Tag: Syria
Fubar squared
Donald Trump’s unanticipated (at this particular moment) but still not surprising (because we all knew he wanted to do it) announcement of quick withdrawal of US troops from Syria has consequences:
- The vacuum the Americans are opening in eastern Syria will be filled, with the Turks coming from the north and Syrian government forces (with Shia allies) from the south and west. The result could be still another major clash in Syria, unless Ankara and Damascus come to some sort of mutual accommodation.
- The Syrian Kurds and Arabs who have been fighting ISIS with US support under the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) rubric now have to run for shelter. Best bet is that the Arabs seek safe haven with the Turks, who will be willing to support them. The Kurds, who are affiliated with Kurdish rebels inside Turkey, will seek shelter with the Syrian regime.
- The Kurds have already indicated they may release several thousand ISIS prisoners they hold, thus ensuring problems for whoever gains control over the SDF territory or part of it. The Kurds will also presumably try to hold on to the oil production facilities in the east, to use as a bargaining chip with the regime.
- Moscow is gleeful, Ankara pleased, and Iran satisfied, even if President Trump is tweeting that they are unhappy because now they will have to fight ISIS without the Americans. Each for different reasons disliked the US role in Syria, and now their diplomatic leverage has been vastly improved. None were as concerned about ISIS as the US was.
- What remains of the Syrian opposition is dismayed and demoralized. Many had some hope the SDF territory would provide a viable and even attractive alternative to Assad’s Syria.
- American allies in Europe and elsewhere are horrified that a presidential tweet announced a major policy decision without any consultation or advance notice and in contradiction to what Washington has been telling them for months. This will be particularly galling to the French (pun intended) and make the British croak (also intended), since both have special forces in eastern Syria fighting alongside the Americans.
- Trump’s national security apparatus may be even more undone, as National Security Advisor Bolton, Secretary of State Pompeo, and Secretary of Defense Mattis had all advised against this move. Republican national security stalwarts in Congress are beside themselves.
- Jim Jeffrey, the very capable retired foreign service officer who had finally put in place a coherent American policy on Syria that depended for its negotiating leverage on keeping Syria’s northeast, will be feeling vertigo as his platform falls out from under him.
It is entirely possible that Trump will reverse or mitigate this disruptive decision, perhaps by continuing the American air campaign against ISIS, which contrary to the President’s tweeting has not been defeated completely. But that will only compound the confusion that friends and adversaries are feeling.
The situation is fubar squared.
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Another red line erased
President Trump has apparently decided to withdraw US troops within 30 days from the one-third of the country they control with the help of allied Kurdish-led but partly Arab-staffed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in anticipation of a Turkish attack on the Kurds. This contradicts official statements of US policy, which claimed the troops would remain until Iranian forces were withdrawn. Pentagon and other officials are said to still be arguing against the decision to erase this red line.
If implemented, this withdrawal will leave a vacuum in northeastern Syria that the Turks, Syrian government with its Iranian allies, and various extremist factions will try to fill, while the SDF tries to hold the territory. A great deal will depend on which of these forces the Americans favor. If they plan to leave via Turkey, that will favor Ankara. I’d bet on that, because the Patriot sale approved less than 24 hours ago suggests a broader rapprochement with the Turks. If they go out by air or through Iraq, they might be able to help the SDF retain control. It is said the SDF are expected to continue to target extremists for American attack.
The outcome of this free-for-all is difficult to predict, though more than likely it will boil down to a fight between Turkey and the Syrian regime. That might end in a pact, with the Turks withdrawing in exchange for commitment from Damascus to crack down on the SDF, especially its Kurdish leadership. Alternatively, the extremists–ISIS or Al Qaeda–may end up with a de facto safe haven, only nominally controlled by the regime or Turkey. The SDF is unlikely to be able to hold its dominance for long without on-the-ground US support, even though they include some ferocious fighters.
Trump’s decision, assuming it holds, would be consistent with both his and President Obama’s assessment that Syria is not worth fighting for. But unlike Obama, Trump claims a firmly anti-Iranian stance. It is hard to square withdrawal from Syria with wanting to back Iran out of its regional efforts at power projection, unless the withdrawal is prelude to all-out war against Iran. Americans are not ready for that, but a president in domestic difficulty, including manifold legal troubles, might try it as a grand distraction. Woe if that is what is happening.
American withdrawal will deprive Washington of any diplomatic leverage in the chimerical Geneva talks on a political solution in Syria. But even with a US presence they weren’t going anywhere. The withdrawal will also limit US capabilities against extremists, especially once the SDF succumbs to Turkish and/or Syrian attacks.
Is this the right decision or the wrong one? Let’s put it this way: if the US was not going to commit itself to a serious rebuilding effort in eastern Syria, one that would provide a model of well-functioning governance for the rest of Syria, staying had little point. That project would have been a difficult and expensive one. Trump, like all his predecessors since 1989, has no stomach for “nation-building.” But if you want to avoid the resurgence of extremists, statebuilding is what is needed. Now it will be up to the Russians, Iranians, and Turks. Let’s see how well they do.
One consequence is apparent: Trump has demonstrated repeatedly that he takes strong positions and backs down from them quickly. Witness his almost simultaneous backdown on the closure of the US government due to the budget fight. Trump bluffs and caves. Those who thought Obama made a big mistake not enforcing the “red line” on chemical weapons in Syria should be screaming foul. But many of them won’t, because they are predominantly Republican. Another red line is being erased.
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The Middle East wants reform
On Tuesday the Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted the presentation of the latest Middle East Public Opinion poll by James Zogby. Polling was conducted in 10 countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey and Iran. Zogby, Co-founder and President of the Arab American Institute and Director of Zogby Research Services, presented a summary of the data and key points before a panel discussion that featured Paul Salem, President of MEI, Kate Seelye, Vice President of MEI, Alex Vatanka, an MEI Senior Fellow, and Steven Cook, Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Throughout the Middle East citizens expressed discontent with the policies of their governments. Only in the UAE did a majority of respondents indicate that their country was on the right track. This discontent spanned the rough divide opened by the Arab spring. Egypt and Tunisia both followed the “democratic track” after successful revolutions in 2011, but a majority of respondents there believe their countries to be on the wrong track, joining Iraq and Palestine as states with majority disapproval. In Egypt the drop included the military, whose confidence levels have fallen 50 points since 2013. Government reform was ranked 3rd overall in the list of political priorities, topping extremism, foreign enemies, health care, and personal rights. This contradicts a common narrative, which justified the failure of the Arab Spring by claiming that the people desired only improved economic and security conditions and cared little for political reform as long as those conditions were met. Downplaying the desire for reform may have been simply wishful thinking by authoritarian leaders in the region. The survey conveyed a sense of foreign policy pragmatism. Regarding Syria there was growing support for a national unity government with participation of Bashar al Assad. Regarding Iran, while majorities supported the Trump administration’s move to pull out of the nuclear deal, in every country except Tunisia and Egypt the majority believe that peace between Iran and the Arab world is “very possible” or “somewhat possible.” Eight out of ten countries, including Iran, held the majority view that it is important to bring Iran into a regional security arrangement with the Arab countries to help bring peace to the region. One exception to this pragmatism is the the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A growing majority in 5 out of 7 Arab states were opposed to a partnership with Israel, even if Israel returns occupied Palestinian lands and fulfills the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative. Palestinians themselves remained overwhelmingly prepared for peace with Israel if the refugee issue is solved and Israel returns to its pre-1967 borders, but a growing number believe the Israelis would never agree to those terms. Given the growing struggle between Saudi Arabia and Turkey for regional influence, the polling reflected just how close the competition is. Turkey surpasses the Saudis for favorability in Tunisia, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan and Iraq, and tightened the gap in Egypt. A majority of Arab countries view Turkey as playing a more positive role than Saudi Arabia in both Iraq and Syria. Public opinion of America has fallen in the region. The EU, Russia and China all fared better than America. The panel believed that this drop in opinion was largely due to the perception of the American government as inept. The polling indicates a continued sense of unrest in the region. With little faith in their own institutions, the people of the Middle East remain largely uninspired by the jingoistic foreign policies of their governments and continue to seek an end to costly civil wars, in order to focus on domestic reforms and economic improvement.Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace Picks: December 3 – 9
1. Ending Gaza’s Perpetual Crisis | Monday, December 3, 2018 | 10:00 am – 12:00 pm | Brookings Institution | Falk Auditorium: 1775 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
An acute crisis has been unfolding in the Gaza Strip for over a decade. Its nearly 2 million residents live amid a man-made humanitarian disaster, with severe urban crowding, staggering unemployment, and a dire scarcity of basic services, including electricity, water, and sewage treatment. Three rounds of open warfare have devastated Gaza while placing Israelis under constant threat. Recent weeks have seen a sharp escalation in fighting, again illustrating the precarious balance of this situation. Moreover, the continued political and physical separation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank hinders Palestinian national development while making a two-state solution even more remote.
On December 3, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings and the Center for a New American Security will launch their new report, “Ending Gaza’s Perpetual Crisis: A New U.S. Approach.” The authors, informed by the deliberations of a high-level task force on the future of U.S. policy toward Gaza, argue that the United States should no longer accept the perpetuation of the current state of affairs in Gaza, given its moral, security, and political costs. They propose instead a route by which American policymakers can help bring an end to this continued state of crisis.
Speakers
Hady Amr
Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy
Natan Sachs
Director, Center for Middle East Policy
Ilan Goldberg
Senior Fellow and Director, Middle East Security Program at Center for a New American Security
Khaled Elgindy
Fellow, Foreign Policy & Center for Middle East Policy
Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen
Director, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Program at US Institute of Peace
Dennis Ross
William Davidson Distinguished Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
2. Belarus and Eastern Europe Security Challenges | Monday, December 3, 2018 | 1:30pm – 3:00 pm | Wilson Center | 1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, 6th Floor, Washington, DC 20004 | Register Here
After the Ukraine crisis, Belarus has improved its image as a contributor to regional security. Part of this shift stems from greater cooperation with the West. This, along with Minsk’s selective non-compliance with Eurasian integration, however, brings closer scrutiny and potential pressure from Moscow. This panel will host a delegation of Belarusian analysts, organized by Pact and USAID, to offer a fresh examination of Belarus’s relationship with the West and with Moscow
Speakers
Vasili Kukharchyk
Country Director, Pact Belarus
Chief of Party, USAID BRAMA Activity
Kateryna Bornukova
Academic Director, Belarus Economic Research and Outreach Center
Yauheni Preiherman
Director, Minks Dialogue
3. Asia Transnational Threats Forum | Tuesday, December 4, 2018 | 9:00 am – 12:30 pm | Brookings Institution | Falk Auditorium: 1775 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
How is the threat of terrorism defined in the East Asia Pacific? Who are the actors and what are their objectives? What are the technologies of terrorism and appropriate policy measures to combat the evolving threat? Moreover, how do individual states and the international community ensure that counterterrorism policies protect individual rights under the rule of law?
On December 4, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings will host distinguished U.S. and Asian counterterrorism experts to articulate the terrorist threat in East Asia and how it has evolved in the region. Panelists will also assess the mechanisms for protecting civil liberties and good governance under a counterterrorism strategy, as well as its implications for regional and international cooperation. This conference is part of the Asia Transnational Threats Forum, an interdisciplinary forum launched by the Brookings Korea Chair that harnesses the collective expertise of U.S. and foreign partners to tackle key strategic issues affecting all of Asia. The first event was on cybersecurity in Asia on June 2018.
Speakers
Jung H. Pak
SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy & Center for East Asia Policy Studies
Yeong Gi Mun
Director, National Counterterrorism Center of the Republic of Korea
Audrey Kurth Cronin
Professor of International Security, American University
Mayuko Hori
Chief Officer, Counterterrorism Cooperation Unit of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Samm Sacks
Cybersecurity Fellow and China Digital Economy Fellow, New America
Joshua Geltzer
Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University
Zachary Abuza
Professor of National Security Strategy, National War College
James Baker
Visiting Fellow, Governance Studies
Ji-Hyang Jang
Senior Fellow, Asian Institute for Policy Studies
Jeffrey Feltman
Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy
4. 9th Annual Conference on Turkey | Tuesday, December 4, 2018 | 9:00 am – 4:00 pm | Middle East Institute | FHI 360 Conference Center: 1825 Connecticut Ave NW, 8th Floor, Washington, District of Columbia 20009 | Register Here
The Middle East Institute (MEI) and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) are pleased to announce the 9th Annual Conference on Turkey. The conference will bring together international policy makers and experts to discuss the challenges Turkey faces domestically and its relations with the Middle East and the West.
Speakers
Knut Dethlefsen
Representative to the US and Canada, FES
Gonul Tol
Director, Center for Turkish Studies at Middle East Institute
Mustafa Akyol
Senior Fellow, Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity at the CATO Institute
Abdullah Akyuz
Former President, Turkish Industry and Business Association
Sinan Ciddi
Executive Director, Institute for Turkish Studies at Georgetown University
Menderes Cinar
Professor of Political Science, Baskent University
Max Hofman
Associate Director, National Security and International Policy at Center for American Progress
The Honorable Serpil Midyatli
Member, State Parliament of Germany
Berkin Safak Sener
International Consultant on Employment, UN Development Programme
Semuhi Sinanoglu
PhD Student at Department of Political Science, University of Toronto
Amb. (ret.) Gerald Feierstein
Senior Vice President, Middle East Institute
… and others.
5. Stabilizing Syria: Toward a Human Security Framework | Wednesday, December 5, 2018 | 9:00 am – 10:30 am | Atlantic Council | 1030 15th St. NW, 12th Floor, Washington, DC 20005 | Register Here
Over the past two years, the Atlantic Council’s Rebuilding Syria Initiative has worked to inform and advance transatlantic policy to foster a transition toward legitimate public order in Syria through economic reconstruction and stabilization. In this effort, we have pooled expertise from specialists to cover the many challenges of rebuilding Syria, including in political economy, development, infrastructure, civil society, law, and employment.
Lessons learned from these engagements are captured in the Initiative’s final report, “Rethinking Stabilization in Eastern Syria: Toward a Human Security Framework,” authored by Dr. Steven Heydemann.
The report finds that as the focus of the Syrian conflict narrows to the two remaining contested areas of the country, the presence of US forces on the ground gives the United States some leverage in shaping the closing trajectory of the conflict. In eastern Syria, the United States has an opportunity to use stabilization—a political endeavor to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict—to advance both short- and long-term interests.
Speakers
Dr. Steven Heydemann
Professor in Middle East Studies, Smith College
Dr. Tamara Cofman Wittes
Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution
Faysal Itani
Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council
6. Artificial Intelligence & Quantum Technology: Implication for US National Security | Wednesday, December 5, 2018 | 11:30 am – 1:30 pm | Hudson Institute |1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Suite 400, Washington, DC 20004| Register Here
Hudson Institute will host a timely discussion on the increasing risk that rapidly emerging advanced technologies pose to U.S national security. To explore these critical issues, Rep. Mike McCaul, Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, will deliver keynote remarks then engage in a moderated Q&A with Senior Fellow Arthur Herman, director of Hudson’s Quantum Alliance Initiative.
Competitor nations, such as Russia and China, have devoted significant resources in the areas of artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum information science, particularly quantum computing. A recent report from the bipartisan Commission on the National Defense Strategy for the United States warned that “U.S. superiority in key areas of innovation is decreasing or has disappeared [while] U.S. competitors are investing heavily in innovation.” Given their enormous promise for benefiting human kind, how should Washington respond to ensure U.S. military superiority while also promoting the peaceful use of AI and quantum technology?
A panel discussion will follow Rep. McCaul’s remarks with Dr. Herman, Aaron VanDevender from Founders Fund, Elsa Kania from the Center for New American Security, Andrew Kim from Google, and Hudson Senior Fellow Sorin Ducaru, a former senior NATO official for emerging security challenges.
Speakers
The Honorable Mike McCaul (R-TX)
Chair, Homeland Security Committee, House of Representatives
Aaron Van Devender
Chief Scientist, Founders Fund
Elsa Kania
Adjunct Fellow, Technology and National Security Program, Center for New American Strategy
Sorin Ducaru
Former Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, NATO
Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Arthur Herman
Senior Fellow and Director, Quantum Alliance Initiative, Hudson Institute
Andrew Kim
Senior Analyst, Public Policy and Government Relations, Google
7. Maritime Security Dialogue | Thursday, December 6, 2018 | 9:30 am – 10:30 am | Center for Strategic & International Studies | 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
Please join CSIS and the United States Naval Institute (USNI) for a Maritime Security Dialogue event featuring a conversation with the Honorable Richard V. Spencer, 76th Secretary of the Navy. He will be discussing the state of the Navy and Marine Corps and innovation in the naval domain.
Speakers
The Honorable Richard V. Spencer
76th Secretary of the Navy
Vice Admiral Peter Daly, USN (ret.)
Chief Executive Officer, US Naval Institute
John J. Hamre
CSIS President and CEO
8. What’s Next for Syria? | Friday, December 7, 2018 | 10:30 am – 12:00 pm | Middle East Institute |1319 18th Street NW, Washington, District of Columbia 20036 | Register Here
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a moderated conversation on Syria with Salman Shaikh, the founder and CEO of The Shaikh Group, and Ambassador Frederic C. Hof. Syria’s political process is at a standstill, with a constitutional commission still not formed and UN Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, soon to depart his role. With the conflict continuing to evolve and international attention shifting, new thinking is needed to tackle the Middle East’s most thorny issue: how to resolve the crisis in Syria.
Shaikh will discuss his lessons learned from many years of intensive Track II efforts on Syria and how they might be applied to designing more effective, alternative pathways forward; and Hof will expand on the implications and sustainability of the newly announced U.S. strategy in Syria and prospects for progress on the political track.
MEI’s senior fellow and director of the Countering Terrorism and Extremism program Charles Lister will moderate the conversation.
Speakers
Amb. Frederic C. Hof
Professor and Diplomatic in Residence, Bard College
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council
Salman Shaikh
Founder and CEO, The Shaikh Group
Charles Lister
Senior Fellow and Director, Countering Terrorism and Extremism Program, Middle East Institute
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Trump is right
Donald Trump said earlier this week about the Middle East:
Now, are we going to stay in that part of the world? One reason is Israel. Oil is becoming less and less of a reason because we’re producing more oil now than we’ve ever produced. So, you know, all of a sudden it gets to a point where you don’t have to stay there.
This is more sensible than 99% of what the man says, even if I think Israel can more than take care of itself. But the main reason for US military deployments in the Middle East is oil, which is far less important than it was in the 1970s and 1980s. That is what prompted President Carter’s 1980 pledge to defend the flow of oil from the Gulf:
Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.
President Carter’s Doctrine was a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which he feared presaged a thrust towards the Gulf. The Soviet Union is gone, Afghanistan is a mess, and the US economy is now far less dependent on oil imports and energy of all sorts than it was in 1980. The Gulf oil producers, especially Saudi Arabia, are far more dependent on oil exports, which they send predominantly to Asia, especially China, Japan, India, and South Korea.
The US nevertheless spends about 12% of the Pentagon budget on protecting the flow of oil from the Gulf and holds a Strategic Petroleum Reserve of well over 100 days of imports, thus protecting our principal economic competitors from the effects of an oil supply disruption while they free ride on our preparations. It is true of course that an oil supply disruption would also affect the US economy, since oil prices are set in a global market and US consumers would feel the price hike in imports of goods of all sorts. But changed circumstances should affect burden-sharing: we need to do less and other oil consumers need to do more.
There are other ways in which the Middle East merits lower priority for American foreign policy. Middle East terrorism now has little impact on Americans both at home, where right-wing attackers are far more common than Islamic ones, and abroad, where relatively few Americans have suffered harm, most of them either by sheer accident or by travel into known danger zones. Nuclear proliferation is still an issue, but mainly a self-inflicted one due to American withdrawal from the nuclear deal with Iran, which is far from the giant threat the Administration is portraying it as. Even if that were not true, American deployments in the Gulf are far too close to Iran for war-fighting purposes. We would need to move them farther away in order to use them in an attack.
The problem is that withdrawal from the Middle East is as problematic as intervention there. That is what President Obama demonstrated. His restraint in Libya, Syria, and Yemen left vacuums filled by jihadis, Iranians, and Gulfies. The results have been catastrophic for each of the states in question. Intervention by middling powers without multilateral authorization and on one side or the other in a civil war is known to have little chance of success and to prolong conflicts. Where the US re-committed its forces in Iraq, whose state was in far better shape than those in Libya, Syria, or Yemen, the results were far more salutary, even if not completely satisfactory.
Part of the problem for the US is lack of diplomatic capacity. American diplomacy has become far too dependent, both physically and strategically, on military presence. Military withdrawal requires a diplomatic posture that can be sustained without the troops. Many other countries by necessity have learned the trick of hitting above their military weight with diplomatic capacity. Witness an extreme example like Norway, or a less dramatic one like Germany. These are countries that lead with their diplomatic and economic clout, not with their troops, ships and planes.
There has been to my knowledge no serious discussion of the difficulties of withdrawal and how they can be met. Part of solution lies in beefing up the political, economic, and cultural capacities of American diplomacy. But withdrawal will remain perilous anyplace a legitimate, inclusive, well-functioning state does not exist. Statebuilding has gotten a really bad name from the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it remains a vital component of any effort to reduce US commitments abroad. About that, both Trump and Obama have been wrong.
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Midterms and foreign policy
I gave a talk this morning at the Italian International Affairs Institute (IAI) on “The 2018 American Midterm Elections: What Do They Signify for the US and for Europe?” Here are my notes for the occasion, which I pretty much used as written:
- It is a pleasure to be back at IAI, which has been kind enough to host my talks many times over the 25 years since I left Rome as Charge’ d’affaires ad interim of the American Embassy.
- Let me start with some basics: the elections are “midterm” because they fall in the middle of a Presidential mandate. They are multiple, that is elections rather than election, because more than one institution is contested: all of the House of Representatives, about one-third of the Senate, and many governorships, state legislatures, and local positions.
- They are also multiple in another sense: even elections for Federal offices in the US are run by the 50 states, not by the Federal government. While all the states elect members of the House from single-member districts with approximately the same population as well as two Senators (no matter what the population of the state), the rules governing who is eligible to vote, design of the ballot, polling procedures, opening times, counting, tabulating, and ultimately deciding the outcome vary quite a bit from state to state and even from county to county.
- Quite a few of our states have trouble getting it all done, especially when the margins are narrow. There are still a few seats undecided.
- Nevertheless, the general shape of the outcome is clear: Democrats have won control of the House of Representatives; Republicans have maintained control of the Senate, widening their margin by a couple of seats.
- What does this mean for the future, especially for American foreign policy and relations with Europe, including Italy?
- First thing to understand is that the election was not about foreign policy. The two biggest issues were health insurance for Democrats and immigration for Republicans. Trade, national security, nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, the Middle East, Iran, China, Russia and all the other issues IAI and I care about were virtually absent from the pre-electoral discourse.
- It was vigorous and led to a high turnout by American standards: about 50% of registered voters. That will sound very low to you, but it is not low in the US, where about 60% turn out for presidential elections and midterms generally draw about 40%.
- There are many reasons for this. Americans move frequently and die pretty much at the rate of everyone else. There is no national procedure for updating registration lists, and virtually no one unregisters when they move out of a community to another one. So some of the low turnout is a statistical artefact.
- The resulting anomalies have led to Republican claims that there is a great deal of fraudulent Democratic voting in US elections. There is no evidence for that. To the contrary, the evidence demonstrates concerted efforts by Republicans in many states to suppress voting by their opponents with ID requirements, closing polling places, and other tricks of the trade.
- The higher turnout this time around occurred among both Democrats and Republicans, but the Democrats have more to gain because their relatively young voter population normally turns out much less than the older Republican voter population.
- What looked like a modest shift the day after the election turned into a considerable Blue Wave as more results are finalized. The shifts from the last midterms in 2014 are notable:
under 30, +11D to +35D
women, +4 to +19
Latinos, +26 to +40
Asians, -1 to +54
college grads, -3 to +20
independents, -12 to +12
single, +13 to +24
not white evangelical, +12 to +34
- Rural areas voted heavily for Republicans. Suburbs, which have generally leaned Republican, turned bluer this time, mainly because of the votes of college-educated women.
- In short: Americans are divided, perhaps more than they have been since World War II.
- On one side, we have a modest, but bigger than normal for midterms, recovery of the Obama coalition, despite a House of Representatives gerrymandered in favor of Republicans and a Senate “map” that incidentally favored Republicans.
- Some high-profile progressives like Beto O’Rourke—a challenger for Ted Cruz’s Senate seat in Texas—and Andrew Gillum—the black Democrat who ran for governor of Florida—lost, but their showings were respectable enough to make them serious future candidates.
- On the other side, we’ve got a Trump-dominated Republican party, which will be more radical than in his first two years. Many of the relative moderates are not returning to Congress. The Republicans there will be whiter, more male, and more rural than before.
- The big winners in this election were those who want America divided and immobilized. That includes Presidents Putin and Xi. America will be consumed for most of the next two years with the 2020 presidential election. The Mueller investigation and oversight hearings will increase the noise and divisiveness, perhaps even to the point of impeachment.
- The Democrats, who are mostly moderates, have limited powers to influence foreign policy. Their main lever of power will be oversight: the power to convene House hearings and subpoena witnesses. The Senate will continue to rubber stamp Trump’s nomination of judges and ambassadors.
- That said there has been considerable agreement in the current Congress between Democrats and Republicans on maintaining the foreign affairs budget and toughening up against China, Russia, and North Korea. There are disagreements on the Iran nuclear deal, which Democrats favor, and on the defense budget, which Republicans traditionally favor.
- In the Middle East, we are likely to see a continued US effort in eastern Syria, some effort at rapprochement with Turkey, and Congressional pressure to stop the war in Yemen as well as sanction Saudi Arabia for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. The Administration will resist that pressure but may give in on Yemen, which would bring Washington into closer alignment with most Europeans.
- It remains to be seen whether the consensus in favor of funding defense, development and diplomacy that existed in Congress since 2016 will be maintained. The Administration itself has signaled an intention to cut defense. Many newly elected Republicans will want to cut development and diplomacy. Democrats will defend both, but compromises should be expected. There is nothing popular about the foreign affairs budget in the US, though most Americans do favor continuing commitments abroad.
- On NATO and the EU, I don’t think much will change. Trump has made it clear he thinks little of NATO and less of the EU. The Congress and the American people are more favorable to both and will try to insist on maintenance of the Alliance. Trump’s hostility to the EU will, however, find some resonance among protectionist Democrats and Republicans. The steel and aluminum tariffs seem destined to stay, at least for now.
- Macron and Merkel notwithstanding, there are of course many in Europe who are sympathetic to their own version of Trump’s nationalism: make Italy, Hungary, Poland, or Denmark great again by blocking immigration, protecting domestic industries, rallying anti-minority sentiment, and undermining the rule of law. Berlusconi after all was an Italian invention.
- I’m afraid the only thing that will sober some of Trump’s American supporters will be a major economic downturn, and even then they may prefer to blame it on someone other than the incumbent, most likely minorities, immigrants, Europeans, and terrorists.
- That said, I think we have passed the moment I would call “peak Trump.” Even without a recession, most Americans—3 million more of whom voted for Hillary in 2016 and haven’t approved of Trump since—are now fed up. Unlike 2016, that majority has spread into red suburbs and states and mobilized more effectively. Democrats won the popular vote for Congress by about 7%. That could be a landslide in a presidential election.
- Trump has a difficult road ahead. But that should be little comfort. If I had to guess, his fall might be at least as painful as his rise. He will resist accountability and transparency to the last.
- Europe has a tremendously important role to play during the next two years. Merkel and Macron have already done great work in maintaining the vision of a united and liberal Europe. So long as Germany and France remain on that line, I can hope the rest of Europe and the US will eventually find their way back from ethnic nationalism.
- But they and those of you who agree with that vision are going to have to do much more. Here are a few concrete suggestions:
• The NATO allies really do need to meet the 2% goal by 2024. Failing to keep on the tracks plays directly into Trump’s malicious hands. If they do so by joining together to form Macron’s European army, I have no objection.
• A negotiated resolution of the trade dispute is highly desirable. Even better would be returning to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which offered big economic benefits.
• The US and Europe need to hang together on Russia and China or hang separately as Ben Franklin said to his fellow revolutionaries. US gas supplies should help on the Russian front.
• On Iran, I see no hope of a US/EU accommodation so long as the US stays out of the nuclear deal. But I don’t really see how it can re-enter under this president. Some issues will have to wait for 2021, when discussing a follow-on deal will be needed anyway.
• On Syria, prospects are better. The US and Europe seem to be on the same wavelength in withholding reconstruction aid until there is a credible and irreversible political transition under way. That is the way to succeed, but pressures on Europe will be great.
• On Libya, the Americans are hoping Italy and France will work together to end the civil war and put the country back on a sustainable path.
- There are lots of other issues, but the overall strategy should be this: hang together where possible, help each other out, and hope to get to 2021 in good enough shape to return to the trajectory most of us would prefer: a Euro-Atlantic community whole and free, though wiser and better, from Vancouver to Vladivostok.
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