Tag: Syria
Ramifications of an Iran nuclear deal
Optimism is breaking out in some circles for tomorrow’s nuclear talks in Baghdad with Iran. Tehran Bureau hopes for a win/win. Stimson projects possible success.
This hopefulness is based on the emerging sense that a quid pro quo is feasible. While the details people imagine vary, in general terms the deal would involve Iran revealing the full extent of its nuclear efforts and limiting enrichment to what the amount and extent it really needs under tight international supervision. The international community would ease off on sanctions.
What is far less clear than the shape of a deal is whether politics in either Tehran or Washington will allow it to happen, as Zack Beauchamp speculated on Twitter last week. Europe, which leads the p5+1 (US, UK, France, China, Russia and Germany) talks with Tehran is useful to the process but will go along with whatever the Americans and Iranians decide.
Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has been a major stumbling block in the past. He scuppered a deal a few years ago that would have supplied Iran with the enriched uranium it needs for a research reactor in exchange for shipping its own stockpile of 20% enriched uranium out of the country. Unquestionably more in charge than in the past, Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards who support him need hostility with the West to maintain their increasingly militarized regime. A resolution–even a partial one–of the nuclear standoff may not be in their interest.
It might not please hawks in the U.S. Congress either. They want a complete halt to enrichment in Iran and don’t want to rely on international inspections that might be suspended or otherwise blocked. Improvement in relations with Iran would hinder their hopes for regime change there. It would also make it difficult to criticize Barack Obama in the runup to the election for his diplomatic outreach to Iran, which failed initially but with the backing of draconian international sanctions seems now to be succeeding.
The smart money is betting that both Tehran and Washington will want to string out the negotiating process past the U.S. election in November. This would be a shame if a deal really is possible before then. The world economy would look a lot brighter if oil prices, pumped up since winter by Iranian threats to close the strait of Hormuz, sank well below $100 per barrel. Improved relations with Iran could also have positive knock-on effects in Iraq and Afghanistan, where Iran (which neighbors both countries) has sought to make things hard for the Americans.
A nuclear deal could also free the American hand a bit in Syria, where Washington has been reluctant to act decisively because it needs Russia and China on board for the P5+1 effort. Of course it might also work in the other direction: Washington could decide to give a bit in Syria in order to get a nuclear deal with Iran. That would not be our finest moment.
PS: Julian Borger is, as usual, worth reading, in particular on how low the bar has been set for the Baghdad talks.
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Syria: what now?
This is a piece of mine Reuters published this afternoon under the headline “Here’s how to handle Syria”:
Bashar al-Assad continues his war on the Syrian opposition, despite the presence of United Nations observers. His efforts have generated extremist reactions, including major bombings. The Syrian opposition continues to fragment, even as protesters manage to mount peaceful demonstrations in many parts of the country. The conflict is increasingly sectarian in character and has overflowed to Lebanon’s Tripoli.
There is no alternative in sight to the existing Security Council resolutions. Syria is not on the NATO summit agenda this weekend in Chicago. The Americans continue to need the Russians “on side” for nuclear talks with Iran that resume next week in Baghdad. Unilateral American action on Syria is not in the cards. Europe is preoccupied with its own financial crisis and is unable to act without American help. Qatari and Saudi weapons entering Syria are likely to increase violence and worsen sectarian tensions.
So what is to be done? Here are some ideas for the Obama administration:
- Lend wholehearted support to the Annan plan, which the United States has been badmouthing ever since the Security Council passed Resolution 2043 on Apr. 21.
- Talk with Moscow about ensuring that Russian vital interests in Syria, port access and arms sales, are protected once Bashar al-Assad is gone. The United States no longer needs to block Moscow’s access to a Mediterranean port, as it did during the Cold War. Russian arms sales to Syria are a small price to pay to bring down a regime that links Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah.
- Deploy civilian observers – including Americans – to Syria. The Security Council has already authorized a civilian component to the U.N. Supervisory Mission in Syria (UNSMIS). It would be too much to expect Syria to accept U.S. military observers, and the U.S. does not send its soldiers and Marines into harm’s way unarmed, as the UNSMIS observers are. But we have had good results with unarmed civilian observers in the Kosovo Verification Mission before the NATO-Yugoslavia war, when the lead observer spoke truth to power about a civilian massacre.
- Stop talk about arming the opposition. It isn’t what we should be doing or encouraging because of the likelihood it will prolong sectarian conflict; we can’t control where the weapons end up; and there is no hope that an insurgency will defeat Assad anytime soon.
- Redouble encouragement for peaceful demonstrations, which are occurring every day in Syria, and try to ensure that the U.N. observers are present for them.
- Increase the flow of non-weapons aid to the opposition inside Syria, which claims to have received precious little so far, and provide intelligence on threatening movements of Syrian security forces.
- Present overhead video of heavy weapons in use against Syrian cities at the Security Council, along with other hard evidence of Annan plan violations. Anne-Marie Slaughter has proposed a U.N. website that would post video and photographs uploaded by Syrians.
- Tighten the application of sanctions, including implementing the draconian financial sanctions already adopted for Iran against Syria as well.
When the Security Council approved the Annan plan, the United States called for “swift and meaningful consequences … should the regime continue to flout its obligations.” The best way of getting those consequences approved in the Security Council is to support full implementation of the Annan plan. Then the United States can go to the Council in mid-July, when the observer mission has to be renewed, arguing that despite its sincere efforts, Bashar al-Assad has defied the international community and needs to be taught a lesson.
PHOTO: Anti-government protesters attend the funeral of Mahmoud Al Moustafa, whom protesters said was killed by forces loyal to Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad, in Deir Al Zour, May 15, 2012. REUTERS/Handout
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Talking Turkey
There were Turks in town this week. Well-informed ones who spoke off the record at a meeting that included other luminaries. Here are some of the conclusions from the discussion.
Zero problems with neighbors, Turkey’s avowed foreign policy based on realpolitik, blew away in the gusts of idealism associated with the Arab spring. Turkey now has growing problems with neighbors, especially Syria and Iran but also Iraq.
Syria. Turkey misread Bashar al Assad. Ankara thought he would step aside, but that reflected a misunderstanding of the nature of the Ba’ath regime and an underestimation of the difficulty of getting Bashar out. In fact, Turkey generally lacks people who understand the Middle East well, and even experts who speak Arabic.
With the U.S. reluctant to intervene, Turkey is paralyzed, fearing that anything it does will worsen its own problems with the Kurds and increase refugee flows. Prime Minister Erdogan’s voice is much stronger than his policies. He lacks domestic political support for any further move against Bashar al Assad. There is little popular sympathy for the Syrian revolution in Turkey. Ankara says it supports an inclusive Syrian National Council (SNC), but in practice Turkish support goes mainly to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, the dominant influence within the Syrian National Council, not to secularists.
Turkey wants the Syrian Kurds to support the revolution, but it isn’t willing to support their desire for decentralization. Ankara pressured the SNC to deny the Kurds what they want, causing them to withdraw from the SNC entirely.
Iran. Turkish relations with Iran have deteriorated sharply. The traditional highly competitive but non-hostile relationship is turning ugly, despite rapidly growing bilateral trade. The balance is sharply in Iran’s favor. Iran will not back down on Syria. Nor will Turkey. Tensions are bound to escalate. It is not clear where the breaking point lies, but there is no sign that it can be avoided.
Iraq. Turkey has improved its relations with the Iraqi Kurds (particularly Kurdistan Regional Government President Barzani) in an effort to influence the Syrian Kurds. But Ankara’s relationship with Baghdad has taken a turn for the worse. Turkey is competing for influence in Iraq with Iran.
Bottom lines: A few years ago, Ankara had hopes for zero problems with neighbors and was knocking on the door to the Europe. If Assad survives, Turkey will now face increasing Middle East turmoil that it has little capacity to manage and no European prospect. Ankara has bitten off more than it can chew in Syria and has little idea what to do about it.
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Ineffective solutions to the wrong problem
John Kerry’s renewed advocacy of safe zones and possible arming of the Syrian opposition provokes me to repeat what I’ve said before: these are ineffective solutions to the wrong problem. If you want to protect civilians, the worst thing you can do for them is to concentrate them in one place where Bashar al Assad can be sure he will be killing his opposition. And if you want to bring Bashar down, an armed opposition is one of the slowest and least effective ways to do it.
First, safe areas, corridors, or whatever you want to call them. They will not be safe because the UN Security Council declares them safe. Remember the safe areas in Bosnia and the UN protected areas in Croatia. They were target-rich environments, because that is where the enemies are. To make areas safe, you have to destroy the Syrian army’s capability to attack them, in particular with aircraft (including helicopters), missiles, artillery and armor.
In order to do that, you have to take down the air defenses. Think Libya times five or maybe ten, because Syrian capabilities are significantly greater. Libya was impossible without the jump start the U.S. gave the operation. And there is someone out there who thinks Jordan and Turkey will do Syria on their own? The EU and the U.S. are simply not going to engage in this effort–they have too much else on their minds, and the Americans want to keep the Russians on side for the nuclear negotiations with Iran.
Second, arming the opposition. This is already happening to some extent–small arms circulate widely in the Middle East. But small arms aren’t going to stop armor, artillery and aircraft, or even mass arrests and torture. An assassin could of course get lucky, but armed rebellion has little prospect for overthrowing Bashar, whose army and other security services have remained cohesive. We can of course feed an insurgency in Syria, but that is no quick solution. Insurgencies typically take decades to succeed, and they more often don’t.
These propositions are not only ineffective. They would take things in the wrong direction. Safe areas would attract mainly Sunni Syrians, thus increasing the sectarian segregation that the civil war has already begun. Arming the opposition would also drive away from its ranks the relatively few Alawites, Christians, Druze and others who have joined its ranks.
Sectarian warfare comparable to what happened in Iraq in 2006-7 is just about the worst outcome imaginable in Syria from the American perspective. Odds are it would overflow to Lebanon, Iraq and maybe even Turkey and Jordan.
If you want to intervene militarily in Syria, the United States should lead the effort and target the command and control of the Syrian armed forces, including Bashar al Assad himself. Talking about half measures that won’t work but instead make things worse is not helpful.
The consequences of a serious military strike on the regime are unpredictable. Would Bashar be killed? Who would take over? Would it intensify the civil war? How will Iran react? This too is a solution that could make things worse.
The Annan plan, even not 100% effective, starts looking like a reasonable proposition when you take a good look at the alternatives. We should stop talking smack about it and do our best to support it.
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This week’s peace picks
1. His Excellency Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations: Building and Sustaining Peace: The UN Role in Post-Conflict Situations, CSIS, 11-noon May 7
The Center for Strategic and International Studies Program on Crisis, Conflict, and Cooperation (C3) invites you to a Statesmen’s Forum with
His Excellency Ban Ki-moon
Secretary-General of the United Nations
On
Building and Sustaining Peace: The UN Role in Post-Conflict Situations
Welcoming Remarks and Moderated by
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Counselor and Trustee
CSIS
Monday, May 7, 11:00 a.m.–12:00 p.m.
B1 Conference Room
1800 K Street, NW, Washington DC 20006
This event will be webcast live and viewable on this webpage.
For questions or concerns, please contact statesmensforum@csis.org.
Ban Ki-moon is the eighth Secretary-General of the United Nations. His priorities have been to mobilize world leaders around a set of new global challenges, from climate change and economic upheaval to pandemics and increasing pressures involving food, energy, and water. He has sought to be a bridge builder, to give voice to the world’s poorest and most vulnerable people, and to strengthen the organization itself. Mr. Ban took office on January 1, 2007. On June 21, 2011, he was unanimously reelected by the General Assembly and will continue to serve until December 31, 2016.
2. Decline of Armed Conflict: Will It Continue? Stimonson, 12:30-2 pm May 7
SIPRI North America, 1111 19th St. NW, 12th floor, Washington DC 20036
RSVP: Please click here.
There is a prevalent public perception that the world has become a more violent place. However, many leading experts agree that there has been a decline of violence and war since 1989. To expand upon these findings and explore their future implications, SIPRI North America will convene a roundtable discussion with two leading experts in the peace and conflict field.
The following key questions will be discussed by a panel of experts:
- What are the reasons behind the decline of armed conflict? And will the decline of armed conflict continue?
- What do we know about the nature and patterns of armed conflict?
- Should the definitions of armed conflict be adjusted?
- How does the Arab Spring fit into the paradigm of declining conflict?
- What role did and should the international community play in mitigating armed conflict?
Welcome: Dr. Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Executive Director, SIPRI North America
Speakers:
- Dr. Sissela Bok, Board Member, SIPRI North America and Senior Visiting Fellow, Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies (Moderator)
- Dr. Joshua S. Goldstein, Professor at the School of International Service, American University
- Dr. Peter Wallensteen, Dag Hammarskjöld Professor of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala Universit
*Light lunch and refreshments will be provided
If you have any questions, please contact Masha Keller at sipri-na@sipri.org
3. Thinking the Unthinkable: Potential Implications of Oil Disruption in Saudi Arabia, Heritage Foundation, noon-1:30 pm May 8
If an “Arab Spring” uprising completely disrupted Saudi oil production, the U.S. and the global economy would face a massive economic and strategic crisis. Russia and Iran as oil-producing states would likely exploit the crisis to increase their power around the world while undermining U.S. influence, especially in the Middle East. A crisis in Saudi Arabia would have drastic implications for the United States, its economy, and the whole world.
The U.S. must plan ahead and develop pro-active, multi-layered preventive and responsive strategies to deal with political threats to the security of oil supply. These would combine intelligence, military, and diplomatic tools as well as outline domestic steps the United States should take in such a crisis. Please join our distinguished panel of experts as they discuss strategic threats to oil supply; policy options available to the United States and to the oil consuming and producing states; and examine lessons learned from other Heritage Foundation energy crisis simulation exercises.
More About the Speakers
Ariel Cohen , Ph.D.
Senior Research Fellow, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, The Heritage Foundation
Bruce Everett, Ph.D.
Adjunct Associate Professor of International Business, The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Simon Henderson
Baker Fellow and Director, Gulf and Energy Policy Program, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Hosted By
4. The Consequences of Syria for Minorities in the Levant, Middle East Institute, noon-1 pm May 9
The Middle East Institute is proud to host journalist and author Jonathan C. Randal for a discussion about the impact of the conflict in Syria on neighboring Lebanon and its complicated religious and ethnic make-up. A tired joke among Lebanese asks why their much-battered country has been spared most of the turmoil that has attended the Arab Spring and its often violent ramifications elsewhere in the Middle East. The jest’s cynical answer: because Lebanon is automatically seeded for the finals. Such gallows humor reflects fears Lebanon will end up footing the bill whether the Alawite regime prevails in Damascus or succumbs to the largely Sunni Syrian opposition. Once again, the region’s minorities feel threatened by outsiders’ geostrategic considerations pitting Iran and its Syrian and Hezbollah allies against the United States. Europe, and the Gulf monarchies. Will the Syria conflict, like so many earlier Middle East conflicts, end up undermining, the role and status of the Levant’s Christian and other minority communities? Randal will draw from his many decades covering Lebanon for the Washington Post and from his book about Lebanon’s civil war, Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers and the War in Lebanon (1983, Viking Press) which has been reissued by Just World Books with an all-new preface as The Tragedy of Lebanon: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers and American Bunglers.
Speaker: Toby Dodge, Consulting Senior Fellow for the Middle East, IISS
Venue: IISS-US, 2121 K Street NW, Suite 801, Washington, DC 20037
Dr Dodge will discuss the future of Iraqi politics.
Dr Toby Dodge is Consulting Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He is also a Reader in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Dr Dodge has carried out extensive research in Iraq both before and after regime change, and has advised senior government officials on Iraq. He holds a PhD from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
This meeting will be moderated by Andrew Parasiliti, Executive Director, IISS-US and Corresponding Director, IISS-Middle East.
IISS-US events are for IISS members and direct invitees only. For more information, please contact events-washington@iiss.org or (202) 659-1490.
6. Will Democratic Governance Take Hold in the Middle East? IRI, 3-5 pm May 10
Agenda
9:00 am | Identifying the Hallmarks of 21st Century Conflict and How to Manage Conflict in Complex, Chaotic, and Fragile Environments
- Ambassador Rick Barton, Keynote Address
Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations - Robert Ricigliano, Introduction
Board Chair, Alliance for Peacebuilding - Richard Solomon
President, U.S. Institute of Peace - Melanie Greenberg
President and CEO, Alliance for Peacebuilding - Pamela Aall
Provost, Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding, U.S. Institute of Peace
10:00 am | Results of the USIP-funded Peacebuilding Mapping Project
- Elena McCollim
Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego - Necla Tschirgi
Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego - Jeffrey Helsing, Discussant
Dean of Curriculum, Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding, U.S. Institute of Peace
11:20 am | How Other Fields Manage Complexity — And What Peacebuilding Can Learn From Them
- Bernard Amadei
Founder, Engineers without Borders - Simon Twigger
Department of Physiology, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee - Daniel Chiu
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Office of the Secretary of Defense - Timothy Ehlinger
Department of Biology, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee - Sheldon Himelfarb, Moderator
Director, Center of Innovation: Science, Technology and Peacebuilding,
U.S. Institute of Peace
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Glass empty
Yesterday’s Middle East Institute discussion of Hamas’s shifting political calculations, moderated by Phil Wilcox of the Foundation for Middle East Peace, was one of the more depressing events I’ve attended lately. And I attend a lot of them.
Bottom line: the shifts, though potentially real, will make no difference to the peace process with Israel. Or even to reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah.
Rob Malley of the International Crisis Group suggested the Arab awakening has certainly sharpened questions for Hamas about its relationship with Syria and Iran and about whether it should moderate its views, as other Muslim Brotherhood organizations have done. Hamas refused to support Bashar al Assad, but somehow that is now a byegone. Iran has renewed its financing, though at what level is unclear.
Gaith al Omari of the American Task Force on Palestine said Hamas needs Iranian financing less than in the past because it has Gaza’s revenue, which makes the Gaza leadership more independent. There is really no progress on reconciliation with Fatah, which would require more than naming a new unity government. It would require agreement on holding elections and unifying the security forces. So far, all we’ve seen is reconciliation theater, nothing more.
Mark Perry of the Jersalem Media and Communications Center anticipates generational change will be important inside Hamas. The outside (of Gaza) leadership may be ready for acceptance of the 1967 borders for a Palestinian state and for reconciliation, but the inside Gaza leadership is not. The division is not really ideological, Malley said, but based on where you happen to sit. There is a real debate happening, but the outcome is unclear.
The U.S. is a problem. The “quartet” (U.S., EU, UN and Russia) conditions (recognition of Israel’s right to exist, renunciation of violence and acceptance of past agreements) are unconditional. But Hamas sees no likelihood that Washington can really bring Israel to the negotiating table with anything interesting to offer on settlements, Jerusalem or other important issues. Hamas’ great fear is that it will get trapped like Fatah, having compromised without getting anything substantial in return. They want to know if they accept the conditions what would happen next. The U.S. has no serious response.
There is nevertheless no alternative to a U.S.-led mediation process. The Europeans and the UN have nothing substantial to offer.
This left me wondering whether George W. Bush was right when he shunned the Middle East peace process. The prospects for anything interesting happening sounded minimal to me. Then again, when the experts all agree the glass is empty, that’s when something interesting happens.
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