Tag: Syria
Still running out of time?
This is from Idlib, in northwestern Syria, today. Al Jazeera says:
The first large sign in Arabic reads: “Yes for a national salvation conference, no to dialogue with killers.” Afterwards a large sign in English declares: “Bashar is a vampire. Don’t you see world?”
This is a far more eloquent response to Bashar al Assad’s latest maneuvers to stay in power than the Secretary of State offered, but I’ll include what she said too:
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, Christophe, it doesn’t appear that there is a coherent and consistent message coming from Syria. We know what they have to do. They must begin a genuine transition to democracy. And allowing one meeting of the opposition in Damascus is not sufficient action toward achieving that goal. So I am disheartened by the recent reports of continued violence on the borders and in Aleppo, where demonstrators have been beaten, attacked with knives by government-organized groups and security forces.
It is absolutely clear that the Syrian Government is running out of time. There isn’t any question about that. They are either going to allow a serious political process that will include peaceful protest to take place throughout Syria and engage in a productive dialogue with members of the opposition and civil society, or they are going to continue to see increasingly organized resistance. We regret the loss of life, and we regret the violence. But this choice is up to the Syrian Government. And right now we are looking for action, not words, and we haven’t seen enough of that.
Still running out of time?
Assad is sane but not secure
The headline writers are suggesting that Syria’s Bashar al Assad has lost his mind, and others that his speech today at Damascus University betrays weakness, but I take him seriously. Bashar is determined to stay in power, offering ill-defined amnesty and national dialogue with 100 regime-picked reformers while cracking down on “vandals” and “saboteurs,” who he claims are part of a conspiracy ensconced among the street protesters. The result is regime murder on a scale that dwarfs what happened in Egypt and Yemen, though it is still far from Gaddafi’s homicidal intentions in Benghazi or his siege of Misrata and other Libyan towns.
While many are appalled at what is going on, the international community has so far done little to stop it. The military option is clearly out, not only because of Syria’s problematic topology but also because the Russians–offended by the NATO effort against Libya–are not going to allow a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the necessary means to pass. In fact, they haven’t allowed any resolution to pass, not even one that simply condemns the regime’s violence, because they are afraid of again sanctioning NATO action. They should relax: there is no stomach in Washington and European capitals for another military intervention.
Bashar’s vulnerabilities lie in two areas: arms and money. It appears he has all the weapons he requires, but the loyalty of a substantial portion of the army is in doubt. Its Alawi leadership will stick with the regime, because it has no alternative, but sporadic indications of dissent among the Sunni officers and rank and file offer some hope that the army has its limits. Look for it to show those limits in the provinces first, not in Damascus or Aleppo.
As for money, the Syrian economy is certainly on the ropes, but I imagine Iran will do its damndest to keep Bashar financially afloat. He is an important link to Lebanon’s Hizbollah, which is Iran’s surrogate on the front line with Israel. It is hard to believe that Tehran would let Bashar fall for lack of hard cash.
Tougher international sanctions targeted on the regime’s financial transfers might make some difference, as might a credible threat of an International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment. The ICC though won’t be allowed into the country to collect evidence. It was able to move against Gaddafi only because the rebels welcomed the court into the Libyan territory they control. I hope however that the ICC investigators are interviewing refugees in Turkey and Lebanon.
Would a clear statement from President Obama calling for Bashar to step down make a difference? I think not, and it would put American credibility at risk. We are already taking a beating from Gaddafi’s persistence in power in Libya, as well as Saleh’s in Yemen. Better it seems to me to lean on the Turks, who have influence and have begun to pressure Bashar.
He is unlikely to leave easily or soon, though like any decision by a single person timing is unpredictable. It is clear however that the foundations of his regime are shaken. His promise of amending the constitution to allow a multiparty political system would spell the end of the Ba’athist autocracy. He may try to renege of course, but Syrians show no sign of willingness to accept restoration of the status quo ante. One way or the other, we are witnessing the end of the Assad regime.
PS: Andrew Sullivan quoted this piece at The Dish, apparently having picked it up from Al Jazeera English. Regulars read it here first!
Yemen will need the Americans
The end is near for Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya and Bashar al Assad of Syria. They may last weeks or even months, but their regimes will never again be able to claim that they are factors for stability, and they are unlikely to risk the kinds of reforms that might satisfy at least some critics and enable them to remain on office. The regimes have suffered mortal wounds, as Saleh himself likely has.
The problem lies in what comes next. Libya at least has an interim National Transitional Council, recognized as a legitimate authority by some major countries. Syria has the beginnings of something similar, a “follow up” “consultative” group growing out of a meeting in Antalya, Turkey two weeks ago. In my way of thinking, it is important that the exile Syrians somehow maintain the momentum of that group and begin to lay concrete plans for how to govern in the aftermath of Assad’s fall, despite the obvious difficulty of coordinating their efforts with the protest leaders inside Syria. It is vital that Syria not succumb to sectarian and ethnic chaos if the revolution there succeeds. Protecting the Alawi and other privileged minorities from the wrath of people who have suffered under the Assad regime is not going to be easy.
Yemen is especially problematic.
The revolution there has several dimensions: students and youth (the “protesters”), political parties (the “opposition,” aka the Joint Meeting Parties), and tribes (especially it seems the al-Ahmar), not to mention a northern (Houthi) insurgency and southern secessionists. In addition, the Americans will be pressing for an “orderly” transition, in order to enable a continuing effort against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The Saudis, who were remarkably inept at exerting their considerable influence to get Saleh out, will nevertheless be big players if they choose to bankroll one competitor or another.
The competing visions of these often disparate and only occasionally harmonious forces will make transition particularly problematic in Yemen, where declining oil production, water shortages and shrinkage of the economy are creating the ideal conditions for state collapse. I am all in favor of the Europeans playing the major role post-war in Libya, and likely Syria as well, and I’d like to see some indication that they are preparing seriously.
But the Europeans are not much of a factor in Yemen. The Americans will feel they can’t afford to ignore Anwar al-Awlaki’s home base, or leave the matter entirely to the ineptitude of the Saudis. It is time for them to begin planning, if they haven’t already done so, for a major post-war effort to support whatever minimal state can be made to emerge from Yemen’s chaos.
Here are the basic categories of things they need to worry about:
- safe and secure environment: initially in Sanaa, but eventually also in the north, where armed resistance to the central government is endemic, and the south, where secessionist sentiment is strong, not to mention the terrorist threat from people taking haven in Yemen’s lawless interior;
- rule of law: likely more tribal than courtroom, but one way or another people need someplace to go to settle disputes;
- stable governance: the Gulf Cooperation Council agreement seems to depend essentially on the existing constitution, which may well be a good way to go since agreement on anything else would be difficult to obtain, but can reasonable elections really be held in Yemen under current conditions?
- sustainable economy: oil and water are key factors in determining whether Yemen can pull of its current economic tail-spin;
- social well-being: food, water, shelter are all in short supply, with a lot of people displaced by various conflicts; health and education are grossly inadequate.
The fixes will come only in the long term. Yemen is going to be a problem for a long time. And it is hard for me to see how the Americans escape at least some responsibility for the post-conflict reconstruction, if they continue to worry about containing Yemen’s terrorist potential.
Where are the patriots?
If nothing else, these weeks of protest and repression are demonstrating how tenaciously autocrats cling to power. This is not surprising, since for the three currently in question–Gaddafi, Assad and Saleh–there really is no role for them if they leave power. Worse, they fear for their livelihoods, their families and their lives.
This occurs to me as I am in Ljubljana (Slovenia) for meetings, one of which will be with a former president. As is all too apparent in the U.S., former presidents play useful roles in democratic societies, whether in talking with the North Koreans (or me), raising support for earthquake-ravaged Haiti, or just as living examples of the possibility of losing power without losing your life. The U.S. even pays and protects them well, as I imagine Slovenia does too.
The problem with our Middle Eastern chiefs of state is of course that they did things during their time in power that might merit justice once they are out of it and available to the courts. Saleh was offered immunity but refused to sign the agreement that would have provided it. The International Criminal Court’s prosecutor has already asked for an arrest warrant for Gaddafi. It is hard to see how Assad is less criminal, though he may have succeeded in preventing much hard evidence getting into the hands of the ICC.
So what we’ve got is four–I’d like to throw in ICC indictee President Bashir of Sudan as well–blatantly criminal chiefs of state (or the equivalent, since Gaddafi claims not to have any official position in what he terms the “republic of the masses”). Military force isn’t yet working against Gaddafi, sanctions aren’t working against Bashir, and protests aren’t working against Assad. Only Saleh seems out of the picture, and that because of an artillery strike that was luckier than the many missiles thrown at Gaddafi.
We shouldn’t expect much better from these four. What I’m waiting for is someone in their respective entourages to take up the cudgels (admittedly something like that has happened in Yemen). All four seem determined not only to stay in power but to take their countries down with them. That’s what should embolden some of their followers: loyalty to their own country and people. Is that too much to ask?
Marvel the Syrians!
From Hama, yesterday:
You’ve got to admire the fortitude and organizational capability of the Syrians. Josh Landis has the most complete coverage I’ve seen of both the “Friday of the Children of Freedom” and the opposition conclave Wednesday and Thursday in Antalya, Turkey.
The demonstrators inside Syria managed to turn out in good numbers to protest the torture and murder by security forces of a 13-year-old boy as well as other atrocities against children, despite shut-down of a large part of the internet and cell phone systems. Damascus and Aleppo, the country’s two biggest cities, are still not turning out big numbers, but yesterday’s demonstrations were widespread and energetic according to the reports that have leaked out. Several dozen people appear to have been killed.
The opposition meeting in Antalya that ended Thursday not only reached agreement on a statement (not yet available in its entirety) but also elected an executive board. So far as I can tell, the program focuses on getting rid of Bashar al Assad in favor of his vice president and holding free and fair elections within a year. There is talk as well of maintaining separation of state and religion as well as Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (Kurdish representation in Antalya was strong, so this is significant). The Washington Post reported:
The statement also called for the creation of a democratic, secular Syrian state, in which freedom of worship would be guaranteed, but religion would play no role, and the rights of the country’s minorities would be respected.
All of this is fine, but of course the big problem is the regime’s determination to hold on to power. My understanding is that the protesters are not promising amnesty to Bashar al Assad, who therefore has a choice of using maximum repression to stay in power or expatriating himself to some safe haven. All indicators are that he is determined to hold on.
The protesters now have the challenge of maintaining nonviolent discipline and unity while under enormous pressure from the security forces. They also need eventually to spread their mass mobilization efforts into the centers of Damascus and Aleppo. Only when some of the security forces begin to hesitate–when they refuse to fire on protesters or even join them–will the revolution in Syria begin to see the fruits of its labors. Connecting with the army, some units of which are believed to be less committed to Bashar al Assad than others, needs to be a priority objective. This is likely to happen earlier in the provinces than in the major cities, where Assad will station the most loyal troops.
The international community is still proving ineffective on Syria. No UN Security Council resolution has emerged, despite expectations earlier in the week. Washington is sounding a bit more stentorian, but nevertheless holding on to the slim hope that Assad will institute reforms. The Wall Street Journal had a good article Friday detailing Obama Administration efforts to win Assad over to a settlement with Israel and a break with Hizbollah, Hamas and Iran. The odds of that now seem vanishingly small, but I suppose someone in the White House (and in Senator Kerry’s office) may still harbor hopes.
The die is cast. Either Assad will succeed, as his father did, in repressing the protests with state violence or he will have to yield to what is beginning to look like a more or less united, determined and focused revolution.
A brighter view of the Arab spring
I wrote yesterday about the pessimistic views of the Arab spring prevalent among experts at a Harvard/Carnegie Endowment event. They know a whole lot more about the Middle East than I do–that’s why I go to their events and write them up. But I think they are overly pessimistic. Why?
First, because I’ve seen things come out all right. I am not just talking South Africa, where admittedly Nelson Mandela’s leadership and stature counted for a lot, as did F.W. de Klerk’s. I am not seeing any Mandelas or de Klerks in the Middle East. Nor do there seem to be any Vaclav Havels or Lech Walesas. But in Serbia, Ukraine and Georgia protest leaderships that were notably lacking in vision and stature had at least temporary success and left their countries better off than they would otherwise have been.
Second, because it seems to me the protesters in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Yemen have shown a combination of nonviolent restraint and persistence that is laudable, and likely to lead in good directions. I am less convinced of the wisdom of the demonstrators in Libya and Bahrain, where it seems to me they fell victim to the temptations of violence and recalcitrance, respectively. But the Libyan Transitional Council shows at least some signs of promise. We’ll see if the Bahrainis can do better in the next “dialogue” phase.
Third, because I have more confidence in a bottom-up process than a top-down one. Here I disagree with Marwan Muasher, who explicitly prefers to see top-down reform. I don’t really know any place where that has worked terribly well in the transition from dictatorship to democracy, though obviously there are leaders like Gorbachev (or de Klerk for that matter) who made the process easier than it might otherwise have been. But people have to want democracy and freedom–it really can’t be given to them.
Nor do I think the consequences of the Arab spring will be quite as negative for U.S. interests as many of the experts say. Middle Eastern leaders who have to be more responsive to public opinion may be more supportive of the Palestinians, but they would be foolish to take their countries to war when the people they lead are looking for prosperity. So, okay, we’ll get Egypt opening the border with Gaza, but closing it was an approach that wasn’t worth a damn anyway. Hamas is likely to need to cut its margins on smuggled goods when they can enter more freely. Maybe an open border will serve American purposes better than the closed one.
I admit that it is hard to see how Yemen comes out of this anything but a basket case, which is where it was headed under Saleh anyway. Certainly it will be a while before any future government in Sanaa gets a grip on the provinces. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula may have a field day in the meanwhile, but they don’t appear so far to have been particularly effective at exploiting the chaos.
That said, the Arab spring is not about American interests, which will have to take a back seat for a while throughout the Middle East. It is however about American values. We should be happy to see them spreading among young Arabs willing to demand their rights. Let’s see where things go before we get too pessimistic.