Tag: Syria
Syria isn’t over
On October 6 last year President Trump and Turkish President Erdogan had a telephone call that altered US policy in Syria. The White House released a statement that the United States Armed Forces would not support or be involved in the Turkish operation into northern Syria. The US no longer deemed ISIS to have a territorial ‘Caliphate,’ leading the Administration to leave the area. This phone call resulted in the abandonment of a strong US ally, the Kurds in northeastern Syria, to face Turkey alone.
This policy shift served as the foundation of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy policy forum titled The New Status Quo in Northeast Syria: Humanitarian and Security Implications on January 23. The forum was composed of Gonul Tol, Founding Director of the Middle East Institute’s Turkish Studies Program, Wladimir van Wilgenburg, coauthor of the 2019 book, The Kurds of Northern Syria: Governance, Diversity, and Conflicts, and Dana Stroul, Kassen Fellow in The Washington Institute’s Geduld Program on Arab Politics.
SDF still functioning
Van Wilgenburg, who recently returned from a trip into northeastern Syria, utilized this map to illustrate the presence and role of geopolitical actors.
The yellow portion of the map is controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which continue to control significant territory. Having visited Syria post-October, he noted the increase of Russian vehicles on the roads, replacing American trucks. Overall, van Wilgenburg stated that the situation on the ground has not changed tremendously; however, the Kurds are scared of possible upcoming demographic changes due to Turkish plans for the creation of refugee resettlement camps in the region.
Van Wilgenburg emphasized that the biggest problem for the SDF is that they still lack recognition from Damascus and are not official participants in peace talks. The economy is much better than in the areas the Syrian government controls, particularly with regards to electricity and water services. While Assad isn’t willing to make concessions to recognizing SDF, he does understand that without the 80,000+ SDF fighters, there would be a huge vacuum, as Syrian forces are not large enough to maintain the SDF territory. SDF is in a weaker state than it was prior to October, but it is still functioning, as long as the cease-fire holds.
Erdogan is worried about his domestic support
Gonul focused on Erdogan’s foreign policy, which is connected directly to his domestic policies. While Turkey’s hope was to create a Turkey-controlled safe zone stretching all the way to the Iraqi border with the capacity to host 1-2 million Syrian refugees, that has not happened. The pocket of Turkish controlled-area is significantly smaller than Erdogan’s intentions.
According to Gonul, Erdogan has not been speaking about Syria as much on local news because the topic is closely tied to domestic Turkish politics and his own status. Turkey is hosting close to 4 million refugees from Syria. This weakens Erdogan, as anti-Kurdish sentiment is strong and blames Erdogan for allowing so many refugees in.
Turkish Kurds have captured a historic 13% of the vote and deprived Erdogan a parliamentary majority. With the Kurds supporting the Turkish opposition, President Erdogan lost local elections in March. Erdogan is trying to marginalize and criminalize the Kurdish opposition. Gonul suggested that Erdogan’s failure to meet his goals in Syria has led to his shift of attention to Libya.
Turkey has also not delivered on capturing Idlib, where there are tensions between Ankara and Moscow. Despite their fragile relationship, Erdogan will not act in Syria without a Russian “green light.” Between tensions with Russia and the United States, Turkey is squeezed in Syria. Gonul does not believe Erdogan will defy the United States in Syria, as the threat of sanctions could strain the already weak Turkish economy.
Why the US Government should care about Syria
Stroul brought the conversation to a more global and US-centric arena, highlighting the core findings from the Syria Study Group report in 2019. She emphasized that Syria is of interest to the US for multiple reasons, but mainly because it represents a geostrategic nexus of threats facing the US: terrorism, Iran and it’s power projection into the region, and Russia and Great Power competition. Stroul disagreed with the notion that the conflict is over, suggesting that it is only entering a new phase. Stroul emphasized that since the Trump/Erdogan phone call there is no longer the same trust between the SDF and the US. This will lead to major consequences in the region.
All three panelists emphasized that refugees are not going to return to Syria at present despite Erodgan’s plan. Van Wilgenburg added that most of the refugees in Turkey that Erdogan is referring to are actually from Aleppo and other more western cities in Syria. They will not want to be relocated to northeastern Syria.
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Pompeo is a failure
Here is Secretary of State Pompeo in an interview with Mary Louise Kelly of NPR that demonstrates unequivocally his unfitness for office:
First he defends withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran nuclear deal), which has led inexorably to Iran acquiring more of the materials required for nuclear weapons. In self-defense, he simply asserts “we’ll stop them,” with no evidence whatsoever. That’s because there is none.
Then he declares himself happy with the Administration’s Ukraine policy, which he claims the State Department controls, and says he has defended every single State Department official. This despite the fact that he has not defended several officials who testified in Congress and that Rudy Giuliani was conducting Ukraine policy outside State Department channels.
In any event, listen to the end, since Kelly then reports on a subsequent conversation with the Secretary, in which he berates her for asking about Ukraine in ways that are simply unacceptable, even if unsurprising. No one should expect this Administration to show even minimal respect for a media professional. It prefers the hacks at Fox News who do its bidding.
Pompeo, again not surprisingly, also has bigoted views on Muslims and counts right-wing extremists among his greatest admirers. That may seem obscure or irrelevant to many Americans, but stop a moment to consider how the 1.8 billion Muslims on earth look at a country that has a bigot as Secretary of State.
The simple fact is that Pompeo is not qualified to lead American foreign policy, which is failing in the most important challenges he faces. In addition to precipitating Iran’s return to pursuit of nuclear weapons, the Administration is presiding over a stunning array of failures:
- North Korea continues to produce nuclear weapons and improve its missiles.
- Venezuela’s President Maduro continues in power.
- Russia continues to occupy a good slice of Ukraine.
- Iran and Russia are winning back control of Syria for President Assad.
- Iraqis are pushing back against the presence of US troops.
- The American “deal of the century” for Israel and Palestine stands no chance of acceptance by the Palestinians.
- The trade war with China has been suspended with few gains, in order to provide American farmers some relief before the 2020 election.
I could go on, but the overall picture is clear: “America First” foreign policy has failed, often because it has amounted to “America Alone.” Our major European allies (that’s now France and Germany, with the UK out of the European Union) are no longer cooperating voluntarily with the US. They can do better withholding cooperation and only giving in when they can get something in return from a transactional president. A few weaker reeds like Poland, Hungary, Italy as well as post-Brexit Britain may be more on board with this Administration, but mainly because of their own nationalist domestic politics. The sense of shared mission to make the world safer for democracy has evaporated. Its now every country for itself.
Lots of us, including me, thought Pompeo might be a relative success compared to his disastrous predecessor, Rex Tillerson. But succeeding as Secretary of State in an administration as wrong-headed about the world as this one just isn’t possible. It will take a decade or more to rebuild US influence in the world once Trump is out of office. Two decades or more if he wins a second term.
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Reconstruction in the Middle East
On January 16 the Middle East Institute hosted a panel discussion titled, Reconstruction in the Civil War Zones of the Middle East. The panel showcased the upcoming release of the World Bank’s Building for Peace in MENA: Reconstruction for Security, Sustainable Growth and Equity this coming February, the Middle East Institute’s Escaping the Conflict Trap, and Fractured Stability: War Economies and Reconstruction in the MENA.
Speakers on the panel included, Steven Heydemann, nonresident Senior Fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy of the Brookings Institution, Luigi Narbone, Director of the Middle East Directions Programme at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute, Francesca Recanatini Senior Public Sector Specialist in Governance at the World Bank, and Ross Harrison, senior fellow at The Middle East Institute and faculty of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. The panel was moderated by Paul Salem, President of the Middle East Institute.
Inaccurate assumptions
Heydemann criticized three assumptions that the international community typically uses to guide reconstruction efforts that are contextually mistaken:
- War completely destroys the pre-war economy.
- Since pre-war institutions are destroyed, the task of post-conflict is to rebuild states and use this reconstruction effort to avoid future conflict.
- The destruction of the prewar institutions generates constituencies that wholeheartedly support reconstruction.
Heydemann critically analyzed these assumptions in the context of the MENA region, proclaiming that oftentimes in MENA there is continuity in the economic norms and practices during wartime. War even amplifies and further consolidates these norms. Secondly, conflict empowers actors to reimpose institutions they can exploit, reigniting previous conflicts. In the process of power sharing negotiations, weak participants are more concerned with positions than than reconstruction efforts.
Harrison emphasized the need for the right diagnosis of the regional conflicts in order to design proper solutions. He challenged the notion that regional actors are only proxy actors, proclaiming that this model is not complex enough to reflect the actual situation. We need realignment at the international and regional levels to create a cooperative environment for reconstruction to take place in.
Competing powers
Narbone spoke about the typical Western liberal blueprint utilized in post-conflict settings, which is not the only power in the region. The MENA conflicts incorporate a plethora of leaders in the region who do not believe in this model, specifically Russia and Iran. Consensus is lacking on the drivers of conflict, with each participant blaming the others. “Reconstruction fatigue” may be appealing but it will have detrimental effects.
Local participation
Recanatini centered her rhetoric around the World Bank’s upcoming report and the importance of citizen participation. After surveying 15,000 Yemeni, Iraqi, and Libyan citizens, asking “What do you believe has been lacking in previous peacebuilding work in your country?” over 19% of Yemenis interviewed, 18% of Libyans interviewed, and 17% of Iraqis agreed that the international community is lacking a vision guiding peacebuilding. Recanatini emphasized the need for international organizations to speak with different actors to ensure that all parts of society are being incorporated and heard. She also urged thinking outside of mandates and crossing into sectors and areas traditionally unexplored by international organizations.
What now?
The panelists all agreed that while civil war conflict zones in MENA would need billions of dollars for reconstruction, smaller grants of money can be used to set examples. Without this kind of support the resulting society will be full of disparities, hierarchies of privilege, vast discrimination and marginalization, etc. All the panelists posited that there is not just one solution to reconstruction in the context of the Middle East. We must be critical of any assumptions underlying efforts in the region.
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Laughing stock
This is an interesting and detailed accounting of US “maximum pressure” efforts against Syria. Googletranslate worked pretty well. I haven’t seen the material in the English-language press. The Americans are trying to use their own and European pressure to get political reform and reduce Iranian influence in Syria. The pressure is intended to come from new sanctions, withholding normalization, blocking reconstruction assistance, and drying up Syrian finances.
Meanwhile the Russians are supporting a regime offensive into Idlib province and blocking humanitarian assistance from crossing the Iraqi and Jordanian borders. Both Washington and Moscow seem inclined to wait the other out. Tehran–under pressure on the home front, handicapped by Soleimani’s death, and preoccupied with US threats–are losing some traction in Syria, yielding to Moscow’s stronger hand. Damascus meanwhile is stonewalling the UN effort to negotiate political reform.
Presidents Assad and Putin think they are holding the stronger hand, as we can tell from this joking conversation about inviting President Trump to Damascus so that he’ll see the light:
I think they are right. There just is not enough in the American pressure package to stop Assad and Putin from laughing at Trump, who has been busy claiming to his supporters that US troops in northeastern Syria are “keeping the oil.” He is apparently unaware that the amount is small, it is sold locally (likely to Damascus), and I suspect the proceeds go to the Kurds helping to protect the oil field, not the Americans. No need to mention that any “keeping the oil,” even the profits from it, would be a warm crime under the Fourth Geneva Convention as well as several other international agreements prohibiting pillage.
The American approach to Syria has been ineffectual from the first, when it started in the Obama Administration. That is partly because the Americans don’t really care about Syria at all, but only about extremists and Iranians present there. From that perspective some progress has been made: the Islamic State has lost its geographic caliphate and the Iranians are finding it difficult to sustain their efforts there as the Russians claim whatever meat is left on the bone. It is good news that the Americans and Europeans are maintaining the sanctions and continuing to insist on political reform as the price for reconstruction assistance, but it isn’t likely to happen anytime soon.
What does all this mean for Syrians? Nothing good. The standoff between Moscow and Washington is likely to continue, the Turks are busy trying to stabilize a good part of northern Syria, the Russians and the regime are pressing ahead in Idlib, and the Americans are doing their best to hold on to a toehold in the northeast with their Kurdish friends. The war has declined in intensity, but large numbers of people are still being displaced (many of them after several previous displacements), and the regime is increasing its control over humanitarian assistance.
The Americans are continuing to prove ineffectual. Make America Great Again appears to mean becoming a laughingstock for Assad and Putin.
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It’s already war, announced or not
The equation looks like a simple one: the US assassinated Quds force commander Soleimani as he left Baghdad airport, and Iran responded with a missile attack on an Iraqi base housing US forces. Now de-escalation is said to have taken hold. Tit-for-tat, yes, but not really war.
It’s not that simple, or that limited. In addition to the drone attack on Soleimani, the US apparently tried the same day to kill another Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander in Yemen, and a couple of days later Iranian forces in eastern Syria were under aerial attack. Washington has also increased sanctions on Iran. Tehran meanwhile has focused on trying to get the Iraqi parliament and government to evict the Americans as well as on unilaterally lifting all the constraints on their nuclear activities under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, or nuclear deal).
This is a multi-front contest, complicated further today by the revelation that the IRGC shot down a Ukrainian airliner shortly after it took off from Tehran airport. That has generated explicitly anti-regime protests inside Iran and a brutal crackdown, which is just what the Trump administration would have ordered up if it could. The discomfort of your enemy in moments of crisis is always welcome.
There are lots of things that haven’t happened yet, so far as we know. It is unclear whether the threshold of one thousand battle deaths arbitrarily required by scholars to classify a conflict as a war has been reached. If we went back to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, that number might be breached in total US and Iranian casualties. We could still see more assassinations in both directions, cyber attacks, more attacks on Gulf oil shipping and facilities, protests and crackdowns in Lebanon and Iraq as well as Iran, attacks in Yemen, Bahrain, or Saudi Arabia, and attacks on or by Israel. We might also eventually see more salvos of cruise or ballistic missiles in one direction and the other.
It is already war, declared or not. President Trump knows the American people don’t support war against Iran and he won’t try to convince them otherwise. He intends simply to proceed, announcing only the good news (from the American perspective) and citing non-existent intelligence, like the plans for attacks on four embassies that no one in the intelligence community has confirmed. Maximum pressure, initiated with sanctions, now includes “kinetic” measures ordered by the President with no authorization from Congress to use military force.
Iranian maximum resistance will not be limited either. Iran will use its proxies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen to pressure America’s friends and allies even as it tries to keep the Europeans, Russians, and Chinese on board the nuclear deal, or what remains of it. Iran can also hit American assets again, not only in Iraq but also elsewhere in the Middle East and even in Latin America as well as inside the US. President Trump wanted to restore deterrence with the Soleimani assassination; there is no reason to believe he has succeeded.
The House Democrats effort to restrain the President will fail. Even if the “concurrent resolution” passes in the Senate, it will be non-binding. The President will veto any binding measure. So we are stuck with a war few Americans or Iranians want conducted by a President who doesn’t care and a Supreme Leader who doesn’t either. Each is concerned with preserving his own hold on power. We need better sense to prevail in both countries, before the de-escalation lull ends and disaster come ever closer.
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Moscow owns Syria
Bassam Barabandi writes:
Russian President Putin’s visit to Syria this week was planned along the lines of one last year, which also came in the Russian holiday season. Putin then gave a speech directly to the Russian soldiers at the Russian Hmeimim base, to which Syrian President Assad was asked to come without knowing Putin would be present. Assad’s role during both visits shows how marginalized he is. The main message sent to other countries is the vast extent of Russia’s influence in the areas the Assad regime controls, the government, and institutions.
Putin aimed in his more recent visit to respond to current events and to reduce Iran’s influence in Syria, as part of a tacit agreement among Western countries, Israel, and Russia to neutralize Syria as an arena for Iranian revenge for the killing of Iranian military commander Soleimani. Putin went to Damascus this time, but his main meetings were outside the media spotlight with Russian field commanders and Assad-regime Syrians close to Russia. Assad did not attend those two-hour long meetings. He only appeared after the fact accompanying Putin to the airport.
We can expect major changes within the Assad regime that will increase Russia’s influence and may lead to a violent confrontation with pro-Iranian loyalists. Putin’s failure to visit Assad at his palace was a signal that Russia is not wedded to the Syrian President. Such a visit would have constituted explicit recognition by Russia of the sovereignty of Syria and the legitimacy of Assad as its president. More importantly, it would have been a clear and strong message to all parties that Russia does not see a substitute for Assad as president in the next stage.
What happened was the opposite. Assad’s remarks were devoted to thanks to Russia and glorification of Putin and his forces. Russia now owns Syria, whose president has limited executive authority. Syrian decisions today come from Moscow. Even if Assad were to leave, this situation would persist. Syria’s dependency could extend for long decades to come, with or without Assad.
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