Tag: Saudi Arabia
The dark side is the bright side
Here is my answer to the silly Benjamin Alter and Edward Fishman “The Dark Side of Energy Independence” published in the New York Times yesterday. They consider all the bad things that could happen in producing countries if oil prices decline to $50 per barrel because of increasing US production. Let’s leave aside the improbability that such a fall would be caused by relatively high-cost US oil and gas production, or the likelihood that Saudi Arabia and other OPEC producers would restrict their output to boost global prices. Sure, a fall to $50 is possible, especially in a period of slow economic growth.
Let’s instead remember that prices averaged around $60-65 per barrel as recently as 2009. In 1998, they were under $20 per barrel, having declined from nearly $100 (in today’s dollars) in 1980/81. So we have seen in the past even more dramatic oil price declines than Alter and Fishman are projecting. Did anything like the political consequences they dread come about? They predict instability in the Persian Gulf monarchies, especially Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, and trouble for Vladimir Putin, who they say might turn to bullying his neighbors.
The short answer is “no.” The Persian Gulf monarchies have survived, and thrived, through many ups and downs in global oil prices. Putin has been at least as inclined to bully his neighbors (and defy the US) with oil prices high than when they were low.
More important: the United States should welcome a situation in which both the Gulf monarchies and Russia need to pay more attention to their populations’ discontents and less to where to invest the mountains of cash they are building up. Alter and Fishman acknowledge this with respect to Russia:
In the long run, of course, America would welcome a Russia that is more beholden to its people’s wishes than to fluctuations in energy markets. Washington should be under no illusions, however, that the transition to that point will be either smooth or linear, and it should prepare for turbulence along the way.
It seems to me it is Moscow that should prepare for turbulence along the way, not Washington. Manama and Riyadh should also worry.
What we should be doing is preparing for the next increase in oil prices, which is inevitable even if unpredictable. This means refilling at lower prices the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and maintaining our focus on energy conservation (especially fuel efficiency standards for cars) and non-hydrocarbon alternatives. It also means convincing Gulf producers to circumnavigate the strait of Hormuz with pipelines, including from Iraq’s southern oil fields to the north and west and across Saudi Arabia. And it means building the Keystone pipeline, with whatever safety measures are required to ensure environmental protection.
The United States has endured decades of increasing oil imports. Paying for them has weakened our position in the world and enriched antagonists. The only dark side to oil independence we should worry about is letting down our guard. I hope never again to see us pandering to Moscow or Riyadh because dependency on oil imports.
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Is the Middle East only about oil?
Increasing energy demand in the East, decreasing energy demand in the West, and North America’s shale energy revolution have sparked debates regarding the future of OPEC and US-Arab relations. But focusing on energy risks neglect of non-energy dimensions. This week’s National Council on Arab Relations discussion hosted by the international law firm Wilkie Farr & Gallagher LLP discussed the myths and realities surrounding US-Arab energy relations. Paul Sullivan of NDU, former Shell President John Hofmeister and former Associate Deputy Secretary of Energy Randa Fahmy Hudome pariticipated. The discussion focused on the following questions:
1. Will increasing domestic energy supply cause the the US to disengage from the Middle East, jeopardize US-Arab relations and reduce American influence in the region?
Shale oil and gas have significantly boosted US prospects for attaining energy self-dependence. Projections suggest the US will become a net oil exporter by 2030. Natural gas will replace oil as the country’s main fuel. BP goes so far as to declare the US will become 99% energy self-sufficient by 2030. With this increased supply the US has reduced its oil and gas imports from every Arab country except Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
Despite the reduced imports, Middle Eastern stability and protection of the energy resources there remain a US priority. Because the oil market is a global one, the US still has an interest in continuing its role as protector of the choke points, sea-lanes of communication and stability needed to secure world access to Middle Eastern energy resources.
Paul Sullivan emphasized the importance of “virtual energy.” China imports 90% of its oil from the Middle East. A disruption in that flow would affect the price and access to imported Chinese goods. Any US import from China (or India, or Japan, or South Korea, or Europe for that matter) is a “virtual” import from the Middle East. Reduced dependence on Middle East energy imports will not end the strategic importance of the Middle East or strong relations with the Arabs for the US.
2. Is there more to the US-Arab relationship than oil?
The energy dimension represents only one aspect of US-Arab relations. The US and Arab nations cooperate in the defense, military, intelligence sectors, on cyber security and financial markets. If strengthened, these aspects could ensure the survival of strong US-Arab relations despite the decreased relevance of the energy relationship.
Fahmy Hudome noted that OPEC too has begun to invest heavily in renewables. Saudi Arabia plans on generating a third of its electricity from solar energy by 2030, and has formed a joint venture with the US SolarReserve to pursue this goal. The UAE is investing in nuclear energy and signed the 123 Agreement with the US. Fahmy Hudome suggested policymakers view the relationship between the US and the Middle East as cooperative, not adversarial.
3.With the evolution of natural gas as a transport fuel, will OPEC lose its relevance in the energy market?
John Hofmeister was adamant that OPEC’s price-setting days are numbered. He argued that reduced US dependence on oil imports and China’s unilateral approach to energy security through cash-for-oil undermines the cartel. Natural gas will replace oil as a cheaper, more available alternative. Liquid natural gas could increase train and freight mobility in the US and compressed natural gas could fuel the trucking industry. Natural gas can also be converted into methanol, a cheaper, more-efficient alternative to ethanol. With natural gas’s comparative practicality and affordability there is no question the cartel will lose relevance, Hofmeister argued.
Hudome was less convinced. She rejects the idea that the shift in global energy demand and supply represents a zero-sum game between the US and the Middle East. The US and its Arab partners can both gain from the rise of natural gas and renewables. She argued world energy supply and demand projections base themselves on difficult to predict variables: shale oil, the rise of renewable energy, and the future regulatory environment in the US. All these factors will influence OPEC’s future role in the global energy market.
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Arab uprisings fail to satisfy the street
From Tunisia to Egypt new transitional leadership has yet to address the economic, security and structural grievances that triggered the Arab spring uprisings. The concerns that triggered the revolutions continue to pull the people into the streets.
Why have the new political leaders failed to address these concerns? According to University of California professor Laurie Brand, the desire to consolidate power in the face of new challenges and constraints, rather than domestic mass politics, drives current post-revolutionary leaders’ behavior. In her paper Arab Uprisings and Mass Politics: Possibilities, Constraints, and Uncertainty discussed this week at the Wilson Center, Brand examines the mass politics of Egypt and Jordan to understand the effects of increased popular political mobilization on Arab states’ regional behavior.
Egyptian President Morsi’s commitment to the peace treaty with Israel is an example of his continuation of domestically unpopular policies. Morsi’s approach to the Gaza tunnels has proven even tougher than Mubarak’s. Morsi’s confidence after his mediating role between Israel and Gaza led him to assume extra-constitutional powers, causing the greatest domestic uproar of this presidency and showing how disassociated he has become from mass sentiment. The economic crisis and Egypt’s IMF requests make this an inopportune moment for the Egyptian president to risk alienating the US by giving in to domestic anti-treaty sentiment. An “uncomfortable marriage of convenience” between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military ties Morsi’s hands on corruption, a main popular grievance. Several articles in the new constitution protect key military interests at the expense of transparency. The $1.3 billion in annual US military aid keeps Morsi from stepping on the military’s toes.
The real differences between Morsi and Mubarak’s foreign policies occur at the regional level, not in relation to the US. Under Morsi, Egypt entertains closer relations with Muslim Brotherhood-sympathising Qatar than with Mubarak’s preferred Saudi Arabia. Morsi’s visit to Iran also represents a significant break with the previous regime. These shifts in regional alignment did not result from mass political pressures, but rather from an attempt to reassert Egypt’s independent regional role.
Much like Morsi, Jordan’s King Abdullah has remained steadfast in the face of mass protests, even as young East Bankers have mobilized in the Harika movements and directly criticize the government, calling for its removal. Jordan’s relations with the US have remained unchanged, while its relations with Egypt have chilled. Military exercises between the US and Jordan testify to the continued relationship, while Jordan’s domestically unpopular containment of the Muslim Brotherhood renders relations with the Egyptian government difficult.
Since the beginning of the Arab spring, popular demands have focused on domestic issues like unemployment, inflation, insecurity and the rule of law. These mass demands have not however shaped the current Arab leaders’ behavior. They are far more interested in solidifying their power in the face of regional and international challenges and constraints. The growing gap between the people of Arab Spring countries and their governments will probably become a source of renewed conflict in the future. Marginalization of the youth and labor movements – what Brand calls the “footmen of the revolution”—resulted in the their failure to produce charismatic leaders with legitimate revolutionary credentials. Instead of new, young leaders coming to the fore, long suppressed, exiled or co-opted opposition leaders attained political power. Once in charge, these leaders did not find serious disagreement with their predecessors’ international alignments and presented no remedy for the countries’ domestic issues.
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Can Syria be saved?
I spoke yesterday on “Can Syria Be Saved” at the Italian Institute of International Affairs (IAI). I was honored at the last minute by Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Staffan de Mistura, who joined the event and provided some comments. Here are the notes I used, amplified with Stefano’s comments and a bit of the Q and A:
1. The situation inside Syria
Military: The regime can clear, but less and less; the revolution can clear more and more. Neither can hold securely or build without the other being able to strike. This is the significance of air power and Scuds, which prevent consolidation of rebel control.
Civilian: The government is doing all right in areas that are loyal, but not gaining and under severe economic pressure. The revolution is unable to supply many areas outside government control and therefore unable to consolidate control and support.
2. Who is doing what outside Syria
There is no sign of the Russians or Iranians abandoning Assad, despite some change in Russian rhetoric. Russian arms supplies continue. Iranian forces are active within Syria, as is Hizbollah. Arms are flowing to the opposition, but unevenly and not always what they need.
The June 2012 Geneva communique, which provides for a fully empowered transition government approved by both the regime and the opposition, is still the only agreed diplomatic route. Brahimi is quiet, which is the best way to be until he has something definite. The Americans are exasperated but unwilling as yet to send arms. The naming of a prime minister this week should bring more civilian assistance, which is already topping $400 million from the US.
3. Why Obama hesitates to intervene more decisively, why Putin backs Assad
President Obama’s hesitation has little to do with Syria. He recognizes full well that a successful revolution there will be a blow to Iran and Hizbollah, but even an unsuccessful one is bleeding them profusely. The main issues for Obama are the Northern Distribution Network, which is vital for American withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the P5+1 nuclear negotiations with Iran. He does not want to risk alienating the Russians on either front.
For the Russians, the main issues are no longer the port and arms sales, if ever they were. Now the question is one of prestige and power. Putin is defining his Russia in explicitly anti-Western terms, all the more so since what he portrays as Western trickery during the Libya intervention.
For Iran, the issue is an existential one. Loss of Syria would disable the connection to Hizbollah and isolate Iran from the Arab world, with the important exception of Iraq. This would be a big loss to a country that thinks of itself increasingly as a regional hegemon. The Islamic Republic would regard the loss of Syria as a big blow.
4. Options for the US and Europe
Britain and France are considering supplying weapons. That is unlikely to buy much allegiance. The best that can be hoped for is to strengthen relatively secularist and pro-Western forces, but that is going to be diffficult given the good military and relief performance of the Islamists, including those the US regards as extremist and even linked to Al Qaeda.
The US hesitates about arms transfers because of “fast and furious,” a US government scheme to track weapons transferred to the Mexican cartels. One of the weapons was used to kill an American border patrol agent. If an American-supplied shoulder-fired missile were to bring down a commercial aircraft, the incident would have major domestic political repurcussions.
Washington is instead focusing on enabling the civilian side, in particularly the newly named Prime Minister Ghassan Hitto and whatever interim government he cobbles together. This should certainly include ample humanitarian assistance and operating expenses.
It might also include military intervention, since the Hitto government won’t be safe inside Syria if Assad continues to use his air force and Scuds. The idea gaining ground outside the US administration is to destroy as much of that capability as possible while it sits on the ground. No one in Washington wants a no-fly zone that requires daily patroling. This is also a possible response to chemical weapons, whose possible use was mentioned during the IAI event but the facts were still very unclear (as they still are today so far as I can tell).
5. Possible outcomes and their implications
The fall of Bashar will be a beginning, not an end. It is not clear that the state structure in this Levant will hold. Lebanon is clearly at risk. You’ve got Kurds in Syria and Iraq who want to unite, in addition to an ongoing if somewhat sporadic Kurdish insurgency inside Turkey. You’ve got Sunnis in Iraq fighting in Syria who might eventually turn around and fight again in Iraq. You’ve got Alawites, Druze, Christians and others who will want to protect their own communities, isolated from others in enclaves.
Even if the state structure holds, there are big questions about the future direction of Syria. Will Islamists triumph? Of which variety? Will secularists do as badly in a post-war transition as they have in Egypt? The opposition in Syria agrees that the state should remain intact, but will it be able to under pressure from a “stay-behind” insurgency like the one that Saddam Hussein mounted in Iraq?
I also ran quickly through the options for post-war Syria that I’ve already published.
Staffan reacted underlining the importance of continuing to talk with the Russians, who are convinced that the intervention in Libya has opened the door to Al Qaeda extremism in Mali and Syria. He also underlined the importance of the opposition forming an inclusive and cohesive government that enunciates a clear plan for how to deal with the previous regime, including an exit for Bashar al Assad, and how to provide guarantees to the Alawites. He underlined that we should be putting together an international peacekeeping force now. We should not be tricked into international intervention by allegations of chemical weapons use.
I’ll stop my account there, as I’ve already gone on too long. It was a stimulating discussion. Many thanks to my hosts at IAI!
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Syria seen from Venus and Mars
I enjoyed yesterday two events on Syria, back to back and less than a block from each other. An all-women panel at the Stimson Center co-sponsored by the Middle East Institute was upbeat and optimistic. An all-men panel at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) was anything but. Commentators on both panels were keen observers, including several with recent experience in and near Syria.
With Mona Yacoubian moderating, the Stimson/MEI panel focused on “Syria Beyond Assad: Building a New Syria from the Grassroots.” Rafif Jouejati, spokesperson for the Local Coordinating Committees and leader of FREE Syria (a nongovernmental organization) underlined that the mood among Syrians, who are seeking freedom, dignity and democracy, is far more optimistic than the Western press would lead you to believe. The revolution is determined to build civil society and protect minority rights. There are still upwards of 300 peaceful demonstrations every Friday. Fear of an Islamist takeover is exaggerated. A hijab may be necessary to meet some people, but they quickly forget if it slips off your head. Civil society training for Syrians in Turkey is accomplishing a lot, as they go back into Syria and train others.
Honey al Sayed, a former Syrian anchor now associated with ROYA Association for a Better Syria and the internet radio station SouriaLi emphasized the importance of rebuilding from the grassroots, as Syrian society has collapsed. The challenges are enormous, but Syrians believe in “unity in diversity” and will meet them. Elizabeth O’Bagy of the Institute for the Study of War focused on the relationship between the civilian local councils and armed groups, which she said are not anxious to provide basic services or govern because they are still fighting the regime. Warlordism is not the problem portrayed in the Western press–there is lots of room to empower civilians. There has been some abuse of regime prisoners, looting and exploitation of aid shipments, but no major massacres. Islamist fighters have no difficulty dealing with a Western woman asking questions. Al Qaeda-linked Jabhat al Nusra keeps its distance, but most other armed groups do cooperate with each other.
Only Leila Hilal of the New America Foundation clouded the Venusian horizon. The situation is complex and fluid. There are a lot of questions about local legitimacy and authority. Who is really in charge? Elders? Religious leaders? Fighters? Technocrats? What will their relationship be to the Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC in Washington parlance)? Will the local councils provide aid? Will they also govern? Are they political bodies or technical ones? What will the role of minorities and women be? How will Western preferences for inclusivity be met? Should we even express them?
The clouds thickened at WINEP, where staff reported on recent travel in the region. With Patrick Clawson moderating, Andrew Tabler described Syria as melting down and spilling over. Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan are facing serious refugee challenges. Jordan has seen 100,000 enter in the last 60 days, many of them running a regime gauntlet to get out of Syria. Fighting has spilled into Lebanon. Hizbollah and Sunni fighters are spilling back from Lebanon into Syria. In addition to refugees, Turkey is seeing a big buildup of displaced people inside Syria along the border. There is a concentration of Islamist extremists (including Jabhat al Nusra) along the border with Israel, which is concerned about the transfer of “strategic” weapons (chemicals, anti-aircraft and missiles) to Hizbollah and to Sunni extremists.
The food and medical supplies that the US has announced it will provide to the Coalition will not help to bring down Bashar al Asad. Sentiment within the revolution has turned dramatically against the US and the West and towards the Salafists and jihadists. With no political settlement in sight, the US is unable to influence the armed groups who will decide the outcome. It would be far better to provide aid to the armed groups: those taking the shots will soon be calling them. The SOC, and likely the provisional government to be named this weekend, has little traction inside Syria and risks becoming a Potemkin village.
Jeff White continued in this vein. Localized fighting is the basis of political legitimacy and power inside Syria. The revolutionaries are fragmented. Civilians are marginalized. The military councils are really in charge. The Islamists are in the vanguard. They have cohesion, discipline, leadership and morale. Jabhat al Nusra is also particularly good at civic action, including securing and distribution of food as well as street cleaning. Their command and control is tight.
The Free Syria Army has more problems with civilian/military relations, jihadists vs. nationalists and regime penetration. A revolution that began in the name of freedom and democracy has turned definitively in the direction of an Islamic state. Antipathy to the West, in particular the US, and the international community in general is strong. Conspiracy theories are common, most notably the notion that the US, Iran and Israel are collaborating against the revolution.
Though better equipped now with antitank weapons, the revolutionaries still suffer shortages and maldistribution of weapons. Logistics are ad hoc. There is a security vacuum in the south–a kind of no man’s land. No two revolutionary units are alike and numbers are hard to come by. The rebels are nevertheless gaining territory.
Though losing control, the regime remains cohesive, with good supplies from Russia and Iran. Hizbollah’s fighting role is increasing, as is the role of irregular regime forces (Shabiha). The army is being hollowed out, losing 40 or more dead per day and several times that in wounded. The Syrian air force is a wasting asset.
Simon Henderson talked about Gulf attitudes, where there is strong support for the Syrian opposition because of the prospect of a strategic setback for Iran. But competition among the Gulf states is proving stronger than their distaste for Iran. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are both supporting the revolution, but they are also competing for influence. The competition is trumping concern about the outcome, leaving the GCC divided in the absence of strong US leadership. Qatar is far less willing than Saudi Arabia to be seen bucking Iran, as it shares hydrocarbon resources in the Gulf with Tehran.
Are these views from Venus and Mars reconcilable? My heart is on Venus. I hope the women are right. My head is on Mars. What the men are seeing is all too real.
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Talk is cheap
Calls for negotiated solutions are all the rage. Secretary of State Kerry wants one in Syria. The Washington Post thinks one is possible in Bahrain. Everyone wants one for Iran. Despite several years of failure, many are still hoping for negotiations with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Ditto Israel/Palestine. Asia needs them for its maritime issues.
It is a good time to remember the classic requirement for successful negotiations: “ripeness,” defined as a mutually hurting stalemate in which both parties come to the conclusion that they cannot gain without negotiations and may well lose. I might hope this condition is close to being met in Syria and Bahrain, but neither President Asad nor the Al Khalifa monarchy seems fully convinced, partly because Iran and Saudi Arabia are respectively providing unqualified support to the regimes under fire. Ripeness may well require greater external pressure: from Russia in the case of Syria and from the United States in the case of Bahrain, which hosts the US Fifth Fleet.
It is difficult to tell where things stand in the Afghanistan negotiations. While the Taliban seem uninterested, Pakistan appears readier than at times in the past. The Americans are committed to getting out of the fight by the end of 2014. President Karzai is anxious for his security forces to take over primary responsibility sooner rather than later. But are they capable of doing so, and what kind of deal are the Afghans likely to cut as the Americans leave?
Israel and Palestine have one way or another been negotiating and fighting on and off since before 1948. Objectively, there would appear to be a mutually hurting stalemate, but neither side sees it that way. Israel has the advantage of vast military superiority, which it has repeatedly used as an alternative to negotiation to get its way in the West Bank and Gaza. A settlement might end that option. The Palestinians have used asymmetric means (terrorism, rocket fire, acceptance at the UN as a non-member state, boycott) to counter and gain they regard as a viable state.
The Iran nuclear negotiations are critical, as their failure could lead not just to an American strike but also to Iranian retaliation around the world and a requirement to continue military action as Tehran rebuilds its nuclear program. The United States is trying to bring about ripeness by ratcheting up sanctions pressure on Tehran, which fears that giving up its nuclear program will put the regime at risk. It is not clear that the US is prepared to strike a bargain that ensures regime survival in exchange for limits on the nuclear program. We may know more after the P5+1 (US, UK, France, Russia, China + Germany) meet with Iran February 26 in Almaty, Kazakhstan.
Asia’s conflicts have only rarely come to actual violence. China, Korea (North and South), Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines and India are sparring over trade routes, islands, resources and ultimately hegemony. This risks arousing nationalist sentiments that will be hard to control, driving countries that have a good deal to gain from keeping the peace in some of the world’s fastest growing economies into wars that the regimes involved will find it difficult to back away from. Asia lacks an over-arching security structure like those in Europe (NATO, OSCE, G8, Council of Europe, etc) and has long depended on the US as a balancing force to preserve the peace. This has been a successful approach since the 1980s, but the economic rise of China has put its future in doubt, even with the Obama Administration’s much-vaunted pivot to Asia.
This is a world that really does need diplomacy. None of the current negotiations seem destined for success, though all have some at least small probability of positive outcomes. Talk really is cheap. I don’t remember anyone complaining that we had spent too much money on it, though some would argue that delay associated with negotiations has sometimes been costly. The French would say that about their recent adventure in Mali.
But war is extraordinarily expensive. Hastening to it is more often than not unwise. That is part of what put the United States into deep economic difficulty since 2003. If we want to conserve our strength for an uncertain future, we need to give talk its due.
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