Tag: Syria
What terrorism tells us about northeast Syria
Former Syrian diplomat Bassam Barabandi sounds the alarm about support for Kurdish governance in northeast Syria:
In Syria, people differ dramatically on the attack the Islamic State carried out in Hasakah last week. Those affiliated with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) believe that Turkey was behind it. Pro-Turkey Syrians believe that the battle was a ploy serving SDF. Opposition not affiliated with SDF or Turkey believes the regime is behind the attack. Anti-imperialists think the US remote-controls ISIS. Regime supporters blame Turkey, the SDF, the US, the Gulf States and NATO.
What is clear
Some things are clear. US and British commandos managed the anti-ISIS operations and partook in them, exposing SDF weakness and the likelihood it is infiltrated. ISIS has the ability to surprise. That raises many questions about how the terrorists got past checkpoints in large numbers, with their weapons. Northeast Syria is just not a priority for the Arab opposition. It is keen on nothing but continuing to receive funds from donors; it did not even issue a statement condemning ISIS or calling for civilian protection.
No Arab voice in the northest has publicly condemned the terrorist attack. There are several reasons:
- SDF has failed to build trust with the Arab majority.
- Failure of the SDF to eliminate, or provide protection from, terrorist sleeper cells.
- Lack of leadership by elders, groups of elders, leaders of local councils.
All are fearful of their interests at home or in the countries where they live. Their real influence doesn’t go beyond the boundaries of their homes.
The missing ingredient
None of the international actors in the northeast have an interest in dealing with heavyweight Arab leaders. Those who claim to be representing Arabs and other local populations know that they are in their positions only so long as they have no real weight or influence. This has led to the Arab majority feeling marginalized.
Marginalization promotes instability. All powers – the Assad regime, Russia, Iran, terrorists – are working to fill the void. They make promises of a better future if the Arabs cooperate against the Kurds and the Americans. Fortunately, the population does not trust these countries or the terrorists. The local Arabs for years have raised their complaints with Amerrican and Western officials at every meeting. They still hope that the international coalition will be more positive in dealing with them, despite the SDF’s behavior.
Nearly a year ago, the SDF announced it had released the ‘less dangerous terrorists’ upon a request from local leaders, elders and others. Now we need to know who those elders were. Who came forward with those demands? Who submitted lists of names? Who claimed to represent the people of Deir Ezzor, Raqqa and Al-Hasakah? Their identities should be published.
Arab leadership is needed
All the projects of restoring stability, governance, building social peace, and the international initiatives aimed at enhancing Arab-Kurdish communication are useless in achieving real, longterm stability if it does not address the local political questions. They may be good for building the region’s economy, creating jobs and establishing infrastructure, but the principal problems are political—not the lack of services. None of the projects will achieve the essential goal of restoring stability to the region and fighting terrorism.
A new social contract between Kurds and Arabs is needed, one that achieves political, economic and social balance. This will require genuine elections, at least among Arabs, to produce real political leaders who can run their communities and bear responsibility. Otherwise, the northeast will remain unstable. The regime, Russia, and Iran will take advantage of the situation. The Arabs and Kurds of the northeast will miss the opportunity created by the presence of the international coalition forces.
Everyone would benefit
The Americans – including politicians, lawmakers, and think tanks, even those run by Arabs – want to establish a Kurdish entity with special status (an independent region or a federalist unit). They exaggerate the strength of SDF in all fields (military strength, protecting minorities, economy, social service, promoting democracy, and equal representation). The reality is different. More than 60% of the SDF are Arabs. They represent the largest number of dead and wounded during the battles to liberate the region from ISIS. Continuing with the illusion that the Kurds are responsible for the defeat of ISIS is unrealistic.
The Assad regime, not the Syrian people, persecuted the Syrian Kurds for the last 60 years. No one should believe that Assad will give the Kurds their political rights. Neither political pressure nor oil will be persuasive. It would be a dangerous misadventure for which Arabs and Kurds will pay its price. Real decisions should be taken to enhance stability by empowering serious Arab leaders—for the sake of all parties.
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Stevenson’s army, January 21
– WSJ says US allows Baltics to transfer arms to Ukraine.
– FT says Taliban threatens Pakistan.
– Oath Keepers were armed for insurrection.
– Fred Kaplan analyzes Biden’s Ukraine gaffe.
– NYT says US special forces bombed a dam in Syria on “no hit” list. Senior officials had denied attack.
– In FA, SAIS prof Hal Brands says US is overstretched militarily.
– More on CIA assessment of Havana Syndrome.
– China demands end to foreign FONOPs.
On the 80the anniversary of the Wannsee conference,NYT remembers. I’ve been to the place where the meeting occurred. Here are the minutes of the meeting.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Make Putin watch his back
Alexander Vindman is the former National Security Council official who gave vital incriminating testimony in Trump’s first impeachment. He blew the whistle on the President’s phone call with President Zelensky of Ukraine, in which Trump sought dirt on then candidate Joe Biden. Now a doctoral student at SAIS, Vindman has interesting, if discouraging, things to say about Russian intentions with respect to Ukraine:
Not a lot of good options in Ukraine
Vindman believes Russia is likely to invade Ukraine, with the aim of keeping Ukraine in its sphere of influence and making it a failed state, one that cannot offer a democratic model for those who want to escape Moscow’s tentacles. Sanctions he thinks won’t have much more impact than in the past, because Russia has hardened its economy against them. In addition, Putin controls a $620 billion sovereign wealth fund, and China will help cushion the blow.
The best military hope lies in NATO countries. The US could station more troops in NATO countries near Ukraine. They, especially those on the eastern front that Russia threatens, could in turn train the Ukrainians and perhaps deploy troops and equipment to help the Ukrainian army defend against attack.
But Putin is vulnerable elsewhere
Vindman ignores Putin’s vulnerabilities beyond Ukraine. One of these was dramatically apparent in Kazakhstan over the last few days, when protesters challenged President Tokayev. The protests quickly turned violent. Tokayev sought Russian help to protect vital installations and ordered his forces to shoot to kill.
The Russians did not send a big force–supposedly only 2500 troops–but Putin is also saddled with defending his annexation of Crimea, besieged Belarusan President Lukashenko, secessionist provinces in Georgia, and the homicidal Syrian President Assad, not to mention maintaining Russian forces in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The Russians are also active through proxy forces in Libya and the Central African Republic. They are building bases in half a dozen African countries. Russian empire-building is reaching further than even Moscow’s Soviet-era ambitions.
A crisis in any one of these places could bring a halt to Putin’s ambitions in Ukraine.
Including at home
Putin is also vulnerable at home. While he has acquired de facto autocratic powers, he is less popular than once he was. Corruption is his Achilles heel. The Kremlin has murdered one potential rival and poisoned, then imprisoned, another. A free and fair election could well do Putin in, so he won’t allow that. He also faces local ethnic and religious minority resistance to his increasingly nationalist and chauvinist rule.
If the Americans want to protect Ukraine, they will need not only to beef up its defenses and undermine Russia’s economy, but also figure out how to exploit Putin’s political and military vulnerabilities beyond Ukraine.
Make Putin watch his back.
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We know for sure there will be surprises
The New Year doesn’t look all that happy: Russia is threatening to invade Ukraine, China is threatening Taiwan, Iran is progressing toward nuclear weapons, the Taliban are retrogressing, and ongoing conflicts in many parts of the world remain unresolved (Syria, Somalia, Yemen, Israel/Palestine…). COVID-19 is appearing in its most virulent version yet. Flights are being cancelled worldwide, school openings after the holidays are at risk, recovering economies are teetering, democracies are faltering, and autocracies are proclaiming victory.
I am still optimistic, partly because it is far easier to improve from a lousy situation than from a good one. This applies in particular to COVID. The Omicron version is far more in infectious than even its Delta predecessor, but it also appears to be less deadly. Evolution favors a mutant virus that spreads easily, not one that kills its host. That’s good news. COVID is on its way to becoming endemic and far less acute. Not quite the common cold, but closer to it than the disease we have seen ravage the world over the past two years, at least for those who get vaccinated and don’t have pre-existing conditions.
The Russian threat to Ukraine is looking like a negotiating ploy, albeit a dangerous one that could still lead to military action. Moscow wants Washington to agree that Ukraine and other former Soviet states will never join NATO but become instead Russian fiefdoms. It also wants NATO to withdraw forces from member states that border the Russian “near abroad.” The former is a non-starter. The latter is conceivable. Remember that Kennedy withdrew (obsolete) missiles from Turkey to get Soviet missiles out of Cuba. A full-scale invasion of Ukraine seems unlikely at this point, but President Putin could still opt to expand the area controlled by the insurgents he backs or to seize critical infrastructure he envies, if Washington is uncompromising.
A full-scale Chinese invasion of Taiwan is also unlikely. Cross-strait trade is enormous: $150 billion or so. Millions of Taiwanese visit China each year and millions more Chinese visit Taiwan. Taiwanese are big investors in China and Chinese are big investors in Taiwan. These economic relations do not preclude political tension, in particular over Taiwan’s status, but they will make Beijing hesitate to try to seize Taiwan by force. Taiwan is not Hong Kong. The US, Japan, and South Korea all have interests in ensuring its independence (not its sovereignty). China can make life hard for Taiwan and squeeze it for political concessions, but violating its air space is a long way from an amphibious assault on its coasts.
Iran’s nuclear progress is looking unstoppable. Turkey and Saudi Arabia are no doubt trying to match it, quietly so as not to arouse the US. A Middle East nuclear arms race is an ugly prospect, but it is not one that in the first instance threatens the US. We are going to have to learn to live with it, hoping that the Iranians decide not to go all the way but rather remain a “threshold” nuclear state. Actually making and deploying nuclear weapons would put all of Iran at risk of an Israeli nuclear strike, a scenario bad enough to make even hardliners in Tehran hesitate.
It is hard to be as sanguine about some of the other conflicts. Syrian President Bashar al Assad is not going anywhere, but the conflict there is no longer killing as many people as once it did. Nor are the Houthis and Taliban likely to stop oppressing Yemenis and Afghans, though there too the killing has likely passed its peak. Arab/Israeli relations have generally improved with the Abrahamic accords, but that has made peace with the Palestinians look even more distant. Why should Israel concede a state to Ramallah if the Gulf Arabs are willing to recognize Israel (either de facto or de jure) without insisting on it? In Somalia, DRC, Myanmar and some other states conflict and instability are now endemic. Like COVID-19, it is hard to see how they could get rid of its entirely.
So the world isn’t pretty on the first day of 2022. But like the domestic situation, I think it marginally more likely to improve than to deteriorate. Of course that assumes no surprises. The one thing we know for sure is that there will be surprises, which usually don’t bode well.
Happy New Year!
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Stevenson’s army, December 14
– NYT says Israel wants earlier delivery of refueling planes that could be used to attack Iran.
– WaPo says Israel attacked suspected chemical weapons sites in Syria.
– SecState Blinken announced an Indo_Pac strategy. Here’s the text.
– Insider reports on potential conflicts of interest — in this case defense lawmakers. And staff.
Good reads: ISW analysis of Russia’s Ukraine options. WOTR piece questioning “gifts” of weapons to allies.
Politico sums up the plan on debt and defense: DEBT AND DEFENSE, TOGETHER AGAIN — No, they aren’t on the same bill, but the Senate is taking action on both the debt limit and the compromise defense bill today. The chamber will vote this morning on a motion to proceed on the joint resolution to raise the debt ceiling and final passage is expected later in Tuesday’s session. After getting tangled in amendment drama, the National Defense Authorization Act will finally be on the move in the Senate with a cloture vote Tuesday and final passage on track for this week.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Getting back to the nuclear deal is the best option, the sooner the better
Iran is arguably already a threshold nuclear state. American withdrawal from the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, aka Iran nuclear deal) in 2018 has allowed Tehran to enrich uranium to 20%, develop more advanced centrifuges, and likely make other technological process. It is now well within one year of being able to fabricate a nuclear weapon. What difference does that make?
Not much, yet. Possession of nuclear weapons is not a major factor in today’s geopolitics, because they are unusable. As Richard Burt put it a decade ago:
The currency of power has changed from [nuclear] military power to economic, technological competitiveness.
http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1230/the-new-geopolitics-why-nuclear-weapons-no-longer-serve-us-interests
Israel’s growing power in the Middle East is not due to its nuclear weapons, which represent a guarantee of its existence rather than a means of projecting power. Arab states are now cozying up to Israel because of its economic and technological prowess, built on top of its military strength. Nuclear weapons have given Pakistan a means of deterring a conventional Indian invasion but have not made Pakistan India’s equal even within South Asia. India is by far the greater economic and technological power. Russia’s resurgence as a great power is not based on its nuclear weapons, which Moscow possessed in the 1990s when it was an economic basket case, but rather on its economic recovery and willingness to project conventional military force into Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria as well as hybrid warfare in the Balkans, Belarus, and elsewhere.
Nuclear weapons are still important for deterrence, but they do little more than guarantee mutual destruction.
So what’s wrong with Iran getting nuclear weapons, or the technology to make and deliver them within a few months time? The answer lies in Turkey and Saudi Arabia, not in Israel. Iran becoming a threshold nuclear state will inspire, if it has not already, its regional rivals to do likewise. Both President Erdogan and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have both said as much. I’d guess Turkey is technologically capable on its own. Saudi Arabia may need to buy experts and technology abroad, but it is capable of doing so. Once four countries in the Middle East go nuclear, the risks of intentional or accidental nuclear warfare rise exponentially.
Bilateral deterrence works reasonably well, judging by experience not only with the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States but also with India and Pakistan, India and China, as well as China and the US. Multilateral deterrence poses much more complex issues, especially with countries that lack second strike capabilities and are geographically proximate. Preparation for launch of Iranian missiles that might (or might not) carry nuclear weapons could trigger responses not only from Israel, which in its submarines has second strike capability, but also from Turkey or Saudi Arabia, depending on the crisis du jour. Miscalculation is a key factor in war. The odds of a mistake are much higher the more countries are involved.
The question remains: can the world manage with Iran as a nuclear-threshold or even a nuclear country? The answer is yes, at least for a while, but that circumstance will not be in Iran’s favor. If it fails to negotiate a return to the JCPOA, the US will tighten its economic sanctions and apply them with more vigor. Israel will continue its “dirty war” of cyber attacks and assassinations of Iranian scientists. Europe and the UK will go along with the Americans, as their financial institutions and companies have too much to lose by displeasing Washington. Moscow won’t want Iran to go nuclear, but its companies may well be prepared to surreptiously help Tehran evade sanctions. Beijing may do likewise, as it has much to gain from acquiring Iranian oil at sanctions-induced relatively cheap prices.
The negotiations on return to the JCPOA adjourned Friday without progress and bitter words from both Washington and Tehran. Failure of the negotiations, whose aim is to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear threshold state, will thus aggravate East/West tensions and vastly complicate US relations with both Russia and China, which won’t take kindly to the tightening of sanctions. Iran’s economy, already well on the way to ruin, will deteriorate further. Israel will find its dirty war progressively more difficult and less effective as the Iranians learn how to counter it. Washington will want try to restrain Ankara and Riyadh from acquiring all the technology needed for nuclear weapons but will find it increasingly difficult to do so.
Getting back to the nuclear deal is the best option. The sooner the better.
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