Tag: South Africa
Stevenson’s army, May 18 and 19
This is from yesterday: We’re back from travel and I’ve only begun to look at the accumulated papers. More to come. Meanwhile, these worthwhile pieces:
– Steve Walt has good advice on how people with master’s degrees can have good foreign policy careers.
– WOTR warns of the seduction of buzzwords.
-Substack columnist Noah Smith has interview with China specialist who has the best analysis I’ve seen of China’s tech policies.
– Media critic Dan Froomkin hits WaPo for not curating its classified leaks. I agree.
– I also agree with this call for beefing up CRS.
– NYT had fine profile of CIA director Burns.
In more recent news: US & allies disagree on F16s to Ukraine.
-Taiwan’s opposition has an interesting candidate.
– CFIUS may be used for Forbes acquisition.
– NYT questions Pentagon rules for special forces.
– FT says South Africa may face severe US sanctions
– Teixeira’s supervisors warned him about classified procedures but didn’t stop him.
Charlie posted this today:
– State has released a new foreign military sales policy, WSJ explains
– Pentagon acknowledges $3 billion accounting error, freeing more money for Ukraine.
– Assad is back in the good graces of the Arab League.
– Politico explain the legislative complexity of passing a debt ceiling bill.
– Glenn Kessler uses the example of “VA cuts” to explain how Ds & Rs argue over the GOP bill. [The point is that discretionary spending cuts are required but not identified.]
Good think pieces: By SAIS Prof Frank Gavin
– On Marine Corps reform
– On future Eurasian security
– And if you’re a subscriber, Economist has a new “defence” news site.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, March 21
– AP quotes Indo-Pacific commander, saying China has militarized at least 3 islands in SCS.
– WSJ says US sending Patriot missiles to Saudi Arabia.
– FT says Russian tactics look like war in Finland in 1940.
– FT explains South African silence on Ukraine.
-WSJ sees Russia shifting to new war plan.
– CFR analysts see China helping Russia hide money.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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It ain’t over until Kim Jong-un sings
North Korea has agreed to talks on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as well as suspension of its nuclear and missile tests while the talks proceed. US/South Korean military exercises will continue as scheduled.
So what does Kim Jong-un get? He gets a big prize: a meeting with the US President, by May. For a brutal regime under tight sanctions that fears for its continued existence, that’s a big prize. Once upon a time, the US used to refuse to meet at all with North Korea, except in the context of the “six party talks” (that’s North and South Korea, China, Japan, Russia, and the US). Kim can’t take a meeting literally to the bank, but it is not surprising he values a North Korean leader’s first encounter with the US President, especially as the sanctions are biting. The Trump Administration merits credit for that.
Of course we’ve been to talks with North Korea on nuclear issues many times in the past. It’s a history that does not inspire confidence. There have been lots of failures, and even the negotiating successes haven’t lasted. North Korea has notoriously cheated on its obligations, including by selling sensitive technology to other countries. Not to mention that it is a brutal and oppressive dictatorship that treats its own people badly. And we haven’t always been sterling at maintaining our part of the bargains in a timely way. So good as the news is, it would be a mistake to get too excited, as Michael O’Hanlon reminded us just this morning.
That said, blocking or rolling back the North Korean missile and nuclear programs is a worthy goal. The threat to the continental US is still hypothetical, but the threat to US forces and our allies in South Korea, Japan, and Guam is all too real already. So too is the risk that North Korea’s successful nuclear and missile programs will inspire similar programs by South Korea or Japan, thus blowing a big hole in the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, which has helped to contain the spread of nuclear weapons to a relatively few countries (in addition to the Perm 5, India and Pakistan, Israel, and South Africa, which gave them up after apartheid ended, as did Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union).
Even a freeze in the North Korean nuclear and missile testing is worth something. Its programs were making far more rapid than intelligence agencies anticipated if we believe what is said in the press. Of course Pyongyang can always restart its testing, whereas we can’t undo a meeting with the President. We can however keep the sanctions in place. We’d best do so. It ain’t over until Kim Jong-un sings a far better tune than temporary suspension of testing.
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Nonproliferation shortcomings
Pantelis Ikonomou, former International Atomic Energy Agency nuclear safeguards inspector, writes:
The on-going North Korean nuclear crisis, in addition to the previous nuclear crises with Iraq and Iran, demonstrates that we lack a coherent, peaceful approach to respond decisively to major nuclear proliferation threats.
In all three cases, world leaders have wavered between war and diplomacy. The results have been suboptimal.
Iraq: war was an excessive response
In September 1980, Iranian airplanes bombed Iraq’s* French-origin research reactor Osiraq. The facility was partially destroyed. Teheran called the attack a preventive act. Notably, Iraq was a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), subject to international Safeguards inspections, and free of anomaly reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Eight months later, in June 1981, the Israeli air force destroyed the Osiraq reactor. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the UN General Assembly, and the world’s mass media rebuked the Israelis for the attack. Remarkably, the US administration called it an act of defense.
In 2003, the United States accused Iraq of having restarted a nuclear weapons program. Reference was made to nuclear weapons related activities, detected in 1991 during the first war Gulf War. This embryonic nuclear program was destroyed by international inspectors immediately thereafter. The IAEA did not support the 2003 allegations. Nonetheless, the US decided that diplomacy had failed and, without UN endorsement, invaded Iraq with a coalition of the willing.
The 2003 invasion of Iraq did not disclose a clandestine nuclear weapons program. In 2005, the IAEA’s Director General ElBaradei and nuclear inspectors were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
Iran: limited diplomatic postponement
Iran’s nuclear program included sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities, such as enrichment and reprocessing. These were conducted in line with the NPT, but nonetheless contained a possible military dimension. The existence of dual-purpose nuclear activities within the NPT constitutes the Treaty’s Achilles heel. While presumed nefarious intentions can cause heightened alertness, they cannot be legally penalized.
Iran’s steady development of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities caused international concern that slowly developed into a crisis. In the years after 2006, the UNSC imposed economic and trade sanctions, leading to diplomatic negotiations with Iran by the P5+1: the US, Russia, China, UK, France plus Germany. The July 2015 P5+1 nuclear agreement imposes a 10- 15-year reduction and freeze of Iran’s sensitive activities along with gradual lifting of sanctions.
IAEA inspectors are monitoring and verifying the implementation of an agreed plan, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. If Iran breaks out of the 2015 agreement, it would need ten months or longer to produce the nuclear material required for a nuclear weapon, which is enough time for response measures.
North Korea: an on-going threat
North Korea joined the IAEA in 1974, signed the NPT in 1985 and in 1992 signed its NPT Safeguards Agreement. From the very beginning, Pyongyang’s behavior was not consistent with its binding international commitments. Already in 1992, IAEA inspectors found inconsistencies in North Korea’s declarations and the year after North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT.
Just one day before the withdrawal was due to take effect, the US persuaded North Korea to suspend its decision. Six months later, in December 1993, IAEA Director General Hans Blix announced that the Agency could no longer provide “any meaningful assurances” that North Korea was not producing nuclear weapons.
A US initiative saved the situation. On 21 October 1994, an Agreed Framework was signed between the US and North Korea in Geneva. The UNSC then requested the IAEA to monitor the freeze of North Korea’s nuclear facilities under the Agreed Framework.
In December 2002, North Korea tampered with IAEA surveillance equipment and a few days later requested the immediate removal of IAEA inspectors from the country. Then, on 10 January 2003, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT and in April 2003 declared it had nuclear weapons.
During the six-party talks (USA, China, Russia, South Korea, Japan and North Korea) starting in 2003 on solving North Korea’s nuclear crisis, North Korea was repeatedly accused of violating the Agreed Framework and other international agreements, thus triggering several IAEA and UNSC resolutions.
North Korea’s capability to produce both plutonium and uranium nuclear weapons is rapidly advancing. Its capacity to enrich uranium has doubled in recent years. US and Chinese officials believe that there are more than 20 nuclear bombs in its arsenal.
The best that can be hoped for with North Korea is an immediate freeze of nuclear and ballistic missile activities. A return to zero nuclear weapons capability is a utopian expectation. With only one exception, no non-NPT member with nuclear weapons (India, Pakistan, and possibly Israel) has ever returned to zero nuclear weapons capability or indicated intentions to do so. The one exception is South Africa, which voluntarily destroyed its nuclear weapons in 1990 under IAEA supervision, as apartheid fell.
Conclusions
Though nuclear proliferation is a leading global threat, we have failed to demonstrate sufficient competence in responding.
The rhetoric of terror on both sides combined with the risk of miscalculation or a military error is extremely worrying. It only accelerates a dangerous nuclear vicious cycle.
PS: With apologies to Dr. Ikonomou, this seems an only slightly appropriate place at which to share John Oliver’s view of North Korea and prospects for opening good communications, among other things via the accordion:
*The original mistakenly said “Iran’s.” Apologies for the editorial error.
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New directions for South Africa
Since the end of apartheid in 1994, a coalition of African nationalists, communists, and trade unionists allied with the African National Congress (ANC) have governed South Africa. In the wake of the 2016 local elections, a new contender emerged: the Democratic Alliance. On Friday, the Cato Institute hosted a conversation entitled “South Africa at a Crossroad: Will Growing Opposition Remove the African National Congress from Power?” with Executive Mayor of Johannesburg Herman Mashaba and comments by Richard Tren, Program Officer at the Searle Freedom Trust. Senior Policy Analyst at the Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity Marian L. Tupy moderated the discussion.
[Herman Mashaba, Executive Mayor of Johannesburg]
Despite significant progress in education, healthcare, and economic wellbeing for black South Africans since the days of apartheid, South Africa finds itself in dire straits. The country has fallen into recession for the second time in nine years. The unemployment rate for black youth is above 50%. President Jacob Zuma is embroiled in an email scandal disclosing patronage of the prominent Gupta family, a revelation both Mashaba and Tren identified with a “culture of corruption.”
“The dream of democracy is a dream deferred,” remarked Mashaba. “This is not Nelson Mandela’s dream.”
Following the August 2016 local elections, in which a coalition government headed by the Democratic Alliance beat out the African National Congress for the Johannesburg mayoral seat, Mashaba believes that voters are signaling frustration with the ANC and with corruption.
“In a few years’ time,” he affirmed confidently, “the ANC will be in our history books.”
“Corruption takes food out of the mouth of the poor to fatten the rich, who already live in wasteful abundance,” he continued. Citing his commitment to the creation of an “honest, responsive, and productive government,” Mashaba detailed his initiatives to suspend Johannesburg public servants suspected of corruption. Tren—a white South African—related concerns about ongoing ANC black economic empowerment programs, which he associated with the corruption and cronyism ravaging the country. The ANC’s mandate that mining operations should be 30% black-owned, he opined, was unreasonable.
Tren advised Mashaba not to align himself or the Democratic Alliance too closely with ANC policy in an effort to garner popular support, denouncing the ANC for its habit of choosing “the path of greater government involvement.” President Zuma doesn’t believe in “growing the pie,” he claimed, but rather in “dividing it up and redistributing it.”
In contrast and against the trepidation of at least one audience member, Mashaba praised the Economic Freedom Fighters—a revolutionary socialist political party in coalition with the Democratic Alliance—for their support in helping to pass the Johannesburg municipal budget two weeks ago. “We share the same passion: South Africa,” the self-declared “proud capitalist” insisted.
Among Mashaba’s mayoral objectives are improved social services, care for the environment, pro-poor development, and the safety and security of Johannesburg communities. Although he consistently espoused the importance of supporting small- and medium-sized businesses and cutting red tape, these stances put him at odds with his co-speaker. Tren voiced concerns about the growing welfare state in South Africa and criticized the country’s progressive constitution for its guarantee of “positive rights” such as healthcare and education.
What, then, is the vision for the new, potentially post-ANC South Africa? If the 2016 local elections and Mashaba’s platform are any indication, immediate concerns such as access to basic social services for the poor will continue to figure large in political discourse. Attaining racial equality will exist as an important, but secondary, goal to economic development. In Mashaba’s own words: “Achieving Black ownership is a good [goal], but it has to take place in a stable economic environment with trust between government and business.”
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Mandela, and de Klerk
It would be hard to say anything new about Nelson Mandela after the last day of praise and remembrance. I met him–very briefly–at a UN cocktail party in 1994. All I really remember is his assiduous effort to introduce himself to each of the wait staff. They were thrilled. So was I.
But there are a few things that might bear repetition, if only for emphasis. As correct as it is to celebrate Mandela for his pursuit of justice, it was really his pursuit of peace that made him so unusual. I wouldn’t want to minimize the courage required to stand up against racism in apartheid South Africa, but it took at least as much to stand up to those who thought violence was the only way to bring the system down and then to seek reconciliation with white South Africans in the aftermath.
That would not have been possible but for Mandela’s negotiating partner, F.W. de Klerk. As the last president of apartheid South Africa, he not only released Mandela from jail but cooperated in converting his country to a one-person, one-vote electoral system that necessarily meant the end of white domination, at least at the ballot box. He also ended South Africa’s nuclear weapons program, which was meant to help sustain apartheid.
South Africa managed its transition quickly and well, even if I find it hard to admire its post-apartheid politics (and politicians). The countries I mostly follow in the Balkans and the Middle East are not so much managing their transitions as experiencing them, and things are going slowly by comparison. It seems to me there are at least four reasons: Read more
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