerned about unemployment, while only 39% within the GCC. This is due to the GCC’s proven ability to assist in job creation, while countries in North Africa and the Levant struggle with their youth unemployment rates.
- Arab youth believe that the biggest obstacle in the Middle East is civil unrest. 55% believe that the recent uprisings and instability are the greatest impediments to the advancement of the region. 38% believe that the lack of democracy is the greatest issue, while some believe it is the threat of terrorism.
- They are increasingly looking towards entrepreneurship as a source of opportunity. 67% feel that the younger generation is more likely to start a business than in previous generations. This entrepreneurial spirit hints at the perceived opportunities in starting one’s own business, specifically in response to some governments’ inability to provide jobs for their youth.
- The country that the younger Arab generation would most like to live in is the United Arab Emirates. 39% said that the UAE is the ideal country they would move to, while 21% said the United States, and 14% said Saudi Arabia. The UAE is the model country for Arab youth in terms of the right balance of governmental responsibility, national economy, foreign relations, etc. The United States has remained high in favor in Arab youth perspectives.
- Arab youth see their country’s biggest allies to be Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 36% believe that Saudi Arabia is their country’s biggest ally and 33% said the UAE. This was followed by Qatar, Kuwait, and lastly the United States, which marks a shift away from Western countries as the largest allies.
- They have a new concern for obesity and rising health issues. Over the past year, there has been a sharp increase in the percentage of youth concerned about obesity from 12% in 2013 to 26% in 2014. An increasing number of the younger generation is worried about diabetes, cancer and heart disease. Among all countries, 52% of youth feel as though the healthcare in their country has remained the same over the past year, while 34% believe that it has improved.
- They believe that the government should subsidize energy costs and aren’t too concerned about climate change. 74% believe that energy, electricity, and transport fuel should be subsidized by the government. This comes from the rising concern about the cost of living in each respective country. While this is the greatest worry among youth, concern for climate change and the environment is a very low priority at only 6%.
- There has been a great increase in daily news consumption, specifically through online media and social networking sites. Television has been the most popular source of news for the sixth year in a row with 75% of Arab youth using it as their most frequent news source. However, a declining number of youth see the television as the most trusted source of news– 39% now view social media as the most reliable source, rising from 22% in 2013.
While the 2014 survey ranges across sixteen countries that vary in political, economic, and social characteristics, there is nonetheless a great sense of continuity in the hopes, concerns, and priorities of Arab youth in the region.
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Between Iraq and a hard place
I’ve been too busy with meetings in New York yesterday and moderating a panel on the Iraq elections this morning to write much (not to mention my visit with grandson Ethan Isaac in Atlanta over the weekend). So I’m grateful for this quickly produced Middle East Institute podcast of the Iraq panel. I was joined for the occasion by former Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad, now businessman (formerly Iraqi civil servant) Saif Abdul-Rahman, SAIS scholar Abbas Kadhim and National Defense University professor Denise Natali.
It seemed to me the bottom lines were these:
- The electoral process so far has gone better than expected, with strong turnout (60%) and relatively few complaints (854);
- The anticipated good but not overwhelming results for Prime Minister Maliki do not ensure the hat trick he seeks, but they make him the man to beat, in particular in intra-Shia negotiations;
- The government formation process will be difficult and possibly prolonged, leaving Maliki in power with the advantages of incumbency;
- The security conditions under which the process will unfold are precarious in several central provinces, including not only Anbar but also Saladin and Diyala;
- The regional conditions are also precarious, with Syria unraveling and high tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia;
- Because of its internal fault lines, Iraq is highly vulnerable to external pressures (mainly from Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia), including some that could lead in the direction of state failure.
Iraqis have still not created a state that all its sects and ethnicities feel comfortable in. It needs a stronger political compact. The Kurds are on the fiscal ropes and need a deal with Baghdad, but independence sentiment is growing. Some Sunni-majority provinces are seeking “region” status; why shouldn’t they have it, consistent with the constitution?
Extremists are taking advantage of the tense internal situation in ways that pose real threats to US interests. Washington should pay more attention than it does, not only to Iraq’s immediate military and intelligence requirements but also to fulfilling civilian aspects of the strategic framework agreement, which remains far short of the implementation it merits.
Those are the points that stick in my mind. There is much more of merit where that came from. Listening to the whole thing won’t be the worst 90 minutes you’ve indulged in lately. I commend it to you!
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