Tag: Syria
The fight for justice in a post-Assad Syria
Colleagues at the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC) have posted this statement welcoming the fall of the Assad regime and looking ahead to a just outcome:
Thirteen years ago, SJAC began preparing for the day after the fall of the Assad government, with the steadfast belief that Syrians would someday have an opportunity to pursue meaningful justice and accountability for the crimes committed against them and to build a state that respects the rights of all Syrians.
Over the past decade, our team in Syria and across the diaspora have collected over two million pieces of documentation of the conflict, conducted extensive investigations of international crimes, and laid the groundwork for comprehensive missing persons investigations. Now, at the start of the first week of a post-Assad Syria, our work has just begun.
In the coming weeks, SJAC’s team will be focused on collecting and preserving at-risk documentation from previously inaccessible, government-controlled areas while ensuring that Syrians have access to clear, impartial sources of information on the immediate justice challenges that will arise in the coming days. As the situation on the ground stabilizes, our team looks forward to working alongside Syrians from across the country to begin to design a meaningful transitional justice process.
While SJAC has long supported Syrian-led justice, the dream of a stable and peaceful Syria can only be achieved with the support of the international community. Over the past decade, as the conflict stalled, many states have withdrawn support for human rights and humanitarian efforts in Syria, while simultaneously disengaging in the peace process. Now, with the dream of a stable and peaceful Syrian at hand, we ask that the international community re-engage in Syria, both through robust funding for reconstruction and justice processes, as well as through political engagement.
As the political makeup of a post-Assad Syria evolves, the international community should reconsider sanctions and reassess Hayat Tahrir Al Sham’s designation as a terrorist organization. In a time of uncertainty, we also ask that host countries continue to provide safe asylum to Syrians around the globe. Syrians themselves will be best placed to assess when it is safe to return.
The future may be uncertain, but the SJAC team is excited to have the opportunity to work for justice and accountability in a post-Assad Syria.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Winners and losers from Assad’s fall
The success of Syrians in deposing Bashar al Assad poses the question of who wins and who loses. Inside Syria, Hayat Tahrir al Sham is the big winner for now. It led the breakout from Idlib and inspired the many risings elsewhere in Syria.
There are lots of other countries that stand to win or lose something in the transition. Let’s assume Syria remains reasonably stable and its government basically inclusive and not vindictive, which appears to be HTS’ intention. We can try to guess the pluses and minuses for the rest of the world.
Turkiye is the big winner
In the region, Turkiye is the big winner. President Erdogan had been ready to negotiate with Assad, who refused to engage. Erdogan lost patience and backed a military outcome. He unleashed both Turkish proxies and HTS, which could not have armed and equipped itself adequately without Ankara’s cooperation. He does not control HTS 100%, especially now that it is in Damascus. But he will have a good deal of influence over its behavior. Let’s hope he uses it in the democratic and less religious direction. That however is the opposite of what he has been doing at home.
Erdogan has two primary goals in Syria. First is achieving enough stability there to allow many of the three million Syrian refugees in Turkiye to return. Returns will take time, but there is already a spontaneous flow back into Syria. The second is keeping the Syrian Kurds associated with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) away from Turkiye’s border with Syria. Erdogan would also like its Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) dissolved. Or at least as far from power as possible.
Refugee returns look like a good bet. Disempowering the Kurds in eastern and northern Syria does not. They are well-established and cooperate closely with US forces in that area. Future President Trump will want to withdraw the Americans. But the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces will remain essential to fighting the Islamic State (IS). HTS, IS, and the PKK all carry the “terrorist” label in the US and Europe. But HTS and IS are rivals. HTS will want the Kurds to continue to fight IS. They will also be vital, at least temporarily, to preventing Iran from re-establishing a land route through Syria to Lebanon.
Israel wins and loses
The Israeli government would have preferred to see the Assad devil it knew stay in power. But his fall means the Iranians and their proxies will no longer be stationed along the northeastern border of Israel. The Israelis have already moved their troops into a UN-patrolled buffer zone inside Syria. They didn’t want some known or unknown force filling that vacuum. That advance might give them a stronger position in future negotiations with Damascus, whenever those occur.
But Israelis have to be worried that a jihadist group led the overthrow of Assad. Ahmed al Sharaa, the birth name of HTS’s Abu Mohammed al Jolani, was born in Riyadh to Syrian parents. They were displaced from the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. The second Palestinian intifada motivated his conversion to jihad. It is hard to picture someone with that background more pliable than the impacable Assad on border and Palestinian issues. Jolani himself appears to have said little about Gaza or the Lebanon war. But some of his followers are clear about where they want to go next:
Lebanon and Jordan
Lebanon and Jordan, two key neighbors of Syria, can hope to be winners from the change of regime . Both will want to see Syrian refugees return home, as they were a strain on their economies. They will also stand to gain from reconstruction and eventually a more prosperous Syria.
Assad had been financing his government and his cronies with proceeds from the export of the stimulant Captagon. Decent people in both Beirut and Amman will welcome relief from that flood of poison into and through their societies. Some of their corrupted politicians may regret it.
Lebanon will have to reabsorb Hezbollah fighters who supported Assad. They will be a defeated and unhappy lot. But the Lebanese Army and state stand to gain from any weakening and demoralization of Hezbollah. Anyone serious in Beirut should see the current situation as an opportunity to strengthen both.
Iran and Russia are the biggest losers
Apart from Assad, Tehran and Moscow are the biggest losers. They backed Assad with people, force, money, and diplomacy. They are now thoroughly discredited.
Iran has already evacuated its personnel from Syria. Tehran has lost not only its best ally but also its land route to Lebanon.
Russia still has its bases. Almost any future Syrian government will have a hard time seeing what it gains from the Russian air force presence. Moscow’s air force brutalized Syrian civilians for almost 10 years. The air bases will no longer have utility even to Moscow. Moscow will prioritize keeping the naval base at Tartus, which is important for its Mediterranean operations.
The Gulf gains, Iraq loses
Gulf diplomacy was trying to normalize relations with Assad in the past year or two. But few Gulfies will mourn his regime, provided stability is maintained. Qatar may be more pleased than Saudi Arabia or Abu Dhabi. The Saudis and Emiratis are less tolerant of political Islam. Nor do they like to see regimes fall. Qatar is more comfortable with political change, including of the Islamist variety.
Iraq’s Shia-dominated government loses a companion in Damascus. It won’t welcome a Sunni-dominated government in Damascus. But Baghdad, like the Gulf, is unlikely to mourn the fall of Assad. He did his damnedest to make life difficult for Iraqis after the fall of Saddam Hussein.
The United States and Europe gain but will need to ante up
The US and Europe have long viewed Assad as a regrettable but necessary evil. They hesitated to bring him down for fear of what might come next. Now they need to step up and fund Syria’s recovery, mainly through the IMF and the World Bank. They will want Gulf money invested as well. The best way to get that is for them to ante up matching funds.
That is also the best way for them to gain leverage over the political settlement. If they want an inclusive outcome, they’ll need to be ready to pay for it. Hesitation could open the door to malicious influence.
Let the Syrians decide
That said, the details of the political settlement should be left to the Syrians. They will need to write a new constitution and eventually hold elections. The extensive constitutional discussions the UN has hosted for a decade may offer some enlightenment on what Syrians want. Just as important in my view is how the new powers that be handle property issues. Only if property rights are clearly established and protected can Syria’s economy revive. But who rightfully owns what and what to do about destroyed property are complicated and difficult issues.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Will Syria stay together or fragment?
One of the threats to Syria now that Assad has fallen is fragmentation. In my experience, all Syrians say they want to preserve the country and its borders. But the conflicts among them and with neighboring countries can foil that goal and lead to partition.
The pieces of the puzzle
Syria’s population is mixed. Ninety per cent of its population is Arab. The rest is mainly Kurdish and Turkmen. More than 70% of Syrians are Sunni Muslim. But there are also various denominations of Christians as well as Alawites, Druze, Ismailis, Shiites and others. Damascus was thoroughly mixed. Several concentrations of Kurds were found along the northern border with Turkey, along with Turkmen and Arabs. The Alawite “homeland” was in the western, Mediterranean provinces of Tartous and Latakis. But they were a plurality and not a majority there. More Sunnis have sought refuge there, as under Bashar al Assad, an Alawite, those provinces were relatively safe.
The war is superimposing on this hodge-podge an additional dimension: military control of territory. Hayat Tahrir al Sham, the leader of the uprising, will control much of Idlib, Aleppo, Hama, and Homs. Turkey and its surrogates will control most of the northern border. They are trying to push Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) east of the Euphrates, an area the SDF already dominates. Other opposition forces will be in charge of the south and the Jordanian border. The Druze have long maintained their insular community in Suwayda. It is unclear who will dominate Damascus. The southerners are arriving there first, but it is hard to picture HTS settling for second fiddle there.
There are no clear pre-existing regional lines along which Syria might fragment, except for the provincial boundaries. But those do not generally correspond to ethnic or religious divisions. The pieces of the puzzle do not fit together. They overlap and melt into each other.
The divisive forces
That would be a good reason to avoid fragmentation. Homogenization of ethnic groups on specific territory would require an enormous amount of ethnic “cleansing.” Ordinary Syrians don’t want that. But there will be forces at work that might make it happen.
The Turkmen/Kurdish conflict has already removed a lot of Kurds from Afrin in the northwest and border areas farther east. Ankara backs the Turkmen and wants to prevent Kurdish access to Türkiye. This is because the Syrian Kurds have supported Kurdish rebels inside Türkiye. The Kurds have built their own governing institutions in eastern Syria. They might seek independence if they get an unsatisfactory political outcome at the end of the war.
The Alawites of Tartous and Latakia are dreading revenge from the rest of Syria for mistreatment under the Assad dictatorship. They could try to set up their own statelet, perhaps even attaching it to Lebanon. They could also try to chase the Sunni Arab population out, while importing as many Alawites as possible from Damascus. Many there served the Assad regime and will want out.
The unifying forces
Syria’s neighbors won’t want a breakup. Türkiye has the most clout because of its presence in Syria and support for HTS. Ankara will oppose even autonomy for the Kurds. Jordan and Iraq have less clout, but they won’t want fragmentation either. Nor will Russia and Iran, which supported Assad and are big losers due to his fall. Ditto Israel and the United States, which would fear radicalization of any rump Syria if its Kurds or Alawites secede. Israel doesn’t want a jihadist entity on its northern border.
HTS and other opposition forces will also resist fragmentation. They want to govern all of Syria, not a part of it. HTS has moderated its attitude toward non-Arab and non-Sunni Muslims. It has also tried to minimize revenge and has emphasized continuity of the Syrian state. But HTS is an authoritarian movement, not a democratic one. It remains to be seen how it will behave in practice.
The obvious solutions
The obvious solution is decentralization. Devolving authority to provincial and municipal institutions offers minorities opportunities to govern themselves, or strongly influence how they are governed. The Alawites and Kurds might be satisfied with decentralization, provided they also get reasonable representation at the national level. The Kurds already have their own institutions. Some non-Kurdish opposition areas in Syria have used local councils for governance since the 2011 uprising against Assad.
There are also power-sharing arrangements that can assuage minority concerns at the national level and lower levels. Quotas in parliament, reserved positions in the state hierarchy, and qualified majority voting in parliament or local councils. I’m not an enthusiast for these, as they often entrench ethnic warlords, but sometimes they prove necessary.
Syrians may invent mechanisms I haven’t considered. In any event it is they who should decide. The country will need a new constitution, then in due course elections. The existing road map for Syria’s political process is UN Security Council resolution 2254, which Assad stymied. HTS and the rest of the opposition can revive it and gain international support by doing so.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Who should the US back in Syria?
The rapid advance in the past week of Syrian opposition forces raises difficult questions for the United States. The leadership of those forces lies with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), a designated terrorist group. The US already cooperates with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which include Syrian Kurds aligned with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). It is also a designated terrorist group that operates inside Turkey. Turkey backs opposition forces in Syria generally termed the Syrian National Army (SNA), which control Afrin under the command of the Turkish Army.
Too many friends
The US cooperates with the SDF because it helps fight against the Islamic State (IS), still another designated terrorist group. HTS has also been effective against IS as well as Al Qaeda in the territory it has controlled for several years in northwestern Syria.
HTS’ leader, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, has been trying for years to soften his group’s jihadist rhetoric. He has sent messages in recent days to Syrian Christians, Kurds, and Alawites suggesting that they will not be mistreated in HTS-controlled territory. He has also indicated HTS will step back from governance, which it will delegate to an interim authority with broad representation. Its Syrian Salvation Government in Idlib province has administered the territory HTS controls there for several years.
Turkiye, a NATO ally, is unhappy that the Americans cooperate with the Kurdish-led SDF. Washington has tried to soften Ankara’s attitude toward the Syrian Kurds for years, to no avail. Turkiye wants the SDF pushed east of the Euphrates River and at least 30 kilometers from the Turkish border. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds are said to be on the move.
Israel, another de facto US ally, won’t be happy to see jihadists conquering Syria. The damage Israel has wreaked on President Assad’s Syrian Arab Army, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Iranian forces is one of the reasons HTS has been able to advance, but Netanyahu is not going to be greeting al-Julani with open arms. He, and perhaps Biden, had hopes that Assad would cut, or at least diminish, his ties to Iran.
So how should the US lean in this complicated situation? With the Turks against the SDF? That isn’t possible without abandoning the fight against IS. With HTS against Assad? That would risk helping a group the Israelis fear may have less benign intentions than its current behavior suggests. With Assad against HTS? That could wreck prospects for a transition in Syria that the US has backed for more than a decade. It would also preserve an ally of Russia and Iran who has brutalized his own population.
Creating new options
If the current options don’t look good, perhaps the right approach is to create new ones. America doesn’t have enough troops in Syria (maybe 1500, depending on how you count) to command the situation. But Washington could lean one way or another to open up better options. This could be better than the current policy paralysis, which has failed to take advantage of a situation that could spell defeat for Russia and Iran.
The Turkish-backed forces in Syria want to chase the Kurds from Manbij, on the western side of the Euphrates. That is a fight that could split the opposition to Assad and give him a new lease on power. The US should encourage the Kurds to withdraw east of the Euphrates and duck a fight they are not likely to win.
The Syrian Arab Army (Assad’s army) will want to withdraw its forces from central Syria to meet these threats. There are still IS remnants in central Syria. The US should press SDF, after withdrawal form Manbij, to fill this vacuum and continue its fight against IS.
HTS and its allies today took Hama, south of Aleppo. Both Homs and the Mediterranean provinces of Tartous and Latakia, where many Alawites live, are now at risk. Risings against Assad could facilitate HTS takeovers. Damascus could be next.
The US could communicate to HTS that Washington would be willing to see creation of an interim government not only in Aleppo but also at the national level. Washington could then work with that government, provided it behaves in a civilized way, rather than HTS directly, in planning for the future of Syria.
What does the US gain?
Success of the rebellion against Assad would be a serious defeat for Russia and Iran, which have backed Assad through more than 13 years of civil war. It would be foolish to imagine the result will be Western-style democracy. But even an outcome (without all the interim steps please!) like Iraq’s current non-autocratic mishmash would be better than the homicidal regime that has governed Syria since the rebellion started in 2011.
PS: And Assad comes down:
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Assad is imploding, but it’s not over yet
With Russia preoccupied in Ukraine and Iran weakened, Syria’s President Bashar al Assad is now under siege. The forces opposing him include both Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) and Turkish-supported rebel groups. Opposition forces in several Syrian provinces are joining the fray, as are the Syrian Democratic
Forces. HTS and the Turks have been governing in Syria’s northwest Idlib and Afrin provinces. The Syrian Democratic Forces are affiliated with Kurdish institutions that govern in much of the east.
How far, how fast?
The HTS offensive has moved fast and far. It controls most of Aleppo, Syria’s largest or second largest city depending on how you count. HTS has also evacuated Kurdish forces from Aleppo and advanced south to the outskirts of Hama. In the meanwhile, the Turkish-supported groups have chased Kurds from their strongholds in Aleppo province. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Kurdish led but partly Arab manned, have evicted Iranian and Shia militias from the east.
The question is whether rebel forces can sustain their momentum and move further south to Hama and Homs. So far, there has been little fighting. The Syrian Army is evaporating. It is poorly staffed, trained, and equipped after more than 13 years of fighting rebels. After hesitating at first, Russian air attacks are now battering rebel-held territory, including civilian targets. Lebanese Hezbollah, a major Iranian-supported factor in Syria, has let it be known it will not send more forces. Israel has battered Hezbollah badly in both Lebanon and Syria.
The quandaries
For the US and EU, these sudden developments pose a difficult issue. They don’t like Assad and have maintained vigorous sanctions against him. But they also don’t like HTS, which is a spinoff from Al Qaeda. And Washington won’t want the Turkish-supported forces beating up on the SDF. They have been helpful in fighting remnants of the Islamic State in eastern Syria.
Israel has its own issues. It did not mind the Assad devil it knew and won’t want a jihadist state in Syria. But if he falls, the Israelis will be happy to see Iran and its proxies disappear from their border. And they will want some cred with whoever takes over. In the past they have been supportive to at least some of the opposition to Assad.
The endgame
HTS is trying hard to project a more tolerant image than many jihadists. It has reached out to the Kurds:
HTS has sought to justify its more tolerant approach (translation from a Tweet by Aaron Zelin):
The jihad in Syria has the duty to repel the attacks of the Assad regime. It is part of sharia politics that the mujahidin in Syria should only fight those who fight them, and refrain from attacking those who refrain from attacking them, and strive to disperse the enemies and reduce them.
Assad will have well-equipped, loyal forces defending Damascus. But if HTS takes Hama and Homs, he won’t have much country left. Opposition forces are rising in the south even as the SDF clears regime forces and its allies from the east. The western, Mediterranean coast would still be his, but vulnerable.
The greatest threat to the opposition forces will arise if Turkiye unleashes its proxies against the Kurds. That would divide the opposition and provide an opportunity for Assad to complicate the fight. He might try to strike a deal with the Kurds. Assad is imploding, but it isn’t over yet.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
It’s time to wake up and smell the coffee
So many people issue have written so much in response to October 7 and its aftermath! It is difficult to imagine saying anything new or even interesting. But after much hesitation I will discuss one issue: the difficult choice Arab Americans face in voting this year.
It had seemed to me that Arab American voters would come around to my perspective, so there was no need. But polling suggests that isn’t happening in the numbers I’d like. So here are some unsolicited views on why Arab Americans should vote for Harris, not Trump.
The Trump record
The Trump record on Israel is unequivocal. He called himself “the best friend Israel ever had in the White House.” But that isn’t correct. He was a best friend to the Israeli right. He gave them a lot of what they asked for:
- withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal,
- approved annexation by Israel of Syrian territory in the Golan Heights,
- moved the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem,
- closed the Jerusalem consulate that functioned as an embassy to the Palestinian Authority (PA),
- cut funds for the PA,
- closed the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) office in Washington,
- rejected the claim that Israeli settlements in the West Bank are illegal,
- cut the humanitarian and other assistance to Palestinians administered by the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA),
- offered a take it or leave it pro-Israel peace plan,
- withdrew the US from the UN Human Rights Council because of its criticism of Israel, and
- sided with Israel against the International Criminal Court’s investigation of alleged Israeli war crimes in Gaza and the West Bank.
Trump would do next what he did before
It’s hard to say for sure what Trump would do next. He hasn’t said much. He knows it would cost him critical votes in Michigan, Wisconsin, and elsewhere. But his advisers are the same people who established the record above. That suggests Trump would give unconditional support to Prime Minister Netanyahu to do whatever he wanted to do. A vote for Trump will condemn innocent people in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iran.
Maybe all one really needs to know is that Trump is Netanyahu’s favored candidate. Israel’s Prime Minister has stiffed many of Biden’s efforts to moderate his offensive in Gaza and reach a ceasefire agreement. Netanyahu also rejected Biden’s pleas not to expand the war to Lebanon. That is not only because the Israeli Prime Minister wants the war to continue so he can stay in power. He also doesn’t want to give Biden any goodies before the election.
The Jewish vote
Trump is frustrated that his vigorous pro-Israel stance doesn’t get him more Jewish votes:
That’s at least in part because many Jewish Americans dislike what Netanyahu is doing as much as Arab Americans do. Many Jews were horrified at what happened October 7 but recognize that Israel is behaving unjustly. In Gaza, it has sought revenge rather than justice and ignored the civilian toll. It has also rejected reasonable proposals for a ceasefire and prisoner/hostage exchange. In the West Bank, Israel is allowing and even encouraging settler violence against Palestinians. In Lebanon, it is destroying civilian infrastructure and killing people who have nothing to do with Hezbollah.
Most Jewish Americans want what most Israelis want. That is a ceasefire in Gaza and an exchange of prisoners and hostages, as well as a Palestinian state. Sixty-eight percent of Jews voted in 2020 for Biden. I would guess more will vote for Harris this November.
Jews and Arabs should be voting together
Jews will vote for Harris agreeing more with Arabs right now than at many times in the past. Arab American supporters of Hamas and Hezbollah are few and far between. Many understand that Hamas’ brutality on October 7 gave Israel motive and opportunity to brutalize Gaza. Hezbollah has participated both in a corrupt Lebanese political system and a war against civilians in Syria. Its rocket attacks on Israel likewise gave Israel motive and opportunity. But Arab Americans, like American Jews, want the wars to stop.
What troubles Arab Americans most is that Biden has not compelled Netanyahu to agree to a Gaza ceasefire. It troubles me as well. But I am convinced that Harris will have a far better chance of succeeding than Biden. Netanyahu will know that he faces at least four more years of her. If Trump is elected, it will mean four more years of a license to kill.
It’s time we all wake up and smell the coffee. Some have already done so. Emgage Action has endorsed Harris in a thoughtful and comprehensive statement. Harris has not promised the squeeze on Israel’s military supplies many would like. But she is clearly more sympathetic to Palestinian needs than Trump. Not voting, voting for a third party candidate, or voting for Trump, would be a serious mistake. Jews and Arabs who want peace in the Middle East should vote for Harris.
RSS - Posts
