Tag: Syria
The limits of military power
Maybe it’s because I’ve been reading Joe Nye’s The Future of Power, but every event I’ve been to lately around DC has reminded me of the limits of military power in achieving U.S. national security objectives. It is certainly not lack of admiration for the prowess of the American military–they are fantastically good at not only the military tasks that are their bread and butter, but also at the many other tasks presidents toss their way. And if you haven’t had the privilege of hearing David Petraeus or James Stavridis talk, you’ve missed some first class intellectual heft.
But consider today’s problems: Iran, Syria, Afghanistan.
If Iran did in fact plot with a Mexican cartel to murder the Saudi ambassador to the U.S., what are we going to do about it? Sure there are military options, and
people who advocate them. If the plot had succeeded we would probably have used one or two like leveling Quds force headquarters with cruise missiles or capturing a few Iranian miscreants in Iraq or Afghanistan. But it is all too obvious that the Iranians would respond, blowing up some favorites of ours or grabbing a few more Americans taking walks in Kurdistan. The more realistic options in response to a plot that did not succeed are the nonmilitary ones I pointed to yesterday.
Syria is a case where military intervention like that undertaken in Libya might make a big difference, and some of the protesters against President Assad’s regime would like to see it happen. But it won’t: the Russians haven’t even allowed a denunciation of the regime’s violence against the demonstrators to pass, and the Arab League is sitting on its duffs. I know there are some who still hope NATO will undertaken the kind of unauthorized campaign it unleashed from the air against the Serbs in 1999, but it isn’t going to happen so long as Bashar keeps the level of atrocities in the daily dozens. The protesters are in for a long struggle without foreign force on their side.
In Afghanistan, the Americans have really brought to bear most of their military capability, without a clear result. No one serious believes any longer that there is a military solution there. We’ll have to settle for a political arrangement that gives the Taliban (hopefully not Al Qaeda) some significant measure of what it wants. Afghanistan is looking more and more like Vietnam, less and less like even Iraq. We aren’t likely to come out in 2014, when withdrawal is to be completed, with much.
Let’s not even discuss Israel/Palestine and North Korea, where American interests are certainly at stake. American military capabilities are vital to shaping the environment in both places, but the opportunities to use it are very limited. It is more an insurance policy against gross misbehavior by one of the protagonists than a tool that we can use on a daily basis. In Joe Nye’s terms, military power in these environments can be converted into influence, persuasion and agenda-setting (i.e. soft power) even if use of American force is not likely.
Of course our flag officers know they need stronger civilian counterparts in defending national security. They have repeatedly called for beefing up civilian capabilities. But it isn’t happening. Congress is tearing the budget of the civilian side of foreign policy to shreds, even as the game of chicken between Republicans and Democrats on the budget approaches the moment of truth. I think we know what will happen if it comes down to cutting the national security budget, which includes both military and civilian expenditure. The military may not like what it ends up with, but it will be a feast relative to what the State Department and the Agency for International Development have on their plates.
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This week’s “peace picks”
Fewer this week than last. I’m trying to be more selective, and maybe there is less out there. Remember some of these may require registration and/or early arrival. Writeups for publication on www.peacefare.net are welcome:
1. Steven Pinker, The Better Angels Of Our Nature, Politics and Prose, October 11, 7 pm
In his new book, the cognitive scientist, author of How the Mind Works, and professor of psychology at Harvard, uses his broad expertise—plus some history and sociology—to examine the human propensity for violence. While we’ve always been a violent species, Pinker finds that we have been growing less so in recent decades.
2. Yemen After the Arab Spring: From Revolution to Disintegration? Root Conference Room, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 13, 2011 9 am-3:45 pm,
Lots of interesting people appearing during the day at this Jamestown Foundation event.
3. Voices from the Front Lines: Update on the Syrian Opposition, United States Institute of Peace, October 13, 10 am-12 noon
Since March, Syrians have taken to the streets calling for an end to the regime of Bashar al-Assad and a transition to democracy. The Syrian government has responded with massive force, killing some 3,000 Syrians and arresting tens of thousands more. Despite government repression, the Syrian uprising has given rise to an active and increasingly capable opposition movement, both inside Syria and among Syrians living abroad.
However, the Syrian opposition has struggled to establish a unified leadership. Now, following an intensive process of negotiations among diverse opposition groups, a Syrian National Council (SNC) has been established to represent the Syrian opposition. The formation of the SNC is an important and positive step in the opposition’s development. Yet significant challenges still must still be overcome for the SNC to secure international recognition, broaden its support within Syria, and acquire the legitimacy it will need to establish itself as a viable alternative to the Assad regime.
4. The Democratic Republic of Congo’s Pivotal 2011 National Elections, Brookings, October 14, 10 am-12 noon
Much is at stake as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) prepares for a pivotal round of national elections on November 28. While violence and security issues have marred the country’s recent history, multi-party elections in 2006 produced democratic gains and this round of elections may push the DRC even closer to becoming a vibrant democracy. However, questions remain as to how the elections will affect the country’s major challenges, including a rapidly growing population, low job growth, and the lingering threat of authoritarianism.
Panelists:
Mvemba P. Dizolele
Duignan Distinguished Visiting Fellow
Stanford University’s Hoover Institution
Anthony W. Gambino
Independent Consultant and Former USAID
Mission Director to the DRC
John Mukum Mbaku
Nonresident Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution
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A step in the right direction
Nadim Shehadi argues in The Guardian
Syrian political society will emerge and show its real face only after the regime is gone, and not before. This will not be a phoenix rising from the ashes, rather a battered society that will be trying to find its way after a long and dark period.
Until then, he advises we stop calling the opposition “the opposition” (because doing so legitimizes the regime) and lower our expectations to about as close to zero as possible, since no Syrian can reveal his true political identity without serious risk.
Fortunately, the Syrian opposition seems not to be taking Shehadi’s advice. Instead it formed a Syrian National Council on Sunday in Istanbul, whose chair outlined its purposes:
…[to] achieve the goals of the revolution to topple the regime, including all of its components and leadership, and to replace it with a democratic pluralistic regime.
Admittedly, this is not yet much of a program, and the people ready to speak openly for the Syrian National Council at present appear all to be expatriates, even if it is claimed that the Local Coordinating Committees that organize demonstrations inside Syria were represented in Istanbul.
But it is vital that the Syrians create something that can be viewed internationally and internally as a legitimate alternative to Bashar al Assad. If diaspora Syrians can help provide the alternative, all the better, even if their role is likely to decrease in the future.
No one watching the course of events in Libya and Egypt can doubt the importance of minimal coherence and legitimacy in the leadership of a rebellion. Libya had such a body, now called the National Transitional Council and recognized widely as the legitimate governing authority. Egypt did not. As a result, the protesters acquiesced in turning over the transition to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which has proven an infelicitous choice from the perspective of those who forced Hosni Mubarak to step down.
The Syrian National Council has a tough job ahead. Some Syrians have begun to take up arms against the regime, which has not hesitated to use indiscriminate force against the protesters. They cannot expect foreign military help. NATO is in no mood for another Libya. There is no demand for it in the Arab world, and the Russians won’t let a Security Council resolution authorize it because of their longstanding alliance with Syria, which includes a naval base at Latakia. While sanctions are taking their toll on the Syrian regime, Iran is doing what it can to relieve its friends in Damascus and ensure that they survive.
Syria is a complex society, with ethnic, sectarian and religious divisions that the Assad regime has long exploited to prevent the emergence of a united opposition. It will not be easy to keep Kurds and Arabs, Sunni and Shia, Christiansand Muslims on the same wavelength. That a reasonably united opposition appears now to be emerging is significant, even if Shehadi is correct that the real, battered face of Syria will only emerge after the Assad regime is gone.
Here is a recent (September 28) Al Arabiya report on the demonstrations in Syria:
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Is the U.S. still enabling dictators?
Several of the Arab protest movements look set to fail: Bahrain’s already has, Yemen’s is engulfed in civil war and Syria’s faces long odds. To what degree is the U.S. enabling outcomes that leave dictators in place?
The most problematic case is Yemen. There the U.S. has armed and trained military forces that President Saleh and his son have used both against unarmed protesters and tribal rivals. It is hard to believe that the U.S. could not do more to restrain the army, but Washington’s interest in continuing the effort against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has limited the constraints it is willing to impose on Saleh and son. We keep mouthing off about the Gulf Cooperation Council plan for Saleh to pass power to his vice president, in preparation for elections. That clearly is not going to happen. Gregory Johnsen proposes a radical reset to prioritize getting rid of Saleh and reaching a political settlement. It is hard to picture the intelligence community and the Pentagon concurring, unless they’ve learned a lesson or two from Pakistan’s relationship with the Haqqani network. They should be worrying about whether we end up with Yemen looking much like Somalia or Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan: a free fire zone for our drones with an increasingly radicalized population and little prospect of stability.
In Bahrain, the U.S. has essentially stood down from its early support of political reform and dialogue proposed by the Crown Prince. We are now getting ready to sell arms to a monarchy that has dissed its Shia population, which it refuses to recognize as a majority (and won’t bother counting either). The only remaining hope is the international commission of inquiry led by Cherif Bassiouni, which is supposed to report soon. Some will object that the King is not really a dictator, and that both the economy and speech are relatively free in Bahrain. I’d suggest talking with some of the protesters about that. The issues in Bahrain have more to do with concentration and abuse of power, discrimination and prejudice than legal restrictions. We should be continuing to press the monarchy for serious reform.
It would be unfair to accuse the U.S. of enabling Bashar al Assad, who is not a favorite in Washington, and President Obama has now said all the right things. But well-informed commentators think we still haven’t done all we could to organize a concerted multilateral effort against him. My own proposition is for diplomatic observers. If Bashar doesn’t accept them, he embarrasses himself. If he does, they are likely to embarrass him. Meanwhile, the protesters seem increasingly to be taking up arms, a move likely to fail and also ignite sectarian and ethnic violence. That’s a worst case outcome from the American perspective.
So whether by commission or omission, Washington is still not doing all it could to make things come out right. I’m not one who denounces the Administration for leading from behind–the White House is correct to expect Yemenis, Bahrainis and Syrians to take point. But especially in Yemen and Syria, where demonstrations continue daily despite ferocious repression, we should do more to lend a hand to those who have the courage to continue to protest nonviolently.
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Diplomatic observers for Syria
I’d like to revive an idea that I put forward more than a month ago: diplomatic observers for Syria.
I think we are in for the long haul in Syria. Bashar al Assad shows no signs of giving up. The international sanctions will pinch with time, but Iran is doing its best to counter them. While Bashar’s support has frayed in Damascus and Aleppo, that is only around the edges. The protesters are under a lot of pressure and have been unable to do what the Libyans did so successfully: put together a proto-government that could project a constitutional framework and roadmap to elections.
Military intervention is simply not in the cards. The Arab League isn’t asking for it. Russia has so far blocked all serious propositions in the UN Security Council. Moscow’s naval base at Latakia guarantees this will continue. I imagine Putin admires Bashar’s spunk and isn’t going to worry about what is done to the demonstrators. Turkey may stiffen its position a bit, but Ankara hasn’t yet done anything that really pinches hard.
If the protest movement in Syria is going to survive, it needs some help. We’ve been through this before. In some of the darkest days of the Kosovar rebellion against Serbia in 1998, the international community provided a Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission that reported on who was doing what to whom. It was too little too late and did not avoid war, but it was that mission that confirmed mass atrocities and helped to rouse the international community to its military intervention.
I don’t expect in Syria that there will be a military intervention, even if an observer mission were to confirm mass atrocities. The Russians won’t sign on to it, and I doubt the Americans and Europeans have the stomach to do it without Security Council authorization, which is what they eventually did in Kosovo.
But an international observer mission would likely reduce the ferocity of Bashar’s assault on Syria’s citizens and give us a far better window on what is happening than we have at present. Ambassador Ford’s visits to the protesters have clearly been a boost. Multiply that 1000 times in quantity (hard to match Ford in quality) and you’ve got something that might make a difference.
Would Bashar agree to it? At some point, he is going to be feeling the international pressure enough to make concessions. It is unlikely he will make any serious political reforms, since those would put his hold on power at risk. If he thinks that agreeing to international observers might eventually help him to relieve international pressures, he might do it.
In any event, I don’t see a downside to proposing it. The protesters have been literally crying for international protection. Civilian observers are not what they have in mind–some of them would like military intervention. But if the Arab League were to press the case and recruit the observers, the time may come when Bashar will yield to the proposition. If he doesn’t, all the worse for him: it suggests he has a great deal to hide.
I fear that if we fail to get something like this in place, the Syrian protest movement may fail, as the Iranian one did. That would be a big defeat for democratic forces in the Middle East, which are having a hard time elsewhere even if Libya and Tunisia seem to be proceeding more or less in the right direction.
In Yemen, the return of President Saleh to Sanaa has upped the ante and increased the violence. In Egypt, it is no longer clear–if ever it was–that the country will end up with a significantly more democratic system than the one Hosni Mubarak reigned over for decades. A Bashar victory in Syria would encourage reactionary forces elsewhere and help Iran to survive the Arab spring with its main client state still firmly attached. We haven’t got a lot of cards left to play on Syria: proposing international observers is a half measure that might be worth a try.
PS, October 26: The Syrian National Council is now calling for international monitors.
PPS, Octoer 28: Human Rights Watch likes the idea too.
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Where is the Security Council?
Thursday’s meeting in Paris of 63 countries to launch the reconstruction phase of the Libyan revolution went well. Money is starting to flow (including a big shipment of Libyan cash) and the Transitional National Council (TNC) continues to say all the right things: no revenge, contracts will be respected, democracy and rule of law should prevail. Elections within 18 months, which is more reasonable than the 12 months previously mooted.
The trick now is implementation. Even at yesterday’s meeting, there was friction over contracts. The French foreign minister made it clear he thought Paris deserved a lion’s share because of its role in the NATO military action. This friction and many others will grow. It is important that too much money not flow too fast into Libya: I’ve never seen a post-war reconstruction effort that would not have benefitted from less funding, which forces decisions on priorities and gives decent people incentives to block corrupt practices.
What the international community needs is a common script: a United Nations Security Council resolution that sets out strategic goals for Libya, as defined by the Libyans and agreed with the international community. The ideal vehicle for this is the new resolution needed to lift sanctions. This should state the main goals, which I might summarize something like this: Libya will be a single, united country with its capital in Tripoli governed by democratic processes under the rule of law. It will use its natural resources transparently and accountably to benefit all its citizens, live in peace with its neighbors and fulfill its obligations under international agreements it has signed as well as the UN charter.
This would not eliminate all frictions in the international community: a country as rich as Libya is bound to create rivalries among oil and gas consumers as well as suppliers of good and services. But it would help to frame the international effort and provide some touchstones to guide reconstruction efforts.
Libya is not the only country needing a Security Council resolution. None has yet passed denouncing the regime’s violence against its citizens in Syria, because Moscow is blocking it. The Secretary of State rightly spent some time yesterday cajoling the Europeans to block oil and oil product imports from Syria, which would deprive Damascus of something like one quarter or one third of its normal revenue. But we should not lose sight of the need for the UNSC to speak up against the blatant violations of human rights Bashar al Assad is indulging in.
US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice has done incredible things this year–Qaddafi would still be sitting pretty in Tripoli but for UN Security Council resolution 1973. She has also gotten the Human Rights Council, that much-criticized body, to play a positive role on Syria, denouncing the regime violence there. But there is no rest for the weary. A strong UNSC resolution is out of the question–there won’t be any authorization to use “all necessary means,” which is the kind of thing needed to implement military options. The Russians are nowhere near going along with it, because of their long friendship with Syria and their use of port facilities at Latakia.
But it is hard for me to believe that the UNSC can allow what Damascus is doing to pass in silence. The Russians should now be worried about their own long-term relationship with a regime that is looking shaky, even if no one expects it to fall soon. Bashar al Assad does not have a lot of friends left. Most of them are in Tehran, which has recently been urging Bashar to reform. Moscow also needs to make sure it is, as President Obama likes to put it, on the right side of history.
PS: The EU went ahead with the oil ban on Syria today. Bravo to both the Europeans and the Secretary of State, who pressed the case hard!
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