Tag: Saudi Arabia
Syria: is there hope?
Salon.com asked me to review recent events in Syria and their significance. They published it today under the heading “Has the Syria threat cooled?”:
Watching Syria is like looking through a kaleidoscope. The picture seems to change dramatically in response to the slightest jolt, but the components remain the same. The past week has seen lots of jolts, but no real change in the elements that make up the sad picture.
Inside Syria, the regime’s forces have started an ethnic cleansing campaign in the west intended to clear Sunnis from areas its Alawite supporters want to secure for themselves. The regime has also successfully pushed south toward the Jordanian border. In much of the rest of the country, there is lots of fighting but only marginal changes in the confrontation lines, which run through many urban areas, or between the urban centers and the countryside. Almost 7 million Syrians are now thought to need humanitarian assistance. The number could rise dramatically during the rest of the year.
Secretary Kerry’s visit to Moscow this week revived, once again, hopes for a negotiated settlement. He and the Russians agreed to try to convene a conference, even before the end of the month, that would include both the Syrian opposition and the Assad regime. The prospect of this conference will relieve President Obama of any need for a quick decision on unilateral action in Syria, since it would hardly be appropriate to preempt the conference. That is likely what both the Russians and the Americans wanted: more time.
Pressure had been building for action, including possible direct American shipment of arms to the opposition, safe areas for displaced people, a no-fly zone, or an attack on Syria’s air force and missiles, which are being used against civilians. Evidence that the regime has used chemical weapons put President Obama on the spot, as he has several times said that crossing this red line would change his calculus. American credibility, some thought, was at stake.
The ink was barely dry on the allegation of chemical weapons use when Carla Del Ponte, a Swiss member of a U.N. human rights inquiry for Libya, suggested that she knew of evidence that chemical weapons were used by the opposition rather than the regime. This allegation has little credibility, not only because of the technical difficulties involved but also because Del Ponte has a record of sensational allegations that are difficult to prove (or disprove).
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Between Iraq and a hard place
World Politics Review published this piece I did for them on Iraq this morning, under the heading “Politically Exposed, Iraq’s Maliki Cracks Down.” They asked that I put up on peacefare.net only a few paragraphs, so I am afraid you have to go to their website to read the rest (you should be able to read it without paying):
While details remain uncertain about who started the fighting and exactly who did what to whom, last week saw a marked escalation in rhetoric and violence between mostly Sunni Arab protesters and Iraqi government forces under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s control. Peaceful protests turned into armed camps. Dozens were killed in the most intense clashes with security forces since Iraq’s virtual civil war in 2006-2007.
The Iraqi state is today much better equipped to hold its own against armed adversaries than it was six or seven years ago, when the U.S. played a crucial role in ending sectarian fighting, not least by negotiating to bring Sunni “Awakening” forces over to the government’s side. Maliki’s approach is less nuanced — his political coalition is not called “State of Law” for nothing. He feels justified using the state’s monopoly on the legitimate means of violence to subdue protesters who take up arms, even as he also promises investigations into any abuses.
The protesters feel equally justified. They view Maliki as increasingly sectarian and authoritarian. Torture is common in Iraq’s prisons. Iraq’s media are under pressure. Maliki has bypassed official processes to appoint personally loyal military commanders and undermined the independence of the central bank, the judiciary, anti-corruption investigators and other countervailing institutions. Several Sunni politicians have been accused of supporting terrorism and their personal security details subjected to arrest, with at least one guard dying in detention under suspicious circumstances…[go here Politically Exposed, Iraq’s Maliki Cracks Down for the rest]
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The dark side is the bright side
Here is my answer to the silly Benjamin Alter and Edward Fishman “The Dark Side of Energy Independence” published in the New York Times yesterday. They consider all the bad things that could happen in producing countries if oil prices decline to $50 per barrel because of increasing US production. Let’s leave aside the improbability that such a fall would be caused by relatively high-cost US oil and gas production, or the likelihood that Saudi Arabia and other OPEC producers would restrict their output to boost global prices. Sure, a fall to $50 is possible, especially in a period of slow economic growth.
Let’s instead remember that prices averaged around $60-65 per barrel as recently as 2009. In 1998, they were under $20 per barrel, having declined from nearly $100 (in today’s dollars) in 1980/81. So we have seen in the past even more dramatic oil price declines than Alter and Fishman are projecting. Did anything like the political consequences they dread come about? They predict instability in the Persian Gulf monarchies, especially Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, and trouble for Vladimir Putin, who they say might turn to bullying his neighbors.
The short answer is “no.” The Persian Gulf monarchies have survived, and thrived, through many ups and downs in global oil prices. Putin has been at least as inclined to bully his neighbors (and defy the US) with oil prices high than when they were low.
More important: the United States should welcome a situation in which both the Gulf monarchies and Russia need to pay more attention to their populations’ discontents and less to where to invest the mountains of cash they are building up. Alter and Fishman acknowledge this with respect to Russia:
In the long run, of course, America would welcome a Russia that is more beholden to its people’s wishes than to fluctuations in energy markets. Washington should be under no illusions, however, that the transition to that point will be either smooth or linear, and it should prepare for turbulence along the way.
It seems to me it is Moscow that should prepare for turbulence along the way, not Washington. Manama and Riyadh should also worry.
What we should be doing is preparing for the next increase in oil prices, which is inevitable even if unpredictable. This means refilling at lower prices the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and maintaining our focus on energy conservation (especially fuel efficiency standards for cars) and non-hydrocarbon alternatives. It also means convincing Gulf producers to circumnavigate the strait of Hormuz with pipelines, including from Iraq’s southern oil fields to the north and west and across Saudi Arabia. And it means building the Keystone pipeline, with whatever safety measures are required to ensure environmental protection.
The United States has endured decades of increasing oil imports. Paying for them has weakened our position in the world and enriched antagonists. The only dark side to oil independence we should worry about is letting down our guard. I hope never again to see us pandering to Moscow or Riyadh because dependency on oil imports.
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Is the Middle East only about oil?
Increasing energy demand in the East, decreasing energy demand in the West, and North America’s shale energy revolution have sparked debates regarding the future of OPEC and US-Arab relations. But focusing on energy risks neglect of non-energy dimensions. This week’s National Council on Arab Relations discussion hosted by the international law firm Wilkie Farr & Gallagher LLP discussed the myths and realities surrounding US-Arab energy relations. Paul Sullivan of NDU, former Shell President John Hofmeister and former Associate Deputy Secretary of Energy Randa Fahmy Hudome pariticipated. The discussion focused on the following questions:
1. Will increasing domestic energy supply cause the the US to disengage from the Middle East, jeopardize US-Arab relations and reduce American influence in the region?
Shale oil and gas have significantly boosted US prospects for attaining energy self-dependence. Projections suggest the US will become a net oil exporter by 2030. Natural gas will replace oil as the country’s main fuel. BP goes so far as to declare the US will become 99% energy self-sufficient by 2030. With this increased supply the US has reduced its oil and gas imports from every Arab country except Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
Despite the reduced imports, Middle Eastern stability and protection of the energy resources there remain a US priority. Because the oil market is a global one, the US still has an interest in continuing its role as protector of the choke points, sea-lanes of communication and stability needed to secure world access to Middle Eastern energy resources.
Paul Sullivan emphasized the importance of “virtual energy.” China imports 90% of its oil from the Middle East. A disruption in that flow would affect the price and access to imported Chinese goods. Any US import from China (or India, or Japan, or South Korea, or Europe for that matter) is a “virtual” import from the Middle East. Reduced dependence on Middle East energy imports will not end the strategic importance of the Middle East or strong relations with the Arabs for the US.
2. Is there more to the US-Arab relationship than oil?
The energy dimension represents only one aspect of US-Arab relations. The US and Arab nations cooperate in the defense, military, intelligence sectors, on cyber security and financial markets. If strengthened, these aspects could ensure the survival of strong US-Arab relations despite the decreased relevance of the energy relationship.
Fahmy Hudome noted that OPEC too has begun to invest heavily in renewables. Saudi Arabia plans on generating a third of its electricity from solar energy by 2030, and has formed a joint venture with the US SolarReserve to pursue this goal. The UAE is investing in nuclear energy and signed the 123 Agreement with the US. Fahmy Hudome suggested policymakers view the relationship between the US and the Middle East as cooperative, not adversarial.
3.With the evolution of natural gas as a transport fuel, will OPEC lose its relevance in the energy market?
John Hofmeister was adamant that OPEC’s price-setting days are numbered. He argued that reduced US dependence on oil imports and China’s unilateral approach to energy security through cash-for-oil undermines the cartel. Natural gas will replace oil as a cheaper, more available alternative. Liquid natural gas could increase train and freight mobility in the US and compressed natural gas could fuel the trucking industry. Natural gas can also be converted into methanol, a cheaper, more-efficient alternative to ethanol. With natural gas’s comparative practicality and affordability there is no question the cartel will lose relevance, Hofmeister argued.
Hudome was less convinced. She rejects the idea that the shift in global energy demand and supply represents a zero-sum game between the US and the Middle East. The US and its Arab partners can both gain from the rise of natural gas and renewables. She argued world energy supply and demand projections base themselves on difficult to predict variables: shale oil, the rise of renewable energy, and the future regulatory environment in the US. All these factors will influence OPEC’s future role in the global energy market.
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Arab uprisings fail to satisfy the street
From Tunisia to Egypt new transitional leadership has yet to address the economic, security and structural grievances that triggered the Arab spring uprisings. The concerns that triggered the revolutions continue to pull the people into the streets.
Why have the new political leaders failed to address these concerns? According to University of California professor Laurie Brand, the desire to consolidate power in the face of new challenges and constraints, rather than domestic mass politics, drives current post-revolutionary leaders’ behavior. In her paper Arab Uprisings and Mass Politics: Possibilities, Constraints, and Uncertainty discussed this week at the Wilson Center, Brand examines the mass politics of Egypt and Jordan to understand the effects of increased popular political mobilization on Arab states’ regional behavior.
Egyptian President Morsi’s commitment to the peace treaty with Israel is an example of his continuation of domestically unpopular policies. Morsi’s approach to the Gaza tunnels has proven even tougher than Mubarak’s. Morsi’s confidence after his mediating role between Israel and Gaza led him to assume extra-constitutional powers, causing the greatest domestic uproar of this presidency and showing how disassociated he has become from mass sentiment. The economic crisis and Egypt’s IMF requests make this an inopportune moment for the Egyptian president to risk alienating the US by giving in to domestic anti-treaty sentiment. An “uncomfortable marriage of convenience” between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military ties Morsi’s hands on corruption, a main popular grievance. Several articles in the new constitution protect key military interests at the expense of transparency. The $1.3 billion in annual US military aid keeps Morsi from stepping on the military’s toes.
The real differences between Morsi and Mubarak’s foreign policies occur at the regional level, not in relation to the US. Under Morsi, Egypt entertains closer relations with Muslim Brotherhood-sympathising Qatar than with Mubarak’s preferred Saudi Arabia. Morsi’s visit to Iran also represents a significant break with the previous regime. These shifts in regional alignment did not result from mass political pressures, but rather from an attempt to reassert Egypt’s independent regional role.
Much like Morsi, Jordan’s King Abdullah has remained steadfast in the face of mass protests, even as young East Bankers have mobilized in the Harika movements and directly criticize the government, calling for its removal. Jordan’s relations with the US have remained unchanged, while its relations with Egypt have chilled. Military exercises between the US and Jordan testify to the continued relationship, while Jordan’s domestically unpopular containment of the Muslim Brotherhood renders relations with the Egyptian government difficult.
Since the beginning of the Arab spring, popular demands have focused on domestic issues like unemployment, inflation, insecurity and the rule of law. These mass demands have not however shaped the current Arab leaders’ behavior. They are far more interested in solidifying their power in the face of regional and international challenges and constraints. The growing gap between the people of Arab Spring countries and their governments will probably become a source of renewed conflict in the future. Marginalization of the youth and labor movements – what Brand calls the “footmen of the revolution”—resulted in the their failure to produce charismatic leaders with legitimate revolutionary credentials. Instead of new, young leaders coming to the fore, long suppressed, exiled or co-opted opposition leaders attained political power. Once in charge, these leaders did not find serious disagreement with their predecessors’ international alignments and presented no remedy for the countries’ domestic issues.
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Can Syria be saved?
I spoke yesterday on “Can Syria Be Saved” at the Italian Institute of International Affairs (IAI). I was honored at the last minute by Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Staffan de Mistura, who joined the event and provided some comments. Here are the notes I used, amplified with Stefano’s comments and a bit of the Q and A:
1. The situation inside Syria
Military: The regime can clear, but less and less; the revolution can clear more and more. Neither can hold securely or build without the other being able to strike. This is the significance of air power and Scuds, which prevent consolidation of rebel control.
Civilian: The government is doing all right in areas that are loyal, but not gaining and under severe economic pressure. The revolution is unable to supply many areas outside government control and therefore unable to consolidate control and support.
2. Who is doing what outside Syria
There is no sign of the Russians or Iranians abandoning Assad, despite some change in Russian rhetoric. Russian arms supplies continue. Iranian forces are active within Syria, as is Hizbollah. Arms are flowing to the opposition, but unevenly and not always what they need.
The June 2012 Geneva communique, which provides for a fully empowered transition government approved by both the regime and the opposition, is still the only agreed diplomatic route. Brahimi is quiet, which is the best way to be until he has something definite. The Americans are exasperated but unwilling as yet to send arms. The naming of a prime minister this week should bring more civilian assistance, which is already topping $400 million from the US.
3. Why Obama hesitates to intervene more decisively, why Putin backs Assad
President Obama’s hesitation has little to do with Syria. He recognizes full well that a successful revolution there will be a blow to Iran and Hizbollah, but even an unsuccessful one is bleeding them profusely. The main issues for Obama are the Northern Distribution Network, which is vital for American withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the P5+1 nuclear negotiations with Iran. He does not want to risk alienating the Russians on either front.
For the Russians, the main issues are no longer the port and arms sales, if ever they were. Now the question is one of prestige and power. Putin is defining his Russia in explicitly anti-Western terms, all the more so since what he portrays as Western trickery during the Libya intervention.
For Iran, the issue is an existential one. Loss of Syria would disable the connection to Hizbollah and isolate Iran from the Arab world, with the important exception of Iraq. This would be a big loss to a country that thinks of itself increasingly as a regional hegemon. The Islamic Republic would regard the loss of Syria as a big blow.
4. Options for the US and Europe
Britain and France are considering supplying weapons. That is unlikely to buy much allegiance. The best that can be hoped for is to strengthen relatively secularist and pro-Western forces, but that is going to be diffficult given the good military and relief performance of the Islamists, including those the US regards as extremist and even linked to Al Qaeda.
The US hesitates about arms transfers because of “fast and furious,” a US government scheme to track weapons transferred to the Mexican cartels. One of the weapons was used to kill an American border patrol agent. If an American-supplied shoulder-fired missile were to bring down a commercial aircraft, the incident would have major domestic political repurcussions.
Washington is instead focusing on enabling the civilian side, in particularly the newly named Prime Minister Ghassan Hitto and whatever interim government he cobbles together. This should certainly include ample humanitarian assistance and operating expenses.
It might also include military intervention, since the Hitto government won’t be safe inside Syria if Assad continues to use his air force and Scuds. The idea gaining ground outside the US administration is to destroy as much of that capability as possible while it sits on the ground. No one in Washington wants a no-fly zone that requires daily patroling. This is also a possible response to chemical weapons, whose possible use was mentioned during the IAI event but the facts were still very unclear (as they still are today so far as I can tell).
5. Possible outcomes and their implications
The fall of Bashar will be a beginning, not an end. It is not clear that the state structure in this Levant will hold. Lebanon is clearly at risk. You’ve got Kurds in Syria and Iraq who want to unite, in addition to an ongoing if somewhat sporadic Kurdish insurgency inside Turkey. You’ve got Sunnis in Iraq fighting in Syria who might eventually turn around and fight again in Iraq. You’ve got Alawites, Druze, Christians and others who will want to protect their own communities, isolated from others in enclaves.
Even if the state structure holds, there are big questions about the future direction of Syria. Will Islamists triumph? Of which variety? Will secularists do as badly in a post-war transition as they have in Egypt? The opposition in Syria agrees that the state should remain intact, but will it be able to under pressure from a “stay-behind” insurgency like the one that Saddam Hussein mounted in Iraq?
I also ran quickly through the options for post-war Syria that I’ve already published.
Staffan reacted underlining the importance of continuing to talk with the Russians, who are convinced that the intervention in Libya has opened the door to Al Qaeda extremism in Mali and Syria. He also underlined the importance of the opposition forming an inclusive and cohesive government that enunciates a clear plan for how to deal with the previous regime, including an exit for Bashar al Assad, and how to provide guarantees to the Alawites. He underlined that we should be putting together an international peacekeeping force now. We should not be tricked into international intervention by allegations of chemical weapons use.
I’ll stop my account there, as I’ve already gone on too long. It was a stimulating discussion. Many thanks to my hosts at IAI!
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