Tag: Syria
Trials and tribulations
President Trump’s former campaign manager and his former personal attorney/fixer yesterday became convicted felons. Paul Manafort’s conviction on eight charges confirmed his financial crimes. He was not acquitted on any charges, but the jury failed to come to a conclusion on ten. Michael Cohen pleaded guilty to financial crimes as well as campaign finance violations associated with paying hush money, at Donald Trump’s direction, to women with whom Trump had had affairs. Nothing like this level of corrupt behavior has come so close to a president in at least 100 years, if not since the founding of the republic.
What significance does any of this have, in particular for foreign policy?
Manafort’s conviction brings enormous pressure on him to cooperate with the Special Counsel in the Russia investigation. Manafort, who seems to me to be a Russian agent, presumably knows a great deal about Trump’s dealings with the Russians. To avoid his spilling the beans, Trump may pardon him, but Manafort would remain vulnerable to state prosecution. That is presumably the reason the President has hesitated so far, though he signaled clearly in his reaction to the verdict (Manafort is a “good man” he said) that he might resort to a pardon. If Manafort talks, many of the details of Trump’s relationship with Moscow are likely to become public, with dramatic impacts: Trump may be soft on Russia, but the Congress has been tough and insisted on increasingly draconian sanctions.
Cohen’s conviction makes it virtually certain that he will cooperate with the Special Counsel to get a lightened sentence. He presumably knows the gory details of Russian investments in Trump real estate, which are manifold and the likely cause of much of Trump’s affection for Putin, in addition to Putin’s help in getting him elected. Trump is terrified Putin will block Russian investments in Trump properties. The day of reckoning on that score is near.
So these convictions, while not directly connected to the Russia investigation, do have implications for its future. I doubt Special Counsel Mueller will act decisively before the end of the month, when a pre-electoral moratorium on major judicial moves begins. The question, which won’t be answered until November 6, is whether Americans will be able to read the handwriting on the wall. Trump’s solid 35% or so is likely to stick with him, but 65% is a lot of potential voters. The big question is whether they will go to vote in sufficient numbers to begin to correct the mistake of 2016.
Many tribulations lie ahead. If the Republicans lose control of the House of Representatives, it will have grounds for impeachment (indictment). The Republicans are likely however to continue their control of the Senate, where conviction is unlikely so long as they remain solid in their support of Trump. The process of impeachment and trial will take months, distracting the Administration from other important issues, including foreign policy.
If the Democrats do not gain control of the House or Senate, impeachment is not possible and they will continue in opposition while the Special Counsel pursues his investigation and decides whether to charge the President. That is unlikely as it contradicts Justice Department policy. Mueller will however file a report that could state boldly what laws the President has violated.
That will happen only if Trump doesn’t fire him or neuter the investigation by taking away its staff’s security clearances. Both are possible, but the political risks involved are significant. It would amount to a presidential guilty plea and would not stop state-level prosecutions that could detail presidential malfeasance and lead to prosecution after Trump leaves office.
So no, we are nowhere near the end of the Trump scandals and their consequences. We face at least two more years of painful revelations and judicial maneuvers, while the Russians, Iranians, Chinese, and others test our mettle in cyberspace, on the high seas, and on land in Syria, Ukraine, Turkey, and elsewhere. Our traditional allies in both Europe and Asia are all hedging their bets, because of Trump’s erratic behavior, his attack on NATO, and his cozying up to Kim Jong-un. And the lengthy Obama recovery is showing signs of aging, in part due to Trump’s tariffs, an inflationary budget, and a giant tax cut for the wealthy.
Neither the trials nor the tribulations are over.
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Burden sharing is good, but…
The State Department announced Friday that it was canceling $200 million in assistance for “stabilization” in parts of Syria the US and its allies control and welcomed a contribution from Saudi Arabia and other countries that would amount to $300 million. What could be wrong with that? It sounds like the Administration has succeeded in getting others to share the burden. That’s good.
The devil of course is in the details. First, the money seems to be limited, like the US money that was originally programmed, to “stabilization,” which in the current Administration’s lexicon means things like water, electricity, demining, and the like. Everything short of governance, which is shunned as the much-despised “nation building” the President doesn’t want to do. But there is no way of preventing ISIS, Al Qaeda, or some other extremist group from returning unless the territory is secured and governed.
The Defense Department is training the security forces. I’ve got serious doubts about that, since what is needed is not just counter-terrorism/insurgency, but rather policing, which has dramatically different requirements, including not only investigatory capabilities but also courts and prisons. But let’s assume the Pentagon has learned that and is somehow training a decent police force that will protect the population and not abuse it. If they arrest someone, where will he be tried? According to what procedures? And how will punishments be administered? If a civil case is brought, how will decisions be enforced?
There are other big issues: who will govern and how? Melissa Dalton of CSIS helpfully outlines the complexities of a serious stabilization effort, which would have to include security, greater citizen engagement, more inclusive governance, and a serious communications/outreach effort. There is not sign of any of these things in the Administration’s announcement. We can hope that mission creep will make them happen, but that is hardly a substitute for good planning.
The Kurds who constitute the heart of the Syrian Democratic Forces, the US allies in eastern Syria, are said to be in negotiations with the Assad regime to combine their forces: is the US really prepared to encourage the Saudis to provide hundreds of millions in eastern Syria if the forces that control it are in turn controlled by Damascus? Wouldn’t that be a contradiction of the announced policy of no aid beyond humanitarian assistance for areas under Assad’s control?
In addition, burden-sharing is not a simple matter, as Melissa also emphasizes. How will the money flow? To whom? To be effective, burden-sharing will require leadership and coordination within a coherent and over-arching strategic framework, as well as oversight to ensure that the impacts are positive. We don’t want to be funding warlords or Kurds attacking inside Turkey. There is no sign of any of this in Friday’s announcement, which mentions only a common list of projects. That is nowhere near what will be required to ensure synergy, effectiveness, and consistency with US policy goals.
Friday’s announcement included Jim Jeffrey’s appointment as the Secretary of State’s Representative for Syria Engagement. That’s good news, as he is eminently qualified from his previous positions as Ambassador to Albania, Turkey, and Iraq. His role is said to be focused on the UN-hosted Geneva talks aimed at ending the war with an irreversible political process. But leverage there will depend on how things are going in the part of eastern Syria that the US and its allies now control. What role will he play in the shared stabilization effort? How will US military and civilian presence be translated into US negotiating leverage? Will Jim have the kind of all-of-government authority required to have a decisive impact on the negotiations?
Yes, burden-sharing is good. But it is also complicated and difficult.
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Diplomacy for drawdown
Marc Lynch, after describing well the security dilemmas and state fragility that are driving Middle East conflicts, concludes:
US hegemony in the Middle East will never be restored because the region has fundamentally changed. Moving beyond the wars and political failures that followed the Arab uprisings will not be easy. The damage is too deep.
The question is: should Americans worry about that? Marc doesn’t answer that question, but Steven Metz does.
American interests in the Middle East are usually defined along these lines:
- Countering international terrorism
- Ensuring oil and gas can flow without hindrance to world markets
- Supporting friends and allies
- Preventing nuclear proliferation
Steven essentially says the threat of international terrorism is overblown, US energy vulnerability is vastly reduced (“Petroleum will not be weaponized”), and US friends and allies can (mostly) take of themselves. He doesn’t deal with the proliferation issue, but he really doesn’t have to, because he is talking mainly about military commitments. Military action has never been a good option for dealing with nuclear proliferation, since it would provide a very strong incentive for acquiring nuclear weapons.
Steven’s conclusion: the US should withdraw its military from the Middle East and rely instead on “off-shore balancing” to ensure that no rival hegemon is able to control the region and intervene only in the event that one threatens US interests. The savings could be gigantic: RAND estimated that in 2008 12-15% of the Pentagon budget was spent to securing oil from the Persian Gulf.
Washing our hands of the Middle East is an attractive proposition. Unfortunately it is one that President Obama tried, without a great deal of success. President Trump is tempted in the same direction. But withdrawal has left the many of the vacuums that Marc describes so well, generating security dilemmas and military responses that have left Syria, Yemen, and Libya in ruins and erstwhile American friends like Israel, Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates at odds and hedging.
It is difficult to see how the United States can withdraw from the Middle East without a focused diplomatic effort to ensure that the region can restore a modicum of stability,or at least remove some of the drivers of instability. Offshore balancing won’t work if there is no balance but only chaos. The Trump Administration is said to be preparing for a Summit to restore some coherence to GCC next month. That makes sense: there will be no serious effort to counter Iran’s behavior in the region so long as Qatar is feuding with the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
But the Administration also needs to end its own feuding with Turkey and restore some balance to its policy on Palestine to make it more palatable to Sunni Arab friends. And it needs to reconsider its position on the Iran deal, which threatens to seriously undermine relations with Europe.
So yes, I agree that we should draw down, if not completely out, from the the Middle East. But there is a lot of diplomatic homework required to make that possible. And a very real possibility that the Administration will focus instead on countering Iran, leading it to increase rather than decrease its military commitments in the region.
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Trump’s Turkey shoot
After weeks of silence and inaction on the issue of Syria, President Trump has finally done something that will affect the outcome of the Syrian civil war. The influence will not be positive.
Using his favorite policy platform – Twitter – Trump announced Friday that as the Turkish Lira “slides rapidly downward against our very strong Dollar,” the United States will increase tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminum. As the New York Times reports, his 50 percent tariff on steel will “effectively [price] Turkish steel out of the American market, which [accounts] for 13 percent of Turkey’s steel exports.”
The run on the Lira, which has been brewing for the past few weeks, is now fully in gear. The self-fulfilling prophecy of foreign-exchange traders selling the Lira before it further loses value, hence depreciating the currency, is in full force. Investors are instead rushing to short the Lira, amplifying the detrimental effect on its value. President Trump boasting about how “strong” the dollar is – which, seeing how uncompetitive American exports are as a result, is not a good thing – does not help.
What does this mean for the countries around Turkey? In the past twenty years, through their “zero-problems” foreign policy and aim for broader strategic influence in the Middle East, Turkey has been increasing its exports to Arab states. Turkish trade with the Middle East and the Gulf increased by 22.1 percent in 2017 alone. As the Lira continues to plummet and Erdoğan continues to shake confidence in the independence of Turkey’s Central Bank, Turkey’s economic strife will have repercussions across the region. It might even cause a domino effect by rattling investor confidence in other economically struggling countries in the region, such as Jordan.
The issue here is what Turkey’s economic troubles, and President Trump’s decision to pile on at the worst possible time, mean for the conflict in Syria. This is particularly salient in the Northern region of Idlib. After Russia and the Syrian government “liberated” the south of Syria of opposition fighters in June and July, Idlib is the last region in Syria with an active Arab military opposition to Assad – IS pockets of influence in the south and the east notwithstanding. During regime attacks on rebel strongholds in Homs in 2014-15, Aleppo in 2016, and Eastern Ghouta and Deraa in 2018, many opposition militias struck deals with the Syrian regime for safe passage to Idlib in exchange for their surrender. The same goes for a significant number of internally displaced persons, who fled regime-held areas and headed for Idlib in the hopes of protection from Assad or the opportunity to leave Syria for Turkey.
The result is that the Idlib region is currently home to more than 2.5 million people, up from 750,000 before the beginning of the war. Idlib is also home to a number of Turkey-sponsored political and military groups, as Turkey hopes to maintain Idlib as a zone of influence for the foreseeable future; it has already spent considerable sums of money in reconstruction efforts, in the hopes that it can return Syrian refugees currently in Turkey to Idlib – despite the fact that most of them are not from Idlib. As the last remaining rebel stronghold, Idlib is also the next military target for the Syrian government
Speculation abounds that the only thing stopping Assad from launching his offensive on Idlib is Russian calls for restraint, as well as a Turkish “red line” warning the Syrian government not to invade Idlib. This is where Turkey’s economic woes become important, particularly as they can be attributed to American actions.
Trump’s tweet will only increase animosity between the US and an economically desperate Turkey. As a result, Turkey is likely to accelerate its turn towards economic cooperation with Russia, with whom they signed a gas pipeline deal in July. Economic cooperation, however, comes with strings attached, and it is likely that Russia will use its greater economic leverage to defuse the chances of a Syrian-Turkish conflict. This would result in Turkish withdrawal from Idlib, and – as Middle East Institute scholar Charles Lister details – a military and humanitarian crisis on a scale unlike anything seen in the Syrian civil war so far should Assad attack the overcrowded region of Idlib.
There is much to criticize about Turkey’s role in Syria. They have sponsored salafist and jihadist groups, encouraged ethnic conflict between the Arabs and the Kurds in the north, and impeded American efforts to liberate eastern Syria from IS by attacking the Kurds in Efrin in January. Trump’s administration, however, is not attempting to influence Turkey’s behavior in Syria in a positive manner, or even to punish Turkey for their actions in Syria. Instead, Trump is kicking Turkey while it is down, meaning that Trump’s first active contribution to the conflict in Syria is somehow worse than America’s inaction in the past few months. As usual, it will be the Syrian population that suffers the most.
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Dialogue, restricted speech, or infiltration?
A former terrorist and the NYPD officer responsible for his arrest spoke at CSIS Monday about strategies for countering violent extremism in today’s world. The Unmaking of Jihadism: The Current Effort to Combat Violent Extremism featured:
- Jesse Morton: Leader of Parallel Networks, former leader and co-founder of Revolution Muslim
- Mitch Silber: Former Director of Intelligence Analysis for the New York City Police Department
- Seth G. Jones: Harold Brown Chair and Director of the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS (Moderator).
Morton and Silber worked on opposite sides of the extremism/CVE divide. Morton said that his traumatic upbringing spawned resentment towards his family and the working class town he grew up in, and that radical Salafi Islam became the outlet through which he expressed this acrimony. The Salafi movement also gave him a community. Morton co-founded Revolution Muslim with his friend Youssef Al-Khattab, a fellow convert to Islam. Abdullah Al-Faisal, a Jamaican cleric who encouraged the killing of Americans, Jews, Hindus, and Christians in his teaching, became Revolution Muslim’s spiritual leader.
Revolution Muslim pioneered the use of Web 2.0 platforms to radicalize individuals without forcing them to travel to terrorist hotbeds around the world. This tactic, which has become a popular recruiting tool for ISIS, involves using social media video lectures to teach large audiences to teach about the militant brand of Salafism. Interested individuals are then contacted by group leaders through end-to-end encrypted messaging services such as Telegram. Morton stressed that Revolution Muslim’s success in evading US law enforcement came through its recognition that the Salafi ideology itself was powerful enough to radicalize individuals without Revolution Muslim having to specifically endorse violent extremism. The group thus remained within its First Amendment rights even though 15-20 terrorist plotters around the world traced their roots back to Revolution Muslim.
Silber furthered Morton’s point, emphasizing that the reason why Revolution Muslim survived in the US for four years was Morton’s exquisite knowledge of First Amendment case law. Morton “frequently danced on the First Amendment line” in his public statements, preventing the authorities from arresting him. Further, Revolution Muslim moved away from the top-down hierarchical approach espoused by Al-Qaeda, allowing individuals around the world to plan and execute their own plots. According to Silber, these factors revolutionized recruiting for terrorist groups around the world. Even Al-Qaeda began publishing an English-language magazine in 2010 that included articles such as “How to make a bomb in the kitchen of your mom.” The Islamic State takes this approach even further. In addition to publishing an English version of Dabiq, ISIS fully embraced Revolution Muslim’s decentralized, web-based strategy, allowing its ideology to continue spreading on the internet even as its territorial caliphate in Iraq and Syria has weakened.
It should come as no surprise that ISIS is in the midst of a resurgence in Iraq, despite Prime Minister Al-Abadi’s declaration of victory over the caliphate last December. Morton stressed that the ideologies associated with extremism always outlive the groups that embody them in a particular time period. ISIS technological prowess also allows it to shift from leaderless resistance back to a command/cadre model at any time, enabling the organization to regroup quickly despite frequent military defeats in recent years. According to Silber, ISIS’ fluidity poses a threat particularly for Europe. For instance, 370 Austrians have traveled to Syria and Iraq since ISIS’ establishment, some of whom have returned to Europe. Further, the threat of other terror organizations cannot be discounted, particularly as Al-Qaeda has reemerged as a “moderate” alternative for terrorists turned off by ISIS’ extreme brutality.
For future US counter-terrorism strategy to be effective, Morton believes that more attention must be paid to the internet’s power to sustain extremist ideologies. He does not believe, however, that restricting free speech on social media platforms is the solution. Social media represents a great outlet for people to voice their opinions, and more should be done to encourage dialogue between people with different views to foster the mutual understanding required to bring people from the poles to the center. To this end, Morton stressed that Islamist extremists and the far right need each other, since both ideologies rely on demonization of the other to survive.
Silber disagreed, arguing that updating social media terms of use agreements to restrict certain types of speech would significantly support CVE efforts. Further, Silber highlighted the valuable role human intelligence played in infiltrating Revolution Muslim and documenting its activities. For Silber, training local officers who possess the technical and linguistic ability to penetrate extremists’ digital networks is the model for the future.
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Peace Picks July 23 – 29
1. The Unmaking of Jihadism: The Current Effort to Combat Violent Extremism | Monday, July 23, 2018 | 11:00 am – 12:00 pm | CSIS | Register Here
Please join Mitch Silber (former Director of Intelligence Analysis for the New York City Police Department), Jesse Morton (the former leader and co-founder of Revolution Muslim for which he served time in prison), and Seth G. Jones (Harold Brown Chair and Director of the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS), as they discuss the ongoing effort to counter violent extremism in the United States and abroad. The discussion will surround the issues of returning foreign fighters, counter messaging, post-prison re-integration, and other efforts related to countering violent extremism. Jesse Morton and Mitch Silber now co-direct a Virginia-based nonprofit, named Parallel Networks, that focuses on the rehabilitation of radicalized individuals.
2. Verifying North Korean Denuclearization: Where Do We Go from Here? | Monday, July 23, 2018 | 1:30 pm – 4:45 pm | CSIS | Register Here
More than one month after the Singapore Summit, little headway has been made on denuclearization of North Korea. Many attribute the slow progress to disparate definitions of denuclearization on the part of the United States and North Korea. This conference brings together regional and technical experts to take stock of where we are on the four elements of the Singapore Summit and to examine the following questions: Why do the United States and North Korea have different definitions of denuclearization? Is CVID feasible? What are the appropriate standards for a verification protocol for North Korea’s denuclearization? What should be our goals in a denuclearization agreement? What are we willing to sacrifice in return? What does the road ahead look like?
WELCOMING REMARKS
Mr. H. Andrew Schwartz, Chief Communications Officer, CSIS
OPENING REMARKS
Dr. John Hamre, President and CEO, CSIS
SESSION I: Verification Standards for North Korean Denuclearization
Mr. Stephen Pomper, Program Director, United States, International Crisis Group
Ms. Rebecca Hersman, Director, Project on Nuclear Issues and Senior Adviser, International Security Program, CSIS
Mr. Richard Johnson, Senior Director Fuel Cycle and Verification, Nuclear Threat Initiative
Mr. William Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School of Government
SESSION II: Taking Stock: Where Do We Go from Here?
Mr. David Nakamura, Staff Writer, The Washington Post
Mr. Christopher Green, Senior Adviser, Korean Peninsula, International Crisis Group
General (Ret.) Walter “Skip” Sharp, Former Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea
Dr. Sue Mi Terry, Senior Fellow, Korea Chair, CSIS
3. What to Expect from Pakistan’s Election? | Tuesday, July 24, 2018 | 10:30 am – 12:30 pm | The Wilson Center | Register Here
On July 25, Pakistan will hold an election that will constitute the country’s second consecutive peaceful transfer of power. The incumbent Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz party, hit by corruption charges that have resulted in a 10-year jail sentence for former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, will try to fend off several opponents. They are led by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party, headed by cricket star-turned-politician Imran Khan. What might recent Pakistani political developments—including Sharif’s sentencing, dozens of parliamentarians changing their political affiliations, and the emergence of several new religious political parties—portend for the election outcome? What role, if any, might Pakistan’s powerful military be playing in the election? What implications might the election’s possible outcomes have for the United States? This event will address these questions and more.
Speakers:
Mariam Mufti, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Waterloo (Canada)
Sahar Khan, Visiting Research Fellow, CATO Institute
Tamanna Salikuddin, Senior Expert, U.S. Institute of Peace, and Former Pakistan and Afghanistan Director, U.S. National Security Council
4. The Military-Industrial Component of the U.S.-India Partnership | Tuesday, July 24, 2018 | 12:15 pm – 2:00 pm | The Stimson Center | Register Here
Please join the Stimson South Asia program for a conversation with Air Marshal M. Matheswaran, the former Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff in the Indian Ministry of Defence, who will talk about the military-industrial component of the U.S.-India partnership. Joanna Spear, Associate Professor of International Affairs at the Elliott School, and Benjamin Schwartz, Head of the Aerospace and Defense Program at the U.S.-India Business Council, will serve as discussants. Sameer Lalwani of the Stimson Center will moderate.
5. Eighth Annual South China Sea Conference | Thursday, July 26, 2018 | 9:00 am – 4:45 pm | CSIS | Register Here
This full-day conference will provide opportunities for in-depth discussion and analysis of developments in the South China Sea over the past year and potential paths forward. The event will feature speakers from throughout the region, including claimant countries. Panels will address recent developments, legal and environmental issues, the strategic balance, and U.S. policy.
9:00 am: Morning Keynote
Representative Ted Yoho, Chair, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific Committee on Foreign Affairs
United States House of Representatives
9:45 am: Panel: State of Play in the South China Sea over the Past Year
Bill Hayton, Associate Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme
Chatham House
Colin Willett, Asia Section Research Manager
Congressional Research Service
Sumathy Permal, Fellow and Head of Centre for Straits of Malacca
Maritime Institute of Malaysia
Feng Zhang, Fellow, Department of International Relations
ANU College of Asia and the Pacific
Moderator:
Amy Searight, Senior Adviser and Director, Southeast Asia Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies
11:15 am: Panel: Dispute Resolution in the South China Sea and Beyond
Commodore Lalit Kapur (Retired), Senior Fellow
Delhi Policy Group
Charles I-hsin Chen, Visiting Senior Fellow
Institute for Taiwan-America Studies
Bec Strating, Lecturer
La Trobe University
Thanh Hai Do, Senior Fellow
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam
Moderator:
Gregory Poling, Director, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative; and Fellow, Southeast Asia Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies
12:30 pm: Lunch Served
1:15 pm: Lunch Keynote
The Honorable Randall G. Schriver, Assistant Secretary for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs
United States Department of Defense
2:00 pm: Panel: Environmental Issues in the South China Sea
Vo Si Tuan, Senior Scientist
Institute of Oceanography, Nha Trang
Carmen Ablan Lagman, Professor
De La Salle University
Rashid Sumaila, Director, Fisheries Economics Research Unit
University of British Columbia
Moderator:
Brian Harding, Deputy Director and Fellow, Southeast Asia Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies
3:30 pm: Panel: The Military Balance in the South China Sea
Collin Koh Swee Lean, Research Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Nanyang Technological University
Hideshi Tokuchi, Distinguished Non-Resident Fellow
Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA
Richard Heydarian, Fellow
ADR-Stratbase Institute
Bonnie Glaser, Senior Advisor and Director, China Power Project
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Moderator:
Andrew Shearer, Senior Adviser on Asia Pacific Security and Director, Alliances and American Leadership Project
Center for Strategic and International Studies
6. Identifying – and Isolating – Jihadi-Salafists through their Ideology, Practices, and Methodology | Thursday, July 26, 2018 | 12:00 pm – 1:00 pm | The Heritage Foundation | Register Here
In order to win the war against the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, the United States must understand the enemy. Yet the problem of knowing the enemy has never been more acute, and the lack of consensus around this issue has never been more debilitating, for American foreign policy.
Without a clear vision of who the U.S. is fighting, the government and military will not be able to distinguish ordinary Muslims from the extraordinary extremists, will be incapable of devising effective strategies for military and political efforts, and will not know which allies can be safe partners and which need to be avoided for being too close to the extremists. While there are many reasons for a lack of understanding the enemy, one of the most important is a deep disagreement about the role that Islam plays in motivating al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.
This event will explore the notion that while a marginal version of Islam is the driver of extremism, it is possible to distinguish the jihadi-salafists from the majority of Muslims. A close examination of the jihadi- salafists’ belief system and methodologies will help the U.S. and allied governments formulate strategies to stop their spread.
Speakers:
Dr. Mary Habeck, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Georgetown University, and American University
Zainab Al-Suwaij, Executive Director, American Islamic Congress
Moderator:
Robin Simcox, Margaret Thatcher Fellow, The Heritage Foundation
7. Faith and Fragile States: Political Stability and Religious Freedom | Friday, July 27, 2018 | 11:00 am – 2:30 pm | USIP | Register Here
Religion influences both peace and conflict worldwide. Violent extremism is often framed in religious terms, and religious discrimination continues to increase as both a driver and symptom of conflict. But, religion drives peace and coexistence as well and religious actors are essential for advancing religious freedom. Efforts to engage religious actors in countering violent extremism (CVE) and interfaith peacebuilding must take this dichotomy into account. Join the International Republican Institute, Search for Common Ground, and the U.S. Institute of Peace on July 27 for two panel discussions that explore the nexus of international religious freedom, CVE, and interfaith peacebuilding.
Opening Remarks
Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA), Former U.S. Representative from Virginia
Tony Garrastazu, Senior Director, Center for Global Impact, International Republican Institute
Panel 1: Religious Engagement in CVE
Shaykh Abdallah Bin Bayyah, President, Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies
Humera Khan, President, Muflehun
Moderator: Nancy Lindborg, President, U.S. Institute of Peace
Panel 2: Interfaith Peacebuilding
Cardinal Onaiyekan, Catholic Archbishop of Abuja, Nigeria
Mike Jobbins, Senior Director of Partnerships and Engagements, Search for Common Ground
Susan Hayward, Senior Advisor, Religion and Inclusive Societies, U.S. Institute of Peace
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