Tag: Syria
Reconstruction in the Middle East
On January 16 the Middle East Institute hosted a panel discussion titled, Reconstruction in the Civil War Zones of the Middle East. The panel showcased the upcoming release of the World Bank’s Building for Peace in MENA: Reconstruction for Security, Sustainable Growth and Equity this coming February, the Middle East Institute’s Escaping the Conflict Trap, and Fractured Stability: War Economies and Reconstruction in the MENA.
Speakers on the panel included, Steven Heydemann, nonresident Senior Fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy of the Brookings Institution, Luigi Narbone, Director of the Middle East Directions Programme at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute, Francesca Recanatini Senior Public Sector Specialist in Governance at the World Bank, and Ross Harrison, senior fellow at The Middle East Institute and faculty of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. The panel was moderated by Paul Salem, President of the Middle East Institute.
Inaccurate assumptions
Heydemann criticized three assumptions that the international community typically uses to guide reconstruction efforts that are contextually mistaken:
- War completely destroys the pre-war economy.
- Since pre-war institutions are destroyed, the task of post-conflict is to rebuild states and use this reconstruction effort to avoid future conflict.
- The destruction of the prewar institutions generates constituencies that wholeheartedly support reconstruction.
Heydemann critically analyzed these assumptions in the context of the MENA region, proclaiming that oftentimes in MENA there is continuity in the economic norms and practices during wartime. War even amplifies and further consolidates these norms. Secondly, conflict empowers actors to reimpose institutions they can exploit, reigniting previous conflicts. In the process of power sharing negotiations, weak participants are more concerned with positions than than reconstruction efforts.
Harrison emphasized the need for the right diagnosis of the regional conflicts in order to design proper solutions. He challenged the notion that regional actors are only proxy actors, proclaiming that this model is not complex enough to reflect the actual situation. We need realignment at the international and regional levels to create a cooperative environment for reconstruction to take place in.
Competing powers
Narbone spoke about the typical Western liberal blueprint utilized in post-conflict settings, which is not the only power in the region. The MENA conflicts incorporate a plethora of leaders in the region who do not believe in this model, specifically Russia and Iran. Consensus is lacking on the drivers of conflict, with each participant blaming the others. “Reconstruction fatigue” may be appealing but it will have detrimental effects.
Local participation
Recanatini centered her rhetoric around the World Bank’s upcoming report and the importance of citizen participation. After surveying 15,000 Yemeni, Iraqi, and Libyan citizens, asking “What do you believe has been lacking in previous peacebuilding work in your country?” over 19% of Yemenis interviewed, 18% of Libyans interviewed, and 17% of Iraqis agreed that the international community is lacking a vision guiding peacebuilding. Recanatini emphasized the need for international organizations to speak with different actors to ensure that all parts of society are being incorporated and heard. She also urged thinking outside of mandates and crossing into sectors and areas traditionally unexplored by international organizations.
What now?
The panelists all agreed that while civil war conflict zones in MENA would need billions of dollars for reconstruction, smaller grants of money can be used to set examples. Without this kind of support the resulting society will be full of disparities, hierarchies of privilege, vast discrimination and marginalization, etc. All the panelists posited that there is not just one solution to reconstruction in the context of the Middle East. We must be critical of any assumptions underlying efforts in the region.
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Laughing stock
This is an interesting and detailed accounting of US “maximum pressure” efforts against Syria. Googletranslate worked pretty well. I haven’t seen the material in the English-language press. The Americans are trying to use their own and European pressure to get political reform and reduce Iranian influence in Syria. The pressure is intended to come from new sanctions, withholding normalization, blocking reconstruction assistance, and drying up Syrian finances.
Meanwhile the Russians are supporting a regime offensive into Idlib province and blocking humanitarian assistance from crossing the Iraqi and Jordanian borders. Both Washington and Moscow seem inclined to wait the other out. Tehran–under pressure on the home front, handicapped by Soleimani’s death, and preoccupied with US threats–are losing some traction in Syria, yielding to Moscow’s stronger hand. Damascus meanwhile is stonewalling the UN effort to negotiate political reform.
Presidents Assad and Putin think they are holding the stronger hand, as we can tell from this joking conversation about inviting President Trump to Damascus so that he’ll see the light:
I think they are right. There just is not enough in the American pressure package to stop Assad and Putin from laughing at Trump, who has been busy claiming to his supporters that US troops in northeastern Syria are “keeping the oil.” He is apparently unaware that the amount is small, it is sold locally (likely to Damascus), and I suspect the proceeds go to the Kurds helping to protect the oil field, not the Americans. No need to mention that any “keeping the oil,” even the profits from it, would be a warm crime under the Fourth Geneva Convention as well as several other international agreements prohibiting pillage.
The American approach to Syria has been ineffectual from the first, when it started in the Obama Administration. That is partly because the Americans don’t really care about Syria at all, but only about extremists and Iranians present there. From that perspective some progress has been made: the Islamic State has lost its geographic caliphate and the Iranians are finding it difficult to sustain their efforts there as the Russians claim whatever meat is left on the bone. It is good news that the Americans and Europeans are maintaining the sanctions and continuing to insist on political reform as the price for reconstruction assistance, but it isn’t likely to happen anytime soon.
What does all this mean for Syrians? Nothing good. The standoff between Moscow and Washington is likely to continue, the Turks are busy trying to stabilize a good part of northern Syria, the Russians and the regime are pressing ahead in Idlib, and the Americans are doing their best to hold on to a toehold in the northeast with their Kurdish friends. The war has declined in intensity, but large numbers of people are still being displaced (many of them after several previous displacements), and the regime is increasing its control over humanitarian assistance.
The Americans are continuing to prove ineffectual. Make America Great Again appears to mean becoming a laughingstock for Assad and Putin.
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It’s already war, announced or not
The equation looks like a simple one: the US assassinated Quds force commander Soleimani as he left Baghdad airport, and Iran responded with a missile attack on an Iraqi base housing US forces. Now de-escalation is said to have taken hold. Tit-for-tat, yes, but not really war.
It’s not that simple, or that limited. In addition to the drone attack on Soleimani, the US apparently tried the same day to kill another Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander in Yemen, and a couple of days later Iranian forces in eastern Syria were under aerial attack. Washington has also increased sanctions on Iran. Tehran meanwhile has focused on trying to get the Iraqi parliament and government to evict the Americans as well as on unilaterally lifting all the constraints on their nuclear activities under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, or nuclear deal).
This is a multi-front contest, complicated further today by the revelation that the IRGC shot down a Ukrainian airliner shortly after it took off from Tehran airport. That has generated explicitly anti-regime protests inside Iran and a brutal crackdown, which is just what the Trump administration would have ordered up if it could. The discomfort of your enemy in moments of crisis is always welcome.
There are lots of things that haven’t happened yet, so far as we know. It is unclear whether the threshold of one thousand battle deaths arbitrarily required by scholars to classify a conflict as a war has been reached. If we went back to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, that number might be breached in total US and Iranian casualties. We could still see more assassinations in both directions, cyber attacks, more attacks on Gulf oil shipping and facilities, protests and crackdowns in Lebanon and Iraq as well as Iran, attacks in Yemen, Bahrain, or Saudi Arabia, and attacks on or by Israel. We might also eventually see more salvos of cruise or ballistic missiles in one direction and the other.
It is already war, declared or not. President Trump knows the American people don’t support war against Iran and he won’t try to convince them otherwise. He intends simply to proceed, announcing only the good news (from the American perspective) and citing non-existent intelligence, like the plans for attacks on four embassies that no one in the intelligence community has confirmed. Maximum pressure, initiated with sanctions, now includes “kinetic” measures ordered by the President with no authorization from Congress to use military force.
Iranian maximum resistance will not be limited either. Iran will use its proxies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen to pressure America’s friends and allies even as it tries to keep the Europeans, Russians, and Chinese on board the nuclear deal, or what remains of it. Iran can also hit American assets again, not only in Iraq but also elsewhere in the Middle East and even in Latin America as well as inside the US. President Trump wanted to restore deterrence with the Soleimani assassination; there is no reason to believe he has succeeded.
The House Democrats effort to restrain the President will fail. Even if the “concurrent resolution” passes in the Senate, it will be non-binding. The President will veto any binding measure. So we are stuck with a war few Americans or Iranians want conducted by a President who doesn’t care and a Supreme Leader who doesn’t either. Each is concerned with preserving his own hold on power. We need better sense to prevail in both countries, before the de-escalation lull ends and disaster come ever closer.
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Moscow owns Syria
Bassam Barabandi writes:
Russian President Putin’s visit to Syria this week was planned along the lines of one last year, which also came in the Russian holiday season. Putin then gave a speech directly to the Russian soldiers at the Russian Hmeimim base, to which Syrian President Assad was asked to come without knowing Putin would be present. Assad’s role during both visits shows how marginalized he is. The main message sent to other countries is the vast extent of Russia’s influence in the areas the Assad regime controls, the government, and institutions.
Putin aimed in his more recent visit to respond to current events and to reduce Iran’s influence in Syria, as part of a tacit agreement among Western countries, Israel, and Russia to neutralize Syria as an arena for Iranian revenge for the killing of Iranian military commander Soleimani. Putin went to Damascus this time, but his main meetings were outside the media spotlight with Russian field commanders and Assad-regime Syrians close to Russia. Assad did not attend those two-hour long meetings. He only appeared after the fact accompanying Putin to the airport.
We can expect major changes within the Assad regime that will increase Russia’s influence and may lead to a violent confrontation with pro-Iranian loyalists. Putin’s failure to visit Assad at his palace was a signal that Russia is not wedded to the Syrian President. Such a visit would have constituted explicit recognition by Russia of the sovereignty of Syria and the legitimacy of Assad as its president. More importantly, it would have been a clear and strong message to all parties that Russia does not see a substitute for Assad as president in the next stage.
What happened was the opposite. Assad’s remarks were devoted to thanks to Russia and glorification of Putin and his forces. Russia now owns Syria, whose president has limited executive authority. Syrian decisions today come from Moscow. Even if Assad were to leave, this situation would persist. Syria’s dependency could extend for long decades to come, with or without Assad.
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How Soleimani’s death affects Syria
Bassam Barabandi writes:
First: Let us not forget that Soleimani’s project was to drive away American forces from Iraq and Syria. He was in no hurry in Syria because he was busy building the foundations to enhance the Iranian political, military, security, economic, popular, and militia influence in Syria, and he surely achieved quite a lot in this field.
Second: Bashar al-Assad is closer to the Iranian axis than the Russian within the Syrian regime. The new IRGC commander may be forced to compel Assad to take decisions in the coming days to prove his loyalty to Iran and to demonstrate that the new commander is in control. This is one of the things that we should monitor in the coming days.
Third: The Assad regime is split, as never before, into two very distinct wings: pro-Iran and pro-Russia. The Iranian wing is led by Bashar al-Assad, who received his advice/ instructions directly from Qassem Soleimani, This was evident in Bashar’s visit to Tehran. Iran also has its own influence in the military and many officers are affiliated with it, but the most dangerous thing is the almost absolute influence of Iran in the countryside of Deir Ezzor Governorate on the West Bank of the Euphrates, in some areas surrounding Damascus, and local and non-local militias located in separate areas inside Syria.
The vacuum and confusion in Iranian decision-making will be very bad for the pro-Iranian wing within the Assad regime, as this wing contains Bashar al-Assad, the major weakness of the Assad regime as a whole.
We do not know how the newly appointed commander Ismail Qaani will look at Bashar Al-Assad, but if he is to lead a more institutionalized position, Assad’s position will be weaker and weaker, and it will not be unlikely with time to get rid of him in a settlement with the rest of the parties.
If Qaani adopts a more centralized policy, he will ask for more concessions from the pro-Iran wing in the regime, which will make Assad look more miserable and ridiculous than previously as part of Iranian messages to Russia and other countries that its influence remains strong in Syria.
Fourth: Russia may take advantage of this opportunity, as the conflict with the Iranian axis looks like a cold war, which is marked by some fierce confrontations that have not yet been resolved. Despite the relative stability in sharing influence between them, the instability of Syria makes the game of influence. Its redistribution always possible, just as was the case of influence between America and Turkey and between Turkey and Russia.
Soleimani’s viciousness will add to Russia’s influence in Syria, and it has to move quickly in several areas. It will ultimately lead to Iranian losses and Russian gains that cannot be appreciated now, but Russia will inevitably try to expand its gains as much as possible. Today, Hizbollah withdrew its forces from some areas in Zabadani, and pro-Russian forces took over.
Neither the Iranian administration nor Qaani and his aides are oblivious to Russia’s aspirations to reduce their influence. They know they must increase their support for the local and non-local militias that they finance. In order for them to achieve this as quickly as possible, Lebanese Hezbollah’s influence on other militia should increase to rectify the central decision vacuum.
Fifth: Iran’s focus on maintaining its influence in the areas under the Assad regime’s control will give comfort to the American spheres of influence, which will reduce the risk of fighting with Iranian militias in eastern Syria for now. If clashes take place, it will not be that Iran wants to expand its presence as much as it will be part of revenge propaganda for Qassem Soleimani. Consequently, the project of military resistance that the Iranian wing in the Assad regime is trying to activate against the American forces in the northeast will not be completed in the planned way in the short term.
Sixth: Turkey is the least affected by Soleimani’s absence in Syria, as opposed to its impact on its interests in Iraq and near-open intelligence cooperation in its struggle against Kurdish forces and political projects.
Seventh: The changes of Iran’s influence in Syria will not be visible in the short run, but rather, the real changes will be in the long-term erosion of Iran’s influence in Syria for the benefit of the other parties. Qaani will need demonstrate more power and influence over media and local coverage to proactively cover the losses.
Eighth: The Iranian project has been benefiting from the American presence in Iraq and Syria, as the Americans were carrying the biggest burden in confronting ISIS. The Iranians were claiming that they were resisting ISIS while they were building militias to control Iraq and to counter the Americans when ready. The Iranian direct escalation toward the US in Iraq started in October 2019, which may reflect that Iranian felt confident and strong enough to be in Iraq alone without other partners.
The real danger from ISIS will arise from Iranian pressure on the Iraqi government to get the American forces out of Iraq.
Many things can happen in the coming days/weeks that may affect Syria:
1. The Iraqi government is yet to make a decision to withdraw US forces from Iraq. Does this mean withdrawal from Iraq as a whole or will the American forces remain in the Kurdistan Regional Government? If it is from the entire country, then the question will be what is the future of the American forces in Syria? From a legal and logistical point of view, will the Iraqi government allow the Americans to use airspace and crossings to transport forces to and from Syria?
2. Legally, if the Iraqi parliament and the Iraqi government pass the decision to withdraw the American forces from Iraq, will this need a whole year from the minute the decision is made to be implemented? If yes, then the Americans will have that period of time to maneuver and their leverage in Syria will be limited.
3. If Iran and its militias attack US bases in northeastern Syria directly or indirectly – will that change the US calculation and cause the Americans to leave Syria? Or will they fight back? How will the SDF forces behave? And the Russians? And Arab clans?
4. The border between Syria and Iraq is another area that must be watch since the Popular Mobilization Forces are in control of most of the border areas, not only the crossings.
5. If the United States leaves for any reason in the coming months, what forces will fill the void? Iran or Russia?
6. Iran will be more stubborn in its positions regarding the Constitutional Committee, Idlib, and the countryside of Aleppo.
7. If the US forces stay in KRG areas against Baghdad wishes, will that step separate the KRG from Iraq? And how will this affect with the Kurdish areas in Syria?
8. A new understanding could be reached between Iran and the international community in which a process of negotiation on all files and concerns starts again, freezing the situation for a while.
9. A new political crisis could occur in Iraq between pro-Iranian parties and both the Kurds and the Sunni, who see the American are the only guarantors to protect them physically as well as their interests in the state. This may delay any decision to have a new prime minister and increase tension inside Iraq.
10. The difficult economic and social situation in Iran and the popular anti-regime movements in both Lebanon and Iraq will make Iranian decisions weaker than they claim and the size of the Iranian adventure much less than now hoped. The Iranian goal is survival of the regime. Any direct military confrontation with the US will weaken the regime without gaining any real benefits.
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Marching towards different wars
Both Iran and the United States are signaling escalation in the wake of the assassination of Quds force commander Qasem Soleimani. Tehran said it had identified 35 targets. President Trump responded with a tweet threat against 52:
Let this serve as a WARNING that if Iran strikes any Americans, or American assets, we have targeted 52 Iranian sites (representing the 52 American hostages taken by Iran many years ago), some at a very high level & important to Iran & the Iranian culture, and those targets, and Iran itself, WILL BE HIT VERY FAST AND VERY HARD. The USA wants no more threats!
Both have the capability, and perhaps the will. It all sounds strikingly symmetrical.
But there the parallel ends. The wars they are contemplating are different. Iran can hit 35 US targets, but only using proxy forces in other countries or cyber attacks. The US can hit 52 sites, but only with stand-off weapons like drones and cruise missiles, in addition to cyber attacks. That I suspect makes cyber attacks less likely: the Americans presumably have the greater capability in that domain, but they also have far more to lose if the Iranians prove even marginally competent. Will Tehran care much if its citizens don’t have internet access?
Neither the US nor Iran wants a traditional ground war. The Iranians because they would lose, should the Americans deploy the kind of force they did in attacking Iraq in 2003. But that isn’t happening. The American electorate is not prepared to support that kind of effort, and the Administration has done nothing to try to mobilize it. President Trump can deploy a few thousand additional troops to the Middle East to protect American embassies and other facilities, but hundreds of thousands are not in the cards.
Trump is hoping his threats of escalation will bring Iran to the negotiating table, where he hopes to get a “better” agreement than President Obama’s nuclear deal. It’s the North Korea gambit: loud threats, some action, then hugs and kisses. If that fails, he will try a stand-off and cyber attack. If he has a game plan beyond that, he has kept it a good secret. He has so far been unwilling to loosen sanctions, which is what the Iranians want.
The Iranians are fighting on different battlefields. They may threaten proxy and cyber attacks, and even indulge in some, but their better bets are forcing the US troops out of Iraq (there is an advisory vote tomorrow on that in the Iraqi parliament) and acquiring all the material and technology they need to build nuclear weapons. Kim Jong-un got respect once he had nukes. Why shouldn’t the Supreme Leader expect the same?
Nothing about American intervention in the Middle East in the past two decades has brought much more than grief to the United States. Trillions of dollars and thousands of American deaths later, we have accomplished little. Iran has gained from the removal of arch-rival Saddam Hussein, protected its ally Bashar al Assad from insurgency, strengthened its position on Israel’s northern borders, and helped the Houthis in Yemen to harass Saudi Arabia.
President Trump had it right when he ran in 2016 on avoiding new Middle East wars and bringing American troops home. But that requires a serious strategy and commitment to diplomacy and alliances that he has been unwilling to make. Now he risks getting the Americans sent home and confronting an Iran that has nuclear capabilities. You tell me who is fighting on the right battlefield.
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