Tag: Somalia
Peace picks, April 2 – April 8
- Cross-Strait Relations Under the Trump Administration | Monday, April 2 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Stimson Center | Register here |
Since the unprecedented phone call between President Trump and Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen in December 2016, the Trump administration’s approach to Taiwan has fluctuated. The latest twist came on March 16 when President Trump signed the Taiwan Travel Act. This law, which permits American officials to visit their counterparts in Taiwan and encourages high-level officials from Taiwan to visit the U.S., prompted a strong protest from Beijing. On the heels of the signing of the TTA, the U.S. sent two deputy assistant secretaries of state to Taiwan. Given these developments, where will relations between U.S., the PRC, and Taiwan go from here? Join us for a timely conversation between Bonnie Glaser, Director of the China Power Project at CSIS, and Yun Sun and Yuki Tatsumi, Co-Directors of Stimson’s East Asia Program. A light lunch will be served.
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- Syria and the Outside Powers: What They Want and Can They Have It? | Monday, April 2 | 1:30pm – 3:00pm | Wilson Center | Register here |
The Syrian civil war is many overlapping conflicts, including the competition and cooperation among outside powers vying to protect their interests, often at the expense of Syria’s sovereignty. What are Russian, Iranian, Turkish, Israeli, and American objectives in Syria, and can they achieve them? Join us as four analysts of Syria and the region address the issue of outside powers and the future of Syria. A conversation with Paul du Quenoy (Associate Professor of History at American University of Beirut), Amy Austin Holmes (Associate Professor of Sociology at American University in Cairo), David Pollock (Kaufman Fellow at the Washington Institute and Director of Project Fikra), and Robin Wright (journalist/author and USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow), with moderator Aaron David Miller (Vice President for New Initiatives and Middle East Program Director at the Wilson Center). There will be a webcast of this event.
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- Iraq and Syria: Views from the U.S. Administration, Military Leaders and the Region | Tuesday, April 3 | 10:00am – 2:30pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
With ISIS driven from its urban strongholds in Iraq and Syria, the urgent task of stabilizing the region – and preventing the return of terrorists – is underway. While Iraq and Syria face many internal challenges and tensions, Iran, Turkey, Arab Gulf State, the United States and Russia are advancing competing agendas. What are the stakes for Iraq, Syria, the region and the world as the struggle for leverage, stability, and reconciliation continues after ISIS? What is the U.S. role? Please join U.S. Administration and military leaders, senior Iraqi representatives and regional experts as they explore one of the most complex and consequential conflicts of our time.
On Panel 1 (10:00am – 11:00), A Pivotal Moment for Iraq – Amb. Fareed Yasseen (Ambassador to the United States, Republic of Iraq), Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman (Kurdistan Regional Government Representative to the United States), and Sarhang Hamasaeed (Director, Middle East Programs, U.S. Institute of Peace), with Amb. Alberto Fernandez (President, Middle East Broadcasting Networks) as moderator.
On Panel 2 (11:20am – 12:30pm), Entering the Post-ISIS Era: Iraq and Its Neighbors – Dr. Elie Abouaoun (Director, Middle East and North Africa Programs, U.S. Institute of Peace), Dr. Mark N. Katz (Professor of Government and Politics, George Mason University), Alireza Nader (Senior International/Defense Researcher, RAND), and Mona Yacoubian (Senior Advisor for Syria, U.S. Institute of Peace), with Kevin Baron (Founding Executive Editor, Defense One) as moderator.
On the Keynote Panel (1:30pm – 2:30pm), Fraught Terrain: Stabilizing Iraq and Syria After ISIS – Gen. Joseph L. Votel (CENTCOM Commander), Amb. Mark Green (Administrator, USAID), and Brett McGurk (Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, U.S. Department of State), with Stephen J. Hadley (Chair, Board of Directors, U.S. Institute of Peace) as moderator.
Network lunch will be held with box lunch provided; RSVP required.
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- The Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen | Thursday, April 5 | 2:00pm – 3:00pm | CSIS | Register here |
Labeled the worst humanitarian crisis in today’s world, the conflict in Yemen is entering its fourth year. To understand the impact the war is having on the Yemeni people, and the challenges it poses to policymakers, join us for a discussion with David Miliband (President and CEO, International Rescue Committee) which will be followed by a panel discussion with Barbara Bodine (Director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University), Peter Salisbury (Senior Consulting Fellow, Chatham House), and Abdulrahman Al-Eryani (International Economist and Development Specialist).
This event will be webcast live.
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- The Future of the JCPOA: Implications for the U.S., Its Allies, and Adversaries | Thursday, April 5 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |
The future of the Iran nuclear deal may soon be clarified. President Trump has asked Congress and our European allies for revisions to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by May 12, and in the meantime will be advised about how and whether to continue American participation in that plan by a significantly reorganized foreign policy team—including new leadership at the State Department, National Security Council, and CIA. Join a panel of experts to explore near-term U.S. policy options, and their international ramifications, with respect to the JCPOA. Including New America International Security Fellow Oubai Shahbandar; Hudson Institute Adjunct Fellow Michael Pregent; Heritage Foundation Policy Analyst Michaela Dodge; Foundation for Defense of Democracies Freedom Scholar Michael Ledeen; and Foundation for Defense of Democracies Senior Advisor Richard Goldberg.
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- Seeking Solutions for Somalia | Friday, April 6 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Brookings Institution | Register here |
Despite important progress through years of international counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and state-building assistance, peace and sustainable stabilization remain elusive in Somalia. Pernicious governance processes give continual lease on life to al-Shabab and other destabilizing armed actors. Improving governance and state-building—and subjecting Somalia’s governments and powerbrokers to accountability—are fundamental for conflict reduction and eventual stabilization. On April 6, Brookings Senior Fellow Vanda Felbab-Brown will brief her December 2017 fieldwork in Somalia and review key security and political developments. Landry Signé, a David M. Rubenstein fellow in the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative, will discuss how the persistence of bad governance, corruption, marginalization, and economic mismanagement have led to state failure and insecurity in the country. Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon will moderate the discussion.
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- Iran’s Sunnis Resist Extremism, But for How Long? | Friday, April 6 | 10:30am – 12:00pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
Iran, a predominantly Shia nation, has a substantial Sunni minority estimated at 15 million of its 80 million population. Politically and economically disadvantaged, these Sunnis receive relatively little attention compared to other minorities and are potential victims of radicalization as tensions flare between regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Atlantic Council’s Future of Iran Initiative invites you to a discussion of Iran’s Sunnis and the launch of a new paper, Iran’s Sunnis Resist Extremism, But for How Long?, by veteran journalist Scheherezade Faramarzi. Faramarzi, who has covered Iran and the Middle East for four decades, traveled in 2015 and 2016 to the southern Iranian province of Hormozgan on the Persian Gulf and also conducted interviews by phone and in person in the United Arab Emirates and with experts based in Europe. Also featuring expert on Middle Eastern and South Asian affairs Fatemeh Aman and Future of Iran Initiative Director Barbara Slavin as moderator.
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Inclusion prevents conflict
I spent part of the morning listening to presentations on the new UN/World Bank study Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict, which at 341 pages will take me and you a while to digest. Gary Milante of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ably moderated. Here are some of the salient points made at today’s session. I take notes on my phone, so no doubt I’ve missed some nuances and may well have made mistakes, for which I apologize in advance to both readers and presenters in advance.
Chuck Call, American University professor:
- Violent conflict has been worsening since 2010, largely due to the Middle East and terrorism.
- Vertical inequality (of income presumably) does not unequivocally correlate with violence, but horizontal inequality (between groups) does.
- Actors, leaders, and narratives are critical, institutions less so in this report than in the prior one.
- States are however key actors, but so too are sub-national and regional actors.
- Main sectors of contestation include land, political power, and services, with the main issue being exclusion.
- The costs of responding to violence are prohibitive; prevention is a good investment.
Chuck added some thoughts about future research directions that I won’t try to reproduce, except to say that they included the dynamics of exclusion as well as how and when it leads to violence. Here are his powerpoint slides.
Sara Batmanglich, peace and conflict adviser, OECD:
She underlined that the report is a unique joint effort of the UN and World Bank that puts people at the focus and suggests that we need far more attention to their feelings of hope, entitlement, dignity, shame, exclusion, empowerment and frustration, as well as their modes of coping. The report also suggests we need to reexamine how the $181 billion per year in aid from OSCE countries is spent, $74 billion in fragile states but only 1/3 of that on key arenas of conflict. There is an unfortunate bias towards very small (<$10k) and large projects (>$10 million), which is unfortunate since most conflict-relevant projects lie somewhere in that gap. We need to learn to build social cohesion and trust as well as develop economies.
Victoria Walker, assistant director at the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces:
The report emphasizes governance issues, especially for the security sector, where too much of our effort is still devoted to “train and equip” and too little to governance issues like accountability and transparency. We need better indicators for these issues, as well as more focus on gender. Decentralization, which is emphasized in the report, is not only something good but also presents serious challenges from a governance perspective.
Seth Kaplan, who teaches here at SAIS:
- Leadership is key: it is needed to build trust across divides, promote dialogue and build inclusive institutions.
- Change depends on forming a coalition of actors committed to moving in a positive (peacebuilding) direction.
- Incentives are important, but they are not absolutes or unchangeable: they depend on framing and ideas.
- Group dynamics are important, especially how groups form, evolve and sometimes move towards polarization and mobilization.
- No state can be successful without national identity, so nationalism is an important force that we need to support.
- Redistribution of resources/services may be important to reducing conflict, but we need to be careful about backlash from those who lose privileges or resources.
- Commerce and entrepreneurialism have greater potential than we are currently exploiting for bridging divides.
- The state is not necessarily the central actor, so we sometimes need to work at the subnational level, to build peace by piece in countries like Somalia and Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as others.
Here are Seth’s slides.
There was only one clear point of contention. Chuck dissented on nationalism: he thought international institutions have no business in the nation-building business, only in state-building.
I was with Seth on that one: in places like Kosovo and Afghanistan, there is no way of avoiding implicit if not explicit support for the central government in its efforts to establish legitimacy with its entire population. And if it is not trying to do that, maybe you shouldn’t be supporting it with international assistance. Of course a country’s citizens and government are primarily responsible for their own identities, but I don’t see how we avoid putting a thumb on that scale.
I look forward to reading the report, which based on these notes sounds pretty interesting.
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The Iran threat
In his opening remarks at the Atlantic Council’s “Pushback: Exposing and Countering Iran” event on Thursday, September 14, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad addressed an American audience on the importance of paying close attention to Iran and its activity in the Middle East. He emphasized that a future in which Iran dominates the Middle East is not in the interest of the United States and that the United States should adopt certain approaches to decreasing the threat that Iran poses. The event included two panels, each discussing a report published by the Atlantic Council. The first panel assessed and described Iran’s activity in the region, and the second made practical recommendations directed towards the US administration.
To contextualize the issue, the first panel, based on the report “Revolution Unveiled: A Closer Look at Iran’s Presence and Influence in the Middle East,” began by examining evidence pointing to Iran’s increasing influence across the Middle East and identified some ways in which it maintains and increases that influence. Phillip Smyth of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (one of the authors of the report) and Tim Michetti of Conflict Armament Research explored Iran’s use of networks of loyal groups and militias and its role in arming these militias as two tactics that Iran has been using.
According to Smyth, Iran is actively expanding its list of primarily Shi’a groups and militias loyal to Tehran, using them as proxies in conflict zones such as Yemen, Syria, and Iraq, and financing them in an effort to become known as protectors of Shi’a groups. The importance of these groups lies not only in their number and the amount of territory which they span (Smyth mentioned mapping at least 40 groups aligned with Iran in Syria alone), but also in the image that they are able to convey of Iran’s strength and importance.
The appearance of these groups with weapons acquired through Iran is one significant way in which Iran accomplishes its goals. To demonstrate, Smyth referred to an image of a militia fighter carrying an AM-50 (Sayyad-2) rifle. The rifle, he explained, tends to appear with groups thought to be financed by Iran and in areas in which Iran possesses influence, and the wide circulation of the image serves as a possible announcement of Iran’s strengths.
Tim Michetti of Conflict Armament Research continued to demonstrate Iran’s apparent influence through weaponry, referring to two cases in particular. The first was the seizing of dhows in the Arabian Gulf that were headed from Iran to Somalia in 2016. The dhows contained Iranian and Russian rifles and weapons, labeled and in serial order, normally indicative of their belonging to a state. This indicated that Iran was sending weapons from its stockpile to armed groups. The second case involved the shipment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Houthi rebels in Yemen. The UAVs received resembled those manufactured by Iran, suggesting once again that Iran is supplying Shi’a forces with weapons across the region.
While Smyth and Michetti presented a picture of an Iran growing in power by the minute, Elisabeth Kendall of the Atlantic Council warned against overestimating Iran’s power. Kendall assessed that much of Iran’s influence is solely in appearance. She referred to the case of Yemen, where, through publicizing its alignment with the Houthis, Iran “antagonized” Saudi Arabia into joining the war, after which it significantly decreased its involvement, switching over instead into the role of peacemaker and leaving Saudi Arabia as the instigator of war in the country, diminishing its credibility. In this way, Iran has been able to “talk up” its involvement, spending less money than it appears to on rebel fighters while still increasing its influence and challenging its regional rivals.
Melissa Dalton of the Center for Strategic and International Studies contributed to this analysis by suggesting that Iran’s main strengths include its creativity and adaptability, traits that it has had to learn over time due to the isolation that it has experienced. Its tendency to use unconventional methods, however, has entrapped it in what Dalton described as a “vicious cycle,” in which the international community responds to Iran’s actions by increasing punishments, causing Iran to once again resort to “asymmetric” retaliation.
While a discussion on practical solutions was reserved for the upcoming panel, the panelists offered some suggestions, primarily related to the US’s outlook on the issue. Kendall’s comment offers an applicable piece of advice, as she urged the audience to approach Iran’s actions with a “healthy skepticism,” avoiding the polarization that often occurs when talking about Iran. Instead of suggesting, as some do, that Iran has a hand in all that occurs in the region, or inferring that it is completely uninvolved, Kendall suggested that one should instead adopt a middle path. A more rational approach to the challenge that Iran poses to the United States, backed with concrete evidence and that allows for a measured response, would be best.
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Peace picks July 17-21
- Mosul after ISIS: Whither U.S. Policy in Iraq | Monday, July 17 | 2:00 – 3:00 pm | Wilson Center | Register Here | The liberation of Mosul from ISIS control is a major win for the Iraqi government, the United States, and the campaign to defeat the terrorist group – but a critically important question now looms: How can the U.S. ensure that military victory against ISIS doesn’t turn into political defeat in Iraq? Join the Wilson Center as former U.S. policy advisers Anthony J. Blinken, Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, Colin Kahl, and Robert Malley address these and related questions in a teleconference.
- Cyber Risk Monday: The Darkening Web | Monday, July 17 | 3:30 pm | Atlantic Council | Register Here | No single invention of the last few decades has disrupted the nature of political conflict like the Internet, which is increasingly used as a weapon by actors eager to exploit or curtail global connectivity in order to further their interests. This Atlantic Council discussion celebrating the launch of Alexander Klimberg’s new book The Darkening Web: The War for Cyberspace brings together intelligence specialist Laura Galante, former Deputy Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security Jane Holl Lute, Atlantic Council president and CEO Fred Kempe, and author Alexander Klimberg himself to discuss the chilling consequences the emergence of cyberspace as a new field of conflict has had on the global order. The discussion will be moderated by Tal Kopan.
- Seventh Annual CSIS South China Sea Conference | Tuesday, July 18 | 9:00 am | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register Here | This full-day conference will provide opportunities for in-depth discussion and analysis of the future of the South China Sea disputes, and potential responses, amid policy shifts in Beijing, Manila, and Washington. Panels include “Renewing American Leadership in the Asia-Pacific” (9:00 am) featuring Sen. Cory Gardner, “State of Play in the South China Sea Over the Past Year” (9:45 am), “Militarization, Counter-coercion, and Capacity Building” (1:45 pm), and “U.S. South China Sea Policy under the New Administration” (3:15 pm).
- Anticipating and Mitigating Future Iranian Military Capabilities | Tuesday, July 18 | 10:00 am | International Institute for Strategic Studies | Register Here | In accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, Iran will soon be allowed to procure advanced military equipment from international suppliers. How Tehran decides to recapitalize its military could have a profound impact on the security and stability of the Gulf and wider Middle East. VADM (Retd) John ‘Fozzie’ Miller, Michael Eisenstadt, and Michael Elleman will discuss the weaponry Iran is likely to seek, how the acquisition of new capabilities will alter the security environment in the Gulf, and the steps the US and its allies in the region must take now to maximize regional security.
- Latin America Terror Trials | Tuesday, July 18 | 3:00 pm | Center for a Secure Free Society | Register Here | In April 2017, Brazil successfully prosecuted the first case of Islamist terrorism in Latin America’s history when it sentenced eight ISIS sympathizers for terror-related charges. In Peru, the prosecution had less success in prosecuting an alleged Hezbollah operative accused of manipulating explosives in 2014. Meanwhile, Argentina is advancing several cases tied to the 1994 Iranian-backed bombing in Buenos Aires of the AMIA cultural center. Join Hon. Marcos Josegrei da Silva, Moisés Vega de la Cruz, and Ricardo Neeb for a policy discussion on how the U.S. Government and civil society could collaborate with Latin American nations to enact or strengthen laws before the next major Islamist terror attack strikes the region. (Part of the discussion will be in Spanish with continuous interpretation.)
- Recovery in Somalia: How Do We Sustain Gains Against al-Shabab? | Tuesday, July 18 | 10:30 – 11:00 am | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here | Somalia’s tenuous progress toward stability will only be sustained if the newly elected government steps up delivery of desperately-needed services to its citizens, offering a viable alternative to al-Shabab extremists. Yet six million Somalis are at risk of famine due to drought, and the looming drawdown of the regional peacekeeping force, AMISOM, threatens to derail the country’s fragile transition if the training of Somali forces is not expedited. Former Somali Minister of Planning and International Cooperation Abdirahman Yusuf Ali Aynte (Abdi Aynte) and U.S. Institute of Peace President Nancy Lindborg will discuss the challenges and potential solutions in a webcast conversation.
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A bona fide boon to lawyers
That’s what the Supreme Court has decided you need: a bona fide (genuine, real, sincere, non-deceptive) relationship with an individual or entity in the US to come here from six Muslim-majority countries (Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, Sudan, and Yemen). President Trump is claiming this vindicates his effort to block all immigration and refugees from these allegedly dangerous countries, from which no terrorist has arrived since 9/11.
Far from it. The merits of the bans he ordered will be considered in the fall. For now, all the Court has decided is that people without a bona fide relationship with the US are not entitled to the ban on the travel ban issued by lower courts.
The question then becomes: what is a bona fide relationship? The Court made clear that category includes familial relations as well as contractual ones, like documented admission to a US university. The only clearly excluded category would be relationships that are deceptive, for example one entered into for the sole purpose of getting into the US.
So the consequence of this decision, as the dissenting minority that wanted to back Trump more fully said, will be a flood of litigation to determine what is a bona fide relationship with a US individual (notable: not necessarily a citizen) or entity. Is an invitation to speak at a conference evidence of such a relationship? Do hotel reservations or airline tickets qualify? What about acceptance into a refugee resettlement program sponsored by the State Department? I’m fairly confident this is a slippery slope to admitting many people.
The problem is that the public image will lean heavily in Trump’s direction, not least because of his exaggerated claim to vindication. This will encourage immigration officials to take a draconian attitude towards enforcement. It will also offend Muslims worldwide, who don’t like the restrictions:
In fact, the countries where majorities like the restrictions are mainly those where ethnic nationalism is rampant: Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Israel fit that category.
Al Qaeda and the Islamic State also relish Trump’s hostility to Muslims, which confirms their assertions about the US and the need to attack it. Trump’s crowing about this Supreme Court decision could easily boost extremist recruitment, both inside and outside the US. The restrictions will likely cause more terrorism than they prevent–it will take only one such act inside the US by someone from one of these countries to prove that point.
Trump however will try to use any terrorist attack in the opposite direction. He all too obviously sees such attacks as opportunities to make his political points. He has used each and every attack in Europe as an opportunity to generate antipathy toward Muslims in general. He’ll no doubt amplify that attitude if and when there is an attack in the US, thus generating more resentment and helping extremist recruitment.
It is true of course that he also has friends in the Muslim world: autocrats like Saudi Arabia’s King Salman, Turkey’s President Erdogan and Egypt’s President Sissi have nothing to fear from this president, who has ignored their brutal and indiscriminate crackdowns on liberal democrats as well as terrorists. Citizens, residents and travelers through those three countries have been involved in terrorist acts in Europe and the US since 9/11, but Trump wouldn’t want to offend his friends by blocking their citizens from the US.
We face another round on the immigration ban at the Supreme Court in the fall, with lots of litigation in the meanwhile. This Administration is a big boon for lawyers.
PS: If you don’t like that chart, try this one:
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Escalation
Military escalation is happening in several places these days:
- Syria: in addition to the March cruise missile strike on a Syrian base in retaliation for the use of chemical weapons, we’ve seen in the past couple of weeks US attacks on Iranian-backed forces approaching US-backed forces, downing of at least two Iranian-built drones, and downing of a Syrian warplane. Tehran and Damascus are pressing hard in eastern Syria, in an effort to deny the US and its allies post-war dominance there.
- Yemen: the Saudis and Emirates are continuing their campaign against the Houthis while the Americans amp up their campaign against Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. Today’s promotion of Mohammed bin Salman, the architect of the Saudi intervention in Yemen, to Crown Prince of the Kingdom presages more rather than less war there.
- Somalia: the Administration has expanded AFRICOM’s latitude in attacking al Shabaab militants, who are proving more resilient than many anticipated.
- Afghanistan: the White House has delegated authority to increase US forces to the military, which intends to deploy several thousand more Americans to help the Afghans counter the Taliban.
- Russia: Moscow’s warplanes have been conducting provocative maneuvers against NATO for some time, and yesterday a NATO F-16 allegedly approached a Russian plane carrying the Defense Minister.
Meanwhile Iraq’s disparate security forces are closing in on Mosul, civil wars continue in Libya and Mali, and North Korea continues to test its increasingly long-range missiles.
This military escalation is occurring in a vacuum of diplomatic and civilian efforts. Syria talks sponsored by Turkey, Iran and Russia are slated to reconvene soon in Astana, but prospects for serious progress there on military de-escalation are poor. The UN-sponsored political talks in Geneva are stalled. Planning for governance of Raqqa after the defeat of the Islamic State there is unclear.
The UN has announced a new Yemen Special Representative of the Secretary General, but it will be some time before he can relaunch its efforts. The UN-backed government in Libya is still unable to exert authority, especially over the eastern part of the country. The UN’s Mali mission has been suffering casualties, inhibiting any civilian efforts there. President Trump has tweeted the failure of Chinese diplomacy (more accurately, his diplomacy with China) to produce results with North Korea.
None of this should surprise. Apart from North Korea, the Americans are committed to not relying on diplomacy (in particular through the UN) and to avoiding anything resembling state-building. While they may sometimes think about financing removal of rubble or mines in newly liberated areas of Syria, they are determined to avoid any responsibility for governance or law and order. The Trump Administration wants to follow the formula Bush 43 tried in Afghanistan: kill the Islamic State and Al Qaeda enemies and get out. The failure of that approach has apparently been forgotten.
The only substantial diplomatic effort the Trump Administration has been pursuing is with Israel and Palestine, where there is an almost 70-year record of failures, with only occasional, if important, moments of partial success (I am thinking of the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, not the Oslo accords). No one is taking bets that Jason Greenblatt’s efforts will succeed, though they may restrain the Israelis a bit and produce some modest improvements in the conditions under which Palestinians live. The two-state solution is, however, as far off as it has ever been.
The worst may be yet to come. The Trump Administration has aligned itself firmly with Israel, the Saudis, and the UAE against Iran. The Iranians seem increasingly determined to carve out their Shia crescent from Iraq through Syria and Lebanon all the way to the Mediterranean. We are on a collision course with Tehran, even if the nuclear deal hold for now
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