Tag: Syria
Turkey is playing with fire
The emergence under Turkish protection of the Free Syrian Army raises again the question of whether the protesters against President Bashar al Assad should turn to violence.
Turkey has welcomed Syrian refugees for months. There is certainly nothing wrong with that: it is in fact an obligation (non-refoulement) to do so if the Syrians have a well-founded fear of persecution, which under the circumstances is evident. Disappointed in Bashar’s refusal to listen to their advice or respond to pressure in favor of reform, the Turks have not however yet done much to block investment in Syria or otherwise signal their displeasure with more than words. Now, rather suddenly, a Foreign Ministry official appears with a Syrian colonel who announces to the world that the Free Syrian Army has already attacked Assad’s forces inside Syria and needs better weapons in order to continue the effort.
This looks to me like a puzzle with missing pieces. Have the Syrians been allowing Kurds to attack inside Turkey? I can’t find indication of that in the press, but it would not be surprising, and might well prompt a response in kind. Or are the Turks just using the means at their disposal? Will Syria also respond in kind, raiding Syrian refugee camps across the border inside Turkey? Or, if they haven’t already, allowing Kurds to attack Turkish forces?
Whatever is going on, it is dangerous. The protesters’ umbrella group, the Syrian National Council, has so far opted not to use violence. The emergence of a separate group prepared to do so from outside the country puts peaceful protesters at even greater risk than they have been so far, and hurts the prospects for maintaining their unity.
The Americans have appeared to be urging the protesters to stick with nonviolence, knowing full well that third party armed intervention like that in Libya is not in the cards. The Turks are of course capable of their own initiatives, but I can’t help but wonder whether Washington has been in touch with Ankara about the Free Syrian Army. Did the Americans oppose letting it raid inside Syria from Turkey, or did they turn a blind eye?
Whatever, as my kids say. None of this is good. Violence–however justified on moral grounds–is going to make it harder for the protesters to win over minorities in Syria and opens the real possibility of ethnic and sectarian warfare that will spill over Syria’s borders into Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Lebanon. That could become a truly serious mess that all concerned would regret. It is time to ask the Turks to keep the Free Syrian Army inside Turkey and to stop playing with fire. If they want to do something, some stiff restrictions on Turkish business with Syria would help.
PS: Jeffrey White discusses the implications of various approaches to military action in Syria at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3415 (why can’t I get hyperlinks from their site?). Nothing he says there convinces me that civilians can be protected better by military means, even if the failure to use them also has dire consequences. Nor do I think, as he suggests, that open discussion of the option will strike fear into the heart of a regime that is increasingly confident of its ability to survive.
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Violence, or no violence?
As the regime of Bashar al Assad continues its bloody crackdown in Syria, at least some protesters are tempted to respond violently, especially those who have defected from the army. There is no question in my mind about their right to self-defense. The question is whether it is good strategy to resort to violence and whether the United States should encourage or discourage it.
Simon Henderson argues in The New Republic that the United States should not discourage it. He sees no reason to take the option off the table. He would also leave open the possibility of foreign military intervention, which the Obama Administration has so far ruled out.
Elliott Abrams takes a more nuanced view in a Council on Foreign Relations paper:
The United States should encourage defections but should not encourage violence in any form. Yet if a military opposition comes into existence and fights the regime, U.S. policymakers will not want to see that opposition crushed. Thus, the United States should not discourage other governments from assisting the rebels if they wish to do so. Nor should it try to stop other groups—for example, Sunni tribes living on both sides of the Syria-Iraq border areas—from assisting brethren inside Syria.
We took an approach of this sort with Bosnia in 1993-95: we turned a blind eye to arming of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats to fight against the Bosnian Serb Army and its ample support from Belgrade.
I side with the Administration on this issue in Syria. Violence by the demonstrators will consolidate the security forces in support of the regime, reduce the likelihood of defections, and strike fear into minority populations, especially if there is cross-border Sunni cooperation in providing arms. The threat of military intervention (by NATO, the U.S., Turkey or someone else) is not credible. No UN Security Council resolution will pass authorizing it; U.S. action in its absence is theoretically possible but highly unlikely. The Arab League is far less antagonistic to Bashar than it was to Qaddafi. The Russians haven’t even allowed a resolution condemning the regime’s violence. Moscow’s naval base at Latakia is too valuable for them to risk another Libya-type air war that would likely put in place a regime unfriendly to the Russian presence on the Mediterranean.
Lest anyone wonder, I agree wholeheartedly with Elliott that the U.S. would benefit from seeing the back of Bashar al Assad. He puts it well:
The end of the Assad regime would be a great gain for the United States. The regime is a bloody dictatorship that is host to Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups, Iran’s only Arab ally, the route through which Iran arms Hezbollah, and a permanent threat to Lebanon’s sovereignty and internal peace. Moreover, by doing its best to assist jihadis seeking to fight Americans in Iraq, it was complicit in the deaths of many Americans soldiers and the wounding of far more. As the regime fights its own populace and clings to power, effective sanctions and vigorous diplomacy can help shorten its life and lay the foundations for a determined effort to build a democratic state in its place.
But violence on the demonstrators’ part has no place in a strategy aimed at weakening the regime, which has advantages in firepower and ruthlessness that simply cannot be overcome in today’s international environment. It isn’t fair, and it isn’t moral, to ask the Syrian National Council to foreswear the use of violence against a regime that is showing little restraint. But it is realistic and necessary.
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Next week’s “peace picks”
Relatively slim pickings this week, at least in numbers. Not sure why.
1. In the Eye of the Storm: Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Domestic Realignment, Brookings, October 25, 2:30-3:30 pm
Panelists
Ümit Boyner
Chair
Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD)
Soli Özel
Professor
Kadir Has University, Istanbul
2. A Roadmap for Effective Economic Reconstruction in Conflict-Affected Areas, USIP, October 26, 9 am-1 pm
The event will include two panels which will address structural as well as programmatic aspects of economic reconstruction, including: risk-aversion in donor institutions, inter-agency and international collaboration and cooperation, monitoring and evaluation, and the role of entrepreneurship and public/private partnerships.
Panelists will glean lessons from relevant case-studies and begin to chart the roadmap to peace and prosperity that World Bank President Robert Zoellick called for with the launch of the 2011 World Development Report.
Speakers
- Fred Tipson, Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow
U.S. Institute of Peace - Basel Saleh, Assistant Professor of Economics
Radford University - Jomana Amara, Assistant Professor of Economics
Naval Postgraduate School - Sharon Morris, Director of the Conflict Management Group
Mercy Corps - Robert Aten, Senior International Economics
Ret. U. S. Agency for International Development - Gary Milante, World Development Report Core Team Member
World Bank - Graciana del Castillo, Co-founding Partner
Macroeconomic Advisory Group - John Simon, Founding Partner
Total Impact Advisors - Del Fitchett
Independent Economics Consultant - Raymond Gilpin, Director of the Center for Sustainable Economies
U.S. Institute of Peace
The Carnegie Endowment and the North-South Institute will host a discussion on the complexities of electoral support in conflict contexts and examine two compelling case studies—the recent elections in Afghanistan and Kenya. The event will also mark the launch of a new book by the North-South Institute, Elections in Dangerous Places.
Radwan Ziadeh, director of the Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies, and Ammar Abdulhamid, founder of the Tharwa Foundation and a human rights activist, will discuss this topic. For more information and to RSVP, contact katarina@jhu.edu.
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The limits of military power
Maybe it’s because I’ve been reading Joe Nye’s The Future of Power, but every event I’ve been to lately around DC has reminded me of the limits of military power in achieving U.S. national security objectives. It is certainly not lack of admiration for the prowess of the American military–they are fantastically good at not only the military tasks that are their bread and butter, but also at the many other tasks presidents toss their way. And if you haven’t had the privilege of hearing David Petraeus or James Stavridis talk, you’ve missed some first class intellectual heft.
But consider today’s problems: Iran, Syria, Afghanistan.
If Iran did in fact plot with a Mexican cartel to murder the Saudi ambassador to the U.S., what are we going to do about it? Sure there are military options, and
people who advocate them. If the plot had succeeded we would probably have used one or two like leveling Quds force headquarters with cruise missiles or capturing a few Iranian miscreants in Iraq or Afghanistan. But it is all too obvious that the Iranians would respond, blowing up some favorites of ours or grabbing a few more Americans taking walks in Kurdistan. The more realistic options in response to a plot that did not succeed are the nonmilitary ones I pointed to yesterday.
Syria is a case where military intervention like that undertaken in Libya might make a big difference, and some of the protesters against President Assad’s regime would like to see it happen. But it won’t: the Russians haven’t even allowed a denunciation of the regime’s violence against the demonstrators to pass, and the Arab League is sitting on its duffs. I know there are some who still hope NATO will undertaken the kind of unauthorized campaign it unleashed from the air against the Serbs in 1999, but it isn’t going to happen so long as Bashar keeps the level of atrocities in the daily dozens. The protesters are in for a long struggle without foreign force on their side.
In Afghanistan, the Americans have really brought to bear most of their military capability, without a clear result. No one serious believes any longer that there is a military solution there. We’ll have to settle for a political arrangement that gives the Taliban (hopefully not Al Qaeda) some significant measure of what it wants. Afghanistan is looking more and more like Vietnam, less and less like even Iraq. We aren’t likely to come out in 2014, when withdrawal is to be completed, with much.
Let’s not even discuss Israel/Palestine and North Korea, where American interests are certainly at stake. American military capabilities are vital to shaping the environment in both places, but the opportunities to use it are very limited. It is more an insurance policy against gross misbehavior by one of the protagonists than a tool that we can use on a daily basis. In Joe Nye’s terms, military power in these environments can be converted into influence, persuasion and agenda-setting (i.e. soft power) even if use of American force is not likely.
Of course our flag officers know they need stronger civilian counterparts in defending national security. They have repeatedly called for beefing up civilian capabilities. But it isn’t happening. Congress is tearing the budget of the civilian side of foreign policy to shreds, even as the game of chicken between Republicans and Democrats on the budget approaches the moment of truth. I think we know what will happen if it comes down to cutting the national security budget, which includes both military and civilian expenditure. The military may not like what it ends up with, but it will be a feast relative to what the State Department and the Agency for International Development have on their plates.
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This week’s “peace picks”
Fewer this week than last. I’m trying to be more selective, and maybe there is less out there. Remember some of these may require registration and/or early arrival. Writeups for publication on www.peacefare.net are welcome:
1. Steven Pinker, The Better Angels Of Our Nature, Politics and Prose, October 11, 7 pm
In his new book, the cognitive scientist, author of How the Mind Works, and professor of psychology at Harvard, uses his broad expertise—plus some history and sociology—to examine the human propensity for violence. While we’ve always been a violent species, Pinker finds that we have been growing less so in recent decades.
2. Yemen After the Arab Spring: From Revolution to Disintegration? Root Conference Room, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 13, 2011 9 am-3:45 pm,
Lots of interesting people appearing during the day at this Jamestown Foundation event.
3. Voices from the Front Lines: Update on the Syrian Opposition, United States Institute of Peace, October 13, 10 am-12 noon
Since March, Syrians have taken to the streets calling for an end to the regime of Bashar al-Assad and a transition to democracy. The Syrian government has responded with massive force, killing some 3,000 Syrians and arresting tens of thousands more. Despite government repression, the Syrian uprising has given rise to an active and increasingly capable opposition movement, both inside Syria and among Syrians living abroad.
However, the Syrian opposition has struggled to establish a unified leadership. Now, following an intensive process of negotiations among diverse opposition groups, a Syrian National Council (SNC) has been established to represent the Syrian opposition. The formation of the SNC is an important and positive step in the opposition’s development. Yet significant challenges still must still be overcome for the SNC to secure international recognition, broaden its support within Syria, and acquire the legitimacy it will need to establish itself as a viable alternative to the Assad regime.
4. The Democratic Republic of Congo’s Pivotal 2011 National Elections, Brookings, October 14, 10 am-12 noon
Much is at stake as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) prepares for a pivotal round of national elections on November 28. While violence and security issues have marred the country’s recent history, multi-party elections in 2006 produced democratic gains and this round of elections may push the DRC even closer to becoming a vibrant democracy. However, questions remain as to how the elections will affect the country’s major challenges, including a rapidly growing population, low job growth, and the lingering threat of authoritarianism.
Panelists:
Mvemba P. Dizolele
Duignan Distinguished Visiting Fellow
Stanford University’s Hoover Institution
Anthony W. Gambino
Independent Consultant and Former USAID
Mission Director to the DRC
John Mukum Mbaku
Nonresident Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution
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A step in the right direction
Nadim Shehadi argues in The Guardian
Syrian political society will emerge and show its real face only after the regime is gone, and not before. This will not be a phoenix rising from the ashes, rather a battered society that will be trying to find its way after a long and dark period.
Until then, he advises we stop calling the opposition “the opposition” (because doing so legitimizes the regime) and lower our expectations to about as close to zero as possible, since no Syrian can reveal his true political identity without serious risk.
Fortunately, the Syrian opposition seems not to be taking Shehadi’s advice. Instead it formed a Syrian National Council on Sunday in Istanbul, whose chair outlined its purposes:
…[to] achieve the goals of the revolution to topple the regime, including all of its components and leadership, and to replace it with a democratic pluralistic regime.
Admittedly, this is not yet much of a program, and the people ready to speak openly for the Syrian National Council at present appear all to be expatriates, even if it is claimed that the Local Coordinating Committees that organize demonstrations inside Syria were represented in Istanbul.
But it is vital that the Syrians create something that can be viewed internationally and internally as a legitimate alternative to Bashar al Assad. If diaspora Syrians can help provide the alternative, all the better, even if their role is likely to decrease in the future.
No one watching the course of events in Libya and Egypt can doubt the importance of minimal coherence and legitimacy in the leadership of a rebellion. Libya had such a body, now called the National Transitional Council and recognized widely as the legitimate governing authority. Egypt did not. As a result, the protesters acquiesced in turning over the transition to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which has proven an infelicitous choice from the perspective of those who forced Hosni Mubarak to step down.
The Syrian National Council has a tough job ahead. Some Syrians have begun to take up arms against the regime, which has not hesitated to use indiscriminate force against the protesters. They cannot expect foreign military help. NATO is in no mood for another Libya. There is no demand for it in the Arab world, and the Russians won’t let a Security Council resolution authorize it because of their longstanding alliance with Syria, which includes a naval base at Latakia. While sanctions are taking their toll on the Syrian regime, Iran is doing what it can to relieve its friends in Damascus and ensure that they survive.
Syria is a complex society, with ethnic, sectarian and religious divisions that the Assad regime has long exploited to prevent the emergence of a united opposition. It will not be easy to keep Kurds and Arabs, Sunni and Shia, Christiansand Muslims on the same wavelength. That a reasonably united opposition appears now to be emerging is significant, even if Shehadi is correct that the real, battered face of Syria will only emerge after the Assad regime is gone.
Here is a recent (September 28) Al Arabiya report on the demonstrations in Syria:
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