Tag: Saudi Arabia
How do you say fast and furious in Arabic?
I’m surprised the American-imposed limits on arms transfers to the Syrian opposition from Qatar and Saudi Arabia are front page news today in the New York Times. It has been common knowledge for some time that the United States does not want shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons (man-portable air defense systems, or MANPADS) transferred to Syrian rebels. Anti-tank weapons are likewise blocked.
I thought it obvious why. But apparently not, so let’s review the merits of the case. These weapons pose a serious threat to commercial aircraft and other civilian targets. Washington does not want to transfer weapons that fall into extremist hands and are then used against Americans. “Fast and furious” comes to mind–the scandal surrounding a transfer of guns to Mexican drug cartels in order to track them that ended in the murder of American border patrol agent. So, too, does the Washington-sponsored mujahideen effort against the Soviets in Afghanistan, which armed radical Islamist forces that are now fighting against the Americans.
Rumint has it that there are hundreds of thousands of MANPADs already in circulation. If so, it is hard to understand how none have made it into Syria. I am told that American ones come with a difficult-to-replace 90-day battery. If effective, that would make them relatively unattractive. I don’t know whether Russian, Chinese, Iranian, British and other systems have similar immobilizing measures. There have been a number of incidents in which MANPADS have been used against civilian aircraft: in Rhodesia, Georgia, Sri Lanka, Kenya and Iraq. Some attempts were successful, others not. It does not take a lot of imagination to picture why officials in Washington would worry about MANPADS getting into the wrong hands.
Anti-tank weapons come in a bewildering variety, wire-guided and not. Some seem to have made their way to Syria, where the rebels have often destroyed the regime’s tanks. I have a hard time understanding why Washington would worry much about the transfer of these weapons, especially if they are already in theater. It would of course be wiser to transfer them to more reliable people, but war doesn’t allow a lot of fine distinctions to be made.
A birdie tells me that the Syrian opposition is getting all the AK-47s and other “light” weapons it needs. It is not doing them a whole lot of good. The Syrian army is using artillery, tanks, snipers and the occasional aircraft to project force far beyond the range the rebels can target effectively when they shoot back.
The real question for Washington at this point is whether to allow the Syrian opposition to get MANPADS, which it would use to enforce a de facto no-fly zone over the areas that it controls. This could level the playing field and allow the opposition to hold on to liberated areas. I haven’t been enthusiastic about the arming of the opposition, not the least because it strengthens extreme Islamist and other anti-democratic forces that should not inherit Syria from the Asad regime. But with the civic opposition yesterday demonstrating in favor of arming Free Syrian Army, it is hard to oppose a shift in Washington’s stance that would allow MANPADS with appropriate self-limiting technology and anti-tank weapons to reach it.
U.S. government officials have been insisting that they draw the line at “lethal” assistance, presumably to bolster their so far unsuccessful efforts to turn the Russians and Chinese around on Syria and allow a UN Security Council resolution with teeth to pass. But with Iran, Hizbollah and the Russians pouring arms and men into Asad’s efforts to crush the rebellion and Syria repeatedly firing artillery into the territory of NATO-member Turkey, isn’t it time to consider leveling the playing field, as the diplomats say?
If that shift takes place, we have to recognize that there is a real possibility that the weapons will some day be used us. How do you say “fast and furious” in Arabic?
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Arab women agree on problems, not solutions
Women have played important roles in the Arab awakening but they now face an uphill struggle to consolidate their gains.
During the first panel of this week’s Woodrow Wilson Center about “Women after the Arab Awakening,” participants discussed the problems facing women on the Middle East. Heads nodded and the audience, mostly women, groaned and laughed together. All cringed when speakers presented alarming legal and cultural setbacks for women and smiled or applauded for stories of courage or insightful comments about the status of women.
In the second panel, when the speakers were asked to identify a path forward, tensions flared. The audience tittered at provocative statements and the question and answer period turned into a heated argument. Underlying the tension, were important issues: the appropriate role of religion in government, the tension between Islam and feminism and the appropriate representation of minorities in democracies.
Dalia Ziada, one of Newsweek’s most influential women and CNN’s eight agents of change in the Arab World, sees politicians and political systems as only part of the problem. Culture is also responsible. Suzanne Mubarak advanced the status of women with the “khula” law giving women the right to divorce and other legislation allowing women to pass down their nationality. President Mubarak allocated 64 seats in the lower house of parliament to women. These legal successes did not result in meaningful improvement in status for women in Egypt because of culture. Most women who ran for office had connections to Suzanne Mubarak or other leaders and were often not considered competent.
Rihab Elhaj, co-founder of the New Libya Foundation, made a similar point. Eighty of the 200 seats in the Libyan parliament are allotted for political parties, which are required to include women alternately with men on their party lists. This helped women get 33 seats, but they have not yet taken on leadership roles because they are unconnected to leading male politicians.
In Tunisia, culture and social norms have also interfered with women achieving the status laws allow. Tunisia has a unique history of legislation promoting women’s rights. But when Omezzine Khelifa, a political party leader in Tunisia and adviser to the Minister of Tourism, proposed parity, many disagreed. Some thought it was not the time to deal with women’s issues. Others opposed a parity law because it suggests that women are incapable of getting into public office any other way. Parity in Tunisia passed, but as in Egypt it did not allow women to win 50% of the seats. Most political parties chose men to head their lists, so women won seats only if a party received enough votes to win multiple seats.
Fahmia Al Fotih, Yemeni journalist, also described cultural barriers. Several key women leaders during the revolution were subjected to harassment and even violence as a result of their participation in the protests. A barrier was erected to keep women and men separate, but some women chose to ignore the barrier in protest and were often beaten as a result. The National Consensus Government is composed of 35 members, of whom only three are women.
Not all problems in the Middle East can be attributed to patriarchal culture. There are real legal, physical and social barriers preventing women from reaching high positions. In Yemen, a humanitarian crisis has pushed political participation from many women’s minds as they struggle to feed their families. According to an Oxfam report this year, four out of five Yemeni women report that their lives have gotten worse in the past twelve months. Saudi blogger Hala Al Dosari recounted harassment by the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, a woman jailed for driving and a youth conference on the empowerment of civil society shut down at the last moment. Ziada expressed concern about possible Egyptian legislation allowing marriage at 14 and female genital mutilation. In Tunisia, Khelifa reported on the recent debate about whether women should be described as “complementary” or “equal” to men in the constitution. Al-Nahda’s draft of Article 28 to the constitution, which used the “complementary” wording, was defeated, but the debate will not be over until the constitution is finalized.
The second panel was intended to address what should be done to solve these problems. Syrian Honey Al-Sayed of Souriali Radio called for an effort to define equal roles for Syrian women now, before the revolution is over. Heads nodded in response, given that so many of the speakers had noted how optimistic they were about women’s rights during their revolutions and how things changed afterwards. Elhaj said that the change in Libya was not because of some Islamist scheme to remove women from the public sphere, but because of a natural reversion to the status of women prior to the revolution. Al-Sayed argued that Syria might be able to avoid this if there is a large-scale education campaign and civil society organizations are developed now.
Gabool Al-Mutawakel, Youth Leadership Development Foundation co-founder, made a similar argument for working to keep the spirit of the Yemeni revolution going, but she offered new insight: the problem facing women is the notion of “women’s issues.” She cited a female politician who preferred to talk about being a woman in politics rather than her policy ideas. Women will not succeed in Yemeni politics if the only areas about which they can speak with credibility are women’s issues. Women must not just represent women, but all of Yemen. Al-Mutawakel suggested we teach women about leadership, not just empowerment. We should also foster a culture of competition where women learn how to win and lose. Quotas can have the effect of killing a woman’s motivation to fight for a seat.
It was in this panel that tensions flared. Hanin Ghaddar, a Wilson Center Public Policy Scholar and editor of NOW News, saw an inherent contradiction between feminism and Islam and argued for separation of religion and state in Lebanon. The revolution taught her that small changes are no longer acceptable and that we need drastic, radical changes, which an Islamic government cannot offer. Yassmine ElSayed Hani, Wilson Center Visiting Arab Journalist, argued on the contrary that separation of religion and state is not realistic in Egypt. Sharia is a way of life that should not be reduced to the troubling laws in the Middle East that are supposedly based on it. About 80% of the Egyptian population is Muslim, so the government should reflect the majority of the population. Ghaddar argued in response that a democracy should protect the minority. Ziada suggested that Egypt may not need a religious government exactly because its population is so religious.
There is agreement about the problems women in the Middle East face, but disagreement on what to do about them.
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This week’s peace picks
It’s a busy week, with lots of variety:
1. Pulling Pakistan out of Economic Crisis, Monday September 24, 11:00 AM – 12:30 PM, Woodrow Wilson Center
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20004, Sixth Floor
Speakers: Shahid Javed Burki, Parvez Hasan, Eric Manes, Aisha Pasha
This event marks the release of a new study on Pakistan’s economy. It is produced by Beaconhouse National University’s Institute of Public Policy, based in Lahore, Pakistan.
2. Russian-Iranian Relations: Implications for U.S. Policy, Monday September 24, 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM, Woodrow Wilson Center
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20004, Sixth Floor
Speaker: Mark N. Katz
Moscow does not want to see Tehran acquire nuclear weapons. Despite this, Russia has been reluctant to cooperate much with the U.S. in preventing this. In his talk, Mark N. Katz, Professor of Government and Politics, George Mason University, and former Title VIII-Supported Research and Short-Term Scholar, Kennan Institute, will discuss why this is.
3. The Myanmar Conference @ CSIS, Tuesday September 15, 8:00 AM – 4:00 PM, CSIS
Venue: CSIS, 1800 K Street NW, Washington DC, 20006, B1 conference facility
Speakers: Jim Webb, Kurt Campbell, Christopher Johnson, David Steinberg, Salai Ngun Cung Lian, Tin Maung Maung Than, Ernie Bower, Serge Pun, David Dapice, Shigehiro Tanaska, Elizabeth Hernandez, Mathew Goodman, Stephen Groff, Christopher Herink, Thomas Dillon, Gregory Beck, Murray Hiebert, Michael Green
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) will host a select and high-level group of experts and senior policy makers for The Myanmar Conference @ CSIS, to be held September 25, 2012, at the CSIS B1 conference facility. We have recruited a world-class group of experts to kick off the on-the-record dialogue around four key themes:
i. Political and Security Developments in Myanmar
ii. Trade, Investment, and Infrastructure
iii. Humanitarian Situation and Foreign Assistance
iv. Conclusions: Recommendations for U.S. Policy toward Myanmar
The conference is being organized around the time of the visits of Myanmar President Thein Sein and opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi to the United States in late September. There is great interest to explore the implications for U.S. policy in the wake of the political and economic reforms in Myanmar and the recent easing of U.S. sanctions ahead of the U.S. presidential and congressional elections in November.
Register for this event here.
4. Ambassador Cameron Munter on Pakistan, Tuesday September 25, 9:00 AM – 10:30 AM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speaker: Cameron Munter
In one of his first public event since returning from Islamabad, Ambassador Cameron Munter will deliver an address on the challenges and opportunities ahead in Pakistan. Frederic Grare will moderate.
Register for this event here.
5. Campaign 2012: Arab Awakening, Tuesday September 25, 10:00 AM – 11:30 AM, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington DC, 20036, Falk Auditorium
Speakers: Benjamin Wittes, Stephanie Gaskell, Raj M. Desai, Shadi Hamid, Tamara Cofman Wittes
Following the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi and the death of U.S. Ambassador to Libya Chris Stevens, the United States is weighing its position and policies in the post-Arab Spring Middle East. More than a year after the initial Arab uprisings, the United States is questioning the state of its relations with the nascent Arab democracies and the emerging Islamist regimes. As the second anniversary of the Arab revolutions approaches, political and economic instability persists alongside growing anti-American sentiment, forcing the United States to adapt its policies to the evolving landscape in the Middle East. With the U.S. election just over six weeks away, many American voters are questioning the presidential candidates’ foreign policy strategies toward the region and wondering how the volatility in the Middle East and North Africa will affect the United States in the months and years ahead.
On September 25, the Campaign 2012 project at Brookings will hold a discussion on the Arab Awakening, the tenth in a series of forums that will identify and address the 12 most critical issues facing the next president. POLITICO Pro defense reporter Stephanie Gaskell will moderate a panel discussion where Brookings experts Tamara Cofman Wittes, Shadi Hamid and Raj Desai will present recommendations to the next president.
Register for this event here.
6. Georgia on the Eve of Parliamentary Elections, Tuesday September 25, 12:15 PM – 2:00 PM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Carnegie Conference Center
Speakers: Thomas de Waal, Mamuka Tsereteli, Cory Welt
On October 1, Georgia votes in a parliamentary election which is set to be its most important and closely-watched contest since the Rose Revolution of 2003. The election is also a shadow leadership election, and its outcome will determine who becomes the leader of the country when a new constitution takes effect next year, as the second term of current president Mikheil Saakashvili ends.
The governing party, the United National Movement, is facing a strong challenge from the recently formed opposition Georgian Dream coalition, led by Bidzina Ivanishvili. The political temperature is high as both sides are predicting victory and exchanging claims and counter-claims about the conduct of the election.
Register for this event here.
7. 2012 African Economic Outlook Report, Wednesday September 26, 9:30 AM – 11:00 AM, Atlantic Council
Venue: Atlantic Council, 1101 15th Street NW, Washington, DC 20005, 11th Floor
Speakers: Todd Moss, Mthuli Ncube, Mwangi Kimenyi, John Simon, J. Peter Pham
The Atlantic Council’s Michael S. Ansari Africa Center and the Africa Growth Initiative at the Brookings Institution are pleased to invite you to a panel discussion on the findings of the 2012 African Economic Outlook (AEO) report. The AEO is a collaborative effort of the African Development Bank, the Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the United Nations Development Program, and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. The annual report surveys and analyzes the economic performance of fifty-three African countries, including, for the first time, Eritrea and newly independent South Sudan.
This year’s report focuses on a critical area of the continent’s socio-economic development: youth unemployment and education. Youth unemployment has been a persistent problem for a majority of African countries and a formidable obstacle to economic growth and stability. Youth dissatisfaction played a major role in the escalation of political unrest in North Africa in the past year, which resulted in a significant decrease in economic growth in the region. Given Africa’s rapidly growing population, the demographic pressure on labor markets in African countries will continue to increase. If African countries commit to education and skills training, however, Africa’s youth bulge could become a significant competitive advantage in a rapidly aging world.
Mthuli Ncube, chief economist and vice president of the African Development Bank, will provide brief remarks on the reports’ findings and broader implications for Africa’s future, followed by a panel discussion. Panelists will discuss the many unpredictable factors threatening the continent’s economic growth offer brief remarks and policy recommendations for African nations before opening the floor to a question and answer session.
RSVP for this event to achuck@acus.org.
8. Will the Monarchs Reform? Challenges to Democracy in the Gulf, Wednesday September 26, 12:00 PM – 2:00 PM, Project on Middle East Democracy at SEIU
Venue: SEIU, 1800 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036, First Floor Conference Room
Speakers: Maryam al-Khawaja, Les Campbell, Kristin Diwan, Stephen McInerney
While 2011 and 2012 have witnessed unprecedented changes across the Middle East and North Africa, the Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates – have not been shaken to the same degree, with the notable exception of Bahrain. Nonetheless, the dramatic uprisings across the region have had a clear impact on both the populations and governments of the Gulf, and it is worth examining political developments and the state of human rights in these countries.
How have the uprisings and political changes in other Arab countries been perceived by both the governments and citizens of the GCC? What steps have been taken by these governments to prevent similar changes from happening in their own countries, and how have these steps been received both domestically and internationally? What, if any, steps toward democratic reform have been taken, and what future actions might we expect from Gulf governments with regard to reform? How have the GCC governments changed their approach toward their citizens, civil society organizations, media outlets, and labor unions? How have the dramatic political changes in the region affected relations between the U.S. and the governments and people of the Gulf? And how can the U.S. and other international actors engage with the Gulf in a manner that helps its citizens realize their democratic aspirations?
Register for this event here.
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Eid mubarak!
Today and tomorrow mark the end of the month of Ramadan, when Muslims fast during the day. Tonight and tomorrow night they feast.
It has been a truly terrible Ramadan in Syria, where Kofi Annan’s peace plan has died (along with thousands of additional Syrians) and the Asad regime has intensified military action, especially in Aleppo. Prospects are not good: Asad refuses to step aside and the opposition refuses to negotiate with him. We are not yet at Bill Zartman’s “mutually hurting stalemate,” when both sides see no gain in continuing to fight and decide instead to talk.
Egypt has taken another unexpected turn, with elected President Morsy taking over by decree the executive and legislative powers that the military had previously reserved for itself. He did it with savoir faire: previous military leaders were retired with medals and new ones chosen from just below them. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that the Muslim Brotherhood, from which Morsy hails, and the military have reached a mutual accommodation, leaving Egypt’s secular revolutionaries out in the cold, which isn’t very refreshing in Egypt at this time of year.
In Libya, Tunisia and Yemen, the revolutions are looking a lot better. Libya‘s General National Congress, elected July 7, convened on schedule and chose as President Magarief, who promises to be a unifying figure. Tunisia is struggling to produce a constitution, with final approval delayed at least to April 2013 rather than October 2012. Yemen has made a start with military reform and is now embarking on preparations for its national dialogue, to be held in November and followed by constitution-writing.
Elsewhere counter-revolution is winning. Bahrain has sentenced human rights activist Nabeel Rajab to three years in prison. I wonder if he would have attracted more attention if his name were Pussy Riot. Algeria, Jordan, Morocco and Saudi Arabia have stifled any serious reform moves. In Iraq, Prime Minister Maliki has weathered political challenges and continues to accumulate power even as frictions between Baghdad and Kurdistan grow.
It looks as if the Arab awakening will continue mainly in North Africa, where it began in early 2011. While Libya has ample oil and gas resources, none of the other countries in which revolutions have come to fruition does. Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen all have serious economic challenges ahead. Syria will be an economic basket case the day after Asad is gone. If we want anything like democracy to prevail in these places, there is going to be a substantial bill to pay.
Marc Lynch has called this a cruel summer. It has certainly been that and worse in Syria. But those of us who have experience with transitions, especially in post-conflict environments, set the bar low. There has been progress elsewhere, even if halting and slower than hoped.
The big open questions are these: is Egypt getting back on track, or are we seeing a new, Islamist autocracy in the making? Can Saudi Arabia manage the succession to next-generation leadership without upheaval? Can the regional war that has begun in Syria be ended before it engulfs several other countries? Can Iran‘s nuclear ambitions be ended at the negotiating table, or will Israel or the United States attack?
No answers are needed today. It suffices to salute those who observe Ramadan with “Eid mubarak!”
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What is a counter autocoup?
Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi Sunday abrogated the constitutional declaration that protected military privileges, arrogated to himself full executive and legislative powers and replaced the country’s upper echelon military chiefs, including former Supreme Council of the Armed Forces chief Field Marshall Tantawi. This is an autocoup (that’s a coup conducted by people already in power against another part of the governing establishment). Or, to be more precise, this is a counter autocoup, since the Egyptian military conducted an autocoup against Morsi in June when they arrogated to themselves broad powers.
I wrote then:
The American press describes the army as “cementing” power. That’s unquestionably what they are trying to do. But it is unlikely to work….It is yet to be seen whether the military has cemented power, or has deluded itself so thoroughly that its moves will be seen one day as demented.
One could of course say something similar about Morsi now. It is unclear whether the army will put up with this seizure of power.
My guess is that it will, not least because Morsi is showing real political skill in choosing people to man (it is almost entirely men) his government. While not as broadly based as some might have hoped, the cabinet he named last week was more technocratic than some expected and included a sprinkling of political rivals as well as holdovers from the last military government. He has also chosen experienced military figures to replace the Minister of Defense (for the last few days Field Marshall Tantawi) and the chief of the army staff.
Morsi’s great advantage over his military rivals is one he seems to understand well: legitimacy, backed domestically by the organizational capabilities of the Muslim Brotherhood and supported internationally by the United States and Saudi Arabia. So long as he shows a modicum of respect for what Yezid Sayigh describes well as the officers’ republic, he may well pull off this latest lurch in Egypt’s dubka between military dictatorship and popular democracy. He has to be careful about paring back the officers’ economic perks and military privileges.
Let’s hope Morsi’s gamble works. Egypt faces growing security problems in the Sinai and serious economic challenges. It needs an effective government and a new constitution. Morsi had appeared to yield to the Supreme Constitutional Court’s decision to dissolve the elected parliament, leaving the constitutional process a shambles. He now has to decide how to reconstitute a legislature and create a committee to write a new constitution.* He would be wise to reach out farther than he did in naming the government towards political forces beyond the Muslim Brotherhood: women, Christians and secularists should have a role that they have so far been denied.
The Egyptian revolution is proving by far the most fraught of those Arab awakenings that have brought down dictators so far. Tunisia, Libya and Yemen all have their problems, but all three seem to be progressing, with fits and starts. Egypt still seems uncertain of its direction, not least because it allowed the military an out-sized role in the post-autocratic transition. But it is also important to recognize that Egypt is much more populous, poorer and diverse than the other Arab awakening countries. This latest turn may not be its last. But Morsi is correct to try to establish civilian control.
*Michelle Dunne points out that there is already a “constituent assembly,” created by the now-dissolved parliament and the object of on-going litigation, working on a new constitution. Morsi presumably has the option of going along with that parlous process.
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The worst of all possible worlds
It is getting hard to keep score, though this graphic from Al Jazeera English may help. Today’s big news is the defection of Syria’s prime minister, who didn’t like Bashar al Asad’s “war crimes and genocide.” About time he noticed. There are reports also of more military defections, even as the battle for Aleppo continues.
Does any of this matter? Or does Bashar get to hold on to his shrinking turf despite going into hiding and losing the support of regime stalwarts?
Michael Hanna offers an important part of the answer in a Tweet this morning:
Syrian defections follow strictly sectarian pattern, likely hardening core support. 1st big Alawi defection, if it comes,will be devastating
The Asad regime is increasingly relying on a narrow base of Alawite/Shia (about 12-13% of the population) support, as Sunnis (like the prime minister) peel away and denounce Bashar’s violence against the civilian population, which is majority Sunni. Christians and Druze have also been distancing themselves, and Kurds have taken up arms against the regime (without however aligning themselves with the opposition). The opposition draws its strength from the majority population and is supported by Sunni powers like Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. What we are witnessing is a regional sectarian war in the making, one that could last a long time and involve ever-widening circles in the Levant.
The Alawites fight tenaciously because they think they know what is coming. This is an “existential” war for them: if the lose, they believe they will be wiped out.
That, along with Russian and Iranian support, could make this go on for a long time. If it does, the consequences for Syria and the region will be devastating. Damascus has already unleashed extremist Syrian Kurds to attack inside Turkey. Jordan is absorbing more than 100,000 Syrian refugees. Iraq’s efforts to guard its border with Syria have led to a confrontation with its own Kurdish peshmerga. Fighting between Sunnis and Alawites has spread to Lebanon, which is also absorbing large numbers of Syrian refugees. The Syrian opposition claims to have captured 48 Iranians in Damascus, sent there to help the regime (Tehran unabashedly claims they were religious pilgrims).
Breaking this self-reinforcing cycle of sectarian polarization is an interest broadly shared in the international community. As The Economist pointed out last week, Russian interests won’t be served if Syria descends into total chaos. Some would like to suggest that territorial separation is a solution. This is nonsense: no one will agree on the lines to be drawn, which will be decided by force of arms directed against the civilian population. That is the truth of what happened in Bosnia, however much the myth-makers delude themselves.
There are several ways the violence might end:
- a definitive victory by the opposition (it is hard now to picture a definitive victory by the regime).
- an international intervention to separate the warring forces and impose what the U.S. military likes to call a “safe and secure environment.”
- a coup from within the regime, followed by a “pacted” (negotiated) transition.
Any of these would be better than continuation of the current chaos, which is the worst of all possible worlds. But I’m afraid that is the mostly likely course of events until Moscow and Washington get together and decide to collaborate in ending the bloodshed.
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