Tag: Syria
Useless idiots have their purposes
Tweeter Hani Sabra:
there’s no nice way to say this, so here goes: anybody who thinks damascus would abide by the plan is total, useless idiot.
I agree with the sentiment, but why then did the Arab League propose the plan, and why did Bashar al Assad accept it?
They aren’t idiots, and the plan serves their useful purposes. The Arab League is certainly not on the side of the protesters. Most of its members either already have, or would if the occasion arose, repress demonstrations like the ones occurring in Syria.
What the Arab League is trying to do is help Bashar. He understood the gesture: you pretend to give me a plan to end the violence, and I’ll pretend to end the violence. No one is fooled, but it at least buys a week, two or even three while the Arab League pretends to wait for implementation and Bashar pretends to implement. In the meanwhile, a lot of demonstrators get killed, hurt and discouraged. Maybe some of them will even agree to the dialogue with the government proposed in the plan. That would buy some more time.
What happens when this charade gets boring? Likely not much, unless the Arab League or the Security Council can be convinced to take more serious action. As regular readers know, my favorite proposal is diplomatic observers. If the Arab League were serious, it would have insisted on verification.
Why would Bashar accept? Only if he thinks he has things under control and can rehabilitate himself internationally by agreeing. What if he rejects? That at least shows him up for the lying bastard he is.
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Best in show
Why would Syria accept the Arab League plan with “no reservations”?
Try this: because it requires nothing verifiable of Damascus except to talk with its opposition. Bashar al Assad has said he is willing to do that from the first. But there aren’t many protesters willing to do it, unless there is a prior agreement that they are talking about transition arrangements. If the protesters refuse the dialogue, Bashar will continue the crackdown.
Even better from Bashar’s point of view if some of the protesters accept and others do not. Then he will have succeeded in splitting them. He’ll get some nice photo ops with the dialoguers while going after the others again. The opposition was already having troubles unifying its disparate forces. Accepting the Arab League plan is a neat maneuver to make that even more difficult.
What could the Arab League have done if it wanted its efforts to bear fruit? The protesters were asking that it suspend Syria from membership and ask for international community support for the demonstrations. Fat chance.
It might have asked to deploy international observers to verify withdrawal of the Syrian military forces, apparently promised in the Arab League agreement, from population centers. That would have been something worth the paper it was written on, and a good deal more. Maybe they can still move in that direction, though nothing in the history of Arab League initiatives suggests they will.
Meanwhile, over at the Syrian national news agency Sana the focus is on Syria’s pavilion at the Tehran media fair. It was best in show!
PS, 10 am November 3: Here are Bashar’s tanks shelling Homs this morning, after the agreement is supposed to have gone into effect.
I imagine there is some Syrian government explanation for this, but they haven’t bothered posting it on their website, which doesn’t mention that the Arab League agreement calls for military withdrawal from Syrian cities. Then again, we don’t really know whether it does, since no one seems to have come up with a copy of the actual agreement.
Follow updates on the situation at The Guardian.
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There are worse fates
The annual EU Forum, a confab sponsored by the Paris-based European Union Institute for Strategic Studies and SAIS’s Center for Transatlantic Relations, convened Thursday and Friday in Washington to focus American and European luminaries on the thing we all call the Arab Spring, even though we know it started last winter, varies from country to country and may not have results as upbeat as the appellation implies. Almost entirely missing from the day and a half conference were Arab voices. This was an opportunity for the “the West” to put its heads together, not for the revolutionaries or the oppressive regimes to offer their narrative.
They were nevertheless much present in the minds of the participants, who leaned towards enthusiasm for the values of the protesters, as well as their energy and determination, while worrying about the impact on Western interests. The three big areas of worry arise from
- the Islamists: what do they really mean by sharia law? will they really play fair in democracy?
- increased Arab support for the Palestinians: will it make the Israel/Palestine equation even more difficult to solve?
- sectarianism (will it lead to civil wars and possible spillover to other countries, especially in Syria, Lebanon and Yemen?
Underlying all was a sense that the West has precious few resources with which to respond effectively to the revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, to the continuing repression in Syria and Yemen, or to the reforms in Jordan and Morocco, never mind the still solid autocratic regimes in the Gulf or the fragmented polity in Palestine. No one seemed to feel Western credibility or influence was strong, especially in light of the long-standing support (and arms) both Europe and the U.S. had given to Arab autocracies in the past (and continue to provide to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and others even now). And everyone was aware that the Chinese, Turks, Brazilians, Indians and other emerging powers will play increasing roles in the Middle East, offering contracts and aid on terms far less complex and burdensome than those of the West.
The Europeans nevertheless came with a strong sense that the Middle East is their “southern neighborhood” and they need to up their game in response to changes that will affect their interests directly, whether through immigration, economic interdependence, oil and gas supplies, contracts, investment and myriad other ties. Precisely what they are going to do about it was not clear, and there was a strong sense that European policy on the Arab Spring has been re-nationalized. The British and French in particular are carving out their own distinct approaches, taking advantage of their forward role in the NATO military action against Qaddafi, while other countries are lagging and the EU itself is still contemplating the interior walls of the Berlaymont.
The Americans would like to focus more on Asia, not only Afghanistan/Pakistan but also China and North Korea as threats to national security. It was clear to all that Europe would not share this Asian interest to the same degree, but yesterday’s talk of Chinese financing to back the euro might change a few minds on that score. The problem for the Americans is that the Asian challenge requires a very different set of policy instruments from the Arab Spring, which apart from Egypt and Yemen Washington might rather leave primarily to the Europeans (no one of course says this quite so bluntly, but if you follow the money that is what they mean). Everyone expects, though, that NATO will remain somehow important and in the end the only real military instrument capable of effective power projection available to the Europeans.
There were lots of other points made. Trade and investment are far more important than aid. We need to be talking not only with secular women but also with Islamist women. Liberal economic reform, associated in Egypt and other countries with the old regimes, is in trouble, at least for the moment. Civil society in the Arab Spring countries needs Western support, but it should not be done through governmental channels but rather by nongovernmental organizations like the American National Endowment for Democracy (and the talked about European Endowment for Democracy). Western conditionality should focus on transparency and accountability rather than specific policy prescriptions.
I could go on, but I trust the sponsors will be doing a far better job of writing up in due course, and tweets are available from EUISS for those really interested. Bottom line: the West is fading even as its values spread. There are worse fates.
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Turkey is playing with fire
The emergence under Turkish protection of the Free Syrian Army raises again the question of whether the protesters against President Bashar al Assad should turn to violence.
Turkey has welcomed Syrian refugees for months. There is certainly nothing wrong with that: it is in fact an obligation (non-refoulement) to do so if the Syrians have a well-founded fear of persecution, which under the circumstances is evident. Disappointed in Bashar’s refusal to listen to their advice or respond to pressure in favor of reform, the Turks have not however yet done much to block investment in Syria or otherwise signal their displeasure with more than words. Now, rather suddenly, a Foreign Ministry official appears with a Syrian colonel who announces to the world that the Free Syrian Army has already attacked Assad’s forces inside Syria and needs better weapons in order to continue the effort.
This looks to me like a puzzle with missing pieces. Have the Syrians been allowing Kurds to attack inside Turkey? I can’t find indication of that in the press, but it would not be surprising, and might well prompt a response in kind. Or are the Turks just using the means at their disposal? Will Syria also respond in kind, raiding Syrian refugee camps across the border inside Turkey? Or, if they haven’t already, allowing Kurds to attack Turkish forces?
Whatever is going on, it is dangerous. The protesters’ umbrella group, the Syrian National Council, has so far opted not to use violence. The emergence of a separate group prepared to do so from outside the country puts peaceful protesters at even greater risk than they have been so far, and hurts the prospects for maintaining their unity.
The Americans have appeared to be urging the protesters to stick with nonviolence, knowing full well that third party armed intervention like that in Libya is not in the cards. The Turks are of course capable of their own initiatives, but I can’t help but wonder whether Washington has been in touch with Ankara about the Free Syrian Army. Did the Americans oppose letting it raid inside Syria from Turkey, or did they turn a blind eye?
Whatever, as my kids say. None of this is good. Violence–however justified on moral grounds–is going to make it harder for the protesters to win over minorities in Syria and opens the real possibility of ethnic and sectarian warfare that will spill over Syria’s borders into Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Lebanon. That could become a truly serious mess that all concerned would regret. It is time to ask the Turks to keep the Free Syrian Army inside Turkey and to stop playing with fire. If they want to do something, some stiff restrictions on Turkish business with Syria would help.
PS: Jeffrey White discusses the implications of various approaches to military action in Syria at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3415 (why can’t I get hyperlinks from their site?). Nothing he says there convinces me that civilians can be protected better by military means, even if the failure to use them also has dire consequences. Nor do I think, as he suggests, that open discussion of the option will strike fear into the heart of a regime that is increasingly confident of its ability to survive.
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Violence, or no violence?
As the regime of Bashar al Assad continues its bloody crackdown in Syria, at least some protesters are tempted to respond violently, especially those who have defected from the army. There is no question in my mind about their right to self-defense. The question is whether it is good strategy to resort to violence and whether the United States should encourage or discourage it.
Simon Henderson argues in The New Republic that the United States should not discourage it. He sees no reason to take the option off the table. He would also leave open the possibility of foreign military intervention, which the Obama Administration has so far ruled out.
Elliott Abrams takes a more nuanced view in a Council on Foreign Relations paper:
The United States should encourage defections but should not encourage violence in any form. Yet if a military opposition comes into existence and fights the regime, U.S. policymakers will not want to see that opposition crushed. Thus, the United States should not discourage other governments from assisting the rebels if they wish to do so. Nor should it try to stop other groups—for example, Sunni tribes living on both sides of the Syria-Iraq border areas—from assisting brethren inside Syria.
We took an approach of this sort with Bosnia in 1993-95: we turned a blind eye to arming of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats to fight against the Bosnian Serb Army and its ample support from Belgrade.
I side with the Administration on this issue in Syria. Violence by the demonstrators will consolidate the security forces in support of the regime, reduce the likelihood of defections, and strike fear into minority populations, especially if there is cross-border Sunni cooperation in providing arms. The threat of military intervention (by NATO, the U.S., Turkey or someone else) is not credible. No UN Security Council resolution will pass authorizing it; U.S. action in its absence is theoretically possible but highly unlikely. The Arab League is far less antagonistic to Bashar than it was to Qaddafi. The Russians haven’t even allowed a resolution condemning the regime’s violence. Moscow’s naval base at Latakia is too valuable for them to risk another Libya-type air war that would likely put in place a regime unfriendly to the Russian presence on the Mediterranean.
Lest anyone wonder, I agree wholeheartedly with Elliott that the U.S. would benefit from seeing the back of Bashar al Assad. He puts it well:
The end of the Assad regime would be a great gain for the United States. The regime is a bloody dictatorship that is host to Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups, Iran’s only Arab ally, the route through which Iran arms Hezbollah, and a permanent threat to Lebanon’s sovereignty and internal peace. Moreover, by doing its best to assist jihadis seeking to fight Americans in Iraq, it was complicit in the deaths of many Americans soldiers and the wounding of far more. As the regime fights its own populace and clings to power, effective sanctions and vigorous diplomacy can help shorten its life and lay the foundations for a determined effort to build a democratic state in its place.
But violence on the demonstrators’ part has no place in a strategy aimed at weakening the regime, which has advantages in firepower and ruthlessness that simply cannot be overcome in today’s international environment. It isn’t fair, and it isn’t moral, to ask the Syrian National Council to foreswear the use of violence against a regime that is showing little restraint. But it is realistic and necessary.
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Next week’s “peace picks”
Relatively slim pickings this week, at least in numbers. Not sure why.
1. In the Eye of the Storm: Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Domestic Realignment, Brookings, October 25, 2:30-3:30 pm
Panelists
Ümit Boyner
Chair
Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD)
Soli Özel
Professor
Kadir Has University, Istanbul
2. A Roadmap for Effective Economic Reconstruction in Conflict-Affected Areas, USIP, October 26, 9 am-1 pm
The event will include two panels which will address structural as well as programmatic aspects of economic reconstruction, including: risk-aversion in donor institutions, inter-agency and international collaboration and cooperation, monitoring and evaluation, and the role of entrepreneurship and public/private partnerships.
Panelists will glean lessons from relevant case-studies and begin to chart the roadmap to peace and prosperity that World Bank President Robert Zoellick called for with the launch of the 2011 World Development Report.
Speakers
- Fred Tipson, Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow
U.S. Institute of Peace - Basel Saleh, Assistant Professor of Economics
Radford University - Jomana Amara, Assistant Professor of Economics
Naval Postgraduate School - Sharon Morris, Director of the Conflict Management Group
Mercy Corps - Robert Aten, Senior International Economics
Ret. U. S. Agency for International Development - Gary Milante, World Development Report Core Team Member
World Bank - Graciana del Castillo, Co-founding Partner
Macroeconomic Advisory Group - John Simon, Founding Partner
Total Impact Advisors - Del Fitchett
Independent Economics Consultant - Raymond Gilpin, Director of the Center for Sustainable Economies
U.S. Institute of Peace
The Carnegie Endowment and the North-South Institute will host a discussion on the complexities of electoral support in conflict contexts and examine two compelling case studies—the recent elections in Afghanistan and Kenya. The event will also mark the launch of a new book by the North-South Institute, Elections in Dangerous Places.
Radwan Ziadeh, director of the Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies, and Ammar Abdulhamid, founder of the Tharwa Foundation and a human rights activist, will discuss this topic. For more information and to RSVP, contact katarina@jhu.edu.
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