peacefare.net

The Geneva 2 Rohrschach

I spent yesterday listening to well-informed people talk (Las Vegas rules) about prospects for the January 22/23 Montreux/Geneva 2 peace talks.  The UN faxed invitations Monday.  The Syrian government has already named its delegation.  The Russians are in.  Iran is not invited to the multilateral opening day in Montreux, but John Kerry says it can hang around with everyone else while UN envoy Brahimi meets with the Syrian parties on the second day in Geneva.  Faute de mieux, the Americans are committed to Geneva 2 and anxious that it begin a peace process, even if there is no hope it will conclude one.  “What else can we do?” they ask plaintively.

The Syrian opposition doesn’t know if it is coming or going.  Some portion of Etilaf, the Syrian Opposition Coalition that Washington and other capitals have accepted as the political representative of the Syrian people, is bound to give in to US pressure to attend, but no formal decision has been taken yet.  The Syrian National Council component of Etilaf is against attending.  So of course are the more extreme Islamists armed groups.  Most moderate Islamist armed groups, organized now as the Islamic Front, are also opposed.  The Free Syrian Army’s Supreme Military Council will have to go, since it gets a lot of assistance from the US.

Why would the opposition not want to attend?  Let me count the reasons:

• There is no serious possibility of Geneva 2 implementing the Geneva 1 goal of a “transitional governing body with full executive authority,” since Bashar al Asad is clearly not prepared to step aside, down or up.
• Anyone from the opposition who attends will be regarded as a traitor by those who don’t, including armed groups with the capacity to do real harm.
• Even if the risks are not mortal, the political risk is significant.
• Attending will fragment the opposition even more and weaken it.
• The opposition does not trust the Americans and loathes the Russians.
• Whatever statement comes out of Geneva 2, it will have to be balanced between the Americans and Russians, which means it could imply support for the scheduled May elections, focus on fighting terrorism rather than ending Asad’s brutality towards the Syrian people and imply an obligation of those attending to cut off supplies of arms (thus obligating Saudi Arabia and Qatar but not Iran).

A ceasefire agreed at Geneva will be meaningless, as the extremist militias not present will violate it right away, with the regime responding in kind (if not pre-empting). The only real upside for the opposition at Geneva would be agreement on humanitarian access.  But the opposition believes that could be agreed without negotiation between the warring parties, as it is a clear legal obligation for the government to allow relief to the civilian population.

One-third of Etilaf is already said to have resigned to protest against going to Geneva 2, which even the many fighters who want a political solution regard as an a snare and a delusion.  Without changing the military balance on the ground, and without strong American backing, Geneva 2 will cause more fragmentation in the opposition.  It will also weaken relative moderates within the opposition and strengthen extremists.  The West is setting up the opposition for failure.

What will it do for the the regime, the Russians and the Iranians?

The regime looks to an international meeting like Geneva 2 for legitimacy, which it has never sought from the Syrian people.  It will claim to have offered reforms and even amnesty, portray itself as a bulwark against extremism, denounce the international conspiracy against Asad and claim that what it has done on chemical weapons demonstrates its reliability.  Disciplined and organized, it will present a clean face to the world in Montreux, even if barrel bombs are still falling on the civilian population of Aleppo.

Moscow’s main objective is to prevent chaos and the flow of extremists from Syria (where 5-600 Russian citizens are fighting against the regime), as well as to protect specific interests like port access and protection of orthodox Christians.  It is difficult for Moscow to see how chaos can be avoided if the regime is removed.  Russia doesn’t want to see Libyan-style chaos in Syria.  In Moscow’s view, a majority of Syrians still supports Asad, who may well run for re-election in May.  He is not creating the extremists, who would exist even if there were no war in Syria.  The Sunni/Shia divide is exaggerated.  It is strife within the Sunni community that is really important.  Transitional justice in Moscow’s estimation should be postponed, as it has been in Cambodia.  It claims to be ready for a peaceful transition to democracy, but there is no sign it is ready to cut off the weapons flow to the regime.

Nor is there sign Iran is ready to abandon Asad.  The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), in particular the Quds Force, controls Iran’s policy on Syria, not President Rouhani.  There is no open dissent from the official narrative:  Israel, the US and Saudi Arabia are trying to remove Asad, so the “resistance front” (Hizbollah and the IRGC) needs to respond.  They cannot be restrained without stopping the flow of extremists and Gulf financing to the opposition forces.  Iran would like an invitation to Montreux, but not with conditions.  It will not accept the Geneva 1 goal.

Tomorrow:  I’ll attempt to answer that plaintive question:  “what else can we do?”