Tag: Syria
Syria still needs nonviolence
Today’s suspension of Syria from the Arab League will be seen by some as irrelevant, even risible. Who would even want to be a member of an organization as feckless as the one that 10 days ago reached an agreement with President Bashar al Assad to end the violence, only to see him turn around and gun down hundreds of protesters? Nor does the Arab League have a great record of achievement elsewhere, and many of its members would arguably respond to protesters in much the same way as Bashar has.
But that misses the point. The key to ending Bashar al Assad’s reign of terror in Syria is to attack his legitimacy. Anything that contributes, even marginally, to that end has to be counted as positive. International legitimacy is important to autocrats. Bashar certainly doesn’t care much about the Arab League–if he did he would not have so blatantly violated the agreement he reached with it–but if the League did not act at this point it would certainly redound to his benefit.
Assistant Secretary of State Feltman testified this week with admirable clarity about U.S. goals and strategy: we want to see protesters protected, Bashar out, and a transition to democracy begun. But he was also appropriately modest about our capacity to get what we want. Our primary leverage is through the European oil embargo, which seems to be holding, and other, mainly financial, sanctions, which are beginning to bite. There is not, at the level of goals, much of a gap between the Administration and outside experts like Andrew Tabler, who also testified.
But Andrew did have some specific policy suggestions worthy of consideration: formation of a Syria contact group, development of a strategy to peel away the regime’s supporters, helping the opposition unify and begin planning for transition, pushing for human rights monitors, preparing for military action and pressing for a Security Council resolution.
The Administration is certainly pursuing several of these already. Feltman made it clear that international monitors is among them, as is helping the opposition. Surely they already are thinking in terms of a strategy to peel away the regime’s supporters and are beginning to press again for Security Council action.
The one that gives me pause, and likely does likewise Feltman, is preparing for military action. It would certainly be justified against a regime that is taking military action against its own citizens, but any visible preparation for international military action will encourage violent resistance inside Syria. That is a bad idea. As Feltman makes amply clear, Bashar al Assad is intentionally encouraging violent resistance, as it solidifies the security forces as well as his political support and gives him every reason to crack down forcefully.
Just as important: there is not likely to be any military protection for the protesters, apart from welcoming those who flee along the border with Turkey. Russia will block any authorization in the Security Council, the Europeans are exhausted after Libya and preoccupied with the euro crisis, and the Arab League is still far from asking for the use of force. The Americans stand to gain a great deal from peaceful regime change in Syria, but violent change will risk ethnic and sectarian warfare with wide and potentially devastating regional consequences.
Bashar is finished, sooner or later. We need to worry about making sure that what comes after is a democratic regime prepared to allow all Syrians a say in how they are governed. That will be far easier to accomplish if the protests can be kept peaceful, no matter how violent the regime gets. For those who doubt this proposition, I can only recommend Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works.
Context matters, and so does U.S. support
I gave a talk yesterday at West Virginia University’s Law School on U.S. policy towards democracy-seeking rebellions. The star attraction at the conference was Erica Chenoweth, co-author of Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. Some of you will have seen my tweets summarizing her talk, which I won’t try to reproduce here. Suffice it to say that she provides hard statistical evidence that nonviolent civil resistance really does work, even against the most repressive regimes, and she gives a coherent rationale for why. She also notes that foreign monetary assistance does not appear to work well.
I was asked to address the U.S. policy response, in particular to the Arab Spring. Here are my speaking notes, which of course do not represent exactly what I said:
West Virginia University
November 10, 2011
1. While I am an admirer of Dr. Chenoweth’s quantitative methodology, I am going to rely today on the much less impressive techniques of the historian and diplomat: stories, I would call them, rather than “cases.”
2. Arab spring is far from over yet, but I’ll try to focus on the transition phase: that is, the phase after a regime falls and before a new one has yet emerged.
3. I am thoroughly convinced of the efficacy of what Dr. Chenoweth calls civic resistance in the earlier phase.
4. But things get much more complicated when that resistance has to turn into something more constructive.
5. There are three cases already in the transition phase, more or less: Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Each is quite different.
6. In Tunisia, the autocrat left the scene quickly and the regime was pushed aside fairly easily. First elections have already been held and there is a clear roadmap ahead. A classic, fairly smooth case, with no sign of counter-revolution on the horizon. Good chance of consolidating a democratic regime.
7. In Egypt, the autocrat also left pretty quickly, but the regime was not pushed aside easily and the protesters called on the army to manage the transition. It is doing so, but in a way that consolidates its control over some aspects of governance (security, foreign policy) and a big piece of the economy. I’d say much less likelihood of success in the transition. Might be rather like Serbia, where a similar deal was made with the security forces and the transition has been slow and halting as a result.
8. In Libya, there was a violent revolution that has the advantage of having swept the old regime away completely, with foreign help. There has been good leadership, decent planning and ample resources. I give the Libyans a decent chance at success in consolidating a democracy, albeit less probability than Tunisia.
9. What of Yemen, Syria and Bahrain, all of which are still in progress?
10. Yemen has turned violent, even if the protesters themselves have stuck with nonviolence. The odds of successful transition to democracy seem to be small, because the opposition to Saleh most likely to take power is the violent one, which is no more inclined to democracy than he is.
11. Syria could be headed in the same direction, though there is still some hope of keeping it on a nonviolent course. That’s vital for success. Violence will lead to sectarian and ethnic breakdown (similar to Iraq) that will be difficult to overcome.
12. Bahrain is an odd case. The protesters have been nonviolent, but the crackdown was effective, unlike Syria and Yemen. A lot depends on the Bassiouni commission report: will it revive nonviolent resistance, or will the regime be able to keep the lid on?
13. What of the other monarchies: Morocco and Jordan? Saudi Arabia and Oman?
14. These four, each in its own way, is attempting to preempt resistance with reform, albeit minimal reform in the case of Riyadh. So far, they are largely succeeding.
15. I do think the monarchies have some advantage in this respect: not because they are somehow nicer, but because their legitimacy is understood not to derive from elections but rather from heredity.
16. It is much harder for a republic to claim that there is no need to change who is in power in order to reform the system.
17. But that does not mean the monarchies will succeed forever. The fact that all Saudi Arabia experts agree that it can’t happen there, that the succession is ensured, is a clear earlier indicator that it may well happen there.
18. If I were advising the Saudis and the other monarchies, I would suggest they get ahead of the curve and stay ahead, by taking truly meaningful steps to redistribute power and ensure that their security services are shifting from protecting the rulers to protecting the ruled.
19. If there is one mistake common to all the Arab Spring successes so far—and also to those places where rebellion is still in progress—it is the use of regime violence against the population.
20. These guys need to learn that legitimacy comes from the people, who will be much more inclined to confer it on those who protect them than on those who attack them.
21. We should also be thinking about how we can encourage security sector reform in advance of rebellion and revolution—it would be far cheaper and more effective than doing it after the fact.
22. America should certainly be supporting those who demonstrate nonviolently for their rights, but I confess to doubts that it should be done through embassies.
23. Robert Ford, our ambassador in Syria who has bravely gone to “observe” demonstrations, is the exception that proves the rule.
24. The rule is that embassies need to stay on good terms with the host government, even if it is an autocracy. They cannot be implicated in support to revolutionaries.
25. Assistance to democracy and human rights advocates should flow not through embassies but through nongovernmental organizations, including the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute as well as non-American counterparts.
26. The more these can be made distinct from our official representation, the better.
27. America is condemned to spreading democracy. If you really believe that all people are created equal, you have no choice but to sympathize with those who claim their rights. But the specific modalities for when and how to do it depend a great deal on context.
PS: In answer to a question, I said yes it can happen in Iran, but American efforts to support it there are problematic because of our fraught relationship with Tehran, which includes both concern about nuclear weapons and attempts to foment ethnic strife inside Iran. In the end, I think Obama got the reaction to the Green Movement about right in the end: rhetorical support without repainting it red, white and blue.


Best freebie next week
Game Changer: Policy and Politics
For a New Middle East
The Grand Hyatt Hotel
1000 H Street NW
Washington, DC 20001
Thursday, November 17, 2011
8:45am-5:30pm
Conference Schedule
8:45am-9:00am – Opening remarks
Ambassador (ret.) Wendy Chamberlin, Middle East Institute President
9:00am-10:30am – After the Arab Spring: Assessing US Policy in the Middle East
Steve Clemons, New America Foundation, The Atlantic
Ambassador (ret.) Daniel Kurtzer, Princeton University
Ambassador (ret.) Ron Schlicher, Former US Department of State
Tamara Cofman Wittes, Deputy Assist. Secretary of State-NEA
10:45am-12:15pm – The Road Ahead for Emerging Arab Democracies
Esraa Abdel Fattah, Egyptian Democratic Academy
Michele Dunne, Atlantic Council
Larry Diamond, Stanford University
Radwan Masmoudi, Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy
2:15pm-3:45 pm – Shifting Regional Power Dynamics in an Era of Change
Abdelkhaleq Abdalla, UAE University
Jamal Khashoggi, Al-Arab TV
Haim Malka, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Mohsen Milani, South Florida University
Paul Salem, Carnegie Middle East Center
4:00pm-5:30pm- Economic and Development Strategies for a Middle East in Transition
Adel Abdellatif, UN Development Programme
Odeh Aburdene, OAI Advisors
Iman Bibars, Ashoka/MENA
Ambassador William B. Taylor, US Department of State
Useless idiots have their purposes
Tweeter Hani Sabra:
there’s no nice way to say this, so here goes: anybody who thinks damascus would abide by the plan is total, useless idiot.
I agree with the sentiment, but why then did the Arab League propose the plan, and why did Bashar al Assad accept it?
They aren’t idiots, and the plan serves their useful purposes. The Arab League is certainly not on the side of the protesters. Most of its members either already have, or would if the occasion arose, repress demonstrations like the ones occurring in Syria.
What the Arab League is trying to do is help Bashar. He understood the gesture: you pretend to give me a plan to end the violence, and I’ll pretend to end the violence. No one is fooled, but it at least buys a week, two or even three while the Arab League pretends to wait for implementation and Bashar pretends to implement. In the meanwhile, a lot of demonstrators get killed, hurt and discouraged. Maybe some of them will even agree to the dialogue with the government proposed in the plan. That would buy some more time.
What happens when this charade gets boring? Likely not much, unless the Arab League or the Security Council can be convinced to take more serious action. As regular readers know, my favorite proposal is diplomatic observers. If the Arab League were serious, it would have insisted on verification.
Why would Bashar accept? Only if he thinks he has things under control and can rehabilitate himself internationally by agreeing. What if he rejects? That at least shows him up for the lying bastard he is.
Best in show
Why would Syria accept the Arab League plan with “no reservations”?
Try this: because it requires nothing verifiable of Damascus except to talk with its opposition. Bashar al Assad has said he is willing to do that from the first. But there aren’t many protesters willing to do it, unless there is a prior agreement that they are talking about transition arrangements. If the protesters refuse the dialogue, Bashar will continue the crackdown.
Even better from Bashar’s point of view if some of the protesters accept and others do not. Then he will have succeeded in splitting them. He’ll get some nice photo ops with the dialoguers while going after the others again. The opposition was already having troubles unifying its disparate forces. Accepting the Arab League plan is a neat maneuver to make that even more difficult.
What could the Arab League have done if it wanted its efforts to bear fruit? The protesters were asking that it suspend Syria from membership and ask for international community support for the demonstrations. Fat chance.
It might have asked to deploy international observers to verify withdrawal of the Syrian military forces, apparently promised in the Arab League agreement, from population centers. That would have been something worth the paper it was written on, and a good deal more. Maybe they can still move in that direction, though nothing in the history of Arab League initiatives suggests they will.
Meanwhile, over at the Syrian national news agency Sana the focus is on Syria’s pavilion at the Tehran media fair. It was best in show!
PS, 10 am November 3: Here are Bashar’s tanks shelling Homs this morning, after the agreement is supposed to have gone into effect.
I imagine there is some Syrian government explanation for this, but they haven’t bothered posting it on their website, which doesn’t mention that the Arab League agreement calls for military withdrawal from Syrian cities. Then again, we don’t really know whether it does, since no one seems to have come up with a copy of the actual agreement.
Follow updates on the situation at The Guardian.
There are worse fates
The annual EU Forum, a confab sponsored by the Paris-based European Union Institute for Strategic Studies and SAIS’s Center for Transatlantic Relations, convened Thursday and Friday in Washington to focus American and European luminaries on the thing we all call the Arab Spring, even though we know it started last winter, varies from country to country and may not have results as upbeat as the appellation implies. Almost entirely missing from the day and a half conference were Arab voices. This was an opportunity for the “the West” to put its heads together, not for the revolutionaries or the oppressive regimes to offer their narrative.
They were nevertheless much present in the minds of the participants, who leaned towards enthusiasm for the values of the protesters, as well as their energy and determination, while worrying about the impact on Western interests. The three big areas of worry arise from
- the Islamists: what do they really mean by sharia law? will they really play fair in democracy?
- increased Arab support for the Palestinians: will it make the Israel/Palestine equation even more difficult to solve?
- sectarianism (will it lead to civil wars and possible spillover to other countries, especially in Syria, Lebanon and Yemen?
Underlying all was a sense that the West has precious few resources with which to respond effectively to the revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, to the continuing repression in Syria and Yemen, or to the reforms in Jordan and Morocco, never mind the still solid autocratic regimes in the Gulf or the fragmented polity in Palestine. No one seemed to feel Western credibility or influence was strong, especially in light of the long-standing support (and arms) both Europe and the U.S. had given to Arab autocracies in the past (and continue to provide to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and others even now). And everyone was aware that the Chinese, Turks, Brazilians, Indians and other emerging powers will play increasing roles in the Middle East, offering contracts and aid on terms far less complex and burdensome than those of the West.
The Europeans nevertheless came with a strong sense that the Middle East is their “southern neighborhood” and they need to up their game in response to changes that will affect their interests directly, whether through immigration, economic interdependence, oil and gas supplies, contracts, investment and myriad other ties. Precisely what they are going to do about it was not clear, and there was a strong sense that European policy on the Arab Spring has been re-nationalized. The British and French in particular are carving out their own distinct approaches, taking advantage of their forward role in the NATO military action against Qaddafi, while other countries are lagging and the EU itself is still contemplating the interior walls of the Berlaymont.
The Americans would like to focus more on Asia, not only Afghanistan/Pakistan but also China and North Korea as threats to national security. It was clear to all that Europe would not share this Asian interest to the same degree, but yesterday’s talk of Chinese financing to back the euro might change a few minds on that score. The problem for the Americans is that the Asian challenge requires a very different set of policy instruments from the Arab Spring, which apart from Egypt and Yemen Washington might rather leave primarily to the Europeans (no one of course says this quite so bluntly, but if you follow the money that is what they mean). Everyone expects, though, that NATO will remain somehow important and in the end the only real military instrument capable of effective power projection available to the Europeans.
There were lots of other points made. Trade and investment are far more important than aid. We need to be talking not only with secular women but also with Islamist women. Liberal economic reform, associated in Egypt and other countries with the old regimes, is in trouble, at least for the moment. Civil society in the Arab Spring countries needs Western support, but it should not be done through governmental channels but rather by nongovernmental organizations like the American National Endowment for Democracy (and the talked about European Endowment for Democracy). Western conditionality should focus on transparency and accountability rather than specific policy prescriptions.
I could go on, but I trust the sponsors will be doing a far better job of writing up in due course, and tweets are available from EUISS for those really interested. Bottom line: the West is fading even as its values spread. There are worse fates.