Tag: Saudi Arabia
Ingredients of success
I’m spending the day at the “The Arab Spring: Getting It Right,” the annual conference of the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy in lovely Crystal City. Here are a few highlights.
The first session focused on the ingredients for successful democratic transitions. Here are my quick notes:
Dan Brumberg, Georgetown, in the chair:
- Systemic problems need systemic solutions: if you get rid of torture, you need forensics.
- Need process of consensus and pact-making.
- Religion is an important dimension of identity that needs to be part of that process.
Jason Gluck, USIP: constitution-making
- People need to know why they need a new constitution. What are the core principles they want enshrined there?
- Egypt: battles over timing, constitutional committee reflect lack of answers. Exclusiveness undermines the constitution-writing body.
- Tunisia: using simple majority, not consensus, in committees writing the constitution, with little outreach to civil society beyond Tunis.
- Libya: only four months for constitution-writing, which doesn’t allow deep consideration or public participation. Inclusivity is in doubt.
- Process matters more than constitutional content. Because it makes for legitimacy. Making a constitution is a political, not a legal exercise. It incarnates core values of the state and society.
- Not a drafting exercise but a national dialogue about needs and aspirations.
- Inclusive, participatory, consensual, transparent, deliberative processes are more likely to have good results.
Alfred Stepan, Columbia: transition needs these elements:
- Legitimate constitution written by a representative group.
- A government results from popular vote.
- Powersharing (with military or religious authorities) is not necessary
- The government has to have real authority over policy.
- Civil society more important in deconstructing autocracy than in reconstructing the state, which requires political society and leadership.
- Major transitions (end of WWII, 1989) have required international support, but Arab awakening is getting much less external assistance.
- Brumberg: ironically, opposition consensus building happens more in autocratic society like Tunisia rather than in more open one like Egypt.
Tunisia has been successful because parties have been talking with each other and developing consensus (pact-making) for a long time (since 2003)
Laith Kubba, National Endowment for Democracy: getting it right means avoiding chaos or crisis. Indicators:
- Military “neutralized” and under civilian control: Tunisia OK, Egypt not and militias are the problem in Libya.
- Security apparatus has to shift from protecting regime to protecting state.
- Economic equity has to increase.
- State institutions need to emerge that allow society to be free, including at local level.
- Democratic culture, including associations, free but responsible press.
- New elites emerging in political parties, youth groups, think tanks.
- Education improving.
Big risk: those who reject democratic culture as a foreign import.
Comment from a Tunisian participant, whose name I missed:
- Traditional solidarity was important in Tunisia. Reduced likelihood of revenge.
- So too was role of women.
The second session focused on regional and global impacts:
Radwan Ziadeh, Syrian National Council and Carr Center, Harvard
- Syria is not like Tunisia, Yemen or Libya. It is now more like Bosnia: international community hesitancy, political opposition cannot deliver so Free Syria Army is taking over, regime crimes are systematic.
- Hoping for protection of civilians in a safety zone along Turkish border by an Administration that includes people who made the mistakes in Bosnia.
- Three hundred observers are insufficient.
- Need for military action without UN Security Council approval, but UNGA (137 countries) and Friends of Syria provide cover.
- Everyone looking for U.S. leadership, but Washington is inhibited by domestic considerations, lack of oil interest.
- Arabs lack resources and legitimacy to act.
Brian Grim, Pew Research Center: Religion and the Arab Spring
- Government restrictions on religion are increasing in more countries and those with greater population before Arab spring.
- Problem is especially strong in Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where constitutional guarantees for religious freedom are not strong and apostasy laws are prevalent, enforced both by governments and social hostilities.
- Restrictions on conversion 80% in MENA, where both government violence and social hostilities are prevalent.
Caryle Murphy, Woodrow Wilson Center: A View from the Gulf (especially Saudi Arabia)
- Arab Spring affects Saudi Arabia externally: Egypt, Bahrain, Iraq.
- Saudi effort is to manage and keep it away from the Gulf.
- Foreign policy activism: GCC confederation? First step with Bahrain?
- Riyadh is disappointed in the U.S., lack of confidence in U.S. willingness to intervene.
- Arab Spring also affects Saudi Arabia internally: TV, internet and Twitter have made young Saudis more aware of the rest of the world and want to be more like it. Ditto those studying abroad.
- But impulse is still evolutionary, not revolutionary. Unemployment is the big youth problem. Government is aware but will it move fast enough to accommodate youth demands for jobs and more freedom?
- Society still very conservative, political consciousness very limited, including both secularists and Islamists.
- Petitions for constitutional monarchy, Umma party formation led to government clampdown.
- Eastern Province: Shia very unhappy.
- Religion is a focus of debate, which is important because it is the foundation of legitimacy.
Aylin Unver Noi, Gedik University (Turkey): Regional Alignments
- Ankara has shifted foreign policy towards Middle East.
- Sunni resistance camp emerging, pro-Palestinian, Islamist-led, democratic governments.
- Revolution in Syria would cause it to join this camp, as Jordan might.
- Turkey concerned with Kurdish aspirations, especially PKK activities in Syria.
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Grasping at straws
That’s what the thinktanksphere is doing on Syria: Bruce Jones at Foreignpolicy.com offers a hazy scenario in which the Syrian army allows a Turkish-led “stabilization force” in with a wink and a nod, even without a UN Security Council mandate. Fat chance. Only if Bashar al Assad thinks he has won a total victory and needs the internationals to pick up the pieces.
What no one wants to admit in Washington is the obvious. The most likely scenario is Bashar al Assad continuing in power and fighting a low-level insurgency against Free Syria Army units. This is a very bad scenario for the United States and anyone else in the world concerned about stability in the Middle East, which is just about anyone who uses oil. We have already seen refugee flows to Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Jordan. Deadly shots have been fired across the border into Lebanon and Turkey.
Of these countries, only Iraq is an important source of oil, but that is no small matter with gasoline at or above $4 per gallon in the U.S. and Iraq pumping all it can (around 2.7 million barrels per day). With Saudi Arabia and Qatar talking openly about arming the opposition in Syria, how long do we think it will take for Syria and Iran figure out ways to retaliate? Even hard talk can cause increases in oil prices. Damascus and Tehran, which are heavily dependent on oil revenue, are hoping that the threat of regional chaos will enrich their coffers, weaken the American economy and make us accept Bashar al Assad’s continuation in power.
This is not an easy situation, and it may endure. We need to be clear about what does and does not further U.S. interests. The goal should be the end of the Assad regime. That would serve not only U.S. interests, but just about everyone else’s except Iran’s. Even Russia is not going to find Assad’s Syria the reliable partner it was in the past. But while Bashar persists we need to try to ensure that the means used to achieve his downfall do not cause more harm than necessary. Arming the Syrian opposition plays into Bashar’s narrative: terrorists are attacking a regime ready to reform.
Recommitment of the opposition to nonviolent seems impossible to many at this point, but in my view it could be game-changing. A real opportunity exists tomorrow, when the UN-sponsored ceasefire is supposed to take effect. The Syrian government says it will stop all “military fighting” as of 6 am tomorrow. Admittedly this leaves big loopholes: how about police and the paramilitary forces known as Shabiha? Who is there to verify compliance? But the right response from the opposition is to make a parallel announcement that it will halt all military action at the same time. That will provide an opportunity for a return to peaceful demonstrations.
The possibility is less imaginary than might appear. Most Syrians are not taking up arms against Bashar al Assad, and those who do are not having a lot of success. Here is a nonviolent “flash” demonstration said to be in front of the Syrian parliament yesterday, with demonstrators holding signs that say “stop the bloodshed”:
The revolutionary leadership would do well to ask the Free Syria Army to take a break tomorrow morning and see what happens. If nothing else, doing so will gain the revolution significant credit internationally.
Admittedly I too am grasping at straws. But it seems nothing else is left.
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Arms and the man
My friends and colleagues are all over the lot on Syria. One suggests we consider going to war against Bashar al Assad, but then offers more, and more powerful, arguments against than in favor of the proposition. Some are criticizing the Obama administration for not supporting humanitarian safe zones and arming of the Syrian opposition, to be undertaken apparently by the Turks and Saudis respectively. Others view diplomatic and political support for the opposition combined with nonintervention as a strategically correct choice, one that undermines Iran and Russia and hurts their standing with the Sunni Arab world. Who is right?
It is of course difficult to say. I don’t doubt anyone’s sincerity in advocating one way or the other. But the arguments in favor of U.S. military intervention are simply not convincing: the Arab League hasn’t asked for it, the Security Council won’t approve it, and the consequences are wildly unpredictable. Besides, the U.S. needs to be ready in coming months to make a credible threat of the use of force against Iran’s nuclear program. Attacking Syria would undermine American readiness and reduce the credibility of the threat against Iran, which is arguably much more important for U.S. national security than Syria.
Humanitarian safe zones and arming the opposition don’t come out any better. Humanitarian zones are target-rich environments that will need protection from the Syrian army. They are not safe unless made safe. Doing so would be a major military undertaking, with all the disadvantages already cited. Arming the opposition would intensify the civil war, make a collapse of the Syrian state more likely, and spread sectarian and ethnic warfare to Iraq, Lebanon, and Turkey. That is precisely what the United States should be avoiding, not encouraging.
The diplomatic approach the Administration has chosen is not fast and not easy, but it is beginning to show results. Tom Pickering, who knows as much about these things as anyone on earth, sees the UNSC presidential statement as a step forward:
What we need now is a concerted effort to convince the Russians that Bashar is a bad bet. If they want to keep port access in Syria, and arms sales there, they will need to switch horses and back a transition. Bashar will not last long once they make that decision: the Russians can cut off financial and military resources without which he knows he cannot survive.
The question is whether a threat to arm the opposition might help with the diplomacy. This is arguable, it seems to me, and in any case it is what is happening. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have made a lot of noise about arming the opposition. It would be surprising if they weren’t already doing it, and preparing to do more. I don’t expect it to have much impact on the battlefield, where the Syrian army has a clear advantage, especially when it uses artillery against civilian population centers. But it could help to tilt the Russians against Bashar and create a sense of urgency about passing a UNSC resolution that begins the transition process.
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Blink, or else
I am speaking tomorrow at the Italian International Affairs Institute (IAI) on Iran, the United States and Europe. Here are the speaking notes I’ve prepared for myself.
1. This year’s biggest foreign policy puzzle is how to handle Iran and its nuclear program. The piece of this puzzle I would like to talk about is Washington. What have the Americans got in mind? What are they trying to achieve? What will they do to achieve it? What happens if they fail?
2. The objective is clear: President Obama aims to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons. He rejects containment. He has broad support in the Congress and beyond for this position.
3. There should really be no doubt about American willingness to use force to achieve this goal. If diplomacy fails to stop Iran from moving toward nuclear weapons, the Americans will attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, and possibly much more.
4. This would not be a one-time decision. It would only set back the Iranian nuclear effort a year or two. We will have to repeat the attacks, likely at more frequent intervals. I don’t agree with Marvin Weinbaum that the Iranians will welcome military action, but it offers only a temporary and unsatisfactory solution. That may be enough for Israel, as Richard Cohen suggests, but it is not good enough for the U.S., which has other priorities in the world and needs to tend them.
5. Karl Bildt and Erkki Tuomioja, foreign ministers of Sweden and Finland, are also wrong to suggest diplomacy is the only option. But it is a preferred option. In a little noted passage in his interview with Jeffrey Goldberg earlier this month, the President outlined what his preference:
…the only way, historically, that a country has ultimately decided not to get nuclear weapons without constant military intervention has been when they themselves take [nuclear weapons] off the table. That’s what happened in Libya, that’s what happened in South Africa. And we think that, without in any way being under an illusion about Iranian intentions, without in any way being naive about the nature of that regime, they are self-interested. They recognize that they are in a bad, bad place right now. It is possible for them to make a strategic calculation that, at minimum, pushes much further to the right whatever potential breakout capacity they may have, and that may turn out to be the best decision for Israel’s security.
6. David Frum misinterprets this passage as meaning that the president is bluffing on the use of force. That is a mistake. But Obama is clearly saying he prefers a diplomatic solution, because it has the potential to be longer-lasting than the military one.
7. From the Washington perspective, Iran is in diplomatic, political and economic isolation. The P5+1 are united. Sanctions are biting. The Sunni Arab world has come to the realization that Iranian nuclear weapons will require a response, one that will make the Middle East a far more dangerous place than it has been even in the past several decades.
8. Many countries have made the commitment that the President is referring to. They usually do it by signing and ratifying the Non-Proliferation Treaty (or in Latin America the Treaty of Tlatelolco) and agreeing to strict International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. Brazil and Argentina made this commitment in the 1990s.
9. The trouble is that Iran, a state party to the NPT, has violated its commitments by undertaking uranium enrichment outside the inspection regime and also working on nuclear explosives. So President Obama will be looking for verifiable commitments reflecting a genuine decision not to pursue nuclear weapons, based on the calculation that Iran will be better off without them.
10. How could that be? Acquisition of nuclear weapons creates security dilemmas for Tehran. The United States will target a nuclear Iran (we have foresworn first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states, but not against nuclear weapons states), Israel will not only target Iran but also launch on warning, and other countries in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Egypt?) are likely to begin seriously to pursue nuclear weapons, greatly complicating Iran’s situation.
11. Keeping its enrichment technology but giving up on nuclear weapons would provide Iran with a good deal of prestige without creating as many problems. U.S. intelligence leaks claim that Iran has not in fact made the decision to acquire nuclear weapons, leaving the door open to an agreement along the lines the President suggests.
12. Such a diplomatic solution would require Iran to agree to rigorous and comprehensive inspections as well as limit enrichment to well below weapons grade, which is 90% and above.
13. The question is whether the internal politics of the three countries most directly involved (United States, Iran and Israel) will allow an agreement along these lines. As Martin Indyk points out, they are currently engaged in a vicious cycle game of chicken: Israel threatens military action, the U.S. ratchets up sanctions to forestall it, Iran doubles down on the nuclear program, causing the Israelis to threaten even more….
14. Can Obama deliver on such a diplomatic solution? The Americans are hard to read. Best to listen to is Senator Mitch McConnell, who as Senate opposition leader represents the anti-Obama position. He declared earlier this month:
If Iran, at any time, begins to enrich uranium to weapons-grade level, or decides to go forward with a weapons program, then the United States will use overwhelming force to end that program.
15. This was generally read as a belligerent statement, since it makes explicit the American willingness to use military force if its red lines are crossed. But in fact it is consistent with the kind of diplomatic solution Obama has in mind.
16. But this Obama/McConnell proposition asks of Iran considerably less than Israel would like. Israel wants to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons capability. This means giving up the technology required to enrich uranium to weapons grade or reprocess plutonium.
17. No country I know of has given up uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing technology, once acquired. It isn’t even clear what it would mean to do so, since the know-how resides in scientists’ brains and not in any given physical plant.
18. If war is to be avoided, someone has to break the cycle Indyk refers to, putting a deal on the table. Daniel Levy suggests that Netanyahu is not really committed to Israeli military action but is trying to stiffen Obama’s spine. He is unlikely to blink. Obama is constrained because of the American elections from appearing soft on Iran. He has to appear ready and willing to use military force.
19. This leaves a possible initiative to Tehran, which is free to move now that its parliamentary elections have been held. They marked a defeat for President Ahmedinejad, who has appeared to be the Iranian official most willing to deal on the nuclear program. Supreme Leader Khamenei is more committed to the game of chicken. He may even think nuclear weapons necessary to his regime’s survival, a conclusion Indyk thinks rational in light of what has happened with North Korea on the one hand and Libya on the other.
20. It is really anyone’s guess what Khamenei will do. But at least he has an undivided polity behind him. My hope is that either he or Obama–better both–decide to blink and cut a deal that ends Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions definitively and avoids a military effort that will have to be repeated at shorter intervals for a long time to come.
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Peace picks this week
I’m late with this week’s top items. Missed two good ones today: on Syria option at Brookings and on war with Iran at Georgetown. I hope you caught them. Here is the rest of the week, with most of the interesting stuff on Wednesday:
1. The Human Rights Situation in Syria: An Assessment by the United Nations Independent Commission of Inquiry, Brookings, 4:30-6 pm March 20
For the past year, the international community has been largely paralyzed in responding to Bashar al-Assad’s violent repression of protests in Syria. Though the United Nations Security Council has failed to pass a condemnatory resolution, the UN Human Rights Council swiftly established an independent international Commission of Inquiry in September 2011 to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law since the beginning of the uprising. After extensive interviews with victims and witnesses, the commission’s report presented this month concluded that the Syrian military and security forces have been committing gross violations of human rights since the onset of the protests.
Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC
Map
RELATED CONTENT
On March 20, Managing Global Order and the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host the members of the commission to discuss the findings of this recently released report. Paulo Pinhiero, chairman of the commission, along with commissioners Yakin Ertürk and Karen AbuZayd will provide an overview of their investigation and describe the current human rights situation in Syria. Senior Fellow Ted Piccone, deputy director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion.After the program, panelists will take audience questions.
Participants
Panelists
Karen AbuZayd
Commissioner, Commission of Inquiry for Syria
Former Commissioner General, UN Relief and Works Agency
Yakin Ertürk
Commissioner, Commission of Inquiry for Syria
Former UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women
Paulo Pinheiro
Chairperson, Commission of Inquiry for Syria
Former UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar
2. Challenging the Axis of Resistance: Syria, Iran and the Strategic Balance in the Middle East, Reserve Officers Association, One Constitution Avenue, NE 7:30-9 am March 21
The Iran-Syria alliance poses significant challenges for U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East. Iran’s support for Syria has helped the Assad regime sustain a brutal campaign of repression against the Syrian people, insulating it from the full effect of international and Arab sanctions. Syria’s support for Iran has enhanced Tehran’s regional influence, promoted Hezbollah’s power in Lebanon, and helped to consolidate an “axis of resistance” that has reshaped the strategic balance in the Middle East.
Please join Jay Solomon, foreign affairs correspondent of the Wall Street Journal, and Daniel Brumberg, USIP’s senior adviser in the Center for Conflict Management, as they examine two of the most significant challenges for the Middle East, Iran and Syria, and the ramifications that their interplay has for U.S. regional strategy. The discussion will be moderated by Steven Heydemann, senior adviser for Middle East Initiatives at the U.S. Institute of Peace.
This is the third in a series of breakfast briefings titled, “A Year of Turmoil: The Arab Awakening and the Path Ahead.” The briefings are organized by the United States Institute of Peace in partnership with the Defense Education Forum of the Reserve Officers Association.
Speakers
- Jay Solomon, Discussant
Foreign Affairs Correspondent
Wall Street Journal - Daniel Brumberg, Discussant
Senior Adviser, Center for Conflict Management
U.S. Institute of Peace - Steven Heydemann, Moderator
Senior Adviser for Middle East Initiatives
U.S. Institute of Peace
Breakfast will be available at 7:30am, followed by the moderated discussion from 8-9am.
3. Iran and the West at a Crossroad: Will Recent Elections Make or Break a Deal on Iran’s Nuclear Program? Middle East Institute, 12-13:15 pm March 21
Location:
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has described upcoming talks with Iran over its nuclear program as “the last chance to resolve the crisis.” Yet as the final hour approaches for an opportunity to avert a military attack, there are few apparent signs Iran will make compromises. Recent parliamentary elections have only strengthened the power of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the hardliners in his inner circle who aspire to make the Islamic republic a regional superpower. Join us for a discussion with Geneive Abdo and Syed Aliakbar Mousavi on the impact of the elections on the future of Iran’s nuclear program, and the outlook for the forthcoming negotiations aimed at de-escalating U.S.-Iranian tensions.
Bio:
Geneive Abdo is the director of the Iran Program at The Century Foundation, a Washington and New York-based think tank. Her current research focuses on contemporary Iran and political Islam. She is the creator and editor of the newly-launched website: www.insideIRAN.org She was formerly the Liaison Officer for the Alliance of Civilizations, a U.N. initiative under Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Before joining the United Nations, Abdo was a foreign correspondent. Her 20-year career focused on coverage of the Middle East and the Muslim world. From 1998-2001, Abdo was the Iran correspondent for the Guardian and a regular contributor to the Economist and the International Herald Tribune. Abdo is the author of No God But God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam (Oxford University Press, 2000), and Mecca and Main Street (Oxford University Press, 2006). Abdo’s commentaries and essays on Islam have appeared in Foreign Policy, the New York Times, and the Washington Post, among other outlets. She has been a commentator on NPR the BBC, the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, CNN, and al-Jazeera,
Seyed Aliakbar Mousavi is a visiting fellow at the University of Maryland and a digital freedom & human rights activist. From 2000 to 2004, Mousavi served as a member of the 6th Parliament of Iran, where he held several positions including Deputy of the Parliamentary ICT Committee, Secretary of the Tehran District, and Head of Inspecting and Supervising of Prisons. Currently, he advises the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, an advocacy group based in the United States, and was a visiting fellow in the Iranian Studies program at Stanford University. He is the founder and former general secretary of the Iranian Graduates Organization and was a member of the Central Council of the Iranian Students Union. Mousavi was also a participant in the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), and an founder of the Prisoners Rights Defense Association.
4. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: Looking for the Arab Spring, Georgetown University, 12:30-2 pm March 21
This event requires a ticket or RSVP
The Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding
invites you to:
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: Looking for the Arab Spring
________________________
featuring:
Natana J. DeLong-Bas
________________________
Wednesday, March 21
12:30pm – ICC 270
________________________
In the midst of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia alone seems to have escaped public protests over corruption, authoritarianism and the quest for more equitable sharing of benefits. This impression masks the realities of life and reform within the Kingdom. This presentation explores some of the ways in which Saudi Arabia is working to address the challenges of the Arab Spring from a long-term perspective, offering analysis of areas of both stability and uncertainty for the future.
________________________
Dr. Natana J. DeLong-Bas is the author of Jihad for Islam: The Struggle for the Future of Saudi Arabia (forthcoming, Oxford, 2012), Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (rev. ed., Oxford, 2008 – named “1 of the 5 best books for understanding Islam” by the Wall Street Journal), and Notable Muslims: Muslim Builders of World Civilization and Culture (OneWorld, 2006), and co-author of Women in Muslim Family Law (with John L. Esposito, rev. ed., Syracuse, 2001). She is Editor-in-Chief of [The Oxford] Encylopedia of Islam and Women (forthcoming, Oxford, 2012) and Deputy Editor of The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World and Oxford Islamic Studies Online (Oxford, 2008), as well as serving on the Advisory Board for Oxford Bibliographies Online – Islamic Studies. She serves as a consultant to the media, the US and international governments and corporations and is a member of The British Council’s Our Shared Future Opinion Leaders Network. Her Op-Ed pieces on contemporary issues in Islam have been published in the US, Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. She teaches comparative theology (Islam and Christianity) at Boston College.
___________________________________________________________
Please RSVP here:
http://gulfarabspring.eventbrite.com/
Seating is limited.
Lunch will be served.
5. Halting the Descent:U.S. Policy toward the Deteriorating Situation in Iraq, 2172 Rayburn, 1:30 pm March 21
You are respectfully requested to attend the following open hearing of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building.
General Jack Keane, USA, Retired
(Former Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army)
Lieutenant General James Dubik, USA, Retired
Senior Fellow
Institute for the Study of War
Kimberly Kagan, Ph.D.
President
Institute for the Study of War
Colin H. Kahl, Ph.D.
Senior Fellow
Center for a New American Security
6. Ahmed Rashid – Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, Politics and Prose, 7 pm March 21
Four years after his Descent into Chaos, the Lahore-based Pakistani journalist reassesses the situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan and offers suggestions for American foreign policy in the region. He pays particular attention to the role of the Taliban and the reliability of American allies.
- 5015 Connecticut Ave NW
- Washington, District Of Columbia
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Annan Anon
Today’s news from Syria is bad, really bad for those of us who hope to see a more open and democratic regime there. The usual sources in Baba Amr, the Homs neighborhood that Bashar al Assad has been shelling for a month, have gone silent, apparently because elite Syrian army units are closing in from all sides. Electricity has been cut off. Violent resistance there will be, but sporadic and largely ineffectual. Expect widespread mistreatment of the civilian population, where the regime is trying to re-install the wall of fear that kept people in line for decades.
In the meanwhile, Kofi Annan, the newly appointed joint envoy of the UN and the Arab League, met in New York with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, in the aftermath of still another UN Security Council meeting that failed to reach agreement on his mandate. Annan was modest in his goals:
It is a very difficult assignment. It is a tough challenge and the first thing we need to do as the secretary general has said is to do everything we can stop the violence and the killing to facilit[tate] humanitarian access and to ensure the needy are looked after and work with the Syrians in coming up with a peaceful solution which respects their aspirations and eventually stablizes the country.
My Twitterfeed is disappointed in his failure to mention transition (away from the Assad regime), but Annan is doing what a good diplomat should: lowering expectations and trying to ensure himself at least a first meeting with Bashar. He needs to keep his public remarks in line with the minimalist goals that Russia and China support. UN envoys don’t last long if one of the Perm 5 members of the UNSC object to what they are saying and doing, or a key interlocutor refuses to meet with them.
Kofi Annan knows as well as any of us that stabilization of Syria is not going to be possible with Bashar al Assad still in power. He betrays it with that adverb: “eventually.” Getting Bashar to step aside from power will not be easy. It will require convincing him that he is safer out of power than in it. Several Arab presidents have already chosen that route (Tunisia’s Ben Ali, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh). Muammar Qaddafi preferred to fight, with well-known consequences. But Bashar will not like any of those precedents: exile in Saudi Arabia, a trial in his home country, exile in Ethiopia and murder victim are not attractive propositions. Maybe Tehran will be?
He will try to sell himself to Annan as a reformer: like the Bahraini and Moroccan monarchies or Algeria’s President Bouteflika, all of whom are engaged in modest reforms intended to co-opt protesters and maintain their regimes intact. Bashar will attribute his obvious excess use of force to the need to fight terrorism, a favorite excuse for violating human rights in this country as well as in Syria. There is just enough evidence of Al Qaeda in Iraq involvement in a few of the bombings in Syria to put some wind in that sail.
We should not expect Annan to get past Bashar’s defenses easily or quickly. As fallacious as the claims may be, he will have to listen and appear to appreciate them. Then, he needs to try to internationalize the situation as much as possible, by getting Arab League and UN monitors back into Syria to prevent renewed violence once a ceasefire is in place. He also needs to maintain his credibility with the Russians, so that he can talk with them about how their interests in port access and arms sales might be better served by a future, democratically-validated regime than by a declining Assad.
Annan will also need to reach out to the protesters in Syria and assure them that their pleas are heard and that their interests will be best served by returning to nonviolence, with international monitors in place to offer what protection they can, which is admittedly not much. In the meanwhile, the Free Syria Army and other militia groups will be arming, but hopefully not fighting. If the protesters resort to violence, Annan’s position will quickly become untenable as the regime returns to the battlefield.
Why is this not more like the situation in Libya or Kosovo, where the rebellions armed themselves and fought the regime tooth and nail? The answer is that the Syrians can be close to certain that no air force is coming to their rescue. The Americans and Europeans are showing no appetite for it. The Turks and Arabs seem almost as reluctant. If any of them were to change their minds and decide to throw their military weight behind the protesters, the situation would be different. But that is unlikely to happen.
Annan’s chances of success are low. But we should wish him the best in his efforts, which should begin as soon as possible. Delay or failure would mean continuation of a war the regime is bound to win.
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