Tag: Sudan
You won’t find any of this on Amazon
Hanukkah, an apocryphal festival if there ever was one, starts this evening. In my family, we expected gifts each night. Here’s my wish list:
1. Release of those arrested post-election in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
2. A serious civilian government in Egypt ready to restrain the security forces and fulfill the ideals of the revolution.
3. International Criminal Court indictment of President Saleh of Yemen.
4. Turnover of power in Damascus to the Syrian National Council.
5. A transition in North Korea that opens the door to peaceful reform.
6. An end to military action in the Nuba Mountains and resolution of Sudan’s disputes with the South.
7. Quick and peaceful formation of a new government in Baghdad.
8. Success in negotiations with the Taliban that allows accelerated withdrawal of U.S. troops.
If you think this is grand, just wait until you see what I ask for the twelve days of Christmas!
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What threatens the United States?
The Council on Foreign Relations published its Preventive Priorities Survey for 2012 last week. What does it tell us about the threats the United States faces in this second decade of the 21st century?
Looking at the ten Tier 1 contingencies “that directly threaten the U.S. homeland, are likely to trigger U.S. military involvement because of treaty commitments, or threaten the supplies of critical U.S. strategic resources,” only three are defined as military threats:
- a major military incident with China involving U.S. or allied forces
- an Iranian nuclear crisis (e.g., surprise advances in nuclear weapons/delivery capability, Israeli response)
- a U.S.-Pakistan military confrontation, triggered by a terror attack or U.S. counterterror operations
Two others might also involve a military threat, though the first is more likely from a terrorist source:
- a mass casualty attack on the U.S. homeland or on a treaty ally
- a severe North Korean crisis (e.g., armed provocations, internal political instability, advances in nuclear weapons/ICBM capability)
The remaining five involve mainly non-military contingencies:
- a highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure (e.g., telecommunications, electrical power, gas and oil, water supply, banking and finance, transportation, and emergency services)
- a significant increase in drug trafficking violence in Mexico that spills over into the United States
- severe internal instability in Pakistan, triggered by a civil-military crisis or terror attacks
- political instability in Saudi Arabia that endangers global oil supplies
- intensification of the European sovereign debt crisis that leads to the collapse of the euro, triggering a double-dip U.S. recession and further limiting budgetary resources
Five of the Tier 2 contingencies “that affect countries of strategic importance to the United States but that do not involve a mutual-defense treaty commitment” are also at least partly military in character, though they don’t necessarily involve U.S. forces:
- a severe Indo-Pak crisis that carries risk of military escalation, triggered by major terror attack
- rising tension/naval incident in the eastern Mediterranean Sea between Turkey and Israel
- a major erosion of security and governance gains in Afghanistan with intensification of insurgency or terror attacks
- a South China Sea armed confrontation over competing territorial claims
- a mass casualty attack on Israel
But Tier 2 also involves predominantly non-military threats to U.S. interests, albeit with potential for military consequences:
- political instability in Egypt with wider regional implications
- an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Syria, with potential outside intervention
- an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Yemen
- rising sectarian tensions and renewed violence in Iraq
- growing instability in Bahrain that spurs further Saudi and/or Iranian military action
Likewise Tier 3 contingencies “that could have severe/widespread humanitarian consequences but in countries of limited strategic importance to the United States” include military threats to U.S. interests:
- military conflict between Sudan and South Sudan
- increased conflict in Somalia, with continued outside intervention
- renewed military conflict between Russia and Georgia
- an outbreak of military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, possibly over Nagorno Karabakh
And some non-military threats:
- heightened political instability and sectarian violence in Nigeria
- political instability in Venezuela surrounding the October 2012 elections or post-Chavez succession
- political instability in Kenya surrounding the August 2012 elections
- an intensification of political instability and violence in Libya
- violent election-related instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
- political instability/resurgent ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan
I don’t mean to suggest in any way that the military is irrelevant to these “non-military” threats. But it is not the only tool needed to meet these contingencies, or even to meet the military ones. And if you begin thinking about preventive action, which is what the CFR unit that publishes this material does, there are clearly major non-military dimensions to what is needed to meet even the threats that take primarily military form.
And for those who read this blog because it publishes sometimes on the Balkans, please note: the region are nowhere to be seen on this list of 30 priorities for the United States.
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Syria is not hopeless
Bashar al Assad continues to defy international pressure by cracking down violently on peaceful protesters in Syria. The internationals are running out of ideas about what to do: Arab League suspension, contact group, tightening sanctions against economic mainstays of the regime, helping the Syrian National Council (SNC) unify and project a program, renewed pursuit of a UN Security Council resolution and ambiguity about whether military force will be used are on Robert Danin’s list, which isn’t much different from Andrew Tabler’s.
What Danin and Tabler are trying to do is accelerate Bashar al Assad’s departure. I wish them luck in that, and I hope we do all they recommend. But I think we need also to prepare for a long siege. Bashar is trying to outlast the protesters, and he might well succeed unless they, and we, get smarter.
They need to get clever about new ways of defying the regime and demonstrating widespread support. The streets are dangerous these days, and the use of violence by some of the demonstrators is going to make it worse. Some stay at home, general strike or boycott-type demonstrations are in order. As Chenoweth and Stephan point out, it is much harder for the regime to respond to these. And much less risky for the demonstrators if they do nothing but fail to appear for work. More coordinated evening banging on pots and pans is another possibility. Do it twice and everyone will understand its significance.
The internationals also need to prepare for the long haul. This means using the time available to get the SNC up to snuff, with a serious plan and program for the future. Yeh, I know there are proposals for this working their way through the State Department, but too slowly for my taste. It also means talking with the Russians about their naval base at Latakia. They are sure to lose it if they don’t switch sides before Bashar falls. The trick is to convince them that his fall is inevitable and they may as well help make it happen, in hope of ensuring their basing rights for the future.
We also need to press for international human rights monitors. They appear to have been part of the Arab League deal (a written copy of which I still haven’t seen). At some point, the regime may give in to these, because it will want confirmation that it has defeated the protests. If Bashar continues to refuse them, he only embarrasses himself.
Syria is not hopeless. But it may take a long time.
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This week’s peace picks
As the weekly “peace picks” post has been taking me too long to assemble, and this week I’ve let it slide until Monday morning, I’m going to try doing less formatting and more cutting and pasting. As always, best to check the sponsoring organizations’ websites for registration, cost, RSVP and other information. And don’t forget the Middle East Institute’s annual conference at the Grand Hyatt November 17. The week is heavy on Afghanistan:
2. Afghanistan in 2011: A Survey of the Afghan People
Webcast: This event will be webcast live beginning at 9:30am on November 15, 2011 at www.usip.org/webcast.
On November 15, the U.S. Institute of Peace will host the Washington launch of The Asia Foundation’s “Afghanistan in 2011: A Survey of the Afghan People” — the broadest, most comprehensive public opinion poll in the country. The report covers all 34 provinces, with candid data gleaned from face-to-face interviews with more than 6,000 Afghan citizens on security, corruption, women’s rights, development, the economy, and negotiating with the Taliban.
This marks the seventh in the Foundation’s series of surveys in Afghanistan; taken together they provide a barometer of Afghan public opinion over time. With support from the U.S. Agency for International Development, the findings help inform national leaders, scholars, donors and the policymaking community focused on Afghanistan and the region. Join USIP and The Asia Foundation for a presentation of this year’s findings, and analysis of what the seven years of findings indicate for Afghanistan’s recent past, and the country’s future.
This event will feature the following speakers:
- David Arnold, introduction
President
The Asia Foundation - Tariq Osman, panelist
Program Director, Kabul
The Asia Foundation - Sunil Pillai, panelist
Technical Adviser, Kabul
The Asia Foundation - Sheilagh Henry, panelist
Deputy Country Representative, Kabul
The Asia Foundation - Andrew Wilder, moderator
Director, Afghanistan and Pakistan Programs
United States Institute of Peace
3. Can Less be More in Afghanistan? State-building Lessons from the Past to Guide the Future
USIP, November 17, 10-noon
Ten years after the U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan initiated a new, post-Taliban order, the success and sustainability of the international community’s ambitious state-building project is being questioned. Though billed as transformative, it is unclear whether the state-building investments and reforms of the past decade can be sustained, or will represent a job half-done.
With the Afghan engagement now at a critical juncture, marked by the convening of another Bonn conference in early December, international donor assistance budgets to Afghanistan are declining, prompting a need to look back as well as forward. Why has deeper and broader engagement been repeatedly attempted despite concern that many efforts have had limited and sometimes counter-productive effects? How can lessons from the past help to identify reasonable ways forward? Please join USIP for a discussion with a panel of leading experts to discuss this important topic at a critical juncture in the state-building history of Afghanistan.
- Astri Suhrke, panelist
Senior Researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute
Author, When Less is More: the International Project in Afghanistan - J. Alexander Thier, panelist
Assistant to the Administrator and Director, Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs
U.S. Agency for International Development - Michael Semple, panelist
2011-2012 Carr Center Fellow
Harvard Kennedy School
- Andrew Wilder, moderator
Director, Afghanistan and Pakistan Programs
United States Institute of Peace
4. Afghan Perspectives on Post-Transition
-
Thursday, Nov 17, 2011 | 10:30 am – 11:30 am
The Center for Strategic and International Studies presents
Afghan Perspectives on Post-Transition
featuring remarks by
Mr. Mohammad Haneef Atmar
Former Afghan Minister of Interior
Sponsored by ANHAM
Thursday, November 17, 2011
10:30AM – 11:30AM
CSIS B1 Conference Center
CSIS 1800 K. St. NW, Washington, DC 20006
CSIS will present the first in a series of speeches and Q&A sessions on perspectives for Afghan governance and issues following the 2014 transition. Our speaker for this first event is Mr. Mohammad Haneef Atmar. Mr. Atmar served as one of Afghanistan’s leading Ministers during his terms in office as the Minister of Interior (2008-2010), Minister of Education (2006-2008) and as Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (2002-2006). We hope you can join us or send a representative.
| November 17, 2011 | 1:00 pm – 2:30 pm | ||||
|
Please join the Better World Campaign, the United Nations Association of the USA and National Capital Area Chapter for a panel discussion on Sudan & South Sudan: United States and United Nations Engagement with
Princeton Lyman U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan and Francois Grignon UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations moderated by Peter Yeo Thursday, November 17, 2011 1:00– 2:30 p.m. 2103 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, DC a light lunch will be served R.S.V.P. |
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Congratulations! What now?
Independence happened at midnight. Statehood and sovereignty will take decades more.
For South Sudan this is as much opportunity as it is challenge. Sudan was not working for the South, which is fortunate indeed to have an opportunity now to make its own future. The development challenges are obvious: Africa’s newest country is also one of its poorest and most illiterate. Oil, which it has in abundance, is not necessarily a cure–more resource-rich countries fail at serious development than succeed.
But in addition to its development problems, South Sudan faces serious challenges to its statehood and sovereignty:
- Abyei: Ethiopian peacekeepers will be arriving, but twice the North has failed to observe the outcome of arbitrations. There is still a long way to go before the border is agreed and demarcated.
- South Kordofan and Blue Nile: The agreement on these two Northern areas where Southern sympathies are strong reads well enough, but will it be implemented?
- Citizenship: The North seems determined to deprive Southerners living in the North of citizenship there. This could lead to massive displacement.
- Oil transport: So far as I can tell, there is still no agreement on transport of oil produced in the South through the North so that it can exported from Port Sudan.
- Debts: no division has yet been agreed. This often takes some time, and it may also be a way of sweetening other deals.
- South/South conflicts: various militias and tribes in the South feel excluded, are unhappy with their slices of the political pie and could challenge the state’s monopoly on the legitimate means of violence. That spells trouble.
No new country is born without challenges. South Sudan may have more than its share, but it also has great advantages: most of its population is delighted with independence, it has oil, and quick recognition and admission to the UN seem assured. It also has the good wishes of most of the world, most especially the United States, which has provided a lot of support.
Time to get on with the hard part: achieving sovereignty and building the state. Maybe that’s the answer to “what is the what?”
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Independence is over-rated
Yes, that’s what I said: over-rated. Despite the inspirational words, the declaration of July 4, 1776 didn’t change much. Seven years of war ensued. That didn’t settle it either: the British continued to interfere with American shipping, so we fought another war in 1812 (-15). Friendship with Britain did not begin until late in the 19th century, and the “special relationship” is a product of the 20th.
My Kosovar and Southern Sudanese friends are discovering that things haven’t changed much.
The NATO/Yugoslavia war over Kosovo ended in June 1999. Seventy-six countries have recognized Kosovo since its independence in February 2008, but Belgrade is using Russia to block Kosovo’s entry into the United Nations General Assembly, which is the modern world’s equivalent of universal recognition. Pristina is now engaged in discussions of practical issues with Belgrade, with modest results, but good neighborly relations are still far off. The promise of eventual EU membership–much sooner for Belgrade and much later for Pristina–may keep things on track, but there are no guarantees.
Sudan’s independence will be declared July 9. Despite extensive arrangements for this eventuality in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed between Khartoum and Juba in 2005, things are not going smoothly. The Abyei region is still contested, despite two arbitration decisions. Ethiopian peacekeepers are now being deployed there, after Khartoum’s army displaced more than 100,000 people last month. There is instability in two northern states, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, where southern sympathies are strong (and some of the sympathizers armed). There are still no agreements on crucial issues: citizenship for northerners in the South and southerners in the North, division of assets and debt, as well as oil revenue and oil transport from the South through the North.
Independence can be declared, but it is sovereignty and statehood that really count. Neither is a function of saying, only of doing. They are acquired through practice, not expression. The three concepts are often confused, and in a well-established state they in fact are congruent. But they are three distinct concepts: statehood depends on the existence of an organized distribution of political power, sovereignty on the state having a monopoly on the legitimate means of violence, and independence–a relative term–on the sovereign state being able to make its own decisions without seeking the approval of others. Neither Southern Sudan nor Kosovo is yet a fully independent sovereign state, though I trust both will make it in due course.
There will be a lot of ups and downs along the way. There certainly were in the United States. The Washington, DC I visited as a child was a segregated city, not by law but by preference of the white majority. Many times while I served abroad in the U.S. Foreign Service I was asked whether a black president was possible. I always said “yes,” but I wasn’t at all sure it would happen in my lifetime. It did, and a lot of people had to change their conception of what it means to be American for it to happen (which is why I’m not surprised that some haven’t changed and are still worrying themselves about the President’s birth certificate).
This process of infusing new meaning into old concepts is important to acquiring statehood and sovereignty: an inclusive concept of what it means to be Southern Sudanese or “Kosovan” is vital to organizing political life and exercising a monopoly on the legitimate means of violence. If some people are excluded, or demoted to second class citizenship, the state will be less than worthy and sovereignty less than complete. So I conclude with Marvin Gaye’s effort to infuse new meaning into an old German drinking song, not so much because I like the results, but because I like the process:
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