Tag: Syria
Sanctioning Syria might work, but not the way it’s done now
The Assad regime and the Syrian economy at large have been under Western sanctions for years, but they have yet to lead to serious concessions. This has caused some analysts and policy makers to favor lifting most sanctions altogether, fearing that their only effect currently is to harm the Syrian civilian population. However, concessions from the Assad regime remain elusive, making this option difficult to realize. In response to these issues and considerations, the Middle East Institute’s Wael Alalwani and Karam Shaar published a paper reviewing US and EU sanctions on Syria earlier this month. On August 24, MEI convened a panel to discuss the report and the issue in general. The discussants agreed that the West lacks focus on the Syrian conflict. Western sanctions regimes lack thought and dedication, causing them to fail at bringing about regime change, while disproportionately harming the Syrian civilian population. Sanctions have a definite function in the fight against injustice in Syria, but their types and application need to be seriously reviewed for them to fulfil it efficiently.
The speakers were:
Natasha Hall
Senior Fellow, Middle East Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Jomana Qaddour
Nonresident Senior Fellow & Head of Syria
Atlantic Council
Member
Syrian Constitutional Committee
Karam Shaar
Research Director,
Operations Policy Center (OPC)
Nonresident Scholar,
MEI
Senior Lecturer
Massey University
Andrew Tabler
Matin J. Gross Fellow, Geduld Program on Arab Politics
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
former Senior Advisor to the U.S. Special Envoy for Syria Engagement
Charles Lister (moderator)
Senior Fellow and Director, Syria and Countering Terrorism and Extremism programs
MEI
The report
Karam Shaar summarized the findings of the report:
- Lift certain sanctions and rely more on others. All country or sector-wide sanctions should be lifted, as they hurt civilians the most and can’t be maintained in the long run. These should be lifted in exchange for concessions as soon as possible. On the other hand, targeted sanctions such as travel bans, asset freezes and secondary sanctions should be expanded.
- Implement a more proactive, all-of-Syria policy and focus on it. The current policy lacks focus and dedication.
- Pursue Syrian officials by using universal jurisdiction legislation in Western countries. Only small steps have been taken in this direction.
- Improve the effectiveness of sanctions. This can be done by targeting the deep cadres of the regime, not the tip of the iceberg (e.g. target known security chiefs who aren’t currently sanctioned, rather than a cabinet minister with little actual importance to the regime). The US and EU should also expand their use of secondary sanctions that target third parties who cooperate with or aid sanctioned individuals, even in activities that aren’t technically under sanctions.
- Make realistic demands. It is completely unrealistic for Assad to agree to the current demand, namely a political transition which will inevitably lead to his downfall and possibly even his death. Regime allies will also never favor this option. If this is the aim, far more pressure would be necessary than is currently applied.
Shaar considers the current sanctions policy a lazy attempt by the US and EU to feign an interest in the fate of the Syrian people, while allowing the situation to fester.
In response, Tabler, who was part of designing Syrian sanctions in the US government until recently, emphasized that mistakes are inevitable. However, it is also important to remember that certain decisions might be made based on classified information that the public isn’t privy to. He also considered scrapping all sector-based sanctions unrealistic. Certain sectors must remain sanctioned, although he does admit that there are sanctions that disproportionately harm citizens.
Bypassing sanctions
Natasha Hall turned the panel’s attention to regime efforts to bypass sanctions. North Korea’s ‘Room 39’ works on ways to access hard currency for Pyongyang through drug trafficking, ransomware, etc. The Assad regime’s ‘Room 39’ activities are perhaps more advanced than that already. It gains currency through the expropriation of IDP assets, as well as UN food aid. Qaddour added that the Syrian regime has become a major exporter of the illegal drug Captagon. The value of only the seized Captagon in the Gulf in 2020 was five times that of the legitimate exports of Syria.
Tabler described sanctions as good for the long haul. The threat of military action has a limited shelf life and diminishing deterrent value. However, when challenged by Shaar and Hall, he acknowledged that sanctions are a cat-and-mouse game. They must continuously be updated as those under sanctions discover loopholes to avoid them. Shaar criticized the Biden administration’s decision not to review and update sanctions, but rather continue to implement the Trump administration’s existing package. This has allowed such loopholes to expand.
The UN has also become a threat to the effectiveness of sanctions. Hall mentioned that the UN doesn’t have to adhere to US or EU sanctions and does work with regime insiders to deliver aid. Qaddour pointed out that this year’s UNSC discussion on aid provision led to the inclusion of early recovery assistance for the first time. Such efforts need to be viewed skeptically. If we can ensure strong conditions and follow-up for where this aid goes, it can benefit ordinary Syrians through the reconstruction of hospitals and schools. Otherwise, it is likely to flow into the pockets of companies owned by regime insiders.
Civilian wellbeing
Qaddour emphasized the need to balance the regime and the welfare of normal Syrians. We shouldn’t maintain a philosophy of ‘down with Assad or we burn the country’. Hall also warned that a failure to engage in sanctions as part of a broader strategy would lead to a North Korea on the Mediterranean: a heavily sanctioned regime that perseveres while its population suffers.
However, Qaddour thinks that Syrian citizens opposed to Assad are aware of the good intentions behind the current sanctions. This is particularly true for the Kurdish-held areas, which don’t bear the brunt of the sanctions and where Assad’s propaganda isn’t a factor. Also in regime areas, people tend to have a nuanced perspective. They can see firsthand that whatever wealth does enter the country flows to those in the regime. Their suffering is starkly contrasted with the wealth of regime insiders.
Re-engaging the West
The panel was unanimous in thinking that the West isn’t engaged enough with the Syrian conflict and that its actions reflect that. Hall made clear that there is much more at stake for the West than humanitarian considerations. The war and the Syrian regime cause arms trafficking, drug (Captagon) smuggling, and potentially the trafficking of foreign fighters. Especially if the regime captures Kurdish-held areas, thousands of foreign fighters would come under its jurisdiction. Tabler also feared that the West underprioritizes Syria.
There are those in Washington who favor ending sanctions. Not for love of the Assad regime, but for fear of the effects. Particularly the experience of Iraq in the 1990s and the suffering caused by US sanctions without tangible results inform this idea, according to Hall and Tabler. However, Qaddour pointed out that lifting sanctions without receiving concessions is impossible. It would devastate US and EU credibility in the future, and vindicate authoritarians claiming that the West will lose interest after a while.
Hall also indicated that ending sanctions won’t solve the suffering of the Syrian people. They would still be under the stress of the demographic engineering the Assad regime is engaging in. The expropriations of IDP and regime opponents property while investing reconstruction efforts in loyal areas that aren’t the most in need makes it impossible for many refugees to return to the country. Under these conditions reconstruction won’t succeed: it will lack the human capital that must also be rebuilt. If we lift sanctions now, we would just allow the entrenchment of a system of injustice. Shaar suggested there is no reason at all to lift targeted personal sanctions such as asset freezes. These don’t hurt Syrian civilians.
The panel came to a number of immediate recommendations:
- They agreed that establishing a high-ranking special envoy for Syria would serve to signal US seriousness and allow the sanctions system to be applied in earnest.
- Hall also recommended a comprehensive review of the effects and effectiveness of our current sanctions regimes.
- Shaar was pessimistic about the prospect of enticing European or American governments to take a genuine interest. He believed the best bet is to focus on what Syrians and those that do care about Syrian interests can do without their help.
Watch the recording of the event below:
Peace Picks | August 30-September 3, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
- Grim Prospects for Women and Girls in Afghanistan | Aug 31, 2021 | 10:00 AM EST | The Heritage Foundation| Register Here
As the world watched Afghanistan fall to the Taliban in a matter of weeks, one point was clear: the lives of Afghan women and girls would forever be changed. Over the last twenty years, women and girls made tremendous gains by going to school, holding political office, and entering the working world. Hard-won freedoms became a part of everyday life, and Afghan women were actively enjoying them.
With the Taliban back in power, many of these gains will likely be lost. So, what can be done now to safeguard the rights of Afghan women and girls? Join the Heritage Foundation as a distinguished panel of experts tackles the scale of the problem and realistic actions that the United States and the international community can take to mitigate the damage.
Speakers:
Lisa Curtis
Senior Fellow and Director, Indo-Pacific Security Program, Center for a New American Security
Heela Najibullah
Conflict and Peace Researcher
Author of “Reconciliation and Social Healing in Afghanistan”
Amb. Roya Rahmani
Former Ambassador of Afghanistan to the United States
Nicole Robinson (moderator)
Research Associate, Allison Center for Foreign Policy, The Heritage Foundation
2. #GermanyVotes – One month to go: The 2021 German elections and their implications | Sep 1, 2021 | 9:00 AM EST | Atlantic Council | Register Here
This event kicks off the Europe Center’s #GermanyVotes: The Superwahljahr Series, a collection of virtual and hybrid events focusing on Germany’s upcoming federal elections. Germans head to the polls on September 26 to pick a new government at a crucial moment in German politics. The elections will mark more than the usual electoral turnover as Chancellor Angela Merkel steps down after sixteen years at the helm of Europe’s largest political and economic power.
The panel will discuss what changes a new government and leadership in Berlin will bring about for Germany, Europe, and the transatlantic alliance. Against the backdrop of a still-new US administration, global crises including the impact of the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the COVID-19 pandemic, and new challenges to the country’s economic model, what new vision will a future German government and chancellor forge for Germany and its place in the world?
Speakers:
Tyson Barker
Head, Technology and Global Affairs Program, German Council on Foreign Relations
Constanze Stelzenmüller
Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe; Fritz Stern Chair on Germany and trans-Atlantic Relations, Brookings Institution
Ines Pohl (moderator)
Washington Bureau Chief, Deutsche Welle
- The 9/11 Attacks from a Historical Perspective | Sep 2, 2021 | 7:45 AM EST | Royal United Services Institute | Register Here
The attacks by the Al Qaeda terrorist organisation on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon, on 11 September 2001 were cataclysmic in totally changing the global strategic environment. This event will commemorate the 20th anniversary.
Speakers:
Prof. Peter Neumann
Professor of Security Studies, Department of War Studies, King’s College London; Senior Associate Fellow, RUSI
Suzanne Raine
Trustee, RUSI
Sir John Scarlett KCMG OBE
Distinguished Fellow, RUSI; Former Chief, MI6
- Tunisia – What Now? | Sep 2, 2021 | 9:00 AM EST | CSIS | Register Here
Tunisia, the lone democracy remaining from the Arab Spring, is at a crossroads. The Covid-19 pandemic devastated an already struggling economy, while the political system has grown increasingly ineffectual. Last month, Tunisia’s president Kais Saied suspended the parliament, sacked the prime minister, and significantly increased his own power for 30 days, and on August 23 he extended those moves indefinitely.
What does the future hold for Tunisia? What can the United States and its allies, who together have invested billions of dollars in the Tunisian democratic experiment, do to support Tunisia in its crisis?
Speakers:
Congressman David Price (D-NC)
Chairman, House Democracy Partnership; Member, House Appropriations Subcommittee on State Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Bowman Cutter
Chairman, the Tunisian Enterprise Fund
Mohamed Malouche
Chairman, Tunisian American Young Professionals
Lobna Jeribi
Founder and President, Solidar Tunisia
Shawna Bader-Blau
Executive Director, Solidarity Center
Jon B. Alterman
Senior Vice President, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and Director, Middle East Program, CSIS
Marti Flacks
Director and Senior Fellow, Human Rights Initiative, CSIS
5. Climate Change: Entry Point for Regional Peace in the Middle East | Sep 2, 2021 | 10:00 AM EST | Clingendael Institute | Register Here
Climate change is hitting the Middle East region hard with unbearable temperatures, water scarcity, desertification and saltwater intrusion undermining local food production. After the recent eruption of violence the need to address underlying stresses of grievances of people living in the region is mentioned as a factor that deserves extra attention. Whereas conflicts over identity and history are hard to overcome, it may still be possible to enter into renewed dialogues over how to build resilience against climate change and use renewables to enhance the level of energy security that could be used for air conditioning and water desalination. In a region prone to tensions, climate change is a common enemy that people in the region are facing.
By using practical examples, this online event will consider how a focus on climate adaptation and mitigation could be used as an entry point for bringing together people that otherwise might hardly talk to each other. What can they gain from entering into a dialogue over better management and distribution of scarce natural resources, and may this also foster a more general spirit of mutual understanding?
Speakers:
Yana Abu Taleb
Director, EcoPeace Middle East – Jordan
Rene van Nes
Head, Division of Conflict Prevention and Mediation Support, European External Action Service
Prof. Alon Tal
Member, Knesset
Dr. Shaddad Attili
Advisor ranking Minister, Negotiations Support Department, PLO
Louise van Schaik (moderator)
Head, EU & Global Affairs Unit, the Clingendael Institute
Tobias von Lossow (Q&A)
Research Fellow, the Clingendael Institute
6. Syria Today: How Assad “Won” beyond the Military | Sep 2, 2021 | 11:00 AM EST | Middle East Institute | Register Here
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to announce a panel discussion featuring contributors to The Middle East Journal’s 2021 Spring and Summer Issues. As the civil war in Syria endures after a decade of conflict, Bashar al-Assad continues to pursue his consolidation of authority and regime legitimization. Aside from military tactics, Assad has diversified his approach to this pursuit through a number of tactics, including swaying influential social and religious leaders to support state security measures and depending on foreign aid to support the reconstruction of the country. A panel of journal contributors will join to discuss these broader themes featured in their articles and delve deeper into the internal workings of the Syrian regime.
Speakers:
Rahaf Aldoughli
Contributor, Middle East Journal; Lecturer, Middle East and North African Studies, Lancaster University
Guy Burton
Contributor, Middle East Journal; Visiting Fellow, LSE Middle East Centre
Eric Lob
Contributor, Middle East Journal; Associate Professor, Department of Politics and International Relations, Florida International University
Emma Beals (moderator)
Non-resident scholar, MEI
7. Prospects for US-Iran Relations under Raisi | Sep 2, 2021 | 11:00 AM EST | Arab Center Washington DC | Register Here
The Iranian Studies Unit of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies and Arab Center Washington DC invite you to a lecture by Dr. Vali Nasr on the prospects for US-Iran relations under the Ebrahim Raisi and Joe Biden Administrations. Dr. Nasr is the Majid Khadduri Professor of International Affairs and Middle East Studies at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), and Non-Resident Senior Fellow at Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.
Speakers:
Vali Nasr (speaker)
Majid Khadduri Professor of International Affairs and Middle East Studies, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)
Khalil E. Jahshan (moderator)
Executive Director, Arab Center Washington DC
Mehran Kamrava (moderator)
Chair, Iranian Studies Unit, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies
8. Learning the Lessons of Afghanistan | Sep 2, 2021 | 7:00 PM EST | Institute for Policy Studies | Register Here
IPS’ Fellow, Phyllis Bennis will be featured in a webinar series, presented by Massachusetts Peace Action. A forum of three deeply knowledgeable speakers who will give their response to these themes and their suggested lessons.
Speakers:
Kathy Kelly
Nonviolent activist
Phyllis Bennis
Middle East Politics Specialist, Institute for Policy Studies
Chris Velazquez
Afghanistan War veteran; Digital Director, Veterans for Peace
Will Hopkins (moderator)
New Hampshire Peace Action
Peace Picks | August 23-27, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
- Policy Pulse: The Fall of Afghanistan | August 23, 2021 | 10:00 AM EST | The Heritage Foundation | Register Here
In recent weeks, Americans have watched in horror as the Taliban overran Afghanistan. The scenes from Kabul have alarmed the nation, and the Biden Administration has denied responsibility while allowing the crisis to spiral out of control. In the midst of the chaos, decision-makers must be clear about how these events came about, how they will impact U.S. national security, and what America’s options are for securing its interests moving forward. Policy professionals won’t want to miss this 30-minute Policy Pulse as Heritage’s leading foreign policy minds to respond to the fall of Afghanistan and break down the critical steps that must be taken in the aftermath.
Speakers:
Luke Coffey
Director, Douglas & Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy
Jeff M. Smith
Research Fellow, South Asia
- Afghanistan’s Collapse and the Implications for Global Jihadism and Counterterrorism | August 23, 2021 | 10:30 AM EST | The Middle East Institute | Register Here
Emboldened by the U.S. decision to withdraw from Afghanistan in April, the Taliban has surged across the country in a dramatic offensive. In response, Afghan security forces have collapsed like dominos, militarily overwhelmed or simply coerced into surrender. The fate of Kabul and the central government looks decidedly uncertain. For the first time in many years, al-Qaeda and its central leadership look likely to have a safe-haven in which to operate, while the group’s network of jihadist allies will feel similarly confident about what the future holds.
What lessons can be learned from 20-years of counterterrorism operations? Should the West try to stop the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan? How has the Taliban’s ascendance impacted the Afghan terrorism landscape, and how does it affect global jihadism?
Speakers:
Karen Joy Greenberg
Director, Center on National Security, Fordham University School of Law
David Kilcullen
President and CEO, Cordillera Applications Group, Inc.; Director, Thesigers and Native Data
Anne Likuski
Senior Research Fellow, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)
Asfandyar Ali Mir
Senior Expert, United States Institute of Peace (USIP)
Charles Lister (moderator)
Senior Fellow and Director, Syria and Countering Terrorism and Extremism programs, MEI
- The State of Play in Afghanistan | August 23, 2021 | 11:30 AM EST | The Atlantic Council | Register Here
The Taliban’s swift and stunning takeover of Afghanistan has shocked the world. As the dire situation continues to unfold, critical questions arise about, most urgently, the safe and prompt evacuation of Americans and US allies and the needed force posture for accomplishing such operations.
Please join the Atlantic Council to hear from General David Petraeus (USA, Ret.), former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. General Petraeus served over 37 years in the United States Army; his assignments included commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and commander, US Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A). GEN (Ret.) Petraeus also served as the 10th commander, US Central Command (USCENTCOM).
General Petraeus will address a wide range of critically important issues, including the long-term implications for US alliances, particularly NATO, and what effective policy options are available to the United States for setting its relationship with a Taliban-led Afghanistan. Also central to this discussion will be the nature of any renewed terrorist threats from a reconstituted Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups who may seek safe haven in Afghanistan, and the most effective homeland defense and counterterrorism policies and posture in this new environment.
Speakers:
General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army (retired)
Former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Board Director, Atlantic Council; Partner, KKR and Chairman, KKR Global Institute
Ambassador Paula J. Dobriansky
Vice Chair, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
Barry Pavel
Senior Vice President and Director, The Atlantic Council
- How Veterans can Protect American Democracy | August 24, 2021 | 10:00 AM EST | Brookings Institute | Register Here
Democracies around the world are under attack and authoritarianism is on the march in nations like Turkey, Venezuela, Hungary, and Poland, resulting in an unprecedented loss of public faith in our institutions and troubling hyper-partisanship here at home. Many Americans understand that democratic values must be protected and passed from one generation to the next, and few take this obligation more seriously than the men and women who have sworn an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States and placed their bodies in harm’s way in the defense of the nation. This spirit of service to the country does not end when one leaves the military, and most veterans believe it is their duty to continue to protect American democracy as engaged citizens.
Speakers:
The Honorable Sean O’Keefe
69th Secretary of the Navy, Department of Defense
General Tony Zinni, USMC (retired)
Former Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command
Admiral Jim Loy
21st Commandant, United States Coast Guard
The Honorable Louis Caldera
17th Secretary of the Army, Department of Defense
Michael E. O’Hanlon (moderator)
Director of Research, Foreign Policy; Co-Director, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Africa Security Initiative; Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Security, Strategy and Technology
- Syria and the West: The Efficacy of Economic Sanctions | August 24, 2021 | 11:00 AM EST | The Middle East Institute | Register Here
The U.S. and European Union have constructed an expansive and complex array of sanctions against Syria’s regime over the last 30 years, and particularly in the past decade. While such measures have been punitive in nature, the West has sought to utilize them since 2011 as a source of pressure and diplomatic leverage amidst the long-standing deadlock facing negotiations over the country’s future. Despite the best intentions, sanctions have not yielded any meaningful change in Syria diplomacy and as a result, they have become a source of intense political and analytical debate – for some, they are still of value and for others, they are only a source of humanitarian suffering, even if unintentional.
Speakers:
Natasha Hall
Senior Fellow, Middle East Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Jomana Qaddour
Nonresident Senior Fellow & Head of Syria, Atlantic Council
Karam Shaar
Research Director, Operations Policy Center (OPC); Nonresident Scholar, MEI; Senior Lecturer, Massey University
Andrew Tabler
Martin J. Gross Fellow, Geduld Program on Arab Politics, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy; former Senior Advisor to the U.S. Special Envoy for Syria Engagement
Charles Lister, moderator
Senior Fellow and Director, Syria and Countering Terrorism and Extremism programs, MEI
What are the successes and failures of Western sanctions against the Syrian regime? How can Western governments adapt their strategies moving forward? In what ways might sanctions be used to effectively change nefarious behavior and create diplomatic leverage?
- Afghanistan Aftershocks | August 25, 2021 | 1:00 PM EST | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register Here
Following the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, aftershocks are being felt worldwide. Please join the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on Wednesday, August 25 for a discussion with our experts on the global impacts of the U.S.’ withdrawal from Afghanistan and of the Taliban assuming control.
The conversation will cover critical questions surrounding human rights under the Taliban, the impending refugee crisis, the proliferation of Salafi-Jihadist terrorist groups, the United States’ global reputation, the responses of Russia, China, and Iran, and the broader geopolitical impacts in South and East Asia, among other topics.
CSIS Chief Communications Officer H. Andrew Schwartz will give opening remarks, followed by an expert panel discussion moderated by Susan Glasser of The New Yorker. The panel discussion will feature CSIS’s Seth G. Jones, Harold Brown Chair and Director of the International Security Program, Michael J. Green, Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair, and Marti Flacks, Director and Senior Fellow of the Human Rights Initiative.
Speakers:
Seth G. Jones
Senior Vice President; Harold Brown Chair; and Director, International Security Program
Marti Flacks
Director and Senior Fellow, Human Rights Initiative
Michael J. Green
Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair
H. Andrew Schwartz
Chief Communications Officer
- The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order | August 26, 2021 | 11:00 AM EST | Brookings Institute | Register Here
China has emerged as a global superpower that could rival, if not eclipse, the United States. What does China want, does it have a grand strategy to achieve it, and what should the United States do about it?
In his new book from Oxford University Press — “The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order” — Rush Doshi outlines how China’s grand strategy has evolved and offers solutions for an effective U.S. response.
On August 26, the Foreign Policy program at Brookings will host a webinar exploring the themes addressed in this new volume. The event will feature a moderated discussion with Rush Doshi, former director of the Brookings China Strategy Initiative and a former fellow in Brookings Foreign Policy, and Michael O’Hanlon, director of research in Brookings Foreign Policy, followed by a panel discussion with experts who will focus on analysis concerning the U.S.-China relationship and China’s grand strategy.
Speakers:
Suzanne Maloney
Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy
Michael E. O’Hanlon (moderator)
Director of Research, Foreign Policy; Co-Director, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Africa Security Initiative; Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Security, Strategy and Technology
Rush Doshi (discussant)
Former Brookings Expert
Thomas Wright (moderator)
Director, Center on the United States and Europe; Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Project on International Order and Strategy
David Edelstein (panelist)
Vice Dean and Professor, Georgetown University
Jackie Deal (panelist)
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute; President and CEO, Long Term Strategy Group
Jude Blanchette (panelist)
Freeman Chair in China Studies, CSIS
Turkey and Israel need to compartmentalize disagreements and cooperate
Not too long ago, Turkey and Israel had a good working relationship. That changed with the rise of Erdogan in Turkey and the increasing focus on Turkey’s intended leadership of the Islamic world. After 2010, the two countries no longer have diplomatic relations, and recently discussions of Eastern Mediterranean gas pipelines became a new potential stumbling block. However, these two countries are key US allies. The importance of their cooperation only increases now that the US is slowly withdrawing from the Middle East. A recent call between Israeli president Herzog and Turkey’s Erdogan could signal a new opening.
The Atlantic Council convened a panel of diplomats and academics to discuss these issues and their implications for the future. The experts saw potential for future cooperation, but this will depend on the states’ ability to understand each others security red lines, and to compartmentalize their relationship.
The speakers were:
Jonathan H. Ferziger
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Middle East Programs
Atlantic Council
Former Middle East Correspondent
Bloomberg
Amb. Mithat Rende
Former Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Turkey to the OECD
Prof. Brenda Shaffer
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Energy Center
Atlantic Council
Amb. Matthew J. Bryza (moderator)
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council in Turkey; Global Energy Center & Eurasia Center,
Atlantic Council
Defne Arslan (introduction)
Director, Atlantic Council in Turkey
Atlantic Council
How we got here
Bryza explained that Israel and Turkey had what amounted to a strategic partnership until relatively recently. He and co-panelist Rende lobbied at that time to realize an Israeli-Turkish gas pipeline. With the rise of Erdogan to power this all changed. His increased focus on Islamic solidarity drew him away from Israel, which he criticized for its treatment of Palestinian rights. The relationship reached a low point with the ‘Mavi Marmara Incident’ also known as the Gaza Flotilla Raid in 2010. Turkey was attempting to break the Israeli blockade on Gaza in Ferziger‘s words, by sending a shipment with aid to the enclave by boat. Israel responded by raiding the boat, leading to the deaths of nine Turkish nationals. Afterwards, Erdogan severed diplomatic relations.
In recent times, there have been cautious signs of improvements. Most notable is the call between Erdogan and Herzog on July 12. Ferziger reminded that Herzog’s role is largely ceremonial in Israeli politics, meaning that this shouldn’t be seen as a call on the highest level. Nonetheless, it does signal willingness on both sides for some level of communication.
Current disagreements
At the core of the bilateral strife are the Palestinians. Erdogan attacks Israel frequently and supports Hamas, whose leaders are often present in Turkey itself. This support for Hamas is an absolute red line to Israel. Shaffer believes that diplomatic initiatives are infeasible if a military presence of Hamas in Turkey remains. Some sort of civilian representation might be feasible, but no more than that. Furthermore, Bryza explained that Turkey’s rhetoric angers Israelis. Erdogan has moderated his comments recently, but with (potentially early) elections coming up, Bryza questioned if he will he be able to avoid nationalist rhetoric in his battle against right-wing rivals.
Israeli domestic politics also complicate the matter. Ferziger said that it is certain that Netanyahu will do whatever he can to paint reconnection with Turkey as a bad choice, while he privately is convinced that it is a good thing. The opposition will use Turkey’s ties to Hamas to make this diplomatic development very difficult.
Ferziger explained that the Hamas connection does help Erdogan, although not as much as one might think. He is popular in Gaza. But in the West Bank he is ‘banned’ and support for him is repressed by the Palestinian Authority. In East Jerusalem, PA control is not universal, meaning that this repression is less total. Nonetheless, Erdogan isn’t the only leader attempting to woo the Palestinians. Saudi Arabia is also engaging in humanitarian and development projects in Palestine. Alongside streets adorned with images of Erdogan, there are streets with those of Mohammed bin Salman. Moreover, Turkish attempts to become involved with the al-Aqsa mosque are met with resistance from Jordan, who currently operates it.
Rende underlined an issue from the Turkish perspective. There is a perception in Turkey that Israel supports the YPG and the establishment of an autonomous territory for the Kurds in Syria. Turkey rejects this as it considers the YPG a terrorist organization linked to the PKK. Shaffer believes that Turkish support for Hamas appears similar to Israel as Israel’s support to the YPG appears to Turkey. There is a need to understand from both sides that support for the Palestinians doesn’t have to equal support for Hamas and that support for the Kurds doesn’t have to equal support for the PKK.
The potential for future cooperation
Despite these issues, the panel generally appeared optimistic on the prospect of cooperation in other fields. The potential for establishing a natural gas pipeline was often mentioned in this regard. Turkey is the region’s only growing market for natural gas according to Rende. As Shaffer opined, connecting Israeli gas to Europe is most logical by attaching to the existing pipelines in Turkey. She explained that Israel is in doubt whether to attempt a gas pipeline through Greece or through Turkey. As Shaffer put it, there is an idea in Israel that it’s either good relations with Greece or with Turkey. But Turkey and Greece have more functional relationships with one another than Israel and Turkey. “There is no reason to be more Greek than the Greeks.”
The prospect of compartmentalizing their relationship was something some panelists were enthusiastic about. Shaffer suggested Turkey should deal with Israel as it does with China. The suppression of Uyghurs in China is completely unpalatable to the Turkish population, and yet Turkey is able to compartmentalize the relationship and engages with China extensively. Iran and Turkey too have tensions surrounding the Azeri population of Iran, which Erdogan has hinted in the past should be united with Azerbaijan. Despite these tensions, Turkey engages with Iran where necessary. Rende added that Turkey has huge differences with the US as well, but that doesn’t stop from cooperating fruitfully.
Shaffer hoped the US might attempt to steer Israel and Turkey more in that direction. The role of a superpower is not only to fight its enemies but to manage its allies. Obama and Trump have done a bad job at this according to her. Having Israel, Turkey, Cyprus, etcetera bickering is not good for the US.
Rende summarized his perspective neatly. Common grounds:
- Trade
- Tourism
- Energy/natural gas
- Defense industry/technology
- Agriculture/water
But the countries countries suffer from a lack of trust and confidence in one another. They must build these up slowly again.
Good steps towards this would be:
- Re-establish ambassadors
- Stop harsh rhetoric through the media
- Establish (ad-hoc) working groups and establish an agenda for cooperation
Watch the recording of the event here:
Stevenson’s army, August 10
– AP sees no increase in US airstrikes in Afghanistan.
– Jeff Schogol says B52s and AC130s are going there.
– WSJ says Russia is having problems in Syria.
Confession: NYT says its prize winning reporter covering the Manhattan Project took money and distorted some news. The paper also tells about a black reporter who exposed lies about radiation.
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No good options for Syria
The Assad regime is undertaking yet one more effort to suppress resistance in the southern Syrian city of Daraa. The brutality will no doubt be extreme, as it has been through more than 10 years of war against the civilian population. The question is Lenin’s: “What is to be done?”
Syria presents Washington with a quandary: American administrations from President Obama onwards find President Assad’s attacks on his own citizens odious and criminal, but they don’t see a risk to US national security that would justify putting American troops at risk to stop it. Once in a great while, Presidents Obama and Trump have used cruise missiles, which entail no risk to Americans, in response to Assad’s egregious use of chemical weapons, but without much effect.
American troops were sent to Syria, and remain there, to fight Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, not Assad. The Americans have sent lots of humanitarian assistance, but that does nothing to weaken or punish Assad. In fact, the portion of that assistance that goes through UN agencies via Damascus helps him a good deal. The Russians have been persistent in making it hard for aid to get to Syrian opposition-held areas from Turkey.
Anyone with even a modicum of human feeling would want to do more to save Syrian civilians from Assad’s depredations. So Josh Rogin and Andrew Tabler call for more, hoping an ongoing policy review will produce at least a special envoy. But a special envoy could be meaningless without a purpose, which Andrew would like to define this way:
a coherent political strategy, supported by the U.S. intelligence community, to isolate Assad and his regime’s facilitators and limit the malign influence of Iran and Russia.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-07-27/search-syria-strategy
How realistic is that?
More sanctions can be imposed–there is rarely a limit to those, but Assad and his enablers are not wanting to travel to the US or Europe and presumably know how to keep their finances under cover. The Syrian economy is already a shambles. Even if Assad is successful militarily, he will be unable to do any significant reconstruction. Iran and Russia already own him and will use their influence in ways the US and Europe consider malign.
The Americans can cause some discomfort to both by maintaining their small military presence in eastern Syria, which supports the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) there. But the Americans have been unable and unwilling to do much to stabilize the situation even where they are present, as that requires risk-taking they want to avoid. Hope that the SDF might develop into a serious military and political challenger to Assad seems to have expired quietly.
Just maintaining Assad’s current isolation requires a good deal of diplomatic heavy lifting. Some Arab countries–most notably Jordan and the United Arab Emirates–have wanted to ease up on Assad. To bolster its lagging economy, Jordan would like to open its border and allow trade with Syria. The UAE sees Assad as a bulwark against the Islamists that Abu Dhabi dreads and loathes. Greece, anxious to avoid another outflux of Syrian refugees, has sent its Ambassador back to Damascus as an “envoy.” Other Europeans may be tempted, or blackmailed, to do something comparable.
The UN political process for Syria, focused on a committee that is supposed to be writing a new constitution, is essentially moribund. Initiative for years has fallen instead to the “Astana powers” (Iran, Russia, and Turkey), none of which are prepared to push for a political solution. All three are relying on their military forces to get what they want in Syria. Iran gets a bridge to Lebanese Hizbollah as well as a new confrontation line with Israel, Russia gets its bases and a foothold in the Middle East, and Turkey gets to repress the Syrian Kurds, some of whom have supported insurgency inside Turkey.
I am not appealing for inaction, just highlighting how difficult it is to think of anything that can be done to affect the situation in a serious way. That is even before we come to discussing Biden Administration priorities, which include reentering the Iran nuclear deal, withdrawing at least some US forces from the Middle East, and refocusing on strategic competition with Russia and China while managing the challenges posed by North Korea, Venezuela, and other bad actors. Never mind the domestic priorities. Syria looks distant in Biden’s perspective.
So sure, a special envoy if you like, but what will s/he do? Talk is cheap, and not bad. But there are no good options for Syria.