Tag: Syria
Defeated, yet still a threat
June 5 the Middle East Institute hosted Ambassador James Jeffery, Special Envoy for the Coalition to Defeat ISIS and Special Representative for Syria Engagement, Edmund Fitton-Brown, coordinator for the United Nations Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team on ISIS, Al-Qaeda & Taliban, and Jessica Lambert-Gray, First Secretary for Counter-Terrorism and Extremism at the British Embassy for a conversation on countering terrorism in the Middle East. Charles Lister, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, moderated the panel.
Jeffery qualified the declaration of the Islamic State (ISIS)’s defeat. Although it should be lauded and the US-led coalition of over 80 countries praised for their efforts, the United States and other international forces ought to remain wary of ISIS affiliates and pockets of resistance in Syria and Iraq. The US will need to continue to arm and train Iraqi soldiers to fight ISIS resistance. The US will also continue to support the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), despite the recent withdrawal of close to 95% of US ground support in Syria. A small force of American troops and strategic personnel will remain to stabilize and secure the SDF-controlled areas along the Euphrates.
Jeffery touched on how broader political issues in the Middle East catalyzed the formation of ISIS. He pointed specifically to how the Assad regime, backed by Iran, lashed out against peaceful protesters in Syria in 2011, fomenting the unrest needed to strengthen ISIS.
Lambert-Gray echoed Jeffery’s statements, positing that while the caliphate is gone, the threat is not. Her analysis portends the rise of “Daesh (ISIS) 2.0” and “Al-Qaeda 3.0” if international forces do not maintain pressure on these groups in Iraq and Syria. She fears that both groups may be able to expand, evolve, and rise again.
Lambert-Gray notes that ISIS’s most concerning weapon is its ability to inspire extremism and terrorist attacks globally. The production of online propaganda has become key to the survival of ISIS during its current “hibernation.” Regarding the Al-Qaeda, Lambert-Gray argues that the threat had never actually subsided. Its Iran-based leadership is becoming increasingly powerful, but she declined to provide any further details, stating that her team is still researching the issue.
In an effort to reduce risks, the UK has banned travel to Syria and provides no diplomatic support to citizens who elect to travel without authorization. The UK is also trying to diminish the online presence of ISIS. Countering Daesh can only be achieved with strategic patience and by an unrelenting drain of their resources.
Fitton-Brown complemented Lambert-Gray’s comments, noting that the “Islamic State’s covert network is forming now in Syria as it did in Iraq in 2017.” He also fears that ISIS will be able to further spread its network through the ongoing refugee crisis at the border of Turkey. In Iraq the government is having trouble containing and trying detained IS fighters. With the prospect of extremism re-emerging in the Levant and possibly spreading into Turkey, Fitton-Brown identifies building inclusive governments for Sunni citizens as the key challenge for Iraq and Syria. Detaining, trying, and eventually releasing foreign ISIS fighters in Iraq and the possibility for further radicalization present additional challenges.
The key message from the panel is that extremism in the Levant still poses a serious threat , with the potential to generate unrest globally. Mitigation of extremist activity has seen modest success, but continued pressure is essential to ensure that groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda do not recover. Among the most dangerous and far-reaching tools that extremist groups can employ are online propaganda and recruiting campaigns.
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Peace Picks June 10- June 15
1. India’s Election results: Impacts on the Economy and Economic Relations with Washington|June 10th, 2019|2:30pm-4:30pm|Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington, DC 20004|Register Here
On May 23, India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was catapulted back into power with a landslide victory in national elections. Two of the biggest immediate challenges in its second term will be economic: Tackling rising unemployment, and pursuing an economic reform plan that struggled during the BJP’s previous term. The new Indian government will also confront considerable challenges in its trade relations with Washington, a key partner. What is the election result’s impact for India’s economy? What might it mean for the U.S.-India economic relationship, which has lagged behind the fast-growing defense partnership? What is the potential for bilateral cooperation in the high-tech and innovation sectors? More broadly, how significant are the strains on the commercial side, and to what extent do they affect U.S.-India strategic partnership? Do U.S.-China trade tensions have implications for India and U.S.-India relations? This event will address these questions and more.
Moderator:
Michael Kugelman, Deputy Director and Senior Associate for South Asia at the Wilson Center
Speakers:
Suman Bery, Public Policy Fellow at the Wilson Center
Richard M. Rossow, Wadhwani Chair, U.S.-India Policy Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Seema Sirohi, Senior Journalist and Columnist, The Economic Times (India)
Jeremy Spaulding, Founder and President, JMS Innovation & Strategy, and Senior Advisor and Program Architect, Alliance for US International Business
2. The Deal of the Century: What About Palestinian Citizens of Israel?|June 11th, 2019|10:00am-11:00am|Foundation for Middle East Peace, 1319 18th Street NW Washington, DC|Register Here
In addition to examining the ramifications of recent political and legislative developments in Israel and the so-called “Deal of the Century,” panelists will discuss the central role of the Palestinian Arab minority in promoting the conditions necessary for a sustainable peace and how the international community can support it in that role.
Moderator:
Lara Friedman, President of the Foundation for Middle East Peace (FMEP)
Panelists:
Jafar Farah, Founder and Director of the Mossawa Center, the Advocacy Center for Arab Citizens in Israel
Shibley Telhami, Sadat Professor for Peace and Development, Director of the University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.
Maya Berry, Executive Director of the Arab American Institute (AAI).
Jeremy Ben-Ami, President of J Street, bringing to the organization deep experience in American politics, a strong belief in the power of diplomacy and a passionate commitment to the state of Israel.
3. Strategic Interest and Leadership in the United Nations|June 13th, 2019|9:30am-11:00am|CSIS Headquarters, 1616 Rhode Island Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036|Register Here
Although there are existing criticisms surrounding the United Nations, a functioning United Nations remains in the U.S. interest. One of the most critical roles the United Nations plays is addressing global problems and burden sharing the costs of security, development, and other public goods. CSIS would like to use this opportunity to identify areas of bipartisan agreement over the U.S. role in the United Nations. Please join us for a public armchair discussion with Governor Bill Richardson and Catherine Bertini which will reflect on the progress made at the United Nations since its formation and will examine how the United States can partner with the United Nations for its economic and national security interests.
Speakers:
Catherine Bertini, Former Executive Director, United Nations World Food Programme
Bill Richardson, Former Governor of New Mexico and Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
4. The Future of Taiwan-US Relations | June 12th, 2019 | 10am-12:45am | The Heritage Foundation, Lehrman Auditorium 214 Massachusetts Ave NE Washington, DC 20002 | Register Here
In this, the 40th year of the Taiwan Relations Act, it bears evaluating the state of the Taiwan-US relationship. There are many positive signs, arms sales, significant unofficial diplomatic contact, and a peak in Congressional activity. There are also signs of reserve on the part of the US administration, including uncertainty over the sale of F-16 fighter jets that have been under consideration for more than 10 years, a failure to pick up on the idea of a US-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement, and a low key opening of the new American Institute in Taiwan. On the other side of the relationship, Taipei is election season, with a range of possible outcomes. So where are US-Taiwan relations today and where are they headed in the short to medium term. Please join us for an assessment, led by Deputy Foreign Minister Szu-chien Hsu and a discussion with leading experts on the relationship from both sides of the relationship.
Panel 1: Economic Statecraft and Opportunity
Panelists:
Moderator: Walter Lohman, Director, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation
Szu-chien Hsu, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan)
Riley Walters, Policy Analyst, Asia Economy and Technology, The Heritage Foundation
Roy Chun Lee, Associate Research Fellow and Deputy Director of the Taiwan WTO and RTA Center, Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research
Panel 2: The Defense of Taiwan, Peace and Security
Moderator: Walter Lohman, Director, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation
Panelists:
I-Chung Lai, President of the Prospect Foundation
Scott Harold, Associate Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy
5. What is happening in Idlib?|June 13th, 2019|11:00am-12:00pm|Turkish Heritage Organization|Register Here
Please join THO as we host a teleconference on the current situation in Idlib. More details will be announced soon.
Speakers:
Ammar Al Selmo, White Helmets Volunteer
Mariam Jalabi, Representative to the UN for the Syrian National Coalition
6. The Role of Open Data in Strengthening Nigerian Democracy|June 11th , 2019|2:00pm-3:30pm|National Endowment for Democracy, 1025 F Street, N.W., Suite 800, Washington, D.C. 20004|Register Here
Transparent, accessible, and credible data has emerged as a key tool for safeguarding the integrity of Nigeria’s democracy against conflict, corruption, and abuses of power. Data empowers civil society, journalists, and citizens to hold power-holders accountable and to expose and address corruption. Data equips government to make policy by providing foundational information about the Nigerian population and its needs. Data improves Nigeria’s information space, countering disinformation and enhancing the quality of reporting. Yet, data has not been used to its full potential in Nigeria. Though the government is increasingly releasing data to the public, it is often inaccessible and difficult to understand. Further, lack of capacity and political will has hindered robust data collection on critical issues. Join us in discussion with our esteemed panelists.
Speakers:
Joshua Olufemi, Current head of knowledge and innovation at Premium Times and Program Director at the Premium Times Centre for Investigative Journalism (PTCIJ) in Abuja
Christopher O’Connor, senior program officer for West Africa at the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a private, nonprofit foundation dedicated to the growth and strengthening of democratic institutions around the world
7. Peering Beyond the DMZ: Understanding North Korea behind the Headlines|June 11th , 2019|12:00pm-1:30pm|Hayek Auditorium, Cato Institute|Register Here
Negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program are at an impasse, and tensions are rising. And while neither side appears to want a war, the path to a diplomatic solution remains unclear. What is obvious, however, is that most U.S. policymakers have little understanding of what the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is or how it operates, a fact that limits America’s ability to peacefully resolve the crisis. Join us as our panelists offer their insights into the “Hermit Kingdom”
Moderator:
Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute
Panelists:
Heidi Linton, Executive Director, Christian Friends of Korea
Randall Spandoni, North Korea Program Director and Senior Regional Advisor for East Asia, World Vision
Daniel Jasper, Public Education and Advocacy Coordinator for Asia, American Friends Service Committee
Moderator: Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute
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What next for the US in Syria
I spoke today at SETA with Charles Lister, Bassam Barabandi, Geoffrey Aronson, and Kadir Ustun on Syria. Here are the talking notes I prepared. I started at number 13 and didn’t use them all. The video of the event is below:
- I find it difficult to know what to say about Syria.
- I could of course just repeat what many others have rightly said: the war is not over, Assad has not won because the country is in ruins and he lacks the means to fix it, it is all tragic and more tragedy impends because the underlying drivers of conflict have not been resolved.
- I could even go further and say that President Trump’s decision to withdraw was foolish, the US must stay in Syria, because otherwise we will have no say in its future, and that those who are trying to at least partially reverse that decision are correct.
- But I really don’t believe much of that: the policy implications for the US merit deeper examination.
- Assad has defeated any chance for a transition to democracy in Damascus: who in Syria would trust others to govern them today? Assad is demographically engineering the part of the country he controls to ensure regime security and has for most practical purposes won.
- He will keep most of the refugees out of regime-controlled Syria because he knows full well he cannot allow them back. He lacks the resources for reconstruction and fears they will threaten his hold on power.
- The Americans are not going to have much say over what happens in Syria, partly because they don’t want to. Neither President Obama nor President Trump thinks Syria is worth a candle.
- They cared about ISIS and Iran, not Syria.
- It is the Astana three that will determine Syria’s fate.
- Iran is there to stay because they have to. They think propping up Assad responds to threats from Israel and from Sunni extremists. Only regular bombing will limit Iranian power projection into the Levant. The Americans should prefer that the Israelis do it.
- The Russians are there to stay because they want to. Syria has given them not only an important naval base and now an air base, but also a toehold in Middle East geopolitics. At the very least, they can now cause trouble for the Americans in most of the region.
- The Turks are there to stay because they want to chase the PKK/PYD away from their borders and enable at least some of the refugees they host to return to Syria.
- The Syria Study Group in its interim report suggested that the Americans stay in northeastern Syria and do what is needed to enable civilians to stabilize it.
- But before a decision like that can be made, the Americans need to ask themselves what it would take. The Study Group put the cart before the horse.
- The six American civilians working there on contracting for rubble removal and a few other basic necessities like demining, water and electricity before being withdrawn by the Trump Administration were nowhere near what is required for a serious stabilization operation.
- That’s what you need if you ISIS is to be prevented from returning: governance and justice decent enough to be preferable to the caliphate.
- Experience, as Frances Z. Brown suggested in Monkey Cage last week, demonstrates that much more will be needed.
- How much more?
- Jim Dobbins is the best guide I know on this subject. For a “heavy peace enforcement” operation in a territory with, let us assume, 2.5 million people, which is my guess at how many are in northeastern Syria (and at least that many in Idlib), Jim suggests a force of more then 35,000 internationals and 13,000 locals costing almost 8 billion dollars per year.
- On top of that, you’ll need dozens if not hundreds of civilians supervising and guiding the disposition of stabilization funding.
- Sure, you can skimp or trade off locals for internationals, but not without consequences. I’ve heard little about Raqqa that suggests reconstruction there is going well there.
- The Turkish reconstruction efforts in the Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch territories, which are said to be “comprehensive” in SETA’s recent description of them, suggest Dobbins’ numbers are not far off.
- The simple conclusion is that nowhere near the required resources are likely to be available for a serious American stabilization effort in northeastern Syria.
- What about the Turks? They want a buffer zone of 30 km or so inside Syria. Could they be relied upon to do the necessary stabilization and reconstruction all across their southern border?
- The answer is likely yes, but not without consequences.
- Upwards of 600,000 Kurds live in northeastern Syria. A significant percentage of them would likely flee, as many did from Afrin during and after Olive Branch, and the PKK fighters so vital to the effort against ISIS would be forced back into the arms of the Syrian regime, which would no doubt expect them to do what they were created to do: attack Turkey.
- US troops remaining in northeastern Syria while the Turks repress the Kurds they think support the PKK and the Syrian regime supports the same Kurds to attack Turkey is not my idea of a place I would want US troops to be.
- What about Idlib? It looks to me as if Assad is determined to retake it, with massive consequences: millions might seek to leave. There is no real ceasefire.
- Maybe these two dire scenarios lead to a standoff? The regime might hold off in Idlib fearing that Ankara would use the occasion to go into northeastern Syria? Maybe Ankara will hold off in northeastern Syria for fear Damascus will go after Idlib in a serious way?
- Might it be possible to deploy Arab peacekeepers to both areas? Now I’m in fantasyland.
- Whatever happens, I don’t think the US presence in Syria, even if doubled or quadrupled, is adequate to the task of enabling stabilization of the territory the SDF now controls, especially as ISIS reconstitutes and the Iranians decide to test our mettle.
- We can’t get out for fear of the consequences. And we don’t want to put enough effort in to make a real difference in repressing ISIS and repelling Iranian-backed proxies. That’s not a good place for America to be.
- My recommendation would be just this: go big and fix Syria or get out and let the chips fall where they may. But neither is likely to happen.
- That will reduce us to putting US troops at risk for the sake of a possible future role in some imagined UN-sponsored peace negotiation. I argued in favor of that 18 months ago. Today it is hard to justify.
- It is fitting that Hulu has revived Catch-22 at this fraught moment.
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The Yemeni quagmire
Hudson Institute held a panel discussion April 18 about the crisis in Yemen and its strategic threat to US interests and allies. The panel included Michael Doran, Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute, Fatima Abo Alasrar, Senior Analyst at Arabia Foundation, Bernard Haykel, Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University.
Haykel gave an overview about the Houthis (who call themselves Ansar Allah), a group belonging to a particular caste of Yemeni society who ruled the country for a thousand years. Before rising again in 2000, They were marginalized since the late 1960s and displaced in 1992 with the revolution. Hussein El Houthi, founder of the group is influenced by Iranian ideology and draws inspiration from Ayatollah Khomeini. El Houthi and the Supreme Leader share the view that the US and Israel are enemies of Yemen, the Arabs, and Islam. This ideological connection was cemented from the middle of 1990s between the Zaydis (a Shia sect which the Houthis belong to) and Lebanese Hezbollah, which provided military, ideological and media training.
Although a small group in Yemen, the Houthis are the most disciplined, best trained and most ideologically motivated group. They are unlikely to be defeated military. Haykel urges that other ways of dealing with Houthis be conceived. Yemen, a poor country, has never been integrated into the labor market of the Gulf. A broad strategy that encompasses development and socioeconomic elements is needed. But Riyadh is not going to be easily convinced to end the war because the Saudis see the Houthis as a Hezbollah-like force on their southern border.
Alasrar argues that neither a military solution nor a political one has worked so far in Yemen. Incentives for the Houthis to come to the table are insufficient. Even when they do negotiate, they are not sincere, due in large part to the ideological alignment with Hezbollah and Iran. The Houthis are likely to remain the de facto authority on the ground given the reluctance of the international community to solve this issue military or politically. The Houthi’s core belief is legitimacy through force. Yemen’s future is therefore bleak. ,
But Alasrar also argues that many in Yemen recognize that the state marginalized the Houthis. Younger Yemenis would like to see a political reconciliation process to help the Houthis become a legitimate political actor. The Houthis did not subscribe to the national reconciliation process conducted in the aftermath of Yemen’s “Arab Spring.” They seized power easily at a vulnerable time when the transitional government after had no army. Weapons and ballistic misled smuggled to Houthis created a means for Iran to attack Saudi Arabia.
Doran stated that the US as a super power has to create a stable regional order in the Middle East. The Khashoggi murder was immoral and ugly, but the campaign to shift US policy on Saudi Arabia is wrong. Its roots lie in President Obama’s outreach to Iran, which he hoped would become a partner in establishing regional stability, which meant down-grading US relations with Saudi Arabia and Israel. There are only two American allies who are contesting Iranians on the ground: Israelis in Syria and the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. The argument that Mohammed bin Salman is unacceptable morally does not mean US should end its support for the Yemen war, which would weaken Saudi Arabia vis-a-vis Iran and leave a Hizbollah-like force on the Red Sea threatening shipping and hitting Saudi Arabia with ballistic missiles. Ending support to Saudi Arabia is not going to improve the Yemen situation or get the Iranians out.
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Counterproductive
The loss of a large part of Notre Dame de Paris is profoundly sad. There is little I can say to amplify what so many others have already written. But sadder still is a President of the United States who can’t keep his mouth shut and always seems to choose the most destructive course of action. In this case, he suggested:
So horrible to watch the massive fire at Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris. Perhaps flying water tankers could be used to put it out. Must act quickly!
What neither he nor I knew was that dumping water on an ancient stone building can weaken its mortar and cause even more damage than the fire, perhaps even collapse of the whole structure.
This is Trump’s modus operandi. He is unable to acknowledge that he may not know better than others, which requires that he surround himself with yes-people. They encourage his self-aggrandizement, preventing any reevaluation or self-correction. So Trump cancels US assistance to Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, hoping that will somehow block their citizens from leaving. No one can say him nay. But that move is pretty much guaranteed to make conditions in those three countries worse and cause more asylum-seekers to arrive in the US, not fewer.
Ditto policy on Iran. Trump’s tight squeeze there without support from Europe, China, or Russia is strengthening Iran’s hardliners and making even extension of the Iran nuclear deal, which begins to “sunset” in just a few years, more difficult. National Security Adviser Bolton has even begun to lay the foundation for a military attack on Iran, by claiming it could be done under the existing Congressional Authorization to Use Military Force. One more Middle East war: precisely what the world needs right now. Iraq and Afghanistan haven’t yet cost enough.
Double ditto on North Korea, where the President has lurched from threatening (nuclear) war to befriending one of the world’s worst tyrants and meeting with his good friend (shall I say lover?) twice to no good effect. Now the Administration is contemplating a third meeting. What’s that saying, attributed to Einstein, about doing the same thing and expecting a different result?
Triple ditto on the Israel/Palestine conflict, where Trump is trying to squeeze the Palestinians by denying them humanitarian and law enforcement assistance. There aren’t enough desperate young Palestinians ready to take up the cudgels?
In none of these situations is it difficult to imagine the Trump Administration’s decisions making things go from bad to worse. And there are others:
- the decision in Syria to withdraw, then not to withdraw, but still to withdraw;
- the President’s comment that US troops should stay in Iraq to keep an eye on Iran, which makes it more difficult for Iraqi politicians to give the necessary approval;
- telling the world the US isn’t interested in Libya, which opened the door to a military push on Tripoli likely to re-ignite the civil war there, or possibly lead to re-imposition of a military dictatorship;
- threatening military action in Venezuela, where everyone understands there is no serious military option, thus reducing the US to a paper tiger;
- continuing to cozy up to President Putin despite Russian behavior in Ukraine and the Sea of Azov, not to mention interference in US politics on a daily basis;
- the threat to close the Mexican border, which would devastate the US and Mexican economies.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the President is incorrigible, mainly because he doesn’t abide correction. His response to criticism is to double down on failed policy and hope that will work, or turn 180 degrees and hope that will. It doesn’t. The more this shambolic Administration continues, the more the rest of the world, friends and enemies, will adjust by hedging that reduces American influence. Trump is destined to be remembered as not just ineffective but also counterproductive.
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Doing something
Mohammad al Abdallah puts it well in his acceptance speech for the Anne Frank Award to the Syrian Justice and Accountability Center (SJAC) from the Dutch government:
“We are not going to sit there, watch and do nothing.”
Caveat emptor: I sit on the Board of SJAC. I don’t think justice and accountability are coming soon, but it takes people of courage and generosity (notice how much time he spends encouraging support for institutions other than SJAC) to make sure they overcome some day.
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