Tag: Saudi Arabia
Peace picks this week
1. The Nuclear Issue: Why is Iran Negotiating?
Date and Time: January 28, 9 am-11 pm
Address: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20004
Speakers: Michael Adler, Bijan Khajehpour, and Alireza Nader
Description: Three top experts in the field will discuss Iran’s domestic, foreign policy, and nuclear challenges.
Register for this event here: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-nuclear-issue-why-iran-negotiating
2. America’s Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace: POSTPONED
Date and Time: January 28, 11 am-1 pm
Address: US Institute of Peace, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, D.C.
Speakers: Daniel Kurtzer, William Quandt, Shibley Telhami, and Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen
Description: As President Barack Obama is sworn in for his second term, and in the wake of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s reelection, many warn that time is running out for the two-state solution. On the occasion of its publication, David Ignatius will join three of the authors of ‘The Peace Puzzle: America’s Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace’ and USIP’s Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen to discuss their own views on whether and why that door is closing, and what the next Obama administration can do to keep it open. ’The Peace Puzzle’ was written by Daniel C. Kurtzer, Scott B. Lasensky, William B. Quandt, Steven L. Spiegel, and Shibley Z. Telhami and co-published by USIP Press and Cornell University Press. It offers a uniquely objective account and assessment of the American role in the peace process over the last two decades, concluding with 11 recommendations for the next administration to strengthen its role in resolving the conflict. While the tone of the book remains optimistic, the authors question whether the ‘determined, persistent, creative, and wise’ American diplomacy and leadership that have ushered in breakthroughs in the past can be recaptured and whether the lessons learned from two decades of failures will be embraced. Please join us for this discussion with David Ignatius on the prospects for a breakthrough in the peace process and the lessons offered in ‘The Peace Puzzle.’
Register for this event: http://www.usip.org/events/americas-quest-arab-israeli-peace
This event will be webcast live beginning at 11:00am on January 28, 2013 at www.usip.org/webcast.
3. The Rise of Islamists: Challenges to Egypt’s Copts
Date and Time: January 28, 4:30pm – 6:00pm
Address: Institute of World Politics, 1521 16th Street NW Washington, DC
Speakers: Nina Shea (Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Religious Freedom Hudson Institute) and Samuel Tadros (Research Fellow, Center for Religious Freedom Hudson Institute)
Description: This event is sponsored by IWP’s Center for Culture and Security. An international human-rights lawyer for over thirty years, Nina Shea joined Hudson Institute as a Senior Fellow in November 2006, where she directs the Center for Religious Freedom. Shea has served as a Commissioner on the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom for 13 years. Her many writings include widely-acclaimed reports on Saudi Arabia’s curriculum of hatred and the book Silenced: How Apostasy & Blasphemy Codes are Choking Freedom Worldwide (Oxford University Press, 2011). She co-authored the forthcoming book, Persecuted: The Global Assault on Christians (Thomas Nelson, March 2013). Samuel Tadros is a Research Fellow at Hudson Institute’s Center for Religious Freedom and a Professorial Lecturer at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. Prior to joining Hudson in 2011, Tadros was a Senior Partner at the Egyptian Union of Liberal Youth, an organization that aims to spread the ideas of classical liberalism in Egypt. His many articles have appeared in the Wall Street Journal, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, National Review, World Affairs, and the Weekly Standard. He is the author of the forthcoming book: Motherland Lost: The Egyptian and Coptic Quest for Modernity.
Register for this event here: http://iwp.edu/events/detail/the-rise-of-islamists-challenges-to-egypts-copts
4. Legal and Political Reforms in Saudi Arabia
Date and Time: January 29, 12:00 to 1:00 pm
Address: Middle East Institute, Boardman Room 1761 N Street, NW, Washington D.C. 20036
Speaker: Dr. Joseph A. Kéchichian
Moderator: Kate Seelye
Description: At a time when many wonder how the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will adapt to challenging regional crises, confront exacerbating internal problems, and manage sensitive ties with leading world powers, Riyadh is on the docket to also ensure a smooth royal succession. Critics of the Kingdom’s reform policies allege that Riyadh is ill-suited to face the massive social, economic and political challenges it faces, some even anticipating its total collapse. Joseph A. Kéchichian argues, however, that serious reforms are under way, including changes in the judicial sector, a genuine “National Dialogue,” and an inclination within the royal family to expand the boundaries of political debate. Kéchichian will also examine relations between the Al Sa’ud and the conservative clerical establishment, and offer an assessment of the legacy of King ‘Abdallah bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz as prospects for a passing of power to a new generation become clearer.
Register for this event here: https://www.mei.edu/civicrm/event/info?reset=1&id=295
5. Al Qaeda Country: Why Mali is Important
Date and Time: January 29, 2013 1:00 PM – 2:00 PM
Address: Lindner Family Commons, Room 602 1957 E Street, NW
Speakers: Peter Chilson (Associate Professor of English, Washington State University ) and David Rain (Associate Professor of Geography and International Affairs, George Washington University)
Description: Prizewinning author Peter Chilson is one of the few Westerners to travel to the Mali conflict zone. There he found a hazy dividing line between the demoralized remnants of the former regime in the south and the new statelet in the north – Azawad – formed when a rebellion by the country’s ethnic Tuareg minority as commandeered by jihadi fighters. In this inaugural lecture of the African Research and Policy Group of the Institute for Global and International Studies, Chilson will lay out the lines of conflicting interest in Mali as some of the world’s great forces take notice. He is the author of the recent book, We Never Knew Exactly Where: Dispatches from the Lost Country of Mali.
Register for this event here: https://docs.google.com/a/aucegypt.edu/spreadsheet/viewform?formkey=dGQ3bHk0eW5SSHNDSzRpUHdrQ0tieUE6MQ
6. Should the United States Save Syria?
Date and Time: January 30, 5:00pm – 6:30pm
Address: The U.S. Navy Memorial Burke Theater
701 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, D.C. 20004
Speakers: Robert Kagan (Brookings Institution), Leon Wieseltier (The New Republic), Joshua Landis (University of Oklahoma), Aaron David Miller (The Wilson Center)
Moderator: Elise Labott (CNN)
Description: In the best American tradition of open inquiry, spirited discussion and practical action, the McCain Institute is introducing a series of structured, reasoned foreign policy debates aimed at developing practical policy options. The debates will include seasoned experts and practitioners of varying affiliations and perspectives. They will be distinctly non-partisan, aiming to look forward at future policy choices, not to look backward to criticize. Audience participation is strenuously encouraged.
Register for this event here: http://mccaininstitute.org/events/mccain-debate-and-decision-series2
7. After the Jordan Elections: Challenges Ahead for the Hashemite Kingdom
Date and Time: February 1, 12:00-1:00 pm
Address: Middle East Institute, Boardman Room 1761 N Street, NW, Washington D.C. 20036
Speakers: Leslie Campbell and Danya Greenfield
Moderator: Kate Seelye
Description: The Middle East Institute is proud to host Leslie Campbell, senior associate and regional director for the Middle East, and Danya Greenfield, deputy director of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council, for an assessment of the Jordanian elections and an examination of the political challenges ahead for Jordan’s King Abdullah II. Both Campbell and Greenfield monitored the parliamentary elections on January 23rd and return to Washington from Amman with fresh insights about the implications of Jordan’s democratic reform efforts and the pressures faced by King Abdullah II as he seeks to address growing frustration with his rule.
Register for this event here: After the Jordan Elections: Challenges Ahead for the Hashemite Kingdom | Middle East Institute.
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Middle East: less grand, more strategy
Middle East Institute intern Aya Fasih, recently arrived from Cairo, writes in her debut on peacefare:
With the re-election of President Obama and massive transformations ongoing in the region, the Middle East Policy Council’s 71st Capitol Hill Conference focused Wednesday on “U.S. Grand Strategy in the Middle East: Is There One?” Related questions included:
- Is it even possible to formulate a grand strategy for the region amidst all the turbulence it is witnessing?
- Were past U.S. grand strategies for the region successful in achieving their objectives?
The prestigious panel, comprised of Chas Freeman Jr., William Quandt, Marwan Muasher and John Duke Anthony (moderated by Thomas Mattair), identified five main points of discussion: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran, the Arab uprisings, the Syrian crisis, and the political-economic security of the Gulf Cooperation Council states.
Chas Freeman Jr., Chairman of Projects International, former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and President of the Middle East Policy Council, said the two main U.S. policies in the Middle East, unconditional support to Israel and strategic partnership with pre-revolutionary Egypt and the rentier Gulf states, were contradictory and therefore precluded any grand strategy. Freeman underscored the costs associated with U.S. support and protection of Israel; he said that U.S. support for irresponsible and immoral policies of Israel has undermined U.S. strategic interests in the region and potential cooperation with the region’s other powers:
America may have Israel’s back, but no one has America’s back.
Continuation post-revolution of an American-Egyptian partnership is in doubt. In the aftermath of the Iraq war, Afghanistan, and “abandonment” of the peace process between the Israelis and Palestinians, the U.S.-Saudi relationship has weakened and become more “transactional.” It should no longer be taken for granted. In Freeman’s view, U.S. policies preclude formulation of grand strategies and leave room for only limited cooperation.
William Quandt, Professor at the University of Virginia and former staff member of the National Security Council, started by expressing suspicion of grand strategies. The Bush 41/Clinton dual containment of Iraq and Iran failed, as did the Bush 43 strategy of replacing certain Arab regimes, starting with Iraq, with pro-Western ones. Quandt, like the other three fellow panelists, thought the U.S. needs to revise its policies, starting with the realization that “we are not all-powerful.” A revised strategy should include:
- an end to U.S.-Iran animosity, which would avoid a dangerous war and benefit Iraq, Syria and Lebanon;
- maintenance of positive relations with NATO ally Turkey, which will also benefit Iraq and Syria;
- friendly relations with Egypt because of its geo-strategic importance and influence over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
- greater attention to Saudi Arabia, which faces a difficult generational transition;
- a negotiated end to the Syrian conflict;
- a renewed effort to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
John Duke Anthony, Founding President of the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations, discussed mainly the six Gulf Cooperation Council states, highlighting the vital strategic importance of the GCC for the region’s security and U.S. energy supplies.
Marwan Muasher, Vice President for Studies at Carnegie Endowment and former Jordanian Foreign Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, and Ambassador to the United States, highlighted how the U.S. must change its approach by assessing the new governments and players in the region not based on their ideology but rather on their performance. U.S. influence will not be decisive in the process of transition. Events on the ground and competition for power among local actors will determine the outcomes. It is crucial that the US start differentiating between different Islamist actors and parties and realize that serious differences exist among them. The clock is ticking on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Unless the U.S. chooses to sponsor it now, peace may never be an option again.
All four panelists agreed that U.S. policies toward the vital region must undergo serious reassessment if the U.S. wants to secure its strategic interests. The U.S. should exert extraordinary effort to solve the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, re-engage with Iran and work quickly to ensure a negotiated settlement in Syria.
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This week’s peace picks
The holiday season has ended. Monday is particularly busy:
1. A Bleak Winter: Providing Needed Aid to Those Fleeing Conflict in Syria, Monday January 14, 9:30 AM – 11:00 AM, Migration Policy Institute
Venue: Migration Policy Institute, 1400 16th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036, Suite 300 (third floor), MPI Conference Room
Speakers: Mort Abramowitz, George Rupp, Fadi al Khankan, Kathleen Newland
The humanitarian crisis in and around Syria is intensifying as more people are forced to flee their homes in the face of continuing violence. More than half a million Syrians have left the country, at least two million are internally displaced, and many more have seen their normal lives and livelihoods destroyed. As winter sets in, stocks of food and fuel are dwindling. The strain on neighboring countries is testing their ability to keep borders open to Syrian refugees and international assistance is not keeping up with the growing needs. No one seems to expect an early end to the displacement, even if the Assad regime falls in the near future.
A delegation of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) visited Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, and Iraq in late November to discuss the humanitarian crisis with refugees, officials from host and donor governments, representatives of international humanitarian organizations and local nongovernmental agencies; and to get a firsthand look at the work of IRC partners and staff who are directly involved in providing assistance to the refugees and to Syrians trapped inside the country.
Please join MPI and IRC on January 14 to discuss the delegation’s report, augmented by the perspective of Dr. Al Khankan, representing the Syrian Expatriates Organization, an organization of Syrian professionals who are raising funds, sending critically needed supplies, and providing direct humanitarian assistance within Syria. The discussion will be moderated by MPI’s Kathleen Newland, who is an IRC overseer and was a member of the delegation that produced the report.
Register for this event here.
2. Conference on Israel’s 2013 Election, Monday January 14, 10:00 AM – 3:30 PM, Georgetown University
Venue: Georgetown University, 37th and O Streets NW, Washington, DC 20057, Copley Hall, Copley Formal Lounge
Speakers: Moran Stern, Natan Sachs, Natasha Mozgovaya, Ghaith Al-Omari, Dennis Ross, Dan Schueftan, Robert Lieber, David Makovsky, Robert Wexler
A conference examining the upcoming general election in Israel, scheduled for January 22, 2013. Experts will discuss the issues that will be factors influencing Israelis as they prepare to go cast their ballots.
This all-day conference in Copley Hall’s Formal Lounge will feature three panels examining domestic politics, regional politics, and Israel-US relations.
Domestic Politics, 10:00 am-11:30 am
Moran Stern (Georgetown, moderator); Natan Sachs (Saban Center at the Brookings Institution); Natasha Mozgovaya (Haaretz Daily Newspaper)
Regional Politics, 11:40 am-1:00 pm
Moran Stern (Georgetown, moderator); Ghaith Al-Omari (American Task Force on Palestine); Amb. Dennis Ross (Georgetown); Dan Schueftan (Georgetown); Gunol Tol (Middle East Institute)
Israel-US relations, 2:00 pm-3:30 pm
Robert Lieber (Georgetown, moderator); David Makovsky (Washington Istitute for Near East Policy); The Honorable Robert Wexler (S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace).
Register for this event here.
3. A Kingdom’s Future: Saudi Arabia Through the Eyes of its Twentysomethings, Monday January 14, 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM, Wilson Center
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20004, 5th Floor
Speaker: Caryle Murphy
The “Arab Awakening” has focused the world’s attention on young people in the Arab world, where they have been agitating for political reform. But what about young Saudis, who have not taken to the streets like many of their peers? Have they been affected by the “Arab Awakening?” A Kingdom’s Future: Saudi Arabia Through the Eyes of Its Twentysomethings explores the self-image of young Saudis and what they want when it comes to education, marriage, politics, religion, and personal liberties. It is based on research during Murphy’s three-year reporting tour in the kingdom, as well as scores of interviews while a public policy scholar at the Wilson Center.
Register for this event here.
3. Turkey Rising: Challenges and Prospects for the New Administration, Monday January 14, 12:30 PM, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Venue: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Washington, DC 20036, Suite 1050, Stern Library and Conference Room
Speakers: Ross Wilson, James F. Jeffrey, Soner Cagaptay
With a booming economy and improving ties with the United States and NATO, Turkey now has a real chance to become a regional power. Yet formidable challenges remain, such as resolving the Kurdish issue, competing with Iran, and easing domestic political friction. To assess these issues and their impact on U.S. policy, The Washington Institute invited Ambassador Ross Wilson, Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, and Soner Cagaptay to address a Policy Forum luncheon in Washington, DC, on Monday, January 14, 2013, starting at 12:30 p.m. EST. The speakers will also discuss Dr. Cagaptay’s new report on Turkey.
Register for this event here.
4. What’s Next for Syria: Humanitarian and Political Perspectives, Monday January 14, 2:00 PM – 3:30 PM, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1774 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Falk Auditorium
Speakers: Ross Wilson, James F. Jeffrey, Soner Cagaptay
With a booming economy and improving ties with the United States and NATO, Turkey now has a real chance to become a regional power. Yet formidable challenges remain, such as resolving the Kurdish issue, competing with Iran, and easing domestic political friction. To assess these issues and their impact on U.S. policy, The Washington Institute invited Ambassador Ross Wilson, Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, and Soner Cagaptay to address a Policy Forum luncheon in Washington, DC, on Monday, January 14, 2013, starting at 12:30 p.m. EST. The speakers will also discuss Dr. Cagaptay’s new report on Turkey.
Register for this event here.
5. The International Development Assistance Ecosystem of the U.S.: A Development and Foreign Policy Strategic Asset, Monday January 14, 3:00 PM – 5:00 PM, CSIS
Venue: CSIS, 1800 K Street NW, Washington DC, 20006, B1 Conference Room
Speakers: Carol Lancaster, Paul O’Brien, Tessie San Martin, Susan Reichle, Asif Shaikh, Daniel Runde
Since the end of the Cold War, the method by which the United States delivers foreign aid to the developing world has changed considerably. During this time, as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) saw large-scale staff reductions coupled with an increase in programs, a large base of U.S for-profit and nonprofit organizations grew up to implement projects and programs in the developing world. Although the budgetary situation reversed beginning in 2002, staffing levels at USAID remained low and a need to engage the U.S. implementer community continues. Concurrently, a broader discussion occurred over the effectiveness of development assistance by major donors. This effort, which resulted in the Paris Declaration of 2005 and later agreements at Accra in 2008 and Busan in 2011, enshrined the notion of country ownership—that the developing world must drive its priorities to ensure sustainability. The Obama administration launched its USAID Forward agenda to re-establish USAID as the premier development agency in the world. A central aspect of this agenda are reforms designed to reduce the Agency’s dependence on contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements with U.S. development implementers and shift to a greater use of government to government support and local organizations.
The report argues that the current U.S. ecosystem of international development assistance should be treated as a strategic asset that plays an important role in meeting U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. As with all systems, it can and should be improved; however, it should be strengthened, not weakened. This system, while imperfect, delivers a level of accountability and transparency for the U.S. government that is vital to continued political support for foreign assistance. The development implementers must do more to evolve to meet the changing nature of how the U.S. government sees development and the broader trends in the field. However, there are significant risks associated with USAID’s proposed reforms, which, if fully implemented, may not achieve the results desired.
Please join us for a panel discussion of this timely report. Copies will be available at the meeting and online the day of the event.
RSVP for this event to ppd@csis.org.
6. Two Years Later: Assessing Tunisia’s Progress since the Jasmine Revolution, Monday January 14, 5:30 PM – 7:30 PM, Johns Hopkins University
Venue: Johns Hopkins University, Bernstein Offit Building, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Room 500
Speakers: Leila Chennoufi, Eamonn Gearon, Stephen McInerny, Samia Msadek, Mohamed Malouche, Daniele Moro
On January 14, 2011, Ben Ali was forced to leave Tunisia by a popular uprising commonly known as the Jasmine Revolution. This historic event triggered mass protests that would sweep the Arab world, forcing other longstanding authoritarian leaders from power and potentially transforming the region. Since that time, Tunisia has witnessed the country’s first free and fair elections, the emergence of new political parties and coalitions, and the many difficulties of maintaining stability amid an uncertain political transition. On the second anniversary of this historic moment, it is important to assess Tunisia’s progress in its difficult transition to democracy and examine the prospects and challenges that lie ahead.
Register for this event here.
7. U.S. Grand Strategy in the Middle East: Is There One?, Wednesday January 16, 9:30 AM – 12:00 PM, Rayburn House Office Building
Venue: Rayburn House Office Buidling, Washington, DC 20515, Gold Room (2168)
Speakers: Chas W. Freeman Jr., William B. Quandt, Marwan Muasher, John Duke Anthony, Thomas R. Mattair
The Middle East Policy Council invites you and your colleagues to our 71st Capitol Hill Conference. Live streaming of this event will begin at approximately 9:30am EST on Wednesday, January 16th and conclude around noon. A questions and answers session will be held at the end of the proceedings. Refreshments will be served.
RSVP for this event to info@mepc.org.
8. The Iran Nuclear Challenge: Explore Policy Options, Wednesday January 16, 12:30 PM – 1:30 PM, American Security Project
Venue: American Security Project, 1100 New York Ave, NW Washington DC, Suite 710W, Conference Room E
Speakers: William Fallon, Frank Kearney, Lawrence Wilkerson, Stephen Cheney
Join us for a discussion with retired military leaders on U.S. military options towards Iran. The discussion will begin promptly at 12:30 p.m. Please arrive by 12:15 p.m. for registration.
We hope you can join us.
RSVP for this event to events@americansecurityproject.org.
9. Freedom in the World 2013 Launch, Wednesday January 16, 1:30 PM – 3:00 PM, Council on Foreign Relations
Venue: Council on Foreign Relations, 1777 F Street NW, Washington DC, 20006
Speakers: David Kramer, Mark Lagon, Arch Puddington, Jill Dougherty, Larry Diamond, Tamara Wittes
Please join us as we release the findings of Freedom in the World 2013, the latest edition of Freedom House’s annual assessment of political and civil rights. This event will feature an in-depth discussion of advances and setbacks in freedom over the past year and the challenges these trends pose for American foreign policy.
Register for this event here.
10. The Way Forward in Afghanistan, Friday January 18, 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM, Heritage Foundation
Venue: Heritage Foundation, 214 Massachusetts Avenue NE, Washington, DC 20002, Lehrman Auditorium
Speakers: Lisa Curtis, Thomas Donnelly, Bill Roggio, Steven Bucci
The United States is moving into a new phase of engagement with Afghanistan as it draws down its combat presence in the country. During last year’s presidential campaign, President Obama declared a goal of bringing American troops home and focusing instead on “nation building” here in the U.S. But a hasty U.S. troop withdrawal and a failure to remain seriously engaged with the Afghans in other ways risks sacrificing everything the U.S. has fought for over the last decade.
What are the best options for the pace and scope of withdrawal over the next two years? What level and type of U.S. troop presence should remain in Afghanistan post-2014 to ensure the country does not revert to its previous status of terrorist safe haven? What are the realistic possibilities for reconciling with the Taliban in a way that preserves democratic and human rights gains?
Join us as a distinguished group of experts addresses these and other questions related to the future of U.S. engagement with Afghanistan.
Register for this event here.
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Light where we can, heavy when we must
Today’s New York Times declares victory for those in the Obama Administration who favor a light footprint abroad. The members of the new national security team–Hagel, Kerry and Brennan–each leans in that direction. Though Hagel voted as a senator for the Iraq war, he later became a doubter. His Vietnam experience and Kerry’s make both new cabinet members hesitant about the use of American military force abroad. Brennan, while always talking a good line in favor of a more comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism in Yemen, is the brains behind the canonical light footprint drone war there against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
The light footprint approach is also getting a boost in Afghanistan, where the White House is leaning towards leaving fewer troops after 2014 than some would like. Zero is even a possibility. The leaks to this effect are all too clearly intended to get President Karzai, who is visiting Washington this week, to stop his mouthing off against the American presence and to convince the Taliban that they can get half a loaf if they come to the negotiating table. But feints in diplomacy have a way of becoming reality. America’s parlous fiscal situation will make many members of Congress look benignly on cutting back the U.S. presence in Afghanistan.
I need hardly mention that the Administration has already taken a light footprint approach to Syria–maybe more like a no footprint approach. It provides humanitarian assistance through nongovernmental organizations and as well as political support to the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, now recognized as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, and other Syrian opposition organizations. It is also setting up Patriot batteries in Turkey and turning a blind eye to arms flowing from Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The results so far have fallen well short of the goal of ending the Asad regime and risk letting Syria fall into the hands of Sunni extremists. But the burden on the United States is mainly diplomacy and foreign assistance, not the far more expensive military.
I find it hard to fault the Administration for trying to limit commitments and save money at a time of serious fiscal strain. But it is a mistake to think we will always want to avoid the heavier footprint: troops and civilians on the ground to establish a safe and secure environment and plant the seeds for governance in states that may fail in ways that endanger vital American interests. The problem I see so far is not so much the President’s preference for the light footprint, but rather the assumption that it will ever be thus. Each and every president since the end of the Cold War has tried to avoid state-building efforts abroad. Each and every one has concluded that they were needed in one place or the other. This includes President Obama, who has quietly and correctly (if not alway successfully) indulged in civilian statebuilding to prevent violence in South Sudan since independence (the troops are cheap since they come from the UN). Obama also tried statebuilding in Afghanistan, where it was not a brilliant success.
We need to maintain the capacity to do heavier footprints, civilian as well as military, even as we try to avoid situations in which they are likely to be needed. This is the equivalent of asking the U.S. government to walk and chew gum at the same time. It has a hard time doing that. It is much more inclined to dismantle the extensive apparatus and experience built up during more than 10 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan than to husband and sustain it. The Civilian Response Corps President George W. Bush established, after declaring as a candidate his disdain for “a nation-building corps,” is already gutted. We’ll be reinventing that wheel if ever there is intervention in Syria, Mali, Iran or half a dozen other places where it might be needed in the next decade. This is not wise or economical.
Our mantra should be: light where we can, heavy where we must.
PS: David Rothkopf hopes what he calls the “disengagers” will redouble diplomatic efforts. Would that it be so.
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Syria is getting what Assad wants
A Syrian reader, Hashem al Shamy (whom I know only as an occasional commenter on peacefare.net) writes (with some small edits by me):
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Submitted on 2013/01/05 at 9:44 am
Dear Mr Serwer, Thanks a lot for taking the time to respond to my comment, which I hope you did not find aggressive. I only wanted to point out what I think of your blog which brings the experience of a seasoned diplomat to the realm of international relations. The fact that I am Syrian should not discredit my dispassionate analysis, since covering the political risk and violence in Syria is part of my job. However, my experience as a Syrian is still valuable because I attended Syrian schools, studied its heavily propagandist curriculum, wore the green uniform to school, had to chant for the late President and the Baath Party. I also was a senior member of the Youth Lead Vanguard of Revolt Council in my high school, and a member of the Baath Party, and worked with senior government officials until six months before the start of the unrest. Unfortunately, I have lost many friends since the start of the unrest in Syria because of their support of the grass roots movement, providing shelter and medicine to fleeing civilians and opposing the regime’s policy publicly. Recently, two of my friends have been referred to the “Terrorism Court” set up by the regime last year after remaining incommunicado for months, which most likely [will] culminate in their execution on charges of undermining the authority of the state and supporting terrorists. I dont want to summarise the events of the past 22 months, which I am sure you are fairly acquainted with. I just would like to clarify some misconceptions that have been distorting the narrative of the Syrian conflict, including some comments posted by your readers. The Assad dynasty since it took power in 1970 The people on the other hand knew very well the limitless repression and the heavy price they will pay once they openly declare their opposition to the regime. When I was asked after my return from Syria in February 2011, one month before the start of the uprising, about the prospects of a similar movement to the ones in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, I was dismissive of any potential event. The reasons were the overconfidence of the regime and the firm grip of its security apparatus on the country, the absence of a grass roots effort to mobilise people on the ground, the division of the political opposition, and most importantly the capability of the regime to inflict a very heavy price on civilians and entire cities. Nevertheless, I never imagined that the regime would write off whole cities and region and would be willing to inflict catastrophic damage on the country as a whole to preserve its power. In your response, you said that focusing on the community level is a crucial factor which is widely overlooked. The regime, from day one, made its policy to target peaceful demonstrators and their leaders. They embarked on a policy of detaining activists calling for non-violent protests, torturing them and returning them dead to their communities to intimidate people, create a vacuum of potential community leaders, and give prominence to extremism on the streets. This is exactly what happened, when the increasing level of bloodshed accompanied by increasingly brutal techniques of the regime generated a reaction of violent response and emphasized demands of revenge and proactive killings in order to save civilians. This dynamic brought the “opposition” to the regime’s turf where it will be able to set the terms of the game and generate a spiral of violence to scare everyone off. On top of that, the regime has always been good at creating divisions and then exploiting them to create a fertile ambiance of uncertainty to advance its policy. Domestically, it allowed the existence of regime-sanctioned opposition groups who called for regime-led reform. Their job was to invalidate the external opposition rather than focusing on the regime’s performance and actions. It also labeled the protestors and later the rebels as “Islamists, extremists and terrorists” to present minorities with an existential threat and lock them into “us or Fundamentalists” narrative. When the regime had failed to quell the protests, turning into an armed insurrection, it sought to involve regional rivals as it usually does to increase the stake for regional countries for its potential demise. Banking on its initial portrayal of protestors as extremist fundamentalists, it exploited the increasing friction between Sunnis and Shiites in the region. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey on the side of “the opposition” and Iran, Iraq and Lebanon on the side of the government. This strategy unleashed the latent forces in the region and managed to blemish the opposition even more as being aided by countries whose sole aim is to destroy “modern and secular” Syria and replace it with stalwarts of the monarchies in the Gulf. The intense Post-Cold War divisions between the US and Russia have helped the Regime keep the international community paralysed over its response to the Syrian crisis. The US, under the Obama Administration, has sought from the beginning to engage with the “Reformist” Bashar Al-Assad, giving him a maneuvering space when protests broke out. Russia, on the other hand has no interest in dropping a faithful country since the 1960s for the sake of promoting democracy. The triple veto at the UNSC has been a convenient pretext for major countries not to intervene and to blame the international stalemate on the rogue behaviour of Russia and Iran. These dynamics have given the Syrian regime the sense of impunity and the ability to make rational decisions to intensify its response and destroy entire cities, knowing that no one will limit its free hand. The convenient illusion and wishful thinking that the regime will negotiate its own demise and exit (the ultimate departure of the President is imminent) have produced a negative response to ending the Syrian conflict. In conclusion, if the regime is not presented with a “credible threat” there will be no change in the regime’s behaviour and more lives and cities will be destroyed, making Syria ungovernable Post-Assad, which is exactly what the regime wants. Any solution that maintains Assad in power will be highly unsuccessful both in the medium and long term. I have so many much to say, but I just wanted to give a brief overview of how the Regime has properly evaluated its environment and gradually pushed the red lines in the sand to keep itself in power at the expense on Syria as a nation. Best, Hashem Alshamy |
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It is not too early
UN special envoy for Syria Lakhdar Brahimi said Friday in Moscow of the Russian Foreign Minister:
I think Sergey Lavrov is absolutely right that the conflict is not only more and more militarized, it is more and more sectarian…And if we are not careful and if the Syrians are not careful, it will be a mainly sectarian conflict.
The day was a particularly bloody one: more than 200 people are said to have been killed in Homs.
The fear of sectarian conflict is well-founded. No matter how many times Syrians tell me that their revolution is not sectarian and aims at a civil state and open, democratic society in which all citizens are equal, the normal mechanisms of violent conflict lend themselves to increasing polarization along sectarian lines. I am afraid, so I seek safety where I can find it, which for Alawites and some other minorities is with the government while Sunnis seek protection from the Free Syrian Army.
Of course there are Sunnis who fight for the Syrian government and minorities who fight for the rebels, but there will be fewer and fewer as time passes. Then when Assad goes, individuals will try to recover property and seek revenge for the harm done to themselves and their families, even if the more organized and disciplined military units on both sides remain disciplined. Revenge killing spirals quickly, polarizing people further and driving them into the arms of their family, tribe, sect or ethnicity. Building a state on the ruins of a fragmented society is far more difficult than anyone imagines in advance.
That’s why I also welcome something else Brahimi said:
Perhaps a peacekeeping force may be acceptable. But it must be part of a complete package that begins with peacekeeping and ends with an election.
This is the first I’ve seen the obvious mentioned at his level: peacekeeping forces are going to be needed in Syria. They will be needed not only to protect minorities but also to support the post-war state-building effort. We’ve seen in Libya what happens when the new state does not have a monopoly on the means of violence. Extremists of all sorts, including Al Qaeda franchisees, set up shop. State-building without a monopoly on the means of violence becomes a dicey proposition. There will be more than two armed forces in Syria at the end of the civil war: Syrian army, local militias, regime Shabiha, Free Syria Army, Jabhat al Nusra and other jihadi extremists.
The issue in Syria is where peacekeeping troops can be found. Even if they are needed, that does not mean they will be available. The obvious troop contributors have all been protagonists in the proxy war of the past two years: Russia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey. The Turks and Russians may be willing, but won’t trust each other. The Americans will not want to put troops into Syria. Nor will the Europeans. China now has experience in 20 UN peacekeeping operations and might like to extend its reach into the Middle East, if the Americans and Russians will allow it. Iran is out of the question, though it will likely stir up trouble using some of the regime militia forces left over. There are lots of other possibilities, but few I can think of that meet the full panoply of desirable criteria: impartial, Arabic-speaking, experienced and self-sufficient in peacekeeping operations, available for deployment abroad. Algeria and Morocco?
A related question is who would authorize and supervise a peacekeeping operation. The UN is one possibility, but the divisions in the Security Council over the past two years hardly suggest it could act decisively. The Arab League is another. Still another is an invitation from a new Syrian government, which would have the advantage of picking which countries to invite and directing where they deploy. But that could defeat the whole purpose of inviting in a more impartial force.
If–against the odds–an international peacekeeping force is somehow put together and somehow properly authorized for Syria, it is important to remember Brahimi’s caution, written before he took up his present position:
Even if such peacekeepers are well-armed and well-trained, however, they will be no match for much larger and well organized forces intent on destroying the
peace or committing mass atrocities. It has to be said upfront that the military forces, civilian police, human rights experts and international aid workers will not provide security, protection, justice, social services and jobs for all of the millions or tens of millions of inhabitants of the country.
A solid political solution is a prerequisite to a peacekeeping deployment.
Syria is going to be a very difficult post-war operation. It is not too early to be thinking about who will conduct it and under what mandate.
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