Tag: Sudan
Two areas agreement
I’m still studying it, but I thought the “framework” agreement reached yesterday in Addis Ababa between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (North) on political partnership and political and security arrangements in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan of enough interest to put out there quickly.
Thabo Mbeki led this African Union High Level Implementation Panel effort, which is intended to end the threat of violence in the leadup to Southern Sudan independence July 9 in two northern Sudanese states where sympathies with the South are strong (and some of the sympathizers armed).
Comments from the well-informed on this agreement and its likelihood of implementation would be most welcome.
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An Arabic student and Middle East scholar
The Middle East Institute, where I studied Arabic through several levels to little avail, has kindly taken me on as one its scholars and this week published an interview covering my career and views on several ongoing conflicts. Here is what they published:
Q: Tell me a bit about your early career. What led you to government service? How did you become involved with peace-building initiatives and mediation?
A: It was all the girl’s fault. I first worked in international affairs at the United Nations, hired by the father of someone I dated in college. I had a scientific background through a Master’s degree in physical chemistry. He needed someone to deal with environmental issues — this was 1970 and we were really just beginning to think about such things. After I finished my doctorate at Princeton, the State Department hired me as a science and technology specialist, dealing mainly with nuclear and missile proliferation issues in Rome and Brasilia. I later worked energy issues and became Economic Minister, Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge’ d’affaires at the US Embassy in Rome.
I did not really get involved in peace-building and mediation until the Bosnian war, when I landed in Sarajevo in November 1994 in a plane hit by small arms fire during the landing. It’s been peace-building all the time since then.
Q: You are currently teaching at George Washington University, Georgetown University, and Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. After careers devoted to both government service and peace-building and conflict resolution initiatives, why did you turn to teaching?
A: It was always my intention to teach, and over the years I have enjoyed lecturing in many different settings. It was about time that I taught my own courses. I just got my student evaluations from last term — both gratifying and humbling. The classroom is an intellectual feast and challenge.
Q: On your blog (www.peacfare.net), you have written that the US must remember that “Afghanistan matters” and the country’s fate and success lies in what the US leaves behind. What is your vision of the Afghanistan that the United States needs to leave behind and how might the US reach this goal?
A: I said in the Washington Post last July that the [US] President [Barack Obama] should specify an end state and suggested: “an Afghanistan that provides no safe haven to terrorists, ensures equal rights to all its citizens and maintains its sovereignty with international help but without foreign troops on its territory.” He seems inclined, however, to stick with only the “no safe havens” part. I think that is hard to achieve without the other pieces.
Q: Afghan President Hamid Karzai has said that Afghans are starting to view NATO as an occupying force, warning that NATO air strikes could lead to a national uprising in Afghanistan. In your opinion, is there potential for a large movement within the country? If so, what might this look like and what implications would this have for US-Pakistani relations?
A: I guess even Karzai is inspired by the Arab Spring, but he should remember that the protests are against local leaders, not against the US.
That said, he is an elected president who clearly is at the limit of what he can tolerate, even if you discount some of what he says as political cover. Of course, there already is a movement against the US presence — we call it the Taliban. Fortunately, most Afghans don’t like it any better than they like our presence. The way to square this circle is with more capable Afghan forces doing most of the heavy lifting.
US-Pakistani relations raise their own complex set of issues, on which I confess I am a neophyte and hesitate to comment. I would just note that whatever we think we’ve been doing does not seem to be improving the situation.
Q: With regard to the situation in Iraq, you wrote on your blog that “the US, UN and Iraqis need to get their heads together sooner rather than later on how to handle Arab-Kurdish disputes, especially as resistance to a continuing US troop presence after the end of this year seems to be strengthening.” What are the core concerns in this debate?
A: Kurds want to extend the territory of Kurdistan to include areas that they claim are historically Kurdish (especially Kirkuk Governorate), guarantee themselves a substantial percentage of Iraq’s national oil revenue, and govern themselves with minimal reference to Baghdad, especially in exploration for and production of new oil discoveries. Arabs want to ensure that Iraq is not divided, either de facto or de jure, and that oil exploration
and production is planned and operated in accordance with a national framework. The Americans don’t want Arabs and Kurds to come to blows, something that seems less likely as they are making a lot more money by cooperating than they would otherwise. I think the UN can help them find a way of untying these knots.
Q: In a March Washington Post article, you discussed the possibility of the United States earning returns on the “enormous investment” in Iraq if it becomes a “reliable, high-volume supplier of oil to world markets” and “can defend itself with only a modicum of U.S. support,” while also holding “relatively free and fair elections that put in power people who reflect the wide diversity of the population and feel real pressure to deliver services efficiently.” What can the US and Iraq do to ensure that Iraq moves toward this ideal state of affairs?
A: I’ve just finished a short brief on this subject. Here are its conclusions:
The following US assistance would reduce a number of risks to Iraqi democracy and help to create the kind of pluralistic society that will generate its own stronger opposition and state institutions:
- support to the Parliament, constitutional court, elections commission, and related civil society organizations, especially for women;
- continued military education and training;
- UN assistance in resolution of Arab/Kurdish issues;
- encouragement to export oil and gas to the north and west;
- assistance for protection of religious and other minorities;
- cooperation in designing a plan to distribute some oil revenue to citizens.
Q: In spite of reports of a tentative agreement between northern and southern Sudan, many people are skeptical about the efficacy of negotiations and the implementation of the established terms, especially with the recent seizure of Abyei. Do you believe that peaceful solutions are possible in this situation, or do you think we will see continued violence in the area, especially as we approach the proposed July 9 date for southern independence?
A: At this point I think the South is so concerned with maintaining peace and stability in advance of independence that it will do its best to avoid further problems up to and even past July 9. Diplomatic recognition will be much easier if independence does not lead to war. Of course the North may not cooperate fully, but I do expect restraint from the South. That said, the seizure of Abyei is likely to cause serious problems in the future,
if there is no negotiated solution.
Q: Given your use of blogs, Twitter, and other social media outlets, what are your thoughts on the significance of Internet activism in the “Arab Spring”? Do you believe that social media sites can and/or will play a part in state-building projects and the “end game” in these national movements, or are they simply useful for the initial stages?
A: Social media seem a lot better suited to organizing a demonstration than establishing a supreme court. That said, I don’t think we’ve reached the limit of human ingenuity, and social media may well prove useful in overcoming the obvious democracy gap in many post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations. But we should also note that media only enable you to do things you want to do — the movements generating change
use the media, not, I hope, the other way around.
Q: On your blog, you indicated that with regard to the current situations in Syria, Yemen, and Libya, it should be US policy “to listen to the locals, and follow their lead if we can figure out what it is” and support their efforts. How can the US support these protestors in their effort to promote democratic ideals, and not make the mistake of settling for a government for government’s sake and the perhaps false promise of stability?
A: It’s difficult. Embassies are not places that interface easily with 18-year-old protestors. And when they do, they may get in hot water with the host government. Many years ago in Italy, I wanted to invite a bright young activist to a meeting on alternative energy technologies. A name check turned up indications that he was a member of what the Italian government regarded as an extreme-left, vaguely anarchist political group. I somehow managed to convince the Embassy that it would be okay. He went on to study and work in the US and is today the distinguished head of an important industry association in Italy. Those are the risks you need to take if you really believe in democratic ideals.
I like the model we’ve developed: NGOs out hunting for talent and providing training, visits to the US, projects run by local people, without too much “Chief of Mission” control. You may not, however, find a lot of State Department officials who agree with me.
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Confusing, and disturbing
Colum Lynch reports yesterday that Sudan seems to be pursuing peace in one province even as it opts for war in another. Khartoum has agreed to the deployment of Ethiopian peacekeepers in the disputed border region of Abyei, where the Sudanese army, provoked by an attack on a convoy by South Sudanese forces last month, has displaced something like 100,000 people. Now, in Southern Kordofan, a province in the North, the Sudanese forces have started attacking forces loyal to South Sudan, apparently fearing that they might seek to secede from the North to join the South.
This has roused the American organizations that follow Sudan to issue a manifesto calling for a tough response to what they regard as primarily the North’s provocations. The list of challenges they cite is impressive:
1. A peaceful and principled resolution to the crisis on the North-South border, including Abyei, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile
2. Peaceful resolution of other outstanding separation issues that could lead to a resumption of North-South war, including border demarcation, oil wealth sharing, and citizenship status
3. An end to the crisis in Darfur and a comprehensive peace agreed to by all parties
4. Security for all people in the Republic of South Sudan, including protection from militia violence, and responsible and accountable Southern security services
5. Tangible and measurable steps toward democratic governance in the North and the South
6. Accountability for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide
The solutions suggested mainly involve ratcheting up pressure on the Khartoum, by removing “carrots” and brandishing new “sticks,” as well as helping Juba (the capital of South Sudan) stabilize its territory.
None of that is objectionable, as Khartoum has repeatedly demonstrated bad faith and Juba unquestionably needs help, but you’ve got to wonder whether it is going to work. The problem is that there are too many problems. Virtually none of those described here in January have been solved. When everything is a priority nothing is a priority.
In practice, the urgent prevails over the important. Khartoum is making the border issues urgent, perhaps even with a view to using them as an excuse not to recognize newly independent South Sudan when July 9 comes. It could get a lot worse if southerners start being expelled from around Khartoum, where several million took refuge during the civil war, or if the North cuts off export of the South’s oil. While a full-scale resumption of the civil war seems unlikely–the North has no intention of risking its army once again in the far reaches of the South–independence day may well not be peaceful.
What can be done about all this? Not a whole lot, if you think only military instruments will work. But UN-appointed mediator Thabo Mbeki is trying diplomacy, with support from the Americans, Norwegians, British and other interested internationals. Khartoum seems determined: not to prevent the South’s independence, but to reassert its authority over territory in the North where there are southern sympathizers and to claim as much of Abyei, which produces oil, as possible. The South has been correctly focused on making independence as smooth as possible, though it seems to be having trouble ensuring that its troops and militias don’t provoke the North.
The agreement on Abyei is a positive development, as is South Sudan’s impending independence. But a lot of what is going on in Sudan today is confusing, and disturbing.
PS: A U.S. Institute of Peace paper argues for a more comprehensive, holistic approach focused on reform in the North. I’m afraid the North’s armed forces may be answering that appeal in Southern Kordofan. Not much room for reform when you are killing and displacing your own population.
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Where are the patriots?
If nothing else, these weeks of protest and repression are demonstrating how tenaciously autocrats cling to power. This is not surprising, since for the three currently in question–Gaddafi, Assad and Saleh–there really is no role for them if they leave power. Worse, they fear for their livelihoods, their families and their lives.
This occurs to me as I am in Ljubljana (Slovenia) for meetings, one of which will be with a former president. As is all too apparent in the U.S., former presidents play useful roles in democratic societies, whether in talking with the North Koreans (or me), raising support for earthquake-ravaged Haiti, or just as living examples of the possibility of losing power without losing your life. The U.S. even pays and protects them well, as I imagine Slovenia does too.
The problem with our Middle Eastern chiefs of state is of course that they did things during their time in power that might merit justice once they are out of it and available to the courts. Saleh was offered immunity but refused to sign the agreement that would have provided it. The International Criminal Court’s prosecutor has already asked for an arrest warrant for Gaddafi. It is hard to see how Assad is less criminal, though he may have succeeded in preventing much hard evidence getting into the hands of the ICC.
So what we’ve got is four–I’d like to throw in ICC indictee President Bashir of Sudan as well–blatantly criminal chiefs of state (or the equivalent, since Gaddafi claims not to have any official position in what he terms the “republic of the masses”). Military force isn’t yet working against Gaddafi, sanctions aren’t working against Bashir, and protests aren’t working against Assad. Only Saleh seems out of the picture, and that because of an artillery strike that was luckier than the many missiles thrown at Gaddafi.
We shouldn’t expect much better from these four. What I’m waiting for is someone in their respective entourages to take up the cudgels (admittedly something like that has happened in Yemen). All four seem determined not only to stay in power but to take their countries down with them. That’s what should embolden some of their followers: loyalty to their own country and people. Is that too much to ask?
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Better to jaw-jaw than to war-war
This could be said of many places of course, but it occurred to me today after a discussion with Sudan’s Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) negotiators Abdullahi Osman el Tom, Mahmoud Abbeker Suleiman and Tahir el Faki over at the now well-located offices of the Public International Law and Policy Group. I’ve often accused the head of that distinguished organization, American University law professor Paul Williams, of never having seen a territory so small he didn’t want to help it gain independence.
That would not be fair in this instance. The JEM folks made it clear that they prefer a negotiated political solution that would leave Darfur within Sudan. But failing that, they were also clear that they would seek independence by military means and confederation with Southern Sudan, which will become independent in July, hoping eventually that Southern Sudan would itself join Khartoum in a confederation (fat chance of that). There was no sign that they had the military capability to achieve independence, but they thought they could prevent Khartoum from winning a decisive military victory. Sudanese soldiers, they thought, had no reason to fight vigorously for President Bashir.
The problem is that the mediation in Doha, conducted by the African Union, is not going well. The JEM negotiators have been given 10 days to react to a proposal they say was prepared without their participation and falls far short of what they would need in order to sign. They are spending their time at PILPG preparing a markup of the mediator’s proposal, one that would make it more specific, enable displaced people to return safely to their homes, provide for return of property and accountability for crimes, and ensure that assistance money (Qatar has promised $2 billion) is spent to benefit Darfurians. This would require a much more comprehensive and detailed agreement, subject to extensive verification, than the one the mediator has proposed. They have nonetheless been told that failure to come to agreement by May 23 would lead to an end to the mediation.
That would trigger Khartoum’s “domestication” plan, which the JEM folks see as an effort to eradicate their movement (and other rebels), push the internationals out of Darfur, force repatriation of displaced people whether conditions are adequate or not, and impose Khartoum’s authority. It would also divide Darfur along ethnic lines, something they oppose, and it would allow janjaweed, the army and intelligence forces free rein, leaving the drivers of conflict unresolved.
What are those? In the view of the JEM people, the drivers of conflict are national, not Darfurian. President Bashir has made it clear that with Southern Sudan’s secession he will govern what remains as an Arab and Islamic state, further marginalizing the peripheral regions. JEM does not define itself in ethnic and religious terms, and most of its adherents are neither Arab nor Muslim. They want a secular, democratic state, the New Sudan of John Garang being their ideal. They welcomed the Arab spring but underlined that nonviolence would not work in Sudan and that they are committed to keeping their military option open.
JEM would like the other Darfurian rebels to join in a united negotiating front, but that seems unlikely. They would like the U.S. to make an effort to unify the rebels, but blamed the international community for “recognizing” different groups and thereby promoting fragmentation.
I have my doubts that the May 23 deadline is really a firm one. If there are signs of progress, I’d be surprised if the Qataris and Khartoum did not want to continue the effort. It really is better, as Winston Churchill said, to jaw-jaw rather than to war-war.
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Disingenuous is the polite term
President Omar al Bashir of Sudan is, to put it politely, disingenuous in this attempt at a straight-up interview by The Guardian. He manages to underestimate the number of displaced people in Darfur by more than a factor of 10, suggests that demonstrations in Sudan failed only because the opposition had no support in the country, claims the International Criminal Court indicted him for political reasons and in the concluding moments offers to come to the aid of Southern Sudan to help it deal with its instability (no doubt caused in part by Khartoum). He wants only peace, not war.
It is only fair to note that he also declines the privilege of hosting Gaddafi in Sudan, noting the importance of friendship with the Libyan people. That’s about the clearest indication I’ve seen this week that Gaddafi is in real trouble.
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