Tag: Saudi Arabia
Syria is getting what Assad wants
A Syrian reader, Hashem al Shamy (whom I know only as an occasional commenter on peacefare.net) writes (with some small edits by me):
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Submitted on 2013/01/05 at 9:44 am
Dear Mr Serwer, Thanks a lot for taking the time to respond to my comment, which I hope you did not find aggressive. I only wanted to point out what I think of your blog which brings the experience of a seasoned diplomat to the realm of international relations. The fact that I am Syrian should not discredit my dispassionate analysis, since covering the political risk and violence in Syria is part of my job. However, my experience as a Syrian is still valuable because I attended Syrian schools, studied its heavily propagandist curriculum, wore the green uniform to school, had to chant for the late President and the Baath Party. I also was a senior member of the Youth Lead Vanguard of Revolt Council in my high school, and a member of the Baath Party, and worked with senior government officials until six months before the start of the unrest. Unfortunately, I have lost many friends since the start of the unrest in Syria because of their support of the grass roots movement, providing shelter and medicine to fleeing civilians and opposing the regime’s policy publicly. Recently, two of my friends have been referred to the “Terrorism Court” set up by the regime last year after remaining incommunicado for months, which most likely [will] culminate in their execution on charges of undermining the authority of the state and supporting terrorists. I dont want to summarise the events of the past 22 months, which I am sure you are fairly acquainted with. I just would like to clarify some misconceptions that have been distorting the narrative of the Syrian conflict, including some comments posted by your readers. The Assad dynasty since it took power in 1970 The people on the other hand knew very well the limitless repression and the heavy price they will pay once they openly declare their opposition to the regime. When I was asked after my return from Syria in February 2011, one month before the start of the uprising, about the prospects of a similar movement to the ones in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, I was dismissive of any potential event. The reasons were the overconfidence of the regime and the firm grip of its security apparatus on the country, the absence of a grass roots effort to mobilise people on the ground, the division of the political opposition, and most importantly the capability of the regime to inflict a very heavy price on civilians and entire cities. Nevertheless, I never imagined that the regime would write off whole cities and region and would be willing to inflict catastrophic damage on the country as a whole to preserve its power. In your response, you said that focusing on the community level is a crucial factor which is widely overlooked. The regime, from day one, made its policy to target peaceful demonstrators and their leaders. They embarked on a policy of detaining activists calling for non-violent protests, torturing them and returning them dead to their communities to intimidate people, create a vacuum of potential community leaders, and give prominence to extremism on the streets. This is exactly what happened, when the increasing level of bloodshed accompanied by increasingly brutal techniques of the regime generated a reaction of violent response and emphasized demands of revenge and proactive killings in order to save civilians. This dynamic brought the “opposition” to the regime’s turf where it will be able to set the terms of the game and generate a spiral of violence to scare everyone off. On top of that, the regime has always been good at creating divisions and then exploiting them to create a fertile ambiance of uncertainty to advance its policy. Domestically, it allowed the existence of regime-sanctioned opposition groups who called for regime-led reform. Their job was to invalidate the external opposition rather than focusing on the regime’s performance and actions. It also labeled the protestors and later the rebels as “Islamists, extremists and terrorists” to present minorities with an existential threat and lock them into “us or Fundamentalists” narrative. When the regime had failed to quell the protests, turning into an armed insurrection, it sought to involve regional rivals as it usually does to increase the stake for regional countries for its potential demise. Banking on its initial portrayal of protestors as extremist fundamentalists, it exploited the increasing friction between Sunnis and Shiites in the region. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey on the side of “the opposition” and Iran, Iraq and Lebanon on the side of the government. This strategy unleashed the latent forces in the region and managed to blemish the opposition even more as being aided by countries whose sole aim is to destroy “modern and secular” Syria and replace it with stalwarts of the monarchies in the Gulf. The intense Post-Cold War divisions between the US and Russia have helped the Regime keep the international community paralysed over its response to the Syrian crisis. The US, under the Obama Administration, has sought from the beginning to engage with the “Reformist” Bashar Al-Assad, giving him a maneuvering space when protests broke out. Russia, on the other hand has no interest in dropping a faithful country since the 1960s for the sake of promoting democracy. The triple veto at the UNSC has been a convenient pretext for major countries not to intervene and to blame the international stalemate on the rogue behaviour of Russia and Iran. These dynamics have given the Syrian regime the sense of impunity and the ability to make rational decisions to intensify its response and destroy entire cities, knowing that no one will limit its free hand. The convenient illusion and wishful thinking that the regime will negotiate its own demise and exit (the ultimate departure of the President is imminent) have produced a negative response to ending the Syrian conflict. In conclusion, if the regime is not presented with a “credible threat” there will be no change in the regime’s behaviour and more lives and cities will be destroyed, making Syria ungovernable Post-Assad, which is exactly what the regime wants. Any solution that maintains Assad in power will be highly unsuccessful both in the medium and long term. I have so many much to say, but I just wanted to give a brief overview of how the Regime has properly evaluated its environment and gradually pushed the red lines in the sand to keep itself in power at the expense on Syria as a nation. Best, Hashem Alshamy |
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It is not too early
UN special envoy for Syria Lakhdar Brahimi said Friday in Moscow of the Russian Foreign Minister:
I think Sergey Lavrov is absolutely right that the conflict is not only more and more militarized, it is more and more sectarian…And if we are not careful and if the Syrians are not careful, it will be a mainly sectarian conflict.
The day was a particularly bloody one: more than 200 people are said to have been killed in Homs.
The fear of sectarian conflict is well-founded. No matter how many times Syrians tell me that their revolution is not sectarian and aims at a civil state and open, democratic society in which all citizens are equal, the normal mechanisms of violent conflict lend themselves to increasing polarization along sectarian lines. I am afraid, so I seek safety where I can find it, which for Alawites and some other minorities is with the government while Sunnis seek protection from the Free Syrian Army.
Of course there are Sunnis who fight for the Syrian government and minorities who fight for the rebels, but there will be fewer and fewer as time passes. Then when Assad goes, individuals will try to recover property and seek revenge for the harm done to themselves and their families, even if the more organized and disciplined military units on both sides remain disciplined. Revenge killing spirals quickly, polarizing people further and driving them into the arms of their family, tribe, sect or ethnicity. Building a state on the ruins of a fragmented society is far more difficult than anyone imagines in advance.
That’s why I also welcome something else Brahimi said:
Perhaps a peacekeeping force may be acceptable. But it must be part of a complete package that begins with peacekeeping and ends with an election.
This is the first I’ve seen the obvious mentioned at his level: peacekeeping forces are going to be needed in Syria. They will be needed not only to protect minorities but also to support the post-war state-building effort. We’ve seen in Libya what happens when the new state does not have a monopoly on the means of violence. Extremists of all sorts, including Al Qaeda franchisees, set up shop. State-building without a monopoly on the means of violence becomes a dicey proposition. There will be more than two armed forces in Syria at the end of the civil war: Syrian army, local militias, regime Shabiha, Free Syria Army, Jabhat al Nusra and other jihadi extremists.
The issue in Syria is where peacekeeping troops can be found. Even if they are needed, that does not mean they will be available. The obvious troop contributors have all been protagonists in the proxy war of the past two years: Russia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey. The Turks and Russians may be willing, but won’t trust each other. The Americans will not want to put troops into Syria. Nor will the Europeans. China now has experience in 20 UN peacekeeping operations and might like to extend its reach into the Middle East, if the Americans and Russians will allow it. Iran is out of the question, though it will likely stir up trouble using some of the regime militia forces left over. There are lots of other possibilities, but few I can think of that meet the full panoply of desirable criteria: impartial, Arabic-speaking, experienced and self-sufficient in peacekeeping operations, available for deployment abroad. Algeria and Morocco?
A related question is who would authorize and supervise a peacekeeping operation. The UN is one possibility, but the divisions in the Security Council over the past two years hardly suggest it could act decisively. The Arab League is another. Still another is an invitation from a new Syrian government, which would have the advantage of picking which countries to invite and directing where they deploy. But that could defeat the whole purpose of inviting in a more impartial force.
If–against the odds–an international peacekeeping force is somehow put together and somehow properly authorized for Syria, it is important to remember Brahimi’s caution, written before he took up his present position:
Even if such peacekeepers are well-armed and well-trained, however, they will be no match for much larger and well organized forces intent on destroying the
peace or committing mass atrocities. It has to be said upfront that the military forces, civilian police, human rights experts and international aid workers will not provide security, protection, justice, social services and jobs for all of the millions or tens of millions of inhabitants of the country.
A solid political solution is a prerequisite to a peacekeeping deployment.
Syria is going to be a very difficult post-war operation. It is not too early to be thinking about who will conduct it and under what mandate.
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Fin de regime
My guess is that we are finally in the waning days of the Asad regime in Syria. UN envoy Brahimi was in Damascus yesterday and will talk with the Russians this weekend. His is sounding like a last ditch effort. Moscow has made it clear that it will no longer prop up Asad. Now they have to be convinced to give him a shove in the right direction. It shouldn’t be all that hard. Bashar’s military police chief has famously absconded, joining his foreign ministry spokesperson. The regime is cracking, though not yet crumbling.
This is a delicate moment in which a great deal is at stake. The devil is in the details. Brahimi is still pressing for a solution that jibes with last June’s Geneva agreement, which Moscow and Washington both endorsed, on formation of a fully empowered government with Bashar still in place. I doubt the revolutionaries will accept it. They want him out before agreeing to a ceasefire. Provided that condition is met, a negotiated transition of power to some sort of “unity” government (which means it would include a “remnant” of the Asad regime) with a guarantee of a future transition could be a good thing, provided it genuinely puts Syria on a democratic path and extracts it from the violence now on going. But it could also sell the Syrian revolution short by putting a new autocrat in place and creating conditions for renewed violence.
There will be precious little real international support for a true transition to democracy. The Saudis and Qataris, who have provided the bulk of the arms and money to the revolutionaries, are not much interested in anything beyond getting Asad out and installing a Sunni (preferably Islamist) regime, democratic or not. The Russians, Iranians and Iraqis will fear that outcome and want to preserve a secular regime, whether democratic or not. The Americans and Turks will want a secular democracy, but they are not in a position to insist on it. The Americans have been reluctant to get too involved. Only if Turkey decides to put its boots on the ground inside Syria will it have the kind of clout required. Even then, it may fail to get what it wants.
The Syrians hold the key to the outcome. But of course they point in many different directions. There are lots of Syrians who would prefer a secular democracy, but they are stronger among the nonviolent protesters than among the revolutionary military forces deciding the outcome. The Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, now recognized internationally as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, is trying to project a unified and moderate image. But the results so far are rudimentary: a few press statements, not always on the most pressing issues. There is still no transition government.
Jabhat al Nusra, a leading Islamist group among the fighters, is producing more substantial results. Rejecting the Coalition, it is anti-Western, Islamist, socially conservative and hard-fighting. The United States has designated it a foreign terrorist organization. Washington’s primary concern is its links to al Qaeda in Iraq, which Jabhat al Nusra denies. But I’ve also heard that the designation was done in part to please the Russians, who are genuinely (and justifiably) concerned with Syria becoming a source of Islamist extremism that could infect parts of Russia. Baghdad is also worried about a Sunni extremist regime in Syria that would try to counter Prime Minister Maliki’s increasingly Shia (and autocratic) drift in Iraq.
Few in Syria want the state to collapse or divide territorially. The revolution has not been fought on ethnic or sectarian grounds, even if it has exposed ethnic and sectarian divisions. Only Syria’s Kurds lean in the direction of federalism, inspired and supported by their confrères in Iraq. But I see no real plan on the horizon to prevent revenge killing, despite the very real likelihood it will happen. If there is extreme violence against the Alawites or other minorities thought to have supported the regime, collapse and division become more likely.
All decisions that depend on the will of a single individual, as Bashar’s to step aside does, are inherently unpredictable. There is of course the possibility he will refuse and hang on for a while, even defying the Russians to do so. A Google search for “fin de regime” turns up a lot of hits concerning Syria, in 2011. The longer this goes on, the worse it will be in the end.
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Bashar al Asad’s apocalypse
I published a daring series of predictions at the end of last year. Very few were correct. The only two that came close were these:
Balkans: Serbia gets candidacy status for the EU but that fails to save President Tadic’s Democratic Party from a parliamentary election defeat. Kosovo meets all the requirements but continues to be denied the European Union visa waiver. Bosnia gets a new government but no constitutional reform.
United States: Republicans nominate Mitt Romney. Economy continues slow recovery. Barack Obama is reelected, by a smaller margin than in 2008. Al Qaeda succeeds post-election in mounting a non-devastating suicide bombing.
Even then, you’ll need to ignore the part about Kosovo meeting all the requirements (it hasn’t yet) and that last part about a successful Al Qaeda bombing in the U.S. (that hasn’t happened yet either). Is it an accident that the two places I know best were also the subject of my most accurate predictions?
I’ll rely on other people for my next big prediction: Andrew Tabler and Jeff White, who know Syria much better than I do, were at the Washington Institute yesterday predicting the end of the Asad regime within weeks, at most a few months. Even if the Mayan apocalypse hasn’t happened, Bashar al Asad’s will.
According to Jeff, the regime’s military capacity to defend itself is way down. Its air power, artillery and Scuds are little avail. Its large-scale maneuver capacity is declining, as are its numbers. There is fighting in 12 of 14 provinces. Regime armor and mechanized infantry can no longer move freely. The only potential major game changers out there are Hizbollah, Iran and chemical weapons. Iran and Hizbollah are not likely to risk more than they already have.
Rebel offensive performance is improving. They are taking objectives and interrupting lines of communication. They appear to be self-sustaining now in arms, their numbers are still growing, and they are capable of more sustained and coordinated action. The Islamists are playing an increasing role. Rebel losses are up, especially among commanders, but their recruitment stream is still strong.
Jeff suggest five possible endgames:
1. Province by province dismantlement of the regime, which has already begun.
2. Chaotic collapse of the regime.
3. Controlled regime contraction to Damascus or the coast.
4. A headlong rush to the coast.
5. Regime recovery, which looks unlikely.
Possible indicators the end is near: there may be desperate pleas for a ceasefire, evacuation of Russian nationals, senior defections or flight, military units abandoning the regime, a coup attempt and last (but not entirely in jest) burning papers at the Iranian Embassy.*
Andrew agreed. There is a marked deterioration in the humanitarian situation, with food in short supply, refugee and displaced people camps overcrowded and ill-equipped. The revolution is turning in an Islamist direction, in part because of U.S. unresponsiveness to its needs. Anti-Western sentiment is strong. It was a mistake to designate Jabhat al Nusra as a terrorist organization before recognizing the Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people.
The Coalition remains badly divided by sect, class, rural/urban and by personality. While the military and civilian leaderships have met and issued a joint statement, how the two insurgent efforts will be combined at various levels is not at all clear. The armed rebellion, with which the U.S. is not well-connected, is likely to be in the lead once Bashar falls. The U.S. should be sending arms, more to gain influence than anything else, as they are no longer needed as much as once they were for military purposes. We need to be ready also with civilian assistance, which has been too slow. The aid should be overt and direct, not covert and indirect, if we want to gain influence over the outcome. Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia may well move faster than we do, as they have with arms, with consequences for our interests.
It is clear Syria will need a lot of help once this is over. Post-war reconstruction has stumped the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it has boots on the ground, which isn’t going to happen in Syria. Working through and with the Coalition, which we’ve now recognized as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, to produce a decent outcome is going to be an an enormous challenge. Failure could ignite a broader conflict in Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Jordan. Success would damage Hizbollah and Iran. This one is worth a candle.
*This morning I would add use of cluster bombs.
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The Gaza war in regional context
While the news media is mainly focused on the exchanges of rocket and air attacks between Israel and Gaza, my guess is that the broader regional picture will be decisive in determining the course and outcome of this latest outbreak of war in the Middle East. Here is a rundown of that broader picture:
1. Egypt: Cairo is trying to broker a ceasefire, with rhetorical support from the Arab League, but the Egyptian Prime Minister’s visit to Gaza Friday made it clear that the Muslim Brotherhood-led government will be more sympathetic to Hamas than Hosni Mubarak. Still, Egypt is in a tight spot: continuation of the war will attract militants to Gaza and the Sinai as well as send an already weak Egyptian economy into a tailspin. While Hamas has roots in the Muslim Brotherhood, a democratic regime in Egypt has to worry that Egypt’s citizens, sympathetic as they are to the plight of the Palestinians, will not want to sacrifice too much on their behalf. A ceasefire could restore Egypt’s role as a key regional player.
2. Syria: There has already been an exchange of artillery fire between the Syrian regime and Israel, something that hasn’t happened in a long time. Bashar al Asad may well look to military action on the Golan front in an effort to rally his remaining support and try to divert attention from his war against the Syrian revolution, now more than a year and a half old. The Syrian army won’t have a lot of spare capacity to challenge Israel, but it won’t want to be left out of the fight if the war continues.
3. Jordan: The protest movement against the rule of King Abdullah has intensified. The monarchy will not want to divert security forces to a fight against Israel, with which it maintains good if not warm relations. If the protests are successful, the king will be weakened further. A more constitutional monarchy might well be less friendly to Israel, but still unwilling to risk conflict.
4. Hizbollah: On the Lebanese front, Hizbollah is the main military force. It is already heavily engaged fighting against the revolution in Syria, but it could presumably make Israel’s situation more difficult by joining in the rocket barrage. Its record fighting Israeli ground forces is significantly better than Hamas’, so the Israelis would hesitate to engage on both fronts. But Hizbollah will be reluctant to aid Hamas, which has fallen out with the Syrian regime Hizbollah is supporting.
5. Gulf Cooperation Council: The Saudis and the other GCC states have not generally engaged directly against Israel, but the visit last week of the Emir of Qatar to Gaza (and his promise of financing) suggest that they may play a behind the scenes role bankrolling Hamas and others willing to challenge Israel. This could significantly attenuate the quiet but growing accommodation between Israel and the Sunni Arab world.
6. Turkey: Turkey and Israel seemed headed for rapprochement that would cure the 2010 rift over the Israeli attack on a Turkish aid flotilla headed for Gaza. This now seems much less likely. Turkey’s Islamist government will have to give at least verbal support to Hamas and hesitate to appear to paper over its differences with Tel Aviv.
7. Iran: Many of the larger rockets in Hamas’ arsenal come from Iran, which must be enjoying watching the Israelis engage in Gaza rather than carrying out the threat to destroy Tehran’s nuclear facilities. Iran will no doubt provide Hamas, Hizbollah and Syria as much assistance as it can spare in its sanctions-weakened state, hoping to keep the Israelis preoccupied.
8. The wider Arab world: Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Yemen and Sudan all have their own problems that preclude more than rhetorical engagement in the Palestinian cause. Marc Lynch notes that mobilization in the Arab world so far is limited but could well intensify. The Arab street, which presumably has a louder voice today than before the Arab awakening, is certainly sympathetic to the Palestinians. And it is far more likely to support Hamas’ more aggressive military approach to Israel than the Palestine Liberation Organization’s diplomatic push for membership for membership in the United Nations.
Bottom line: Egypt likely has the decisive role in determining whether this war remains, like the one in 2008/9, a bilateral affair or turns into a wider conflict with more permanent consequences. But Iran, Hizbollah, and Turkey are also important players. If Israeli ground action lines up all the regional forces in favor of Hamas, the unintended consequences could be dramatic.
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Yemen isn’t working
Daniel Byman, Brookings fellow and the moderator of Tuesday’s event about “Yemen and the Fight Against a Resurgent al-Qaeda,” noted that Yemen has become increasingly important in Washington over the past decade. Despite this, few understand Yemen. American political leaders have not found a successful strategy to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat” al-Qaeda in Yemen. Ibrahim Sharqieh of Brookings Doha and Gregory Johnsen, Ph.D. candidate at Princeton, did not claim the expertise to address moral or legal questions about drone strikes, but they questioned their effectiveness in achieving U.S. objectives.
Sharqieh noted the fluctuations of U.S. interest in Yemen over the past 14 or 15 years. Until the Yemeni people elected a new president in parallel with “Arab Spring” reformation movements across the Middle East, the U.S. cooperated with the Ali Abdullah Saleh regime. When the al Qaeda threat was high, the U.S. gave Yemen more assistance, attention, and aid money. When the threat was low, the Yemen issue would be replaced with other more pressing foreign concerns. This approach makes it in Yemen’s interest to have some al Qaeda presence. Johnsen agreed that a mutually dependent relationship has formed between new President Hadi and the U.S. Hadi needs the U.S. because he lacks domestic support and the U.S. needs Hadi to continue its drone strikes. Sharqieh explained that this relationship excludes the Yemeni people from the discussion of fighting al Qaeda increasing a sense of alienation.
Sharqieh proposed a new approach focused on political settlement, development and local ownership of the conflict against al Qaeda. First, the Yemeni political transition must be successful in order to provide hope for the people and reinforce the nonviolence of the Yemeni uprising. The Iran-backed north, separatist south and influence of the old regime are barriers to the success of the political settlement. Second, the U.S. should adopt a sustainable assistance program to combat the serious challenges to stability: the 46% unemployment rate, 56% of people under the poverty line, 300,000 suffering from malnutrition, and significant illegal immigration. Third, Yemenis need to feel ownership of the al Qaeda threat. Many resent the U.S. drone attacks as a violation of national sovereignty.
Johnsen agreed that the “Yemen Model” for fighting terrorism has not been effective. It was on the day of President Obama’s inauguration in 2009 that Said Ali al-Shihri announced the joining of al Qaeda‘s Saudi branch with a Yemeni contingent to form al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In December 2009, Secretary of State Clinton added the organization to the list of known terrorist groups and the U.S. carried out its first drone attack in Yemen. Days later al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula placed a suicide bomber on a plane to Detroit. From the Christmas Day failed attack to today, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has grown from 200 or 300 to anywhere from 1,000 to 6,000 members.
How has the organization grown so quickly? Civilian deaths in drone attacks are partly to blame, Johnsen believes, in addition to economic and humanitarian challenges. The U.S. views Yemenis as terrorists and non-terrorists, but al Qaeda members in Yemen might also be tribal figures, community leaders, friends or family. Yemen is not like Afghanistan where al Qaeda members are often easily identifiable foreigners.
“Yemen is a broken country,” Johnsen said, and the path forward for the U.S. will not be easy. The U.S. cannot win the fight against al Qaeda alone. Yemeni tribes and Saudi Arabia are well-positioned to help, if they want to do so. The Obama administration has never explicitly defined for a foreign or domestic audience the moral or legal framework in which the drone strikes operate. It is possible that the U.S. has burned all bridges that could have encouraged tribal allies to take up the fight against al Qaeda, but Washington could improve the prospects with an apology for past civilian deaths and an honest effort to find a better strategy.
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