Tag: Syria
Stevenson’s army, July 19
In a lengthy and curious article describing the changing administration response to the coronavirus, NYT point blame on two new figures, Chief of Staff Mark Meadows and Dr. Deborah Birx. On line, NYT has added a short summary article, 5 takeaways. The reports blame Meadows for daily small group meetings to plot strategy to turn the pandemic problems over to the states and thus away from the WH. Key date was April 10. The articles also depict Dr. Birx as the eternal optimist, repeatedly promising that the models forecast declining infections. She reportedly was given a West Wing office and was closer to the discussions and planning than any other medical person. The article has other nuggets, such as the claim that Jared Kushner told California Gov. Newsom he had to praise Trump if he wanted the medical equipment he was seeking.
– DHS was warned that agents sent to Portland lacked training in crowd control.
– WaPo says Russia is gaining in Syria.
– McClatchy says there is a serious whistleblower complaint against SecState Pompeo.
-WaPo has a review of the new book about Newt Gingrich.
– Two respected former members of Congress suggest ending gerrymandering by having the House reject credentials of members from gerrymandered states. Don’t go there!
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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The odious route to peace in Syria
A bit after 34 minutes in this briefing on US Syria sanctions, Faysal Itani asks two important questions of Joel Rayburn, State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary: 1) what conditions would Syria have to fulfill to get relief from sanctions and more normal relations with the US? 2) what do we do if the sanctions cause collapse of the regime?
Joel responds that there are six Trump-approved conditions Assad or any Syrian government would have to meet :
- Cease sponsorship of terrorism;
- Severe its military relationship with Iran and Iranian proxies;
- Cease hostility to regional neighbors;
- Surrender weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and cease its WMD programs in a sustainable way;
- Create conditions for refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) to return safely;
- Hold war criminals accountable, or allow the international community to do so.
Rayburn was at pains to point out that the first four were problems even before 2011. Only the last two stem from the war since then.
On regime collapse, Joel just shifts the responsibility to Syrian President Assad.
Both these answers are problematic.
The six conditions (which somehow become seven when Joel refers to the Caesar Act) are tantamount to regime change in Syria. There is no way Assad would survive numbers 5 and 6, especially as he himself is a prime candidate for war crimes accountability. 1-4 are less obviously connected one-by-one to regime change, but they amount to the same thing. It is a radically different Syria that could agree to meet these conditions.
The trouble is that we are nowhere near getting any of these conditions fulfilled. There is little likelihood that even the strict sanctions now being implemented will get us there any time soon. In the meanwhile, the sanctions will make life harder for many innocent Syrians and give the regime the foreign bogey-man it needs to blame for conditions it itself created. We need to do much more to ease humanitarian relief and remittances into areas the regime does not control and to prevent the regime from targeting UN agency relief, much of which we pay for, to its supporters.
The longer-term question is when can we hope that negotiating relief from sanctions with Assad will get us a worthwhile fraction of the conditions we have set? That’s how sanctions really work: you get something in exchange for relief from them, not in response to imposing them.
The prospect of regime collapse is what limits how long we can wait. It would mean risking revival of the Islamic State and resurgence of Al Qaeda or some 3.0 version of them, with all the harm that implies for US forces in Syria, the neighboring countries, and for Americans elsewhere in the world. It’s a judgment call, but it would be a serious mistake to wait too long. A year–at the outside two–of Caesar sanctions should be enough to tell us whether we have reached the point of diminishing returns.
It is profoundly odious to contemplate talks with Assad, and particularly difficult to do so if it looks as if his regime might be on the verge of collapse. His first priority in such talks would be self-preservation. But that is what we need to contemplate, unless we are willing to invest much more blood, treasure, and weapons in enabling an alternative to Assad that could take over quickly, avoid state collapse, and govern in a way more to our liking. I see no sign whatsoever that Americans–and certainly not Donald Trump–have the stomach for such a state-building commitment in Syria.
Joel and Syria Special Envoy Jim Jeffrey are hoping that Russia will save us from this conundrum. It would be nice if, as they often suggest, Moscow decides Assad is no longer their man. The Russians tell any American who will listen that they are unhappy with him. Some think Moscow could defenestrate Assad and find a more pliable proxy, in order to gain access to World Bank reconstruction funding, but they haven’t done it through a decade of rebellion and war.
A main factor here is money: if Moscow is willing to continue to bail out the Syrian economy, it is hard to imagine Assad crying “uncle.” But if Moscow–which is feeling the pinch of both Covid-19 and low oil prices–decides it is time, then a serious negotiation about Syria’s political future without Assad might begin. The Iranians–also pinched by Covid-19 and low oil prices–are a far less important financial factor.
The problems with relying on Russia to get rid of Assad are many. Moscow’s primary purpose there is to prevent regime change, not cause it. This is both a question of principle and interest, as it protects a fellow autocrat and the Russians’ biggest footprint in the Mediterranean. Moscow enjoys the discomfort Assad causes the West as well as the use of Syrian naval and air force facilities. Putin has taken good advantage of the situation in Syria to drive a wedge into NATO and pry Turkey loose, though not quite out.
All-in-all, Syria has been a winning wicket for Moscow. They talk smack about Assad to entertain the Westerners, but they aren’t likely to risk losing it all by unseating him until they can be sure the replacement will be at least as useful.
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A Tale of Two Refugee Groups…
In light of a recent Amnesty International claim that refugee camps “will become new epicenters” of the coronavirus, the Wilson Center hosted a webcast entitled Refugees and COVID-19 on June 24. The webcast examined the effect of coronavirus on two distinct refugee groups: the Rohingya and Syrians. Featured speakers included humanitarian leaders, Asia experts, and Middle East experts. Speakers’ names and affiliations are listed below.
Merissa Khurma (Moderator): Program Manager, Middle East Program, Wilson Center
Manzoor Hasan: Executive Director, Center for Peace & Security, BRAC University
Omar Kadkoy: Policy Analyst, Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey
Matthew Reynolds: Regional Representative for the United States of America & the Caribbean, UNHCR
Jennifer Poidatz: Vice President for Humanitarian Response, Catholic Relief Services
Background & Context
The Rohingya are an Indo-Aryan ethnic group, native to Rakhine State, Myanmar (Burma). They have suffered decades of repression at the hands of the Burmese government. Tensions escalated in 2017, when the Burmese military launched a violent campaign against the state’s Rohingya population. This particular campaign is infamous for the military’s perpetration of mass atrocity crimes. Approximately one million Rohingya now reside in refugee camps in Bangladesh.
Unlike the Rohingya, Syrian refugees span different ethnic and religious sects. They are citizens or permanent residents of Syria, who have fled or become displaced in the nine years since the onset of the Syrian Civil War. There are approximately 6.6 million Syrian refugees worldwide, 5.5 million of whom live in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt.
Excepting the fact that they have each been the subject of mass atrocity crimes, Rohingya and Syrian refugees are largely dissimilar. According to Reynolds, the Rohingya fit a “classic” model for refugee populations. Rohingya almost exclusively reside in densely-populated refugee camps, isolated from the citizens of their host country. In comparison, Kadkoy put the percentage of Syrian refugees in refugee camps at 2%. That is to say: more than 90% of Syrian refugees reside in urban areas, alongside the citizens of their host countries. Accordingly, Rohingya and Syrian experiences with coronavirus differ dramatically.
COVID-19 & the Rohingya
Due to their relative isolation, the Rohingya have had few encounters with COVID-19. According to Reynolds and the UNHCR, there are only 45 documented cases in the refugee camps, and fewer than 5 Rohingya have died of coronavirus. Even so, COVID-19 presents unique challenges. For one, the pandemic poses a threat to the Rohingya’s economic well-being. Because the refugees are so isolated from the Bangladeshi mainstream, many rely on aid to survive. Hasan estimates nearly half have no income to supplement the aid that they receive, monetary or otherwise, from NGOs. Because aid delivery has been disrupted, many Rohingya are at risk of falling into debt.
Moreover, Hasan argues that there is widespread distrust. Many Rohingya are skeptical of coronavirus testing and treatment; they are even hesitant to schedule medical appointments. Hasan believes that this trust deficit can be ameliorated through the provision of 4G Internet and the implementation of local trust-building measures. Finally, and critically, the population density of the refugee camps renders the Rohingya ill-prepared should coronavirus appear. Social-distancing is virtually impossible, according to Reynolds, and the Rohingya do not have enough Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to effectively combat the virus’ spread. The Rohingya are an incredibly vulnerable population; if/when coronavirus appears, they are sitting ducks.
COVID-19 & Syrians
Syrian refugees, by comparison, have been afflicted with the Coronavirus in relatively high numbers. They are overwhelmingly poor and exist on the margins of urban society; when coronavirus appeared, Syrian refugees were hit first and hardest. According to Kadkoy, Syrian refugees in Turkey are struggling to cope with the economic standstill brought on by the pandemic. Because refugees generally work in informal labor markets, their labor is perceived as disposable, and they have lost jobs at a rate four times higher than Turkish citizens. Even Syrians who retained their jobs have reported decreases in wages. Refugees’ health and financial security are both tenuous. Without relief, aid, or intervention, the situation is unlikely to change.
To watch the Wilson Center’s webcast in full, please click here.
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Protest rises across the Middle East
“Today we are witnessing not only Lebanon and Iraq’s powerful protest movements calling for greater rights and an end to corruption, but also solidarity movements in Palestine and Syria supporting the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States. What common goals are shared by protest movements across the Middle East? What lessons can the civil resistance currently surging in the United States learn from social movements and activism in the Middle East, and vice versa? What impact has COVID-19 had on ongoing protests in Lebanon and Iraq?” On June 24, the Middle East Institute held an online discussion on protests and solidarity movements in states throughout the Middle East. The event was moderated by Zahra Hakir and featured four guest speakers:
Zahra Hankir (Moderator): Freelance journalist and author, Our Women on the Ground: Essays by Arab Women Reporting from the Arab World
Zahra Ali: Assistant Professor of Sociology, Rutgers University-Newark
Ahmed Abu Artema: Palestinian journalist and peace activist
Razan Ghazzawi: Doctoral candidate, University of Sussex
Lokman Slim: Director, Hayya Bina and UMAM
Iraq
Ali believes that the protests that have occurred across Iraq since October 2019 symbolize an unprecedented attempt by ordinary Iraqis to change the course of their nation’s contemporary history. In Tahrir Square in Baghdad, activists occupy the streets and have begun to provide free educational and cultural services to Iraqi citizens. Through their work, these activists have developed new codes of conduct that question traditional conceptions of gender norms. Ali believes that the US invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 engendered divisions along sectarian lines. To protesters in Iraq, resentment against these divisions lay at the heart of their dismay.
Syria
Ghazzawi highlights that recent protests in Daraa, Idlib, Afrin, Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, and Suwayda arose following the imposition of new political and socio-economic realities by the Syrian state, Russia, Iran, and Turkey. The demand to release detained protesters has uniformly resonated throughout protests across Syria. Ghazzawi believes that these protests challenge previous analysis of essentialist notions of sectarianism in Syria. In addition, Ghazzawi finds these protests to be significant in the way in which they challenge authoritiarian, colonial, and partition geography. The protests require one to think beyond the model of the Syrian state vis-à-vis the opposition.
Solidarity with BLM in Palestinian Territories
There is a history of solidarity between the cause of Palestinian liberation and Black social justice movements. Abu Artema highlights the recent development of solidarity movements in the Palestinian Territories with the Black Lives Matter movement and protests against the death of George Floyd. Abu Artema stresses that in expressing solidarity with the Black Lives Matter movement, Palestinians have simultaneously protested against instances of aggression by Israeli soldiers.
Lebanon
Slim underscores that the rise of anti-establishment protests in Lebanon has surpassed sectarian lines. Similar to Iraq, Lebanon remains plagued by the ramifications of sectarian divisions. Because of the economic collapse and the failure of the Lebanese healthcare system amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, protests in Lebanon have increased in intensity. To Slim, these protests have exposed growing dislike for Hezbollah among Lebanese citizens, who associate the group with Lebanon’s corrupt government. Furthermore, the enactment of the United States Caesar Civilian Protection Act may have deleterious consequences for Hezbollah, which has backed the Assad-regime throughout the Syrian Civil War.
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Peace Picks | June 22-28
Notice: Due to recent public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live-streaming.
- Algeria’s Borderlands: A Country Unto Themselves | June 22, 2020 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM | Carnegie Middle East Center | Watch Event Here
Algerian officials in the northeastern border area between Algeria and Tunisia continue to permit the cross-border smuggling of petrol and other commodities. In turn, smugglers have participated in the authorities’ efforts to neutralize security threats, even as they continue to engage in the illicit trade. The two ostensibly adversarial parties effectively complement each other. In her new paper, Algeria’s Borderlands: A Country Unto Themselves, Algerian political scientist Dalia Ghanem examines such paradoxes and argues that state formation remains an evolving process in the country.
Speakers:
Dalia Ghanem: resident scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center.
Max Gallien: political scientist at the Institute of Development Studies.
Isabelle Werenfels: senior fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP).
- Assessing the Implications of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act | June 22, 2020 | 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
On June 17, the long-awaited Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act came into force, imposing the most comprehensive set of sanctions against Syria’s Assad regime to date. Aimed principally at preventing further war crimes by preventing any foreign investment into the Syrian regime, the sanctions will almost certainly have a consequential impact on Syria’s politics and economy. As the act comes into force, Syria is already beset by a spiraling economic crisis, the effects of which have generated unusually defiant and persistent anti-regime protests in the Druze-majority governorate of Suwayda and rising levels of discontent within regime-held territories. Southern Syria faces an expanding insurgency, ISIS is slowly resurging in the central desert, Turkey is doubling down on a permanent presence in the northwest and for now, U.S. troops appear to be staying.
How will the Caesar Act’s sanctions be enforced and with what goals in mind? What effect are they likely to have within today’s context? Does a policy of escalating pressure on the Assad regime promise diplomatic progress or humanitarian suffering?
Speakers:
Amb. James F. Jeffrey: Special Representative for Syria and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS
Rime Allaf: Syrian writer and commentator; board member, The Day After Project
Qutaiba Idlbi: Non-resident scholar, MEI; Syria fellow, International Center for Transitional Justice
Charles Lister (Moderator): Director, Syria and Countering Terrorism and Extremism Programs, MEI
- U.S. Grand Strategy in the Middle East | June 22, 2020 | 2:00 PM – 3:00 PM | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register Here
While prominent voices in Washington have argued that U.S. interests in the Middle East are dwindling and will require the United States to “do less” there, Jake Sullivan argued in a recent Foreign Affairs article that the United States should be more ambitious using U.S. leverage and diplomacy to promote regional stability.
Speakers:
Jake Sullivan: Nonresident Senior Fellow, Geoeconomics and Strategy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Jon B. Alterman: Senior Vice President, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and Director, Middle East Program
- Iranian Kurds: Challenges, Existence, and Goals | June 23, 2020 | 11:00 AM | Washington Kurdish Institute | Register Here
With 12 million people, the Iranian Kurds make up the second largest population of the Kurds in the greater Kurdistan. Similar to Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, the Iranian Kurds have been struggling for decades for freedom under the current Iranian regime. The Kurdistan region of Iran (Rojhelat) has the highest rate of political prisoners in the country. The regime’s discriminatory economic policies in Rojhelat have resulted in poverty and poor living conditions for the Kurds, which led many to become border porters known as Kolbars. Hundreds of Kolabrs are victims of the Iranian border guard attacks and executions every year. The dire political, economic, and security situation of Rojhelat continues under the current regime that has been suppressing its citizens on an ethnic and sectarian basis.
As the first founders of the Kurdish nationalism and political parties in greater Kurdistan, the panel will discuss the current situation of the Iranian Kurds and their goals. The panel will also discuss the Iranian Kurdish relations and cooperation with other opposition groups in Iran and potential future understandings.
Speakers:
David L. Phillips: Director of the Program on Peace-building and Rights at Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights
Arash Salih: Representative of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan to the United States.
Salah Bayaziddi: Representative of the Komala Party to the United States.
Kamran Balnour: Representative of the Kurdistan Democratic Party to the United States
- The World Economy After COVID-19: A Conversation with President Romano Prodi | June 23, 2020 | 12:30 PM – 2:00 PM | Johns Hopkins SAIS | Register Here
Join Johns Hopkins SAIS for a conversation with Romano Prodi, Former President of the European Commission (1999-2004); Former Prime Minister of Italy (1996-1998; 2006-2008). The event is moderated by Justin O. Frosini, Adjunct Professor of Constitutional Law, SAIS Europe; Director of the Center for Constitutional Studies and Democratic Development and Associate Professor, Bocconi University.
- The Sunni Religious Establishment of Damascus: When Unification Creates Division | June 24, 2020 | 7:00 AM – 8:00 AM | Carnegie Middle East Center | Watch Event Here
The 2011 uprising in Syria totally transformed the religious establishment in Damascus. The regime sent into exile many prominent, influential religious figures who, forced to work from abroad, formed a religious opposition group called the Syrian Islamic Council. The regime also restructured what remained of the capital’s competing religious institutions. This robbed the religious establishment in Damascus of the financial and administrative independence that had been its key privileges. But it also presented new Sunni clerics from the capital’s hinterland with opportunities to enter the competitive religious arena — as well as posing a major challenge to the SIC, obliged to operate in exile. In her latest paper, The Sunni Religious Establishment of Damascus: When Unification Creates Division, Laila Rifai mentions how the religious sphere in Rural Damascus Governorate is poised to become a political battleground as both the regime and the exiled opposition seek to court a new rising group of religious leaders.
Speakers:
Laila Rifai: writer and researcher, specializing in Syrian religious affairs.
Thomas Pierret: senior researcher at CNRS-IREMAM, Aix-en-Provence.
Muhammed Mounir Al Fakir: fellow at the Omran Centre for Strategic Studies.
- Turkish-Israeli Relations: Prospects for Improved Diplomacy | June 25, 2020 | 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
Over the past decade Israel-Turkey relations have been strained. There have been recent positive signs, however. Israel’s decision not to sign a statement by France, Greece, Cyprus, the UAE, and Egypt condemning Turkey’s actions in the eastern Mediterranean and a tweet posted by Israel’s official Twitter account praising its diplomatic relations with Turkey raised hopes. Turkish analysts saw the moves as a sign of both countries’ willingness to cooperate when it comes to eastern Mediterranean energy but tensions remain.
How does Israel and Turkey’s involvement in Syria and increasing opportunities for economic cooperation affect the prospect of improved bilateral relations? How will Israel’s plans for annexation and Turkey’s public support for the Palestinians affect diplomatic relations? Are there enough incentives to normalize Israel-Turkey relations or will the barriers be insurmountable?
Speakers:
Nimrod Goren: Founder and head of Mitvim, The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Karel Valansi: Political columnist, Shalom Newspaper
Gönül Tol: (Moderator): Director of Turkey Program and Senior Fellow, Frontier Europe Initiative, MEI
- The Broader Implications U.S. Disentanglement from Afghanistan| June 26, 2020 | 10:00 AM – 11:15 AM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
On 29 February, the United States signed an agreement with the Taliban designed to allow for an orderly withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Afghanistan by next spring if not sooner. Coming after many months of difficult negotiations, the decision carried a promise from the Taliban to deny to any terrorist group or individual the use of Afghan soil to undertake an attack on the United States or its allies. The accord also carried a Taliban commitment to participate in an intra-Afghan dialogue quickly aimed at a peaceful resolution of the civil conflict. American policy for Afghanistan must be seen as well on a broader canvas of continuing U.S. diplomatic, political and military disengagement regionally. As in Afghanistan, withdrawal leaves unanswered many questions about how American national security interests may be affected, particularly at a time of increased great power competition.
What might be the impact of a full U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan on the course of the civil war and prospects for peace talks? What would the United States do if after departure the Taliban broke the terms of their agreement or threatened the survival of the Afghan state? How would the end of an American military presence affect relations with Pakistan? And is the United States prepared to accede to strongly increased Iranian, Russian, or Chinese influence in Afghanistan and the region?
Javid Ahmad: Nonresident fellow, Atlantic Council
Ronald E. Neumann: President, The American Academy of Diplomacy
J. Alexander Thier: Senior advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Elizabeth Threlkeld: Senior fellow and deputy director, South Asia Program, Stimson Center
Marvin Weinbaum (Moderator): Director, Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies, MEI
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Nuclear reminders
Former International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Pantelis Ikonomou writes occasionally for peacefare.net. We have never met in person, or even spoken on the phone, but his unequivocal commitment to containing and reducing nuclear risks, combined with his technical expertise, has been more than enough reason for me to open the blog to his always welcome contributions.
He has now written and published with Springer a wonderful comprehensive volume modestly titled Global Nuclear Developments: Insights from a Former IAEA Inspector. It is a first-rate primer on:
- the technology required to make a nuclear weapon,
- how the current international regime to control nuclear weapons evolved and how it functions,
- how major nonproliferation crises have been handled in North Korea, Iran, Syria, Libya, Romania, and the former Soviet Union,
- possible future proliferators, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Japan, and South Korea,
- nuclear incidents/accidents, and
- the nuclear weapons states, both within the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty–US, Russia, China, UK, and France–and outside it–India, Pakistan, Israel, and South Africa.
Throughout, Pantelis demonstrates his excellent and dispassionate command of the details while also offering practical and well-founded guidance for the future. North Korea, he thinks, will not be giving up nuclear weapons but its program might be frozen, given the right incentives. The US, he thinks, made a colossal error in withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal (the JCPOA) and thereby shortening the time required for Tehran to obtain the material needed to build a nuclear weapon. He understands that the deal in which Libya gave up its military nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief was a good one, but Qadaffi’s ultimate end will have strengthened North Korean resolve not to do likewise. I found his discussion of the South African and Israeli pursuit of nuclear weapons particularly interesting.
Pantelis is proud of the work of the IAEA, but blunt about the shortcomings of the regime it administers. He regards its Additional Protocol as adequate to limiting the possibility of hiding a military nuclear program within a civilian one, but he also notes that it is not universally and unconditionally accepted, most notably by Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran (which accepts it only within the context of JCPOA) as well as Israel, which remains outside the NPT. He also underlines the tensions between nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons states over the reluctance of the former to deliver on nuclear disarmament, which contributed to the failure of the 2015 review conference and what he feared would be the likely failure of the 2020 edition before it was postponed this spring.
In the end, Pantelis speculates on the emergence of a new “tetra”-polar equilibrium among nuclear weapons states:
- US and UK;
- Russia and India;
- China, Pakistan, and North Korea;
- Israel and France.
I am not sure how he comes to this conclusion. Even if 1. and 3. are historically well-rooted, I’m not convinced that India will ally with Russia or that today’s France is interested in allying with Israel, even if Pantelis is correct that France helped Israel develop its nuclear weapons in the past. Nor do I see why this configuration should be stable. It seems to me that two-party nuclear standoffs (US/USSR, India/Pakistan, US/China) are far more likely to be stable than anything with four corners to it.
Pantelis reserves his final enthusiasm for an epilogue in which he pleads with the world’s scientific community to convince the nuclear weapons states, especially the US and Russia, to engage seriously in nuclear disarmament rather than their current race to modernize and proliferate nuclear weapons, which is intensifying. I wouldn’t fault him there at all. The craziness of pursuing weapons that can never be used without sealing your own country’s destruction has not been lost on most of the world’s states. Lowering the level of mutual assured destruction could free up a lot of resources for more useful things. It is fortunate we have well-informed observer/participants like Pantelis to remind us of what we should be doing.
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