Tag: Saudi Arabia
The Passover of Arab liberation
Tonight is the beginning of Passover, the holiday celebrating the founding narrative of the Jewish people, which is also regarded by many non-Jews as the archetypal liberation story.
This Passover is the first in my lifetime that we can truly cast Egypt in the liberation story not only as the oppressor but also as the people liberating themselves. I’ve watched and commented enthusiastically for months now on the events unfolding in North Africa and the Middle East. For those of us privileged to live in a relatively free and prosperous country, the courage and conviction of those demonstrating nonviolently for freedom in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Syria is thrilling. Unlike the ancient Jews, they are not trying to leave the countries that have kept them captive but instead are trying to revolutionize them, creating political systems that will allow far wider margins of freedom to speak, associate and choose their rulers than existed anywhere in the Arab world until now.
Jews of course worry about what the Arab revolutions of 2011 mean for world politics in general and Israel in particular. But my sense of the relatively liberal and secularized community in which I live and pray is that the revolutions have the benefit of doubt. Lots of us anticipate that a liberated Egypt will give greater support to the Palestinian cause, but we may also think that is a necessary ingredient in completing the Middle East peace process. As the Palestinian papers all too clearly reveal, Israel has been less than forthcoming and more than recalcitrant, passing up decent offers from the Palestinian Authority that might have opened the door to resolution.
Americans of all religions also worry about the implications of the revolutions for their interests in political stability, countering violent extremism and reliability of oil supplies. Most it seems to me have gradually tilted towards support for the demonstrators, as has the Obama Administration, even in Yemen. This is made relatively easy by the fact that the revolutions have not yet touched directly on U.S. oil interests: none of the countries so far involved is a major supplier. Where U.S. interests and values have been most at odds–in Bahrain because of the 5th Fleet presence and Saudi Arabia because of oil–the tilt has been in favor of interests. Washington has essentially supported the Saudi and Bahraini monarchies in their efforts to buy off and repress dissent, even if those same monarchies are angry at Washington for promoting revolution elsewhere.
Libya is a special case. There some of the demonstrators chose to respond to violence with violence. The international community has backed them against the Gaddafi regime, but so far at least the results are less than satisfactory. It can be very difficult to dislodge an autocrat with violence, as that is their preferred method. They can and do escalate. The Gaddafi regime will not win in Libya, but it has already created a mess that will be difficult to repair. While Tunisia and now Egypt seem headed down paths that will lead to more open and democratic societies, Libya will need a lot more help to find its way after its devastating experience under Gaddafi and the war that will end his rule.
The outcome in Syria is also in doubt. As I noted yesterday, Syrians need to decide what they really want: the promise of responsiveness from a still autocratic regime, or real choices about how they are governed. Liberation will not be easy, as Bashar al Assad is brutal, determined and marginally more “enlightened” than some of the other autocrats in the Middle East. The benign despotism he is offering may well attract some Syrians, especially those who thrive under the current regime.
My message for Bashar and for all the other leaders on this Passover of the Arab rebellions, is simple: let your people go!
Here they are, in Homs, Syria, today:
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Implosions, more and less advanced
While the rest of the world catches up with the question of “how does Libya end,” which I dealt with yesterday, let’s take a look ahead. Today’s big news was not the explosions in Libya, but rather the implosion in Yemen, where President Saleh is now facing an opposition strengthened by defections from his army, government, parliament and diplomatic corps. He is appealing for “mediation” by the Saudis, which is being interpreted in some circles as a plea for Saudi guarantees if he agrees to step down in six months. He had already agreed to step down at the end of his present term in 2013.
It very much looks as if Washington may lose its spear carrier in the fight against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). This is a problem, since no one–including Saleh–seems to think AQAP is a serious threat to Yemen, which it uses as haven and launching pad. No one in his right mind would want to try to govern it.
Washington will have to convince whoever takes over–the betting seems to be on General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, but these things are inherently uncertain–that AQAP merits his attention. This will be difficult: Yemen is a place with a lot of problems. Water and oil are running out, there are more or less perennial rebellions both north and south, the population is high half the day on qat, and the authority of the government barely extends to the outskirts of Sanaa, the capital.
In Syria, the process of popular protest is far less advanced, but firing on demonstrators by the security forces has reaped an increase in demonstrations in the south. No telling whether the Syrians have the stomach to go all the way to revolution, and Bashar al Assad is a clever autocrat. But he too is lacking resources and tied to Iran in ways that make it difficult for him to do what most Syrians want: an opening to the West and foreign investment, which necessarily entails reducing ties to Iran and Hizbollah and settling up somehow with Israel. Syria also has ethnic and sectarian issues: Kurdish citizens treated as second class and a Sunni majority governed by an Alawhite (more or less Shia) but secular majority.
Bahrain, now under Gulf Cooperation Council protection, seems to be doing its best to turn its rebellion into sectarian strife, which is not how it began. It is hard to believe that is in the interests of the (Sunni) Khalifa monarchy, which governs a less than prosperous Shia majority. But when Saudi Arabia decides to embrace you, I guess you have to hug back.
It has already been an extraordinary few weeks in North Africa. While the monarchies in Jordan, Morocco and Saudi Arabia seem to be learning how to keep the lid on, the pot is boiling over in Yemen and may still do so in Syria and Bahrain. It would be nice if the heat rose under the Iranian pot, but that does not appear to be happening, no matter how often the Secretary of State and the President wish it so.
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Counter revolution advances, not only in Libya
With the U.S. and Europe hesitating to take action against Gaddafi, the counter-revolution is in full swing, not only in Libya. The Saudis have prevented any sizable demonstrations and have sent military forces into Bahrain to reinforce its effort to repress the demonstrations, which yesterday focused on Manama’s financial district. In Yemen, seven were killed over the weekend and many more injured as the government used deadly force against university demonstrators. Demonstrators and local doctors are also claiming that some sort of illegal poison gas was used:
In Libya, Gaddafi’s forces have taken Brega and are headed east towards Benghazi. The once hopeful rebellion appears headed for defeat, if not oblivion. The past several days of inaction have had serious consequences, as Tripoli has used its unchallenged air force and superior fire power to force the rebels out of several key positions. Libyan forces are now approaching Adjabiya. Their long supply lines now represent the last, best hope of the rebellion to prevent the fall of Benghazi.
Will these reversals encourage conservative forces in Tunisia and Egypt to hold on to what positions they can, or even strike back to counter changes already in progress? Are the reversals temporary setbacks, or are we witnessing the end of the (early) Arab spring? Will the protesters find ways of reviving their efforts? Will the regimes turn their backs on protester aspirations or look for ways to offer more meaningful reforms? Lots of questions, few answers.
PS: Little did I know when I wrote this that Jackson Diehl had already asked similar questions, with a somewhat more pessimistic spin, in this morning’s Washington Post.
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Not yet time to use oil reserves
Dan Yergin is right: it is not yet time to use the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). Why not?
The 727 billion barrel SPR is intended for use in an oil supply disruption. Libya has partially disrupted its own oil supplies, but they are relatively small, about 1.5 million barrels per day of exports. Oil prices are spiking, but not because of the Libyan supply disruption. As Yergin says, they are anticipating risks in the future, risks like demonstrations in Saudi Arabia that might disrupt the massive supplies that come from its Shia-populated Eastern Province.
We should be urging oil exporting countries to increase their production in response to higher prices, which they are likely to do in any case, and holding our own reserves in reserve for the possibility that things will get worse, possibly much worse. The market is telling us that is a real possibility.
I spent the years 1982-85, when oil prices fell sharply, preparing for an oil supply disruption and the resulting spike in prices as the U.S. representative to the emergency committee at the International Energy Agency. I trust the plans we developed then for a coordinated (with friends and allies) draw of oil stocks early in a supply disruption have been much improved since. Relatively small emergency drawdowns of the SPR were authorized during Desert Storm in 1991 and after Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Loans and exchanges have been used to meet other exigencies.
I understand that there is a real need for the White House to be seen as doing something to counter the rise in oil prices and defend the economic recovery. But there is a real risk that turmoil in the Middle East will eventually disrupt many millions of barrels per day of oil supply, making things much worse than they are today. I’d wait to see the whites of oil disruption’s eyes before using our most important, but inherently limited, weapon to defend against a price spike.
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What will Friday prayers bring?
Tomorrow is Friday again, and across the “greater” Middle East there will be prayers and restlessness. The big questions:
- Saudi Arabia: intellectuals have been signing petitions in favor of constitutional monarchy, but the experts are still betting that people will not go the street–it is illegal to demonstrate, and socially disapproved. We’ll see.
- Libya: most of the country is liberated already, but will crowds risk turning out in Tripoli?
- Egypt: Mubarak’s buddy prime minister, Ahmed Shafiq, has stepped down. El Baradei at least is calling this a turning point. Will it open the way for real regime change that the military has been resisting?
- Tunisia: Ben Ali’s buddy prime minister has already stepped down, opening the way for real change, but the country is burdened with refugees from Libya. The Brits are at least trying to relieve that burden.
- Yemen: President Saleh has said he’ll step down in 2013. The political party opposition, buoyed by tribal support, is proposing he do it by the end of this year. Will that be enough to split his opponents and save his tuchas?
- Bahrain: formal opposition parties have presented reform demands in an opening bid for negotiations with the monarchy. Will that split them from the demonstrators?
- Iraq: The violent crackdown last weekend amplified what otherwise might have been relatively quiet demonstrations against corruption and for better services. Has the government learned its lesson?
- Jordan and Syria: little noise, as their king who allows demonstrations and president who doesn’t try to feed a reform half loaf to relatively weak oppositions. Will they succeed?
- Iran: crackdown in full swing with the arrest of Green Movement stars Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi and their wives. Ahmedinejad is increasingly dominant and effective against both clerical and lay opponents, inside and outside the regime. Can he keep it up?
I can’t remember a time I looked forward so much to Friday, with anticipation but also with trepidation. The world could be looking very different by Sunday.
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Trying to see the humor in it
Three video items that have come to my attention today, causing my darker humor bone to vibrate:
1. Berlusconi kissing Gaddafi’s hand, courtesy of PressTV (they might have a bit of an ax to grind):
2. Saif al Islam selling snake oil to Christiane Amanpour, who isn’t buying, courtesy of the Daily Beast:
3. A bit of fun at the Saudi King’s expense, courtesy of Emma Sky:
For those interested in more serious fare, try the Ottaways’ Of Revolutions, Regime Change, and State Collapse in the Arab World – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
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