Tag: Syria
The buck still stops with the Syrians
It has taken longer than Syria-watchers predicted, but President Obama today finally called on Bashar al Assad to “step aside” in Syria. This is an interesting formulation that implies he could remain nominally president but allow reforms to move forward. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon seems to have also taken that line yesterday with Bashar in a phone call.
Let’s look at the options from Bashar’s perspective. Egyptian President Mubarak stepped down and now finds himself on trial. Libyan non-president Qaddafi refused to step down and now is fighting a war he is likely to lose. Yemen’s President Saleh is recovering from wounds his opponents inflicted in retaliation for his military attacks on them, but he has managed to continue to dominate Sanaa from Saudi Arabia, using his son and other loyalists as proxies. Only former Tunisian President Ben Ali is managing an untroubled, but powerless, retirement somewhere in Saudi Arabia. None of those options looks as good as “step aside,” though I have my doubts the protesters would accept Bashar remaining even nominally in power for more than a brief transition period.
President Obama also signed an executive order that
- blocks the property of the Syrian government,
- bans U.S. persons from new investments in or exporting services to Syria, and
- bans U.S. imports of, and other transactions or dealings in, Syrian-origin petroleum or petroleum products.
The trouble of course is that there is little Syrian government property in the U.S., few new investments or service exports to Syria and almost no U.S. import of Syrian oil or oil products.
For President Obama’s new rhetorical line to be effective, other countries–especially Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the Europeans–will need to play hard ball with the Syrian regime. Both the Turks and Saudis have sounded recently as if they are willing to do that, and the Europeans in their own complicated way seem to be moving in the same direction.
Diplomacy is getting other people to do what you want them to do. As many in the blogosphere are noting, Washington’s direct influence on events in Syria is small. President Obama himself said:
The future of Syria must be determined by its people, but President Bashar al-Assad is standing in their way. His calls for dialogue and reform have rung hollow while he is imprisoning, torturing, and slaughtering his own people. We have consistently said that President Assad must lead a democratic transition or get out of the way. He has not led. For the sake of the Syrian people, the time has come for President Assad to step aside.
So that’s where the buck stops: with the Syrian people, who have shown remarkable courage and determination so far. Here they are in Aleppo yesterday:
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Qaddafi near the end, Bashar still bumping along
It’s only been a week or so since I published a Council on Foreign Relations paper on preparing for post-Qaddafi Libya. It looks as if we are going to be there before the end of the month, if not in Tripoli itself in most of the rest of the country. A high-level defection, talks in Tunisia between the regime and the rebels, an ineffectual Scud missile launch by Qaddafi’s forces and rebel penetration of more western Libyan towns all signal that Qaddafi is near the end of his road.
That will of course be cause for celebration, but the really tough challenge–a successful transition to a more democratic regime that can govern and defend united Libya while respecting the rights of all its people–lies ahead. The Transitional National Council (TNC) that Europe and the United States have recognized as the legitimate governing authority has good intentions and even some good plans, but implementation in the confused period after the fall of Qaddafi will be difficult at best.
It seems to me that the international community is already well behind the curve. It needs a new UN Security Council resolution laying out the goals, parameters and leadership for the post-Qaddafi period. The EU, preoccupied though it is with the problems of the euro, needs to be thinking about deployment of a paramilitary police force at TNC request to ensure public order in Tripoli, at least temporarily. Hoping it won’t be requested or needed is not a good plan.
The internationals are in worse shape in Syria, where they haven’t managed to pass even a Security Council resolution denouncing Bashar al Assad’s horrendous assaults on his own population. The Turkish national security council is planning to meet Thursday to consider “radical” moves on Syria. Foreign Minister Davutoglu has pronounced what he terms the “final word,” which presumably means that action is coming soon. Speculation centers on a Turkish military incursion across the border into Syria, presumably to protect civilians in neighboring villages. In that event, all Bashar has to do is concentrate his attacks on the population in areas the Turks would find it hard to reach.
The more important move could come in the form of Turkish economic sanctions that signal clearly to businesspeople in Damascus and Aleppo that they need to convince Bashar al Assad to stop. But that isn’t easy for the Turks, who are enjoying their role as the burgeoning economic power of the region and will not want to give anyone reason to think twice about doing business with Turkish companies. It would be far easier for the Turks if any economic sanctions were multilateral and decided at the United Nations.
I am in Istanbul this morning–it really is a thrilling city of fabulous economic activity. Turkish geopolitical confidence is growing, but taking on Syria either militarily or economically when your foreign policy is focused on “zero problems” with neighbors is not easy. Still, I have to hope Ankara decides this week to save Europe and the United States from their own ineffectiveness.
PS: A demonstration in Aleppo, this evening:
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Diplomatic observers in Syria?
Reading the news from Latakia, it is hard for someone just coming out of Pristina not to note the similarity in military technique between Bashar al Assad’s Syrian forces and Slobodan Milosevic’s Yugoslav forces.
Milosevic aimed more explicitly to cause the Kosovo Albanians to flee their homes, using artillery to put holes in roofs and leaving the bodies of prominent people in the centers of towns. But the indiscriminate attacks on one neighborhood after another (or one village after the other in Kosovo) seem to the non-military eye comparable. Ditto the rounding up of young people, the random shootings and the mistreatment and torture in prison.
Also similar is the difficulty the rest of the world is having coming to a clear and unequivocal statement against the violence, which Nadim Shehadi notes is the truly complicated side of the equation. But it is an instructive analogy. When the international community unified and spoke with a single voice, it was always difficult for Milosevic to continue the violence.
We haven’t had that kind of unity yet vis-a-vis Syria. The Security Council has managed a statement, but no resolution. Individual voices have been crystal clear: I am in Istanbul this evening and read a statement from the Turkish Foreign Minister in the English version of Hurriyet that was unequivocal in demanding that the Syrian regime stop. We have to make those many voices one. A Security Council resolution passed with Russian and Chinese support would be the ideal diplomatic vehicle.
There is also a need to operationalize the international community’s concern. In Kosovo, this was done with the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM), an effort agreed to by Milosevic that I felt at the time was too little too late. But it was a lot more than has been done or even proposed in Syria, where the regime has kept out even the press. And KDOM ultimately had a big impact, when its chief was shown a massacre site and reacted with appropriate horror, calling Milosevic out for what had been done in Serbia’s name.
Diplomatic observers would do what Robert Ford can’t: be present all over Syria and report on any violations of a ceasefire quickly. They can only be deployed once Bashar al Assad agrees to stop the military action. If and when he does, would it be a good idea?
PS: See Jeff White’s piece, which I don’t seem to be able to HTML: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3393
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Getting to post-Assad Syria
By Adam Lewis, Editor & Webmaster at Peacefare.net
Today a Middle East Institute panel entitled “Syria on the Verge: Implications for a Nation in Revolt” stirred hopes for the revolt there to succeed.
The four panelists featured were Radwan Ziadeh (Visiting Scholar at the Institute for Middle East Studies at George Washington University and a member of Syria’s “opposition in exile”), Ausama Monajed (Executive Director of the London-based Strategic Research Communication Centre), Andrew J. Tabler (a Next Generation fellow at the Washington Institute) and former U.S. Ambassador to Syria Theodore Kattouf. While offering different perspectives, there were a few key points on which they agreed: The collapse of the Assad regime has become inevitable.
- The Obama administration announcement that President Bashar al Assad must step down will have positive effects.
- There are still major obstacles to overcome on the road to a democratic Syria. Most worrisome is that the regime continues to maintain almost uniform loyalty among the security and military forces.
- To facilitate the collapse of the Assad regime and the peaceful emergence of a new Syrian government, the U.S. should lead in international efforts to isolate the regime. This will require sanctions and diplomatic pressure while at the same time offering “lifelines” (or incentives to defect) to key regime supporters: senior military commanders, Allawite community leaders, and members of the Sunni business elite.
Through this combination of carrots and sticks the international community can convey to the regime loyalists that they have a great deal to lose by going down with the Assad ship and alternatively have the option to be part of a brighter future for Syria.
Radwan Ziadeh
The Assad regime’s Ramadan offensive has not impeded the gathering momentum of the Syrian opposition. It is a mistake to overestimate the role that religion is playing in the uprising. Ramadan, and specifically the Friday prayers, have provided a gathering place where protesters organize. It is difficult for the regime to prevent such gatherings.
Prominent Allawites are beginning to speak up against the regime. By doing so, they are undermining the regime’s attempts to present the Allawite community as an unconditional supporter and are diffusing sectarian tension. In fact, many Allawites have not done particularly well under the regime.
More forceful U.S. and global condemnation of the regime would give Syrian protesters greater momentum while also encouraging wider-scale defections within the regime. But Ankara should take the diplomatic lead in international efforts as Syrians view Turkey more favorably and with less suspicion than the U.S.
Ausama Monajed
While the growing movement has created a vast proliferation of opposition groups, committees and factions (each city or small town has its own), it should not be understood as divided. All of these various factions share a similar vision for a post-Assad Syria and have a similar set of core principles that guide their activity. On any given day, 70% of the slogans protesters use are shared across Syria.
The international community should not worry about a non-democratic outcome. Syrian protesters are experiencing a form of democracy as they build a broad coalition. Many of the larger opposition groups are already discussing the formation of political parties as well as the drafting of a new constitution.
International efforts can be most helpful if they:
- help Syrian opposition groups both inside and outside the country coalesce. The outsiders have a stronger grasp of foreign policy and can help the domestic Syrian movement develop a leadership core that can effectively engage internationals;
- convince the Sunni business elite to abandon the regime. This can be accomplished by pairing sanctions that undermine any benefits that come from working with the regime with assurances that those who jump ship now can avoid prosecution. If this group can be won over, Damascus and Aleppo will succumb to protest and the regime will crumble.
Andrew Tabler
The Syrian regime is not immune to international economic and diplomatic pressure. It has anticipated this movement for a long time. Since 1980 Syria has been one of the twenty fastest growing countries in the world, and the regime has recognized the economic challenges that its now burgeoning population poses. The Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 is an example of how international pressure caused the regime to change policy. The international community’s best leverage is energy export sanctions. Oil proceeds account for about 25-33% of Syria’s revenue and if eliminated could cripple the regime without decimating society (as occurred with oil sanctions in Iraq).
The opposition’s lack of a clear leadership group is both its greatest weakness and greatest strength. While it has not offered the international community an effective negotiating partner, it has also avoided a hierarchical structure that the Syrian security forces could decapitate.
A coup is an alternative to either the regime maintaining power or the opposition winning outright. The lack of government control in Eastern Syria, as well as the growing Saudi support for opposition elements in that area, could lead to the creation of a Benghazi-type opposition stronghold.
Theodore Kattouf
Since talks in Geneva broke down in 2000 there has been general confusion about how the U.S. government should approach the Syrian regime. The aftermath of the Hariri assassination in Lebanon in 2005 shook Bashar al Assad. Since then, however, Assad has become smug and overconfident.
The Obama administration has been right to be cautious, even if it was overly optimistic early on that the protests could inspire Assad to implement meaningful reforms. The administration recognized at the beginning of the conflict it simply did not have the leverage to take effective action without Arab League or UN Security Council support. It thus avoided taking ownership over the outcome of the conflict. The Syrian opposition generally endorsed this approach, as it did not seek international intervention.
The U.S. is now in a much stronger position. It can and should push the UNSC to apply sanctions against Syria as well as encourage Turkey and the EU to help it further Syria’s economic isolation. The Syrian security forces still appear fiercely loyal to Assad. These forces will have to be stretched much further before they break. If sanctions can trigger an economic collapse that prevents the regime from paying the troops, loyalties could shift quickly.
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Anyone still think it was the downgrade?
Yesterday’s sharp bump upwards on the stock market following the Fed’s announcement that it would keep interest rates low for two years demonstrates all too clearly that the sharp falls the previous two days were not reactions to the S&P downgrade of U.S. government debt. I shouldn’t say it, but I will: I told you so.
The press this morning attributes the Fed action to concern about growth, which is surely in part true. But it also reflects concern about banks and the financial system, which are always close to the Fed’s heart. Low interest rates have helped to save the banks for several years now–their profits are soaring–and will continue to help in the future, as a result of the Fed’s commitment.
Does this change the picture for foreign policy? Is the Federal budget under any less pressure? The short answer is “no.” If Congress sticks with the debt deal, it still has to cut expenditures sharply starting in fiscal year 2013. All the Fed has done is to make monetary policy carry the burden of adjustment until then.
The longer answer is a bit more nuanced. Certainly U.S. government borrowing costs for the next two years will continue to be unusually low, unless the markets really do lose confidence in the dollar or inflation rears its you know what. Low interest rates will ease the government’s fiscal situation. I confess to relief about this, but it does not reduce the need for triage on foreign policy.
Nina Hachigian, who was overly optimistic about the American role in the world a few years ago, is overly pessimistic now. America is no less indispensable today that it was last week, but it is likely to be less available in the future. People who have grown to rely on the United States to help them out of the deep holes they dig for themselves–from the Balkans to Israel/Palestine to Iraq and Afghanistan–are going to find us preoccupied elsewhere, with our own top national security risks.
This is not a bad thing–most of them will discover their own capacities to manage are greater than they had imagined. And it is high time some of America’s burdens shifted to Europe and the Arab League, even if the former has financial problems of its own and the latter lots of money but little experience. Far more often than in the past, the message from America will be handle it on your own, or figure out a cheap way to get it done.
What we need to be careful about is cheap shortcuts that end up of creating expensive longterm problems. In the Balkans, that expensive delusion comes from those who advocate rearranging borders to accommodate ethnic differences, a sure formula for instability if not war. In the Middle East, it comes from those who resist defining clearly the borders of the Palestinian state or want to turn a blind eye to the Arab spring, ignoring Egypt and Tunisia because the revolutions there have been “successful.” Backing a revolution doesn’t necessarily mean paying for it or bombing a regime into submission, as Robert Ford (our man in Damascus) has demonstrated with his deft visits to protesters in Hama.
Diplomacy is not inherently expensive. Military action is. In tight financial times, we’ll do better with a foreign policy that relies less on deployed forces and more on alert diplomats.
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Making Bashar al Assad history
As Marc Lynch points out in a tweet this morning, the region is belatedly beginning to react to regime violence against protesters in Syria. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have denounced it and have withdrawn their ambassadors, along with Qatar and Kuwait. Turkey is sending its foreign minister to Damascus tomorrow with a “final warning.” The Arab League has expressed “growing concern.”
Blake Hounshell at Foreign Policy is predicting the downfall not only of Bashar al Assad but of the whole regime:
The whole Baathist system has to come down, and it probably will. The only questions now are how long it will take, and how much more innocent blood will be shed in the process.
I hope he is correct, but it won’t happen unless the pressure builds.
Let’s leave aside the remarkable hypocrisy of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia denouncing violence against demonstrators. They are more than welcome to join the international chorus against it in Syria, even if they jointly repressed the demonstrations this spring in Bahrain. The denunciations already make some difference, as they are necessarily the first step on the road to more vigorous action. What more can Syria’s neighbors do that will make a difference?
Andrew Tabler and David Schenker discussed the options early in July. Those that have not been tried yet include depriving Bashar al Assad of revenue by blocking oil exports, expanding sanctions on his businessman cronies, referring him to the International Criminal Court, and encouraging Syrian army defections. Most of the rest of what they recommend has already been tried, including denunciation by UN human rights experts, enhanced relations with the opposition and more vocal alignment with the Syrian people.
The brutal fact is that whether Bashar al Assad falls, and how long it takes, depends more on the wisdom and fortitude of the Syrians than on anything else. So far, they have been remarkable. A journalist who has been there and talked with the protesters recently has assured me that they look even better up close.
The two key “pillars of the regime” remain the army and the business communities in Aleppo and Damascus. If one or both of these crumbles, Bashar al Assad is history.
PS: The LA Times put up this video, allegedly recorded in Idlib yesterday:
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