Tag: Stabilization
Reconstruction in the Middle East
On January 16 the Middle East Institute hosted a panel discussion titled, Reconstruction in the Civil War Zones of the Middle East. The panel showcased the upcoming release of the World Bank’s Building for Peace in MENA: Reconstruction for Security, Sustainable Growth and Equity this coming February, the Middle East Institute’s Escaping the Conflict Trap, and Fractured Stability: War Economies and Reconstruction in the MENA.
Speakers on the panel included, Steven Heydemann, nonresident Senior Fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy of the Brookings Institution, Luigi Narbone, Director of the Middle East Directions Programme at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute, Francesca Recanatini Senior Public Sector Specialist in Governance at the World Bank, and Ross Harrison, senior fellow at The Middle East Institute and faculty of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. The panel was moderated by Paul Salem, President of the Middle East Institute.
Inaccurate assumptions
Heydemann criticized three assumptions that the international community typically uses to guide reconstruction efforts that are contextually mistaken:
- War completely destroys the pre-war economy.
- Since pre-war institutions are destroyed, the task of post-conflict is to rebuild states and use this reconstruction effort to avoid future conflict.
- The destruction of the prewar institutions generates constituencies that wholeheartedly support reconstruction.
Heydemann critically analyzed these assumptions in the context of the MENA region, proclaiming that oftentimes in MENA there is continuity in the economic norms and practices during wartime. War even amplifies and further consolidates these norms. Secondly, conflict empowers actors to reimpose institutions they can exploit, reigniting previous conflicts. In the process of power sharing negotiations, weak participants are more concerned with positions than than reconstruction efforts.
Harrison emphasized the need for the right diagnosis of the regional conflicts in order to design proper solutions. He challenged the notion that regional actors are only proxy actors, proclaiming that this model is not complex enough to reflect the actual situation. We need realignment at the international and regional levels to create a cooperative environment for reconstruction to take place in.
Competing powers
Narbone spoke about the typical Western liberal blueprint utilized in post-conflict settings, which is not the only power in the region. The MENA conflicts incorporate a plethora of leaders in the region who do not believe in this model, specifically Russia and Iran. Consensus is lacking on the drivers of conflict, with each participant blaming the others. “Reconstruction fatigue” may be appealing but it will have detrimental effects.
Local participation
Recanatini centered her rhetoric around the World Bank’s upcoming report and the importance of citizen participation. After surveying 15,000 Yemeni, Iraqi, and Libyan citizens, asking “What do you believe has been lacking in previous peacebuilding work in your country?” over 19% of Yemenis interviewed, 18% of Libyans interviewed, and 17% of Iraqis agreed that the international community is lacking a vision guiding peacebuilding. Recanatini emphasized the need for international organizations to speak with different actors to ensure that all parts of society are being incorporated and heard. She also urged thinking outside of mandates and crossing into sectors and areas traditionally unexplored by international organizations.
What now?
The panelists all agreed that while civil war conflict zones in MENA would need billions of dollars for reconstruction, smaller grants of money can be used to set examples. Without this kind of support the resulting society will be full of disparities, hierarchies of privilege, vast discrimination and marginalization, etc. All the panelists posited that there is not just one solution to reconstruction in the context of the Middle East. We must be critical of any assumptions underlying efforts in the region.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Ends and means after the caliphate
On September 10 the Brookings Institution hosted a panel discussion entitled “The Counter-ISIS Coalition: Diplomacy and Security in Action.” The panel featured two former special presidential envoys to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL: General John Allen, current President of Brookings, and Brett McGurk, a nonresident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Lise Grande, who served as Deputy Special Representative of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq during the height of the campaign against ISIS, joined the panel through a video link from Amman. The New Yorker’s Susan B. Glasser moderated.
Allen emphasized that ISIS remains a threat through its residual forces in Syria, the presence of its affiliates in countries like Nigeria, Libya, and the Philippines, and its online influence. McGurk also pointed to the danger of the next generation of jihadi fighters coming from Syria’s al-Hol camp, where 73,000 ISIS women and children are held. Neither the Syrian Democratic Forces who administer the camp nor the US have sufficient resources to manage the threat.
America’s objectives in Syria have broadened under the Trump administration to include countering the remaining ISIS threat, promoting regime change, and removing Iranian forces from the country. Simultaneously, America has reduced the number US troops to around 1000. McGurk stressed that this widening gap between America’s goals in Syria and the resources it has in the country will make it hard to respond to the next crisis. The Turkish-US joint patrols of the safe zone in northern Syria that began last weekend will further draw these limited resources away from managing critical threats like al-Hol.
Both McGurk and Allen attributed the coalition’s successes to three factors: strong American leadership, commitment from an unusually large number of allies, and working by, with, and through local partners that America had previously developed in Iraq. Both argued that in the event of a crisis it would be harder to create a coalition now due to some allies’ loss of trust in American leadership. McGurk also speculated that John Bolton’s departure from the White House will not change these conditions, stating that the Trump administration lacked a functional communication process between the President and the national security adviser prior to Bolton’s tenure.
Grande noted that while UN stabilization usually begins by trying to fixing entire systems, in Iraq they took a bottom-up approach to repairing electricity, water, and sanitation grids. During the stabilization of Ramadi, UN workers coordinated with Iraqi forces to enter cities as soon as they were liberated and set up mobile electricity grids consisting of generators on trucks. They hired local engineers to connect each house to the generators as families returned to them. While past stabilization programs have taken 2 years to reconnect electricity grids, in Ramadi families had power within 2 hours of returning home. Grande described this as both the largest and most successful stabilization effort in the UN’s history, which she said was possible due to the strength of the Iraqi government’s commitment, an Iraqi private sector with great engineering capabilities, and support from the coalition and the United States.
Grande also credits the success the UN had in stabilizing these cities to the premium Iraqi forces placed on protecting civilians and keeping them in their homes when possible. Each morning during the liberation of Mosul, the UN sent the number of empty beds available in their camps to the Iraqi commanders, who structured their battle plan to ensure only that number of civilians were evacuated from their homes. The Iraqi security forces escorted these families across the front lines, checked them for weapons, and delivered them to aid workers, who got them into temporary housing by nightfall.
Grande contrasted this to the average of four weeks it takes civilians to get humanitarian assistance in most active conflict zones. The Iraqi security forces were also able to protect 90% of the residents of East Mosul in their homes, limiting the number of evacuees needing immediate assistance. She concluded that the commitment of the Iraqi government to protecting civilians, support from the Iraqi private sector, and the strength of America’s coalition leadership were critical to the UN’s success in stabilizing newly liberated cities. Without those conditions the UN will not be able to recreate this success in stabilizing future conflict zones.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
One more time: prevention
The Keough School of Global Affairs July 18 hosted a multi-panel event titled “Unity on Global Fragility: Can Today’s Momentum in Washington Stop Tomorrow’s Violent Conflicts?” The event was headlined by Senator Chris Coons (Delaware) and Senator Todd Young (Indiana) who sponsored the Global Fragility Act of 2019. After remarks by Denise Natali, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations at the State Department, a panel discussion was held featuring Pete Marocco, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, Patrick Antonietti, Director of Stabilization and Peace Operations in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of Defense, Shamil Idriss, CEO, Search for Common Ground, and Dafna Rand, Vice President for Policy & Research, Mercy Corps. Uzra Zeya, President and CEO, Alliance for Peacebuilding, moderated.
A second panel followed immediately with Rear Admiral Tim Ziemer (US Navy, Ret.), Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance at USAID, Anne A. Witkowsky, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs, Nancy Lindborg, President and CEO, US Institute of Peace, Jake Harriman, Founder ad CEO ofNuru,and Anselme Wimye, Director of Program Quality, DRC Bukavu Office, Search for Common Ground. The second panel was moderated by George A. Lopez, Rev Theodore M. Hesburgh, Professor Emeritus of Peace Studies, Keough School of Global Affairs. Dean Scott Appleby, Marilyn Keough Dean, Keough School of Global Affairs, University of Notre Dame provided the opening and closing remarks.
Here are 5 takeaways from the event:
1. Prevention is better than reactive response:
Senator Young shared a UN statistic that there are currently more than 400 violent conflicts worldwide and half of the conflicts that ended since 2000 restarted within 7 years. Senator Coons added that the US counter-terrorism strategy since 9/11 has been ineffective and costly, listing Libya and Syria as examples of failure. If the US doesn’t invest in prevention it will end up paying more on the back end. The deployment pace for US troops is too high and often times they are ill equipped to deal with the challenges they face, which don’t require direct application of force. Young quoted Benjamin Franklin’s “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” Ziemer said many USAID operations running now are because of prior ineffectiveness in prevention.
2. Prevention needs more funding, better spending and updated success metrics:
Current spending on preventive measures is inadequate and wastes the limited funds available. Coons stated it costs $1,000,000 for every soldier deployed abroad per year, much more than it would cost to send humanitarian and development workers to stabilize weak countries. Admiral Ziemer added that the $1.2 billion over the next 5 years provided by the Global Fragility Act is a drop in the bucket of the budget. One issue is the difficulty in measuring a non-event, making it harder to justify spending to constituents. How do you value avoided cost and pain? To address this the Senators propose new metrics for success rather than money spent, which isn’t tied to any actual results. Both agree that spending should be monitored and if proven to be ineffective should be reevaluated. Witkoswky mentioned much of the funding comes with constraints hampering progress, highlighting the need for more flexible funding.
3. The problem of risk-aversion:
All the panelists agreed that the State Department is too risk averse. Without taking risks and accepting failures it can’t be effective in the crisis areas that most need its help. Harriman said adopting a “fail fast, learn fast” mentality will allow State to work in crisis areas and build off prior experience to formulate better strategy.
4. The need for inter-Agency cooperation and cohesive strategy:
Both the Senators and panelists agree a more cohesive strategy is needed to effectively address global fragility. Currently different departments within the US government and its allies work in many places to fight global fragility but their efforts are fragmented. Defense, Diplomacy and Development need to work together. The State Department needs to work better alongside the Department of Defense to formulate a joint strategy. Coons said “We need to retrain everybody to play the same game.”
Marocco finds State needs to deploy more with the Defense Department to understand the situation on the ground instead of dictating policy from Washington. Antonietti believes stabilization can be planned during all stages of conflict and shouldn’t be left to wait until the initial fighting is over. Harriman added the military needs to find better ways to work with nongovernmental organizations in conflict areas to win hearts and minds. He also emphasized the tendency to promote humanitarian assistance when sustainable development is needed to solve root issues. Anselme Wimye affirmed all the above points, saying that often policies are well-intended but ignore the situation on the ground and the needs of the people who live in crisis areas. If the US. can create a cohesive strategy including military, State Department, allies, and NGOs real progress can be made.
5. Understanding the long-term
Global fragility is a long-term issue. The US can’t spend for 5 years and expect large-scale results. The timeframe is at least a decade, so there is a need for continued support and funding. Ziemer pointed to the President’s Malaria Initiative (2005), which had roughly the same cost, bridged 3 administrations and resulted in a 60% reduction of mortality from malaria. The framework to deal with global fragility is in place, now the hard work of improving it, funding it, and working with allies has to be stepped up to have a significant impact.
A full video of the event is available here.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stabilizing Iraq and Syria post-ISIS
The National Press Club last Wednesday hosted the Foreign Policy Research Institute‘s launch of the latest issue of their journal, Orbis, entitled “Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent after the Fall of the Caliphate.” The papers aim to analyze the current state of ISIS as well as society in Iraq and Syria, and to assess and recommend possible guidelines and tactics for American action in the region. To accompany the issue’s launch, FPRI invited the following speakers to discuss the topic of stabilization in Syria and Iraq:
Moderator: Samuel Helfont – Assistant Professor, Naval War College, Monterey
Tally Helfont – Director of Program on the Middle East, Foreign Policy Research Institute
Barak Mendelsohn – Associate Professor, Haverford College
Assaf Moghadam – Adjunct Associate Professor, Columbia University
Mendelsohn asserted that to deal with global jihadi movements like al-Qaeda and ISIS we need to more accurately assess the scope of their threat and capacities. The challenge they pose to local and American security is often overblown. Focusing on jihadi terrorist attacks is counter-productive. A single successful terrorist attack can lead to the impression that the jidadis are “winning,” when the situation is often more complex. Terrorism is an instrument for political, not strategic or military objectives. Jihadi movements consistently fail to achieve their political objectives – for instance, setting up a sustainable ISIS caliphate – through terrorism.
Mendelsohn also emphasized the systemic challenges that constrain the threat posed by transnational jihadi movements. National and subnational identities, which are usually of national or ethnic nature, constrain the appeal of transnational movements based on religious identity. It is not sufficient to practice Islam to find religious political leadership appealing. Political as well as religious or social affiliation is needed. As transnational political movements, cross-border logistical coordination is also an issue for jihadi groups. Finally, they are plagued by infighting, further reducing their capacity to operate effectively.
Moghadam agreed with Mendelsohn on the constraining factors jihadi groups face. He hoped, however, that policy-makers would not confuse “jihadism constrained” with “jihadism declining.” While their threat might often be overblown, jihadi groups will not disappear any time soon. Their ideology continues to appeal to some people. Jihadi movements are by nature highly decentralized. Their lack of a “center of gravity” means they cannot be easily eradicated with a precise military attack.
Decentralization also means that jihadi groups’ constituent parts are adaptable and innovative. Key individuals play an oversized role, making jihadi groups capable of reacting to changing environments. In addition, the conditions that gave rise to jihadi groups such as ISIS are still in place. In Syria especially, regions devastated by ISIS will face governance and resource issues for decades to come, providing fertile ground for radical military groups to thrive.
Moghadam concluded by predicting that we will witness a shift in the global jihadi movement from a “bipolar” structure – centered around the poles of ISIS and al-Qaeda – to a “multipolar,” localized structure, with smaller groups gaining influence in a greater number of locations. This will make it harder to fully eradicate the threat of jihadism. When it comes to counter-terrorism, he advocated for a less reactionary stance. Jihadi groups use terrorism to provoke Western governments into over-reacting, thus alienating Muslim communities and reinforcing the appeal of the groups Western states are trying to combat. He called for better cooperation with Muslim communities in Europe and the US.
Tally Helfont focused on what Gulf states can do to counter the influence of jihadi groups in the Middle East. These states are worried about the appeal of transnational jihadism in the Gulf, but are also seeking to counter Iranian influence and fill the vacuum left by American political withdrawal. Gulf states’ counter-terrorism strategy has focused on stopping “men, money, and ideas.” This means increasingly trying to curb the radical messages and influence of local religious leaders as well as stopping financial flows to terrorists from private citizens in the Gulf.
Countering jihadi ideas is especially important, both in education and in mosques. Helfont asserts that Gulf states – particularly Saudi Arabia and UAE – have begun to see the appeal of critical thinking and want to create new generations of citizens who are capable of thinking for themselves and innovating with the best on the international stage.
Caveat emptor: It was hard to decipher useful lessons from the panelists’ statements. While the jihadi threat is often overblown, it is essential for the American government to portray ISIS as a genuine threat to national security to justify continued involvement in Syria and Iraq. A Muslim terrorism group is also a useful foil in electoral campaigns. Doubts should be raised about the capacity of stabilization to succeed without subsequent peace-building and reconstructing projects afterwards. There’s still a lot to consider before we can get a clear idea of how to durably stabilize the Fertile Crescent.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace Picks July 8 – 15
You can find more events for the upcoming week here
1. A Vision: Ukraine – 2030: Sustainable Development Doctrine | Tuesday, July 10, 2018 | 1:30 pm – 3:00 pm | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Ukraine has made significant progress on ambitious economic and financial reforms in recent years. Steps have been taken to intensify the fight against corruption and boost economic growth across a range of sectors. However, much work is still needed for Ukraine’s economic development and improvement of the socio-economic situation. In addition to focus on specific reforms and bolstering investor confidence, strategies for long-term sustainable development must also be considered.
At this event, Mr. Serhiy Taruta, Member of Parliament, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, will present a paper, entitled Ukraine 2030, a vision which lays out a framework for the strategic direction of Ukraine’s long-term development. This will be followed by a discussion on the challenges and opportunities for Ukraine’s sustainable development will be discussed.
Speakers:
Moderator: Ambassador John Herbst, Director – Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
Mr. Serhiy Taruta, Member of Parliament, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
Dr. Anders Åslund, Senior Fellow – Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council; Independent Member, Supervisory Board, Ukrzaliznytsia
Dr. Vira Nanivska, Policy Research Director, Collegium Anna Yaroslavna: East
Dr. Edi Segura, Chairman of the Board, The Blezyer Foundation; Partner and Chief Economist, SigmaBleyzer
Ms. Michelle Small, Director, Head of the Washington DC Representative Office, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Mr. Morgan Williams, President, US-Ukraine Business Council
2. Elections in Zimbabwe: Autocracy and Stasis, or Democracy and Change? | Tuesday, July 10, 2018 | 3:00 pm – 4:30 pm | National Endowment for Democracy | Register Here
Since the Movement for Democratic Change’s founding in 1999, Zimbabwe has been going through a protracted struggle for democratization. An entrenched incumbent, fortified by a strong political-military network, has met aspirations for democratic improvement with strong resistance. This network, however, underwent a serious rupture last November when former allies effectively deposed its long-serving leader, Robert Mugabe. The new president, President Emmerson Mnangagwa, has scheduled general elections for July 30, 2018. The upcoming polls present new political dynamics and a heightened level of anticipation both within and outside Zimbabwe. In his presentation, Dr. Alex Magaisa will consider the struggle to achieve greater democratic accountability in today’s Zimbabwe. He will assess preparations for the approaching elections and discuss the prospects for democratization, including possible post-election scenarios and the roles of the military and the international community. Comments by Dr.Alexander H. Noyes will follow.
Speakers:
Moderator: Natalie Kay, Program Officer, Southern Africa, National Endowment for Democracy
Alex Magaisa, Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow, National Endowment for Democracy
Alexander H. Noyes, Senior Associate (Non-Resident), Africa Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies
3. July 15 Coup Attempt: Two Years Later | Wednesday, July 11, 2018 | 11:00 am – 12:30 pm | Turkish Heritage Organization
Please join the Turkish Heritage Organization and the Global Policy Institute on July 11 for a panel discussion on the second anniversary of the July 15 coup attempt that took place in 2016. Since this critical event in Turkey’s recent history, the country has witnessed profound changes within both its foreign and domestic politics. Our distinguished guests will discuss how the coup attempt shaped present day Turkey and the potential implications regarding U.S.-Turkey relations.
Speakers:
Moderator: Deniz Karatas, Global Policy Institute
Abraham Wagner, Adjunct Professor of International and Public Affairs & Senior Research Scholar, Columbia University
4. Future of US-Turkish Relations After Erdogan’s Victory | Wednesday, July 11, 2018 | 12:00 pm – 2:00 pm | Endowment for Middle East Truth | Register Here
Join EMET on Capitol Hill as we host Congressman Gus Bilirakis, FDD scholar and former Turkish parliament member Dr. Aykan Erdemir, the pro-Kurdish opposition US representative of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), Giran Ozcan, and EMET’s Director of the Kurdistan Project, Diliman Abdulkader. The panel will be moderated by EMET founder and President Sarah Stern. Our panel will analyze the implications of the June 24th Turkish elections called by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Leading Turkey since 2002 with the Justice and Development Party (AKP), internally Erdogan has tilted state institutions to further solidify his position, he has targeted political opposition groups, academics, journalists, and the Kurdish minority all while labeling those speaking against his rule as “terrorists.” Erdogan has distanced himself from his short-lived “zero problem with neighbors” policy as he has made more foes than friends in the region. He has threatened Greece with military action while continuing to have a foothold in Northern Cyprus. His incursions into Syria targeting US-backed Kurdish forces has created a diminishing of relations with the United States. Under Erdogan, Turkey has pivoted towards Russia by purchasing Russian missiles incompatible with NATO defense systems. The panel will examine the outcome of the elections, what Turkey’s future holds under Erdogan and how this will affect US-Turkish relations.
5. Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent After the Fall of the Caliphate | Wednesday, July 11, 2018 | 12:00pm – 1:45pm | Foreign Policy Research Institute | Register Here
In 2014, the United States stated its intention to “degrade and destroy” ISIS. Since then, a diverse array of forces has worked tirelessly to liberate key territories in Iraq and Syria from ISIS’s Caliphate. Now, in the summer of 2018, ISIS’s Caliphate largely has been dismantled as a territorial entity. However, the group is far from destroyed, and its ability to maneuver is much improved as it reverts to an insurgency. What’s more, there is very little to prevent yet another non-state armed group from retaking the very same lands that ISIS once held. Accordingly, American diplomacy, military strategy, and intelligence collection likely will focus on Iraq and Syria for many years to come. Thus, the question for policymakers is how the U.S. can prevent non-state armed groups from regaining a territorial foothold, further destabilizing these territories, and ultimately threatening U.S. interests in the region. Relatedly, the question of what to do about the likes of al-Qaeda and ISIS even if they do not hold territory remains equally pressing.
“Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent After the Fall of the Caliphate,” a special issue of Orbis: FPRI’s Journal of World Affairs (Summer 2018) and the subject of this panel, seeks to provide a framework for thinking about the threat of terrorism emanating from the Fertile Crescent now that ISIS’s Caliphate is being undone and to provide concrete policy recommendations to establish a tenable politico-economic status quo.
Speakers:
Tally Helfont, Director of Program on the Middle East, Foreign Policy Research Institute
Samuel Helfont, Assistant Professor, Naval War College, Monterey
Barak Mendelsohn, Associate Professor, Haverford College
Assaf Moghadam, Adjunct Associate Professor, Columbia University
6. Next Steps on North Korea: Denuclearization and Building a New Relationship | Thursday, July 12, 2018 | 9:00am – 10:30 am | Korea Economic Institute of America | Register Here
With the historic first meeting between a sitting U.S. president and the leader of North Korea now complete, the difficult process of negotiating North Korea’s dismantlement and building a new relationship between the United States and North Korea begins. What are the key steps the United States and North Korea need to take to achieve the goals of the Singapore Statement? What is the role of South Korea as the process moves forward? What challenges beyond denuclearization are there for building new U.S.-North Korea relationship?
Please join the Korea Economic Institute of America and the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy for a discussion of the key next steps in dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program and moving towards the new relationship called for in the Singapore Statement.
Speakers:
Moderator: Jenna Gibson, Korea Economic Institute of America
Patrick Cronin, Center for a New American Security
Katrin Katz, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Kim Seok Hwan, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy
Kim Yong Hyun, Dongguk University
RSS - Posts
