Tag: Syria
Who should the US back in Syria?
The rapid advance in the past week of Syrian opposition forces raises difficult questions for the United States. The leadership of those forces lies with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), a designated terrorist group. The US already cooperates with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which include Syrian Kurds aligned with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). It is also a designated terrorist group that operates inside Turkey. Turkey backs opposition forces in Syria generally termed the Syrian National Army (SNA), which control Afrin under the command of the Turkish Army.
Too many friends
The US cooperates with the SDF because it helps fight against the Islamic State (IS), still another designated terrorist group. HTS has also been effective against IS as well as Al Qaeda in the territory it has controlled for several years in northwestern Syria.
HTS’ leader, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, has been trying for years to soften his group’s jihadist rhetoric. He has sent messages in recent days to Syrian Christians, Kurds, and Alawites suggesting that they will not be mistreated in HTS-controlled territory. He has also indicated HTS will step back from governance, which it will delegate to an interim authority with broad representation. Its Syrian Salvation Government in Idlib province has administered the territory HTS controls there for several years.
Turkiye, a NATO ally, is unhappy that the Americans cooperate with the Kurdish-led SDF. Washington has tried to soften Ankara’s attitude toward the Syrian Kurds for years, to no avail. Turkiye wants the SDF pushed east of the Euphrates River and at least 30 kilometers from the Turkish border. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds are said to be on the move.
Israel, another de facto US ally, won’t be happy to see jihadists conquering Syria. The damage Israel has wreaked on President Assad’s Syrian Arab Army, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Iranian forces is one of the reasons HTS has been able to advance, but Netanyahu is not going to be greeting al-Julani with open arms. He, and perhaps Biden, had hopes that Assad would cut, or at least diminish, his ties to Iran.
So how should the US lean in this complicated situation? With the Turks against the SDF? That isn’t possible without abandoning the fight against IS. With HTS against Assad? That would risk helping a group the Israelis fear may have less benign intentions than its current behavior suggests. With Assad against HTS? That could wreck prospects for a transition in Syria that the US has backed for more than a decade. It would also preserve an ally of Russia and Iran who has brutalized his own population.
Creating new options
If the current options don’t look good, perhaps the right approach is to create new ones. America doesn’t have enough troops in Syria (maybe 1500, depending on how you count) to command the situation. But Washington could lean one way or another to open up better options. This could be better than the current policy paralysis, which has failed to take advantage of a situation that could spell defeat for Russia and Iran.
The Turkish-backed forces in Syria want to chase the Kurds from Manbij, on the western side of the Euphrates. That is a fight that could split the opposition to Assad and give him a new lease on power. The US should encourage the Kurds to withdraw east of the Euphrates and duck a fight they are not likely to win.
The Syrian Arab Army (Assad’s army) will want to withdraw its forces from central Syria to meet these threats. There are still IS remnants in central Syria. The US should press SDF, after withdrawal form Manbij, to fill this vacuum and continue its fight against IS.
HTS and its allies today took Hama, south of Aleppo. Both Homs and the Mediterranean provinces of Tartous and Latakia, where many Alawites live, are now at risk. Risings against Assad could facilitate HTS takeovers. Damascus could be next.
The US could communicate to HTS that Washington would be willing to see creation of an interim government not only in Aleppo but also at the national level. Washington could then work with that government, provided it behaves in a civilized way, rather than HTS directly, in planning for the future of Syria.
What does the US gain?
Success of the rebellion against Assad would be a serious defeat for Russia and Iran, which have backed Assad through more than 13 years of civil war. It would be foolish to imagine the result will be Western-style democracy. But even an outcome (without all the interim steps please!) like Iraq’s current non-autocratic mishmash would be better than the homicidal regime that has governed Syria since the rebellion started in 2011.
PS: And Assad comes down:
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Assad is imploding, but it’s not over yet
With Russia preoccupied in Ukraine and Iran weakened, Syria’s President Bashar al Assad is now under siege. The forces opposing him include both Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) and Turkish-supported rebel groups. Opposition forces in several Syrian provinces are joining the fray, as are the Syrian Democratic
Forces. HTS and the Turks have been governing in Syria’s northwest Idlib and Afrin provinces. The Syrian Democratic Forces are affiliated with Kurdish institutions that govern in much of the east.
How far, how fast?
The HTS offensive has moved fast and far. It controls most of Aleppo, Syria’s largest or second largest city depending on how you count. HTS has also evacuated Kurdish forces from Aleppo and advanced south to the outskirts of Hama. In the meanwhile, the Turkish-supported groups have chased Kurds from their strongholds in Aleppo province. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Kurdish led but partly Arab manned, have evicted Iranian and Shia militias from the east.
The question is whether rebel forces can sustain their momentum and move further south to Hama and Homs. So far, there has been little fighting. The Syrian Army is evaporating. It is poorly staffed, trained, and equipped after more than 13 years of fighting rebels. After hesitating at first, Russian air attacks are now battering rebel-held territory, including civilian targets. Lebanese Hezbollah, a major Iranian-supported factor in Syria, has let it be known it will not send more forces. Israel has battered Hezbollah badly in both Lebanon and Syria.
The quandaries
For the US and EU, these sudden developments pose a difficult issue. They don’t like Assad and have maintained vigorous sanctions against him. But they also don’t like HTS, which is a spinoff from Al Qaeda. And Washington won’t want the Turkish-supported forces beating up on the SDF. They have been helpful in fighting remnants of the Islamic State in eastern Syria.
Israel has its own issues. It did not mind the Assad devil it knew and won’t want a jihadist state in Syria. But if he falls, the Israelis will be happy to see Iran and its proxies disappear from their border. And they will want some cred with whoever takes over. In the past they have been supportive to at least some of the opposition to Assad.
The endgame
HTS is trying hard to project a more tolerant image than many jihadists. It has reached out to the Kurds:
HTS has sought to justify its more tolerant approach (translation from a Tweet by Aaron Zelin):
The jihad in Syria has the duty to repel the attacks of the Assad regime. It is part of sharia politics that the mujahidin in Syria should only fight those who fight them, and refrain from attacking those who refrain from attacking them, and strive to disperse the enemies and reduce them.
Assad will have well-equipped, loyal forces defending Damascus. But if HTS takes Hama and Homs, he won’t have much country left. Opposition forces are rising in the south even as the SDF clears regime forces and its allies from the east. The western, Mediterranean coast would still be his, but vulnerable.
The greatest threat to the opposition forces will arise if Turkiye unleashes its proxies against the Kurds. That would divide the opposition and provide an opportunity for Assad to complicate the fight. He might try to strike a deal with the Kurds. Assad is imploding, but it isn’t over yet.
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It’s time to wake up and smell the coffee
So many people issue have written so much in response to October 7 and its aftermath! It is difficult to imagine saying anything new or even interesting. But after much hesitation I will discuss one issue: the difficult choice Arab Americans face in voting this year.
It had seemed to me that Arab American voters would come around to my perspective, so there was no need. But polling suggests that isn’t happening in the numbers I’d like. So here are some unsolicited views on why Arab Americans should vote for Harris, not Trump.
The Trump record
The Trump record on Israel is unequivocal. He called himself “the best friend Israel ever had in the White House.” But that isn’t correct. He was a best friend to the Israeli right. He gave them a lot of what they asked for:
- withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal,
- approved annexation by Israel of Syrian territory in the Golan Heights,
- moved the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem,
- closed the Jerusalem consulate that functioned as an embassy to the Palestinian Authority (PA),
- cut funds for the PA,
- closed the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) office in Washington,
- rejected the claim that Israeli settlements in the West Bank are illegal,
- cut the humanitarian and other assistance to Palestinians administered by the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA),
- offered a take it or leave it pro-Israel peace plan,
- withdrew the US from the UN Human Rights Council because of its criticism of Israel, and
- sided with Israel against the International Criminal Court’s investigation of alleged Israeli war crimes in Gaza and the West Bank.
Trump would do next what he did before
It’s hard to say for sure what Trump would do next. He hasn’t said much. He knows it would cost him critical votes in Michigan, Wisconsin, and elsewhere. But his advisers are the same people who established the record above. That suggests Trump would give unconditional support to Prime Minister Netanyahu to do whatever he wanted to do. A vote for Trump will condemn innocent people in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iran.
Maybe all one really needs to know is that Trump is Netanyahu’s favored candidate. Israel’s Prime Minister has stiffed many of Biden’s efforts to moderate his offensive in Gaza and reach a ceasefire agreement. Netanyahu also rejected Biden’s pleas not to expand the war to Lebanon. That is not only because the Israeli Prime Minister wants the war to continue so he can stay in power. He also doesn’t want to give Biden any goodies before the election.
The Jewish vote
Trump is frustrated that his vigorous pro-Israel stance doesn’t get him more Jewish votes:
That’s at least in part because many Jewish Americans dislike what Netanyahu is doing as much as Arab Americans do. Many Jews were horrified at what happened October 7 but recognize that Israel is behaving unjustly. In Gaza, it has sought revenge rather than justice and ignored the civilian toll. It has also rejected reasonable proposals for a ceasefire and prisoner/hostage exchange. In the West Bank, Israel is allowing and even encouraging settler violence against Palestinians. In Lebanon, it is destroying civilian infrastructure and killing people who have nothing to do with Hezbollah.
Most Jewish Americans want what most Israelis want. That is a ceasefire in Gaza and an exchange of prisoners and hostages, as well as a Palestinian state. Sixty-eight percent of Jews voted in 2020 for Biden. I would guess more will vote for Harris this November.
Jews and Arabs should be voting together
Jews will vote for Harris agreeing more with Arabs right now than at many times in the past. Arab American supporters of Hamas and Hezbollah are few and far between. Many understand that Hamas’ brutality on October 7 gave Israel motive and opportunity to brutalize Gaza. Hezbollah has participated both in a corrupt Lebanese political system and a war against civilians in Syria. Its rocket attacks on Israel likewise gave Israel motive and opportunity. But Arab Americans, like American Jews, want the wars to stop.
What troubles Arab Americans most is that Biden has not compelled Netanyahu to agree to a Gaza ceasefire. It troubles me as well. But I am convinced that Harris will have a far better chance of succeeding than Biden. Netanyahu will know that he faces at least four more years of her. If Trump is elected, it will mean four more years of a license to kill.
It’s time we all wake up and smell the coffee. Some have already done so. Emgage Action has endorsed Harris in a thoughtful and comprehensive statement. Harris has not promised the squeeze on Israel’s military supplies many would like. But she is clearly more sympathetic to Palestinian needs than Trump. Not voting, voting for a third party candidate, or voting for Trump, would be a serious mistake. Jews and Arabs who want peace in the Middle East should vote for Harris.
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It’s about Iran as well as the Palestinians
Israel is now conducting a different war in Lebanon than the one it has conducted in Gaza. As Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib (@afalkhatib) has noted, “Gaza is a war of revenge, not precision.” So far, the war in Lebanon has been far more precise and targeted, though of course it has also killed hundreds of innocent civilians.
The “precision” war
This is likely to continue. The Israelis know most Sunnis, Christians, and Druze in Lebanon do not trust Shia Hezbollah. There is no point in hitting them. Support for President Assad’s war against the (mainly Sunni) Syrian opposition and involvement in Lebanon’s corrupt sectarian politics have blotted Hezbollah’s copybook. Leveling communities that don’t like Hezbollah would make no sense.
Hezbollah opposes the existence of Israel, but it has done little for the approximately 200,000 Palestinians who live in Lebanon. The Israelis are letting it be known that they are contemplating a ground invasion, but that is likely to be unrewarding. The Israel Defense Force will prefer to continue to destroy Hezbollah large rocket and missile inventory from the air. Any ground incursion is likely to be limited to the south.
The Arab openness
The Jordanian Foreign Minister yesterday made the Arab and Muslim position clear:
This is not new for the Jordanians, who protect Israel’s security every day, in return for Israeli help with internal security. But “all of us are willing to right now guarantee the security of Israel” is a bold formula, even with the traditional conditions that follow. He was apparently speaking after a meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, whose 57 members include the non-Arab Muslim states.
There is more Muslim and Arab acceptance today of Israel’s existence than at any other time since 1948. But Israel isn’t paying any attention. Why not?
Two reasons
The first reason is the one Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi cites. Netanyahu wants to prevent the formation of a Palestinian state. He has devoted the last 30 years to that cause. He is not going to give it up now.
Just as important: for him, the fight with Hamas and Hezbollah is about Iran, not only Palestine. The IDF is well on its way to destroying Tehran’s best deterrent, which was Lebanese Hezbollah’s stock of rockets and missiles. Tehran’s Syrian deterrent is already in tatters. Hamas isn’t destroyed but will need time to recover. So Netanyahu is clearing the way for an Israeli attack on Iran, focused on its nuclear facilities. I find it hard to understand how Iran would use a nuclear weapon against a place as small as Israel without killing a lot of Muslims. But Israeli prime ministers have been willing to do some frightening things to prevent neighbors from getting nukes.
The consequences
With its deterrent gone and at risk of losing its nuclear assets, Tehran will likely amp up its nuclear program. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps will no doubt see production of nuclear weapons as a necessary deterrent against an Israeli attack. An Iranian sprint for nuclear weapons will ignite Turkiye and Saudi Arabia rivalry. That would make four nuclear or near nuclear powers in the Middle East, with many complicated relations among them. It is hard to see how that will serve Israeli or American interests.
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The wider war has arrived, when will peace?
Iran yesterday retaliated against Israel for its bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus, which killed high ranking officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The barrage of hundreds of drones and missiles was ineffective, due to Israeli, American, British, and Jordanian air defenses. The Iranians made no secret of what they intended to do and presumably are hoping it will not trigger another round.
Multiple vectors
But it is still reasonable to conclude that the wider Middle East war many have feared has already begun. Israel continues its attack on Gaza. Lebanese Hizbollah and Israel are exchanging shots across the border. Israel is frequently targeting Iranian assets in Syria. Yemen’s Houthis are targeting shipping and warships in the Red Sea. Iraq’s Iranian-sponsored “Popular Mobilization Forces” have been targeting American military bases. Israeli settlers have been chasing Palestinians from their homes on the West Bank.
Of course the pace and lethality of this wider war could heighten. So far, its most deadly axis by far has been Israel/Hamas. Hamas has killed about 1500 Israelis and the Israelis have killed tens of thousands of Palestinians, in retaliation for the mass murder, kidnapping, and mayhem of October 7. Elsewhere the wider war is more than symbolic, but still far less fatal.
Worsening prospects
Once such things start, the natural tendency is towards escalation. Certainly things have gotten worse in the past six months. They are likely to get worse still. The murder of an Israeli teenager on the West Bank last week sparked heightened settler violence against Palestinians there. Hizbollah could do a lot more damage if it unleashes its missiles. So could the Israelis if they decide to push into southern Lebanon. Iran still has lots of drones and missiles it could use in a second attack.
The next round will be Israel’s choice. It could choose to write off yesterday’s attack as ineffective and unworthy of response. Or it could decide to reassert deterrence with a direct attack on Iran or on Iranian assets in the region. I suspect the decision will be based primarily on Prime Minister Netanyahu’s domestic political calculations. He faces growing demands for his resignation. Any pause in the fighting could provide the time to bring him down. He is still hoping for enough of a victory in Gaza, Lebanon, or Iran to enable him to remain in power.
That seems unlikely in Gaza. Israel has done significant harm to Hamas there but is still far from the total defeat Netanyahu has set as its war goal. Israel has been hitting Hizbollah in Lebanon without much reaction. That could be a likelier prospect. He may think a devastating blow against Iran would enable him to avoid the inevitable for a while longer. Why anyone in his war cabinet would go along with that is unclear to me, but so far they have generally supported his wartime decisions.
Can diplomacy work?
The still wider and more deadly war in prospect is not in the US interest. Nor do the Europeans want it. Karim Sadjadpour on MSNBC last night pointed out that the Chinese would likewise prefer stability in the Middle East to lower and steady oil prices. The Russians by contrast benefit from de-stabilization and the consequent distraction from the Ukraine war as well as the bump up in oil prices. But even acting together it is unclear that the Americans, Europeans, and Chinese could exert sufficient influence on Israel or Iran to de-escalate.
Both countries have leaders whose political mandates won’t last much longer. Iran’s Supreme Leader is almost 85 years old and ill. Netanyahu is suffering a catastrophic decline in popularity as well as serious corruption charges. Both are claiming not to want to escalate. But neither sees an enticing option other than escalation. Both want victory over the other as a political legacy. The wider war has arrived, but until there is decisively new leadership in both Tehran and Jerusalem peace is unlikely.
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Stevenson’s army, January 29
– WSJ says the drone attack at Tower 22 succeeded because it was confused with a returning US drone.
– NYT reports on possible retaliatory options.
– Politico sees GOP split.
– Eliot Cohen says go to war with Iran. [FYI, I strongly disagree]
Best list I’ve seen is from MEI’s Lister, as in the ever-valuable D Brief:
What are some options for a U.S. response that are not inside Iran? One target might include the “general cargo” (and likely surveillance) ship Behshad, which has been hanging around the Red Sea or Gulf of Aden during virtually every Houthi naval attack off the Yemeni coast.
MEI’s Lister had four suggestions:
- The “Glasshouse” at the airport in Damascus;
- The Imam Ali Base in eastern Syria, which features “hardened missile tunnels,” according to Lister;
- The Dimas Airbase, which is a “major drone facility” west of Damascus;
- And the Mayadin special forces training camp in eastern Syria.
– Keep an eye on Ecuador — will be part of week 4 exercise. FT today.
– CFR’s Steve Biddle analyzes Russia’s defensive strategy
—
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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