Tag: Syria
The 90 day ultimatum
United States Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice used today’s passage of UNSC Security Council resolution 2043 authorizing deployment of 300 UN observers to Syria to issue an ultimatum: the Syrian government needs to fully comply with the six-point Annan plan or else.
Or else what? The explicit threat was not to renew the observer mission. But Rice was trying to imply more than that:
…let there be no doubt: we, our allies and others in this body are planning and preparing for those actions that will be required of us all, if the Asad regime persists in the slaughter of the Syrian people.
There are not a lot of good options out there. A Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing Thursday revealed few. Tightening sanctions is one, but the Russians resisted including that in the resolution. Maybe they will be willing to do it if Damascus continues to defy the Security Council for another 90 days. An arms embargo is another. But arms embargoes are normally enforced against a country, not only a government. The Russians are unlikely to allow one to pass that applies to Damascus but not the Free Syria Army. While I am not in favor of a violent uprising, it would be profoundly unjust to deny Syrians the means to defend themselves.
Then there is the option Rice was presumably trying to imply: military action, by NATO and/or a coalition of the willing. I still see little prospect of this happening, though three more months of Syrian government defiance could change the picture.
Unfortunately what the 90-day ultimatum does in the meanwhile is to give Bashar al Assad a three-month hunting license. It is now in his interest to get the observers in as quickly as possible, since no military action can be taken while they are deployed in Syria. He’ll try to use the 90 days to bag as many protesters as possible. It would have been far better to deploy them with no fixed time limit, or with a shorter one requiring re-authorization by the Security Council. The reports the Secretary General is required to make every 15 days are a useful mechanism to keep international attention focused on implementation of the Annan plan, but they don’t provide the same leverage that a shorter authorization would have done.
That said, the key is to get the Syrian army out of artillery range of population centers. Randa Slim wisely reminds us that local leaders in Syria have the capacity to put hundreds of thousands–maybe millions–into the streets if peace protests are permitted, as required by the Annan plan. This she suggests would be a game changer.
I agree. Syria needs no more than a couple of days of relative peace for the people to show unequivocally and peacefully their preference for Bashar al Assad’s departure. If the observers can help to give them those days, their deployment will be worthwhile. If not, withdrawal in 90 days will be the right move. But then it will be incumbent on the Obama Administration to have a plan for what comes next.
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Syria can get worse
NATO preparations for military intervention in Syria are again in the news. The Obama Administration is looking for Plan B. Even my former colleagues at US Institute of Peace are calling for suppression of Syrian air defenses. That’s spelled W-A-R.
I am feeling the need to repeat what I’ve said before: half measures won’t work and could make things worse. If removal of Bashar al Assad from power is your objective, and you propose to achieve it by military means, don’t trick yourself into thinking it will necessarily be easy or quick. Certainly a humanitarian corridor is not an obvious or direct means of getting rid of Bashar. It is a target-rich environment that is only safe if military force makes it so.
It would be folly for NATO to waste its resources on such a half-baked non-solution. That is certainly one of the lessons of the Libya experience, when a humanitarian intervention had to refocus on Qaddafi in order to bring about the desired, but not stated, result.
If you want Bashar al Assad out, the thing to do is take him out. A massive attack on Syria’s command and control facilities would force him underground–as a lesser effort eventually did to Qaddafi–and all but guarantee that the regime changes, though in which direction is unpredictable. To control that, you’ve got to put boots on the ground. But you will also need to write off any prospect of Russian or Chinese support for action against Iran’s nuclear facilities, which are certainly a greater threat to U.S. national security than Bashar al Assad.
Arming the opposition is another option. There is lots of mumbling from Senators McCain and Lieberman about how the Free Syria Army (FSA) hasn’t gotten any help from anyone and are running out of ammo. The French call that de la blague. The Turkish and Iraqi borders have seen lots of arms flowing. Others want to manage the process despite the chaotic conditions. The FSA is not a threat to the Syrian regime in the short-term. It is an insurgency that will be difficult to defeat entirely but offers little immediate prospect of displacing Bashar al Assad, whose army is stronger than the Libyan one and notably more loyal.
A long, violent, drawn-out and increasingly sectarian conflict in Syria is not a good outcome for the United States. I am second to none in wishing Bashar al Assad gone from a country in which I studied Arabic and enjoyed remarkable hospitality from people who have suffered a half century of privation, economic and political. Yes, we should certainly support the on-the-ground opposition and do everything possible to protect their right to protest and determine their own political future.
But the best bet for now is to play out Annan plan and the UN observer scenario for what it is worth: either it will lead to a serious reduction in violence, and I hope a corresponding increase in peaceful protest, or the observers will give up like the Arab League observers before them and abandon the field. If the former, we’ll all be able to celebrate, as nonviolent protest will provide by far the best foundation for a successful transition to something like democracy. If the latter, we should not be surprised to find that things get worse, much worse, as they did after the Arab League observers withdrew.
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What good are UN observers?
That was my title for a piece The Guardian published this morning as UN observers in Syria must show courage in their actions and words:
By insisting on moving freely, and reporting what they see, the observers can deter violence and help to restore stability in Syria
As Kofi Annan rushes to deploy the first 30 UN observers to Syria, it is important to ask what good they might do. How can a few dozen unarmed soldiers monitor a ceasefire in a country of more than 22 million? Even at their anticipated full strength of 250, what can they really accomplish? Won’t government minders lead them around by the nose, showing them only what President Bashar al-Assad wants them to see? How can they possibly understand what is going on in a situation that is chaotic at best, homicidal at worst?
These doubts are well-founded, especially in today’s Syria. Observers are most useful where there is a peace to keep. If both sides in a conflict conclude that they cannot make further gains by fighting, then observers can increase mutual confidence in a ceasefire and reduce the likelihood of misunderstandings or miscommunications leading to violence.
Those conditions do not exist today in much of Syria, where the government is still purposefully attacking its own population. Violence has declined in some places, but fighting continues in others. The government has already made it clear it wants the observers to go where and when it is safe, as determined by Damascus. On Sunday, Assad’s spokeswoman said: “Syria cannot be responsible for the security of these observers unless it co-ordinates and participates in all steps on the ground.” This is as much threat as warning. The government security forces have always tried to focus on one major community at a time. Damascus will try to take the observers to those communities where relative peace prevails.
To be effective in this situation, the observers will need to take a proactive stance, reaching out to the Syrian opposition, insisting on going where they want when they want, and reporting amply on what they find. This takes courage. The UN secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, is providing the top cover. “It is the Syrian government’s responsibility to guarantee freedom of access, freedom of movement within the country,” he said. The observers will need to focus their attention on the violence, report on its origins and course, and demand that it stop.
Liaison with the opposition, while desirable, is also problematic. Anyone the UN observers contact may be tracked and monitored by the Syrian security forces. Arbitrary detention, torture and extrajudicial killings are common in Assad’s Syria. Some courageous individuals will speak up no matter what. Others, who are prepared to talk with the observers, will need to move quickly to protect themselves thereafter, changing residences, cell phones and even identities. This will make it difficult for the observers to maintain continuity.
Despite these very real problems, the presence and persistence of the observers can deter violence and encourage non-violent protest. The opposition will become less bold in provoking the security forces, fearing provocations will be visible internationally. Peaceful demonstrations, which are already common, will become larger and more frequent. The security forces will gradually realise that the observers cannot be intimidated and that they will return to check and re-check what is going on, reporting their findings in ways that will embarrass anyone who is continuing the violence. The commanders may begin to behave with less abandon.
The UN observers, in addition to doing whatever they can to report on violations of the Annan plan, need to keep in mind their own broader significance. They are the living symbols of international community engagement, the only token so far of the UN security council’s commitment to restoring peace and stability in Syria. They will need to try to maintain a good working relationship with the Syrian government, but they also have to insist on their own independence. This includes the freedom to meet with the Syrian and foreign media and report fully what they have found.
The ceasefire, already fraying, cannot, however, succeed for long on its own. The UN security council resolution requires humanitarian and media access as well as the start of a political dialogue. This is where Annan’s job gets really hard. Even though the security council was silent on the future of Assad, he has to be convinced to step aside, because there can be no serious transition if he remains in place. The ceasefire can only be a bridge to a broader political solution, not an end in itself.
If the observers come to the conclusion that current conditions do not permit them to do their work effectively, or if they determine that one side or the other is primarily responsible for the violence and mayhem, then they need to say so plainly. Failure is a possibility, but even failure can sometimes have a positive impact. The Arab League observers, whose mission failed during the winter, played a useful role despite their pro-Assad Sudanese leader. They talked with the opposition, their presence encouraged peaceful demonstrations, some reported accurately on what was going on, and others resigned in protest over the restrictions the Syrian government put on them. In the end, it was the withdrawal of the Arab League mission that escalated the Syrian situation to the UN and ultimately forced the security council to act.
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Luck needs a policy
We got lucky Friday: the ceasefire in Syria mostly held. But luck is not a policy. Today things are falling apart. Belligerents adhere to ceasefires for many reasons, including to give themselves a break and to reorganize and rearm. When they see their antagonists doing likewise, they may figure they are losing relative advantage and go back to fighting. Certainly it is unwise to rely on good intentions, especially when one of the antagonists is Bashar al Assad.
What is to be done? The monitors the UN Security Council approved today are part of the answer. Inserting them will give the international community eyes and ears that it today lacks. That will tamp down violence and provide a means of holding one or the other side accountable when it happens. Some may doubt whether the Arab League observers did much good, but certainly the situation in many places deteriorated badly after their withdrawal. No ceasefire is going to last long in Syria without a means of policing it.
The Annan plan has important elements other than the ceasefire, which still need to be implemented. Hillary Clinton is precisely correct to be arguing for withdrawal of heavy weapons from Syrian population centers, freedom of expression, humanitarian access and freedom of movement for international journalists. But don’t expect Bashar al Assad to comply with these additional provisions of the Annan plan unless a lot of pressure is brought to bear and Moscow puts its foot down.
It is vital that Free Syria Army–the not so organized armed wing of the rebellion–hold its fire, giving the diplomatic machinery a chance to start up. If the opposition turns to violence–even in response to regime violence–the prospects for a negotiated solution will dim quickly.
What the opposition needs to do now is show its strength nonviolently–yesterday’s widespread demonstrations were a great start–and prepare for negotiations. Its lack of clear leadership and structure are an advantage while protesting, but fragmentation will turn to disadvantage once negotiations start. It is also important that the opposition make as many friendly contacts with the security forces as possible while the ceasefire holds, hoping to prevent them from returning to repression once it breaks down. If the opposition can make Bashar al Assad doubt the reliability of his security forces, good things can happen.
The critical wording of the provisional Security Council resolution was this (I haven’t yet been able to verify where this wording is in the resolution that passed within the hour):
…a Syrian-led political transition leading to a democratic, plural political system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations, ethnicities or beliefs, including through commencing a comprehensive political dialogue between the Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition;
This is obviously, and importantly, intended to signal to Syria’s many minorities that they will be treated correctly in the transition. Reference to the “whole spectrum” of the Syrian opposition opens the door to inclusion of groups not part of the Syrian National Council, which does not have adequate representation of on-the-ground protest groups. But it will also open the door to what could be interminable arguing over who should be at the table.
Uniting the opposition behind a single set of negotiating positions and a broadly representative delegation is the next critical step, if the six-point plan has even partial success. The responsibility is more for Syrians than foreigners, but I can at least hope that the U.S. and Europe are trying hard to insist on a single platform, carried to the negotiations by people representing the full spectrum of diversity in Syria. Luck needs a policy if is to last.
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U.S.-Iraq relations after the withdrawal
I’m speaking at noon with Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman and former Iraqi UN Deputy Perm Rep Feisal Istrabadi at the Middle East Institute (the event is at SEIU, 1800 Massachusetts). Here are the notes I’ve prepared for myself (but I’ll vary it depending on what they say):
–Tony Blinken, speaking last month at Center for American Progress, said: “Iraq today is less violent, more democratic and more prosperous…than at any time in recent history.”
–There are some indications that violence, especially from Al Qaeda in Iraq, is up since late last year. But even if true, Tony’s statement sets a low bar and the gains are still reversible.
–If our goal is a “sovereign, stable, self-reliant country, with a representative government that could become a partner in the region, and no safe haven for terrorists,” we are not there yet.
–On security, Iraq still endures an unacceptably high number of attacks: deaths per month in politically motivated attacks are way down from the peak, but they are still sufficient to keep sectarian tensions high, which is what Saddam Hussein loyalist Izzat al Duri said was intended in his recent video.
–The economy is not really in good shape. High Iraqi oil production helps Baghdad’s budget and moderates world prices, which Americans like, but it does not an economy make.
–Democracy in Iraq does not yet include an independent judiciary, protection of basic human rights, vigorous parliamentary oversight, effective provincial and local governments or fulfillment of many constitutionally mandated procedures.
–Looking to the future, there are three fundamental threats to Iraq that might vitiate U.S. efforts there:
- First is the threat of breakdown: an Iraq that becomes chaotic and dysfunctional, a more or less failed state like the one Prime Minister Maliki took over in 2006.
- Second is the threat of breakup: an Iraq that fragments along ethnic and sectarian lines, with broad regional consequences as each of the neighbors seeks advantage.
- Third is autocracy: fear of breakdown or breakup may motivate Maliki, or someone else, to centralize power and refuse to transfer it in accordance with the will of its people, expressed in verifiably free and fair elections.
–None of these Iraqs can be the kind of partner the United States seeks, but I won’t spend much time on the first two possibilities. It is the third that worries people these days.
–We need an Iraq that respects the rights and will of its people.
–The question is what influence we have, apart from the usual diplomatic jawboning, which Jim Jeffrey and the embassy have mastered beyond a shadow of doubt.
–There are four specific potential sources of U.S. influence in today’s Iraq: arms, aid, oil and what—for lack of a better term—I would call relationships.
—Arms transfers, some people say, give us “leverage”: we should make providing our support conditional on Iraqi adherence to democratic norms, or meaningful power-sharing, or depoliticization of the security forces.
–Those are all worthy objectives, but this seems to me easy to say and difficult to do. Once you’ve embarked on a program of transferring F-16s, it is going to take a big issue to override the vested interests involved. Conditionality would encourage the Iraqis to get their arms elsewhere.
–The best we can do it seems to me is to make it clear—preferably in writing in advance—that none of the weapons systems the U.S. provides can be used against Iraq’s own citizens exercising their legal rights.
–We should also make it clear that we will cooperate only with a professional army under civilian control. But Iraq’s specific governing arrangements are no longer ours to determine, so long as they remain representative and democratic.
—Aid is a more flexible tool. It should be targeted towards democracy and rule of law. I would focus on encouraging a more independent judiciary and promoting a civil society that will demand real democracy while carefully monitoring government expenditures and corruption.
–To be clear: there is no reason why the U.S. should still be spending hundreds of millions in Iraq for economic and agricultural development. The Iraqis have more than enough incentive, and their own resources, to do those things.
–Iraqi resources come from exported oil, more than 90% of which is shipped through the Gulf under Iranian guns, even when the existing pipeline to Turkey is operating.
–This is where we have so far failed clamorously: shipment of Iraq’s oil by pipeline to the north and west—once Syria undergoes its transition—would help to reduce Iranian pressure on Iraq and align Iraqi interests with those of Europe and the United States.
–Of course this means Iraq’s oil, and eventually gas as well, would have to traverse Kurdish and Sunni-populated territory, which means domestic political reconciliation is a prerequisite.
–Some will see that as an insurmountable obstacle. I see it as a challenge, one well worth overcoming. Iraq should be tied umbilically to Turkey and the Mediterranean, not to Hormuz.
–Finally: relationships. American influence inside Iraq comes in part from good relationships with the main political players, with the obvious but I hope declining exception of the Sadrists.
–While they may still resent the occupation, Iraqis of most stripes look to the Americans for protection. Iraqis of all stripes believe that the United States is vital to re-establishing their country’s regional role.
–We should be ready and willing to help, expecting however that Iraq will align with the United States where it really counts: right now, that means supporting the P5+1 effort on Iran’s nuclear program and the Arab League plan for Syria.
–And it means pumping as much oil as possible into a world market concerned with the prospect of war with Iran.
–Just a word in conclusion about the long term. Maliki, whatever his virtues and vices, is not for ever if democracy survives in Iraq.
–We need to use the Strategic Framework Agreement to ensure that our institutions and Iraq’s institutions, our people and Iraq’s people, our economy and Iraq’s economy, our culture and Iraq’s culture, are tied closely together.
–I’ll be glad if the Assistant Secretary tells me I am wrong, but I have the impression that we still have not learned how to fully exploit the potential of this agreement to sharply increase the interconnectedness between Iraq and the United States.
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Working or not?
While Andrew Tabler, surely one of the best Syria analysts in DC, already denounced the ceasefire as a failure yesterday, the Washington Post this morning suggests it is holding.
The truth is we really don’t know yet just what is going on. Ceasefires often need a few days to take hold, and they just as often fall apart quickly. Tabler is correct to point out that the Syrian military did not fulfill the requirement that it withdraw from population centers, and that Bashar al Assad is clearly intending to keep his police and paramilitaries active. But his army may well need a respite. The elite units comprised of unquestionably loyal soldiers have been hyperactive for more than a year. The opposition could definitely use a few days to refresh itself.
If the ceasefire is even partly effective, it will provide an opportunity to chart a more productive course than the chaotic war that the Syrian government is conducting against its own citizens. The resistance is gradually weakening. We should not delude ourselves: Bashar al Assad may not be any more able to beat the armed insurgency his forces face than the Americans in Afghanistan can defeat the Taliban, but he may well be able to hold on to his seat in Damascus. In the meanwhile, even an insurgency doomed to failure may roil security and politics in the Middle East in ways that are unpredictable but unlikely to be salubrious.
The best way forward is to use whatever respite the ceasefire provides to strengthen the Syrian revolution’s commitment to nonviolence and enable it to speak with one voice. Tomorrow, Friday, will be an important day. If the opposition can convince large numbers of Syrians to demonstrate one way or another that they want Bashar to go, his generals will be thinking about escape routes. But if the cease fire collapses in chaos, with the blame shared, we are headed back into a war Bashar cannot win but won’t lose.
If the ceasefire by some miracle does hold, the question of negotiations will quickly arise. The opposition has said it will only discuss Bashar al Assad’s departure and the subsequent transition. This is Bashar’s “red line”: he seems to believe he is winning and will insist on staying in power. The only thing I can think of that will change that is a Russian or Iranian diktat. The Iranians will hold on tight–they haven’t got a chance of maintaining their strong position in Syria, and its role as transit agent to Hizbollah, once a Sunni-majority transition regime comes to power. The Russians likely have a price–at the least, continuation of their port access and arms sales.
If there are going to be negotiations, the opposition will have a hard time getting organized to engage in them. Their many factions are still jockeying for power. A leaderless revolution has many advantages during the repression–it can’t be decapitated or readily coopted–but once negotiations start structure and discipline become vital ingredients for success. Let’s hope the Syrian opposition is not quite as disorganized and fractious as it has appeared in recent months.
PS: Tonight in Aleppo:
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