Tag: Syria
The UN poised to act on Syria
Turtle Bay has helpfully posted the latest UN Security Council draft resolution on Syria. It does many good things (condemns the regime’s repression, calls for access for the Arab League monitors, international journalists and the UN, endorses the Arab League efforts, calls for accountability), but the key question is whether it is sufficient to initiate a transition in Syria away from the Assad regime. Here are the most relevant provisions:
6. Calls for an inclusive Syrian-led political process conducted in an environment free from violence, fear, intimidation and extremism, and aimed at effectively addressing the legitimate aspirations and concerns of Syria’s people, without prejudging the outcome;
7. Fully supports in this regard the League of Arab States’ 22 January 2012 decision to facilitate a Syrian-led political transition to a democratic, plural political system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations or ethnicities or beliefs, including through commencing a serious political dialogue between the Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition under the League of Arab States’ auspices, in accordance with the timetable set out by the League of Arab States;
The text fails to call for Bashar al Assad to step down or transfer authority to his vice president, an apparent concession to the Russian view that the UNSC is not about regime change. The real clinker here is “without prejudging the outcome,” which is intended to shield Bashar.
My guess is that this is nevertheless sufficient to initiate a transition, provided the Arab League, the Americans and the Europeans stay firm and united (and the text is not watered down further). This means maintaining sanctions and pushing for Bashar to step aside, even though the resolution is not explicit on this point. The UNSC may not want to call for his ouster, but the Arab League and individual member states are entitled to press for it. It is impossible to picture “a serious political dialogue between the Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition” unless he does, since at least some of the Syrian opposition will be unwilling to meet under Bashar’s auspices.
The resolution rules out any authorized use of force: “nothing in this resolution authorizes measures under Article 42 of the Charter.” But for now at least that is fine. No one outside Syria is prepared to use force there.
The concluding provision for an Arab League report on implementation within 21 days and every 30 days thereafter is a yawn to most of us, but of course it is important to ensure that this issue get back regularly to the Security Council without the Russians running interference. If the Russians defy my prediction and don’t veto, this resolution could set the snowball in motion and we may well see the back of Bashar al Assad before spring.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The likely Russian veto
Russia faces a big decision in the UN Security Council: whether to veto the draft resolution on Syria, or use the threat of a veto to extract further concessions in the text and then go along, maybe by abstaining.
There are ample reasons for Moscow to veto. In its current form the resolution foresees “delegation by the President of Syria of his full authority to his Deputy to fully cooperate with the national unity government in order to empower it to perform its duties in the transitional period.” If seriously implemented, this would mean the end of Bashar al Assad, though not necessarily of his sidekicks. Farouk al-Sharaa, the vice president, is a solid Assad regime type. But once a transition is set in motion, it will be difficult for Moscow to prevent it from gathering momentum.
That is not something Prime Minister Putin would like to see happening, especially in the run-up to Russia’s own March 4 presidential election. Putin will want to maintain his image as strong, unmoveable and defiant of the West. Russian protesters will view any concession on Syria in the Security Council as an incentive to up their game: if Syrians can displace an autocrat, why can’t Russians follow suite?
So the odds are in favor of a Russian veto this week, but there is still a slim possibility they would allow a defanged resolution to pass. The text is already less than crystal clear on what is supposed to happen. It reads like an obfuscated “puzzler” on Car Talk. The part immediately preceding the text on delegation of powers to the vice president reads this way:
Fully supports in this regard the League of Arab States’ initiative set out in its 22 January 2012 decision to facilitate a political transition leading to a democratic, plural political system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations or ethnicities or beliefs, including through commencing a serious political dialogue between the Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition under the League of Arab States’ auspices, in accordance with the timetable set out by the League of Arab States, aimed at:
So the delegation of powers is not to happen right away. There is to be a serious political dialogue aimed at the delegation of powers. There is lots of wiggle room here: what is the “whole spectrume of the Syrian opposition?” Elements of the opposition will likely refuse to take part. Who is to blame if the dialogue doesn’t happen? What if it takes a long time?
The main Russian concern will be to ensure that any resolution passing the Security Council cannot be interpreted as authorizing the use of force against the Syrian regime. While the Arab League has been at pains to emphasize that it is not asking for military intervention but rather indicating a way forward that will avoid it, the resolution still has a few points on which the Russians can be expected to balk. For example:
stressing that nothing in this resolution compels States to resort to the use of force or the threat of force,
Moscow will want that to read “nothing in this resolution permits States…” Nor will Moscow like this bit at the end:
Decides to review Syria’s implementation of this resolution within 15 days and, in the event that Syria has not complied, to adopt further measures, in consultation with the League of Arab States;
Moscow will read “further measures” as opening the door to military intervention.
But these points seem to me negotiable: the West and the Arab League are far from pressing for the use of force against Bashar al Assad, even if some of the Syrian opposition would support it. How would President Obama justify another war in the Middle East in the midst of an election campaign? Only if Bashar al Assad is dumb enough to commit truly mass atrocities, which he so far has avoided on a daily basis, even as the numbers add up to well over 5000. Washington does not want to engage militarily–it is far more likely to make the mistake of throwing its weight behind the Free Syrian Army, perhaps clandestinely.
If the Russians can get a real commitment to no use of force, and if they would like this problem to go away and not come back before their own elections, they might even abstain on a resolution that, while changed from the current draft, is not too far off in its general outlines. I’m not holding my breath, just hoping that somehow the UNSC can finally move on what is a major threat to international peace and security. Getting the outlines of a transition plan through the Security Council is only a first step, but that’s how journeys start.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
How bad could Syria get?
It is hard to be optimistic about Syria. The question is, how bad could it get? The possible scenarios are essentially driven by two factors:
- the degree of success Bashar al Assad has in repressing the protests;
- the effectiveness of international efforts to weaken the regime and protect the protesters.
These two factors yield four scenarios:
- Divided sovereignty: Bashar is successful in repressing protests in some areas, but the international protection efforts are successful in others. Syria is effectively divided between areas loyal to a weakened regime and liberated “safe” areas. A lengthy struggle for predominance ensues.
- The regime wins: Bashar is successful in repressing the protests and international efforts to protect protesters fail. The regime regains its predominance and strengthens its ties with Iran.
- Protesters win: international efforts to protect protesters are effective and repression is not. The regime loses control of the country and has to yield. Iran/Syria alliance is broken.
- Civil war: Repression is ineffective, but so is international protection. Fighting escalates, organized mainly along sectarian lines. Iran, Iraq, Turkey and the Gulf states align with their sectarian favorites inside Syria, creating regional havoc.
1. and 3. are what most of us the West would regard as preferred outcomes, though divided sovereignty would likely create continuing problems and even a clear win by the protesters will leave Syria with many transition problems.
2. and 4. are what we would like to avoid. Some people ask, as Marc Lynch did yesterday on Twitter, why diplomats are attracted to an Arab League proposal for transition that starts with Bashar passing power to his vice president and creation of a broad unity government. The answer is that they are trying to avoid 2. and 4., because they know full well that international protection efforts are not likely to be effective enough to ensure 1. and 3.
2. and 4., a regime win or civil war, should be our biggest concerns. We can try to avoid them not only by tracing a path forward that weakens or eliminates Bashar’s hold on power, but also by tightening sanctions and strengthening the protest movement, which still seems divided and at times incoherent. But in the past few days it seems to have found its voice in the appeals to the Security Council.
The “defensive action” of the Free Syria Army, which others see as strengthening the protest movement, I see as more likely to take it down the path to 2. or 4. Only if it stays in a strictly defensive posture–keeping order at demonstrations, outing agents provocateurs, conducting counter-intelligence operations–can it really help. If it guns down the regime’s army and police, that and the regime’s reaction will discourage people from taking to the streets.
Let there be no doubt: “regime wins” and “civil war” are still real possibilities. Either one would be a big setback for Europe and the United States, which need to invest a bit more diplomatic oomph in making Syria come out closer to “divided sovereignty,” or better: “protesters win.” For the moment, this entails a concerted effort with the Russians to get a decent resolution denouncing the violence and projecting a political path away from the Assad regime through the Security Council.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Syria is coming to a head
The Arab League has suspended its human rights monitoring mission. The UN Security Council is discussing seriously a resolution on Syria. The anti-regime Syrian National Council is looking for international intervention to establish a safe zone. The Assad regime has amped up its violent repression, and the Free Syria Army is amping up its response. Civil war is in the air. This is a truly dangerous situation, but also one that could turn in a good direction.
The danger lies in further escalation of violence: the regime still holds the advantage in firepower and manpower. Increased violence will solidify support among regime loyalists and reduce the numbers of protesters in the streets. Frightened Alawite, Christian and other minorities will rally around the regime, dreading the consequences of a Sunni majority victory, especially one in which the Muslim Brotherhood plays a strong role.
Opportunity lies in the UN Security Council resolution. It needs to define a clear transition path away from the Assad regime that has the support of Moscow and no objection from Beijing. The Arab League is proposing a handover of power to Bashar al Assad’s vice president and formation of an inclusive government, followed by elections. This is vaguely similar to the Gulf Cooperation Council plan for Yemen, where its effectiveness has been less than 100%. The devil is in the details: how inclusive the government is determines whether it has real legitimacy, but broad inclusiveness is difficult to achieve (neither regime nor protesters will want to sit in the same room with their antagonists) and will likely limit its ability to make decisions.
The key to the UNSC resolution is Russian support, which depends on convincing Moscow that it stands to lose more by backing the Assad regime rather than abandoning it. Above all, Russia will want guarantees of continued access to port facilities in Syria. It is distasteful no doubt to the Syrian opposition to provide any guarantees to Russia, which has backed Assad shamelessly. But that is the price of the UNSC resolution, which takes priority right now.
It is not easy to follow the evolution of a UNSC resolution, but the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect is trying. It looks as if the European/Arab initiative will only come to a head next week, likely not before Wednesday. If they can get a resolution passed that defines a clear political path forward, along the lines of the Arab League proposal to be presented on Tuesday, that would be a tremendous step forward.
In the meanwhile, we can expect further escalation of violence in Syria, with the regime taking advantage of the suspension of the monitoring mission to do its dirtiest work and the Free Syria Army responding with the limited means at its disposal. I see no sign yet of an appetite for an international intervention like the one in Libya. While NATO may be doing some quiet preparations, the Alliance is not buzzing the way it normally does before taking action. The Russians will ensure that any UNSC resolution cannot be interpreted to authorize military intervention.
I continue to believe that nonviolent action is the best course of action for the anti-regime forces. A further slide to civil war is not to their advantage, both because they lack firepower and because it will discourage passage of a satisfactory Security Council resolution, defined as one that outlines a political way forward. I understand perfectly well the impulse (and justification) for self-defense and even for offensive maneuvers. But violence will lengthen the process of bringing Bashar down and reduce the odds of a peaceful and democratic outcome. For those who doubt this, consult Chenoweth and Stefan.
Some readers may ask, why should the U.S. care? The short answer is that sectarian civil war in Syria could create real difficulties in Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey and elsewhere, destabilizing a part of the world that is already requiring an inordinate amount of American attention. And just about any imaginable post-Assad regime is likely to be less friendly to Iran. The fall of Assad could be a big plus for American diplomatic efforts to weaken Hizbollah and Hamas as well as block Iran’s nuclear weapons program.
Next week could be crucial. Neither the regime nor its opponents can endure much more. Syria is coming to a head.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Ambiguities in Egypt and Syria
It’s only two days since I attempted a summary of where things stand in the Arab world. Already things are changing. As one of my colleagues notes, that’s just the point: politics are going to be dynamic in the Arab world in the future. The decades of stasis are over.
In Egypt, large crowds are turning out today (the first anniversary of the revolution) to insist on transfer of power to the newly installed parliament. It looks as if the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is going to have trouble holding on to as much power as it would like. Will the SCAF make the mistake of forcibly dispersing the demonstrators, or has it begun to understand that it needs to reduce its own visibility and delegate more authority to the popularly elected representatives of the people? The soldiers would be wise to let them take the rap for the lousy economy and political strife.
In Syria, developments are also ambiguous. Led by Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries have yanked their human rights observers from the Arab League team, which is likely to eviscerate that effort, or at least de-fang it. The Syrian Foreign Minister is welcoming the observers back, which is not a good sign for their likely effectiveness without the GCC participants. That is a great irony: the GCC as the guardian of human rights?
At the same time, the Arab League is asking for the UN Security Council to act. The Assad regime, having rejected the Arab League plan for a peaceful transition, is buying lots of Russian trainer aircraft, a sale that directly contradicts Moscow’s indications that Syria has reached the end of its rope. While those aircraft will presumably not be delivered for some time, their sale would certainly be a political signal of Moscow’s support for Damascus.
It will be interesting to see how the Americans react if Syria begins to use its existing aircraft against the demonstrators. President Obama in last night’s State of the Union address paired Bashar al Assad with Muammar Qaddafi. Will their ends be similar? I have generally discounted the possibility of military action to protect the protesters, but if Assad starts using aircraft that could change the equation quickly.
.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
This is called retrenchment
We all anticipated this State of the Union speech would not focus on international issues, but here is my short list of more important things not mentioned or glossed over:
- West Bank settlements (or Palestinians)
- North Korea
- Euro crisis
- Africa or Latin America (not even Cuba),
- Bahrain or Saudi Arabia, virtually no Egypt, Tunisia or Yemen
- China (except as an unfair competitor)
- Turkey, Mexico, Brazil, India or even Russia (except as an emerging market)
- Pakistan (except as an Al Qaeda haven)
- Strait of Hormuz
That’s a pretty spectacular list, even without noting the absence of NATO, Japan, allies, Europe, the UN…
A few notable items that were mentioned:
- Strong on regime change in Syria (putting Assad in the same sentence with Qaddafi could have implications) and on exporting democracy and free markets in general
- Positive about peaceful resolution of the dispute with Iran over nuclear weapons, while keeping all options on the table
- Trade agreements with South Korea, Panama and Colombia
- Burma as the hope of the Pacific!
Of course the President also mentioned withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, security cooperation with Israel, blows delivered against Al Qaeda, and the troops (no mention of civilians serving abroad this time around I’m afraid).
If this is a prelude to the campaign, as rightly it should be, it presages an ever more economically focused foreign policy, with security issues narrowed to a few top priorities and little focus on diplomacy except on a few specific issues. This is a vision for restoring American economic strength at home, not increasing–or perhaps even maintaining–its commitments abroad. This is called retrenchment.
PS: I should have mentioned that Richard Haas calls it “restoration.” That’s a more positive word, but the substance is the same.
RSS - Posts
