Tag: Syria
Not too late for shame
Why don’t we talk more about civil society in Syria?
A cursory search of “Syria” in Google News will produce a plethora of articles and papers about the intentions, interests, and actions of foreign powers, military groups, radical militias, and the Syrian government. In common discussion both among the policy community and the greater American public, the civil conflict in Syria is almost exclusively seen through the lens of great-power politics. There are many reasons for this:
- As Americans, we care about what our government does abroad, and consider crises with this in mind.
- It is natural when analyzing conflicts to focus on the main actors, i.e. states and military groups.
- Larger social organizations like governments and militias use press releases, a strong online presence, and propaganda to gain visibility abroad.
- Small, local organizations, or disorganized civil society are harder to place in the public eye.
The adage that “one death is a tragedy, one million is a statistic” still holds. The media industry can only run so many horror stories of bombed civilians, destroyed hospitals, or sniped children before the general public shouts “enough,” and switches off. There is comfort in ignorance. Tragedy only sells in small quantities.
It has become easy to see the Syrian civil conflict as a giant game of chess between half a dozen actors and to forget the millions of lives that have been impacted by the war. Netanyahu’s latest outburst or Trump’s mood today can begin to matter more than the fifty civilians massacred in the latest Russian airstrike. It is easy, when presented with such a deluge of information and traumatic events, to filter out the bloody noise of individual annihilation and stick to the clean, sanitary puppet show of great-power politics.
For me, the bubble burst on July 13, when the Middle East Institute welcomed Syrian journalist and civil activist Raed Fares to speak at a roundtable about the state of civil society in northwestern Syria. Fares, who has survived multiple assassination attempts by ISIS and Jabat al-Nusra, founded the Union of Revolutionary Bureaus (URB) in the city of Kafranbel, located in the northern region of Idlib. Their main activity is running the FM radio station Radio Fresh, as well as overseeing women centers and other civil society endeavors around the city.
What struck home the hardest while listening to Fares is the realization of how dissociated I had become from the pain and horror of individual people living and fighting in Syria. Some might say that is for the best: emotion and objectivity don’t mix well. Good research doesn’t come from the heart.
Phasing out emotion, however, as well as concentrating on objective, feasible policy-making, can make us forget about the true victims of the Syrian civil war. National interests may take precedence over foreign lives in the minds of many, but that doesn’t mean that local casualties and damage should stop mattering. This civil war will end someday. Many would argue it is already over. The process of reconstruction is just around the corner. The state of civil society matters.
This is especially the case in Idlib. Fares is currently visiting the United States to try to rescue funding for his organization cut by the Trump administration, without which he will likely have to shut down the URB. He warned that the disappearance of secular, democracy-promoting organisms such as the URB directly profits jihadi groups such as HTS and al-Qaeda, who become the default service providers and political mouthpieces for a tired and frustrated population.
A journalist told me that Syria stories consistently are the least-read media pieces. Americans are tired of hearing about Syria. After seven years of the same-old, depressing stories coming out of the country, they apparently would rather hear about almost anything else.
The consequence, according to Fares, is a fairly similar conclusion in Syria, albeit for wildly different reasons. After seven years of blood, seven years of bombs, seven years of poverty and misery, the Syrian people are ready for the conflict to be over, regardless of who wins. They just want something resembling stability and normalcy. Currently, only Bashar al-Assad can provide this.
If anything, this is the most significant sign that Assad has won. In the territories currently or soon to be under his control, the appetite for systemic change and popular upheaval has been utterly annihilated, leaving a despot who massacres his own people as their only hope for proximate relief. Who can blame them? This is just a symbol of the moral failure reached by the international community when it comes to the Syrian people.
The policy community and the greater public need to acknowledge and focus on the plight of Syrians. Forgetting about the Syrian people is counter-productive. Stabilization is the current buzzword when it comes to Syria, and it cannot occur without the help and interest of the local population. Neither can peace-building and reconstruction, whether or not the American government is involved. Policy think-tanks and media outlets need to make a greater effort to broadcast the voices of the Syrian population, and to make sure that their hopes and needs are part of the conversation surrounding their future.
Not only is shutting out the Syrian people counter-productive, it is also wrong. Justice and morality might seem like privileges that can wait for stability and security to be restored. Local populations, however, don’t forget past injustices easily. The Syrian people, and the greater Arab world, will remember how we treated them at their hour of greatest need. It is probably already too late for redemption. It is not, however, too late for shame.
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Coup failure and civilian control
The SETA Foundation convened a panel yesterday discussing how the July 15, 2016 coup attempt has affected civil-military relations in Turkey. Panelists were:
- Sener Akturk, Associate Professor, Koç University Department of International Relations
- Edward Erickson, Scholar-in-Residence in the Clark Center for Global Engagement, State University of New York at Cortland
- Mark Perry, Author and Foreign Policy Analyst.
Kadir Ustun (Executive Director, The SETA Foundation at Washington DC) moderated the conversation.
Ustun underlined that the events of July 2016 were an attack on Turkey’s democracy. Erdogan’s leadership in the coup’s aftermath allowed the Turkish people to “reclaim their democratic institutions.” Akturk furthered this point, claiming that Turkey actually faced two assaults on its democracy, one from the “bolshevik” PKK in July 2015 and the other from Fethullah Gulen’s “Messianic cult” in July 2016.
Erdogan’s reforms, Akturk said, posed an existential threat to each group by eroding the credibility of their grievances with Turkish society. The creation of a government-sponsored Kurdish TV channel in 2009 significantly reduced the PKK claim that Erdogan marginalized the Kurds. The lifting of the headscarf ban for public employees in 2013 eroded the Gulen Movement’s argument that the government limited religious freedom of expression.
As a result, both groups resorted to violence to achieve their political objectives. Akturk emphasized that these groups, not Erdogan, represent the real threat to Turkey’s democracy. While Erdogan championed Morsi’s democratically-elected government in Egypt, Gulenists encouraged the coup that brought it down in 2013. Further, the PKK’s constitution reveals its Bolshevik-leaning tendencies, while the governing style of its Syrian affiliate, the PYD, betrays the PKK’s preference for totalitarianism.
Akturk also remarked that the attempted coup shifted the Turkish civilian-military balance firmly in favor of civilian oversight over the military. As a result of the coup attempt, the military became subordinate to civilian rule, forcing the Turkish armed forces to delink themselves from politics and occupy themselves only with fighting. Finally, Akturk revealed that any doubts surrounding Turkey’s military capability following Erdogan’s dismissal of 42% of its commanders after the coup were swiftly silenced with the success of Operation Euphrates Shield in the Fall of 2015.
Erickson argued that the coup failed because of a generational change in the military. The staunch Kemalists who held the office of Chief of the General Staff during Turkey’s coup-riddled 20th century had largely been replaced by younger officers by 2016. Many of these officers received their educations abroad or had served on NATO assignments, exposing them to the view that the military should not interfere with domestic politics. Further, many had witnessed the aftermath of the 1980 coup, which resulted in over 600,000 arrests. As a result, the coup failed. Instead of siding with the plotters, the Chief of the General Staff in 2016, Hulusi Akar, sided with Erdogan.
The significance of the coup for Turkey’s democracy, Erickson argued, is that it brought about Turkey’s second republic, which began with the adoption of the presidential system this year. Importantly, the presidential system brought about one of Samuel Huntington’s key elements of a functioning democracy: civilian control over the military. In Erickson’s view, while Turkey’s politics may swing towards authoritarianism in the short term under Erdogan, the establishment of the military as a force used purely for fighting represents a gain that will strengthen Turkey’s democracy in the long term.
In his remarks, Perry cautioned against using American standards to measure the legitimacy of Turkey’s military, and to instead appreciate that Turkey’s establishing civilian control over the military is a huge accomplishment. Perry claimed that Hulusi Akar’s decision to side with Erdogan during the coup reveals that “Turkey does not need coups anymore.” But the Turkish military still has a long way to go before it is viewed as a legitimate institution by all Turks. So long as not all elements of Turkish society feel represented by the Turkish armed forces, some Turks will continue to struggle to see it as a legitimate implementer of Turkish national interests abroad.
Caveat emptor: All of the panelists agreed that the failure of the attempted coup strengthened Turkey’s democracy by paving the way to firmer civilian control of the military. The panelists, however, chose to gloss over the reality that these gains will likely only become visible after Erdogan and his authoritarian agenda leave office.
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Stabilizing Iraq and Syria post-ISIS
The National Press Club last Wednesday hosted the Foreign Policy Research Institute‘s launch of the latest issue of their journal, Orbis, entitled “Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent after the Fall of the Caliphate.” The papers aim to analyze the current state of ISIS as well as society in Iraq and Syria, and to assess and recommend possible guidelines and tactics for American action in the region. To accompany the issue’s launch, FPRI invited the following speakers to discuss the topic of stabilization in Syria and Iraq:
Moderator: Samuel Helfont – Assistant Professor, Naval War College, Monterey
Tally Helfont – Director of Program on the Middle East, Foreign Policy Research Institute
Barak Mendelsohn – Associate Professor, Haverford College
Assaf Moghadam – Adjunct Associate Professor, Columbia University
Mendelsohn asserted that to deal with global jihadi movements like al-Qaeda and ISIS we need to more accurately assess the scope of their threat and capacities. The challenge they pose to local and American security is often overblown. Focusing on jihadi terrorist attacks is counter-productive. A single successful terrorist attack can lead to the impression that the jidadis are “winning,” when the situation is often more complex. Terrorism is an instrument for political, not strategic or military objectives. Jihadi movements consistently fail to achieve their political objectives – for instance, setting up a sustainable ISIS caliphate – through terrorism.
Mendelsohn also emphasized the systemic challenges that constrain the threat posed by transnational jihadi movements. National and subnational identities, which are usually of national or ethnic nature, constrain the appeal of transnational movements based on religious identity. It is not sufficient to practice Islam to find religious political leadership appealing. Political as well as religious or social affiliation is needed. As transnational political movements, cross-border logistical coordination is also an issue for jihadi groups. Finally, they are plagued by infighting, further reducing their capacity to operate effectively.
Moghadam agreed with Mendelsohn on the constraining factors jihadi groups face. He hoped, however, that policy-makers would not confuse “jihadism constrained” with “jihadism declining.” While their threat might often be overblown, jihadi groups will not disappear any time soon. Their ideology continues to appeal to some people. Jihadi movements are by nature highly decentralized. Their lack of a “center of gravity” means they cannot be easily eradicated with a precise military attack.
Decentralization also means that jihadi groups’ constituent parts are adaptable and innovative. Key individuals play an oversized role, making jihadi groups capable of reacting to changing environments. In addition, the conditions that gave rise to jihadi groups such as ISIS are still in place. In Syria especially, regions devastated by ISIS will face governance and resource issues for decades to come, providing fertile ground for radical military groups to thrive.
Moghadam concluded by predicting that we will witness a shift in the global jihadi movement from a “bipolar” structure – centered around the poles of ISIS and al-Qaeda – to a “multipolar,” localized structure, with smaller groups gaining influence in a greater number of locations. This will make it harder to fully eradicate the threat of jihadism. When it comes to counter-terrorism, he advocated for a less reactionary stance. Jihadi groups use terrorism to provoke Western governments into over-reacting, thus alienating Muslim communities and reinforcing the appeal of the groups Western states are trying to combat. He called for better cooperation with Muslim communities in Europe and the US.
Tally Helfont focused on what Gulf states can do to counter the influence of jihadi groups in the Middle East. These states are worried about the appeal of transnational jihadism in the Gulf, but are also seeking to counter Iranian influence and fill the vacuum left by American political withdrawal. Gulf states’ counter-terrorism strategy has focused on stopping “men, money, and ideas.” This means increasingly trying to curb the radical messages and influence of local religious leaders as well as stopping financial flows to terrorists from private citizens in the Gulf.
Countering jihadi ideas is especially important, both in education and in mosques. Helfont asserts that Gulf states – particularly Saudi Arabia and UAE – have begun to see the appeal of critical thinking and want to create new generations of citizens who are capable of thinking for themselves and innovating with the best on the international stage.
Caveat emptor: It was hard to decipher useful lessons from the panelists’ statements. While the jihadi threat is often overblown, it is essential for the American government to portray ISIS as a genuine threat to national security to justify continued involvement in Syria and Iraq. A Muslim terrorism group is also a useful foil in electoral campaigns. Doubts should be raised about the capacity of stabilization to succeed without subsequent peace-building and reconstructing projects afterwards. There’s still a lot to consider before we can get a clear idea of how to durably stabilize the Fertile Crescent.
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Life ain’t fair
The Trump-Putin press conference after their meeting in Helsinki merits little comment. It wasn’t a lovefest, but they mostly avoided points of friction. The only obvious one was on Crimea, where Putin essentially said they had agreed to disagree on the legitimacy of Russia’s annexation. Trump said nothing.
On Syria, they are hoping for unspecified cooperation. The Syrian opposition, under bombardment by Russian warplanes, will be glad to hear that. Putin emphasized the importance of humanitarian assistance, but Russia essentially provides none (other than a bit of air transport). The US provides the lion’s share.
Both presidents want the summit to mark the beginning of a more normal relationship between the two powers. Putin was pleased to appear on an equal footing with Trump and emphasized nuclear weapons, as did Trump. No one mentioned that Russia is a declining regional power with an economy more or less the size of Spain’s.
Trump acknowledged that he had pushed American liquified natural gas as an alternative to Germany’s import of Russian gas through the Nordstream pipeline. Never mind that it would be far more costly. I think Chancellor Merkel might have noticed though.
The lies were fast and furious. Putin claimed the referendum on Crimea’s annexation was conducted according to international standards. Hardly. It didn’t even offer an option to keep Crimea’s autonomous status inside Ukraine, not to mention that it was conducted under Russian military occupation.
Trump tried to distract attention to a question about whether he believed the US intelligence community assessment of Russian interference in the 2016 election by ranting about “where is Hillary Clinton’s server!” It’s with the FBI. He should ask there. Trump also said Putin forcefully denied the charge. That should settle it.
Putin referred to an implementation issue with the INF (Intermediate Nuclear Forces) treaty. Hardly. Russia is violating the treaty.
He also tried to suggest that he knew nothing about the Russian officials Mueller has indicted but that some of what the Americans are complaining about might be the handiwork of private Russian companies. Does anyone think Putin doesn’t know precisely what the GU (Russian military intelligence) is up to? Does anyone think private Russian companies don’t do the bidding of the Russian government?
Putin also generously offered cooperation with the Mueller investigation, on a reciprocal basis. We need only arrest Bill Browder, Putin’s nemesis and the originator of the Magnitsky Act. Then Mueller can participate in the interrogation of the indicted GU officials and Russian law enforcement will participate in the interrogation of Browder. Even Trump might not fall for that one.
Had a Democratic president appeared with Putin in this fashion a few days after the indictment of Russian officials for interfering in a US election and a few months after the Russians tried to kill a defector in Great Britain, the Republicans would be getting out the noose. The president wouldn’t even have to be black, just liberal. But this pair of white nationalist liars get to display their mendacity with impunity. Life ain’t fair.
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Best summit EVER!
Hard to write anything you haven’t already read about the Mueller indictment of 12 Russian officials for cyberattacks on the United States. This is the second shoe to drop. The first consisted of indictments for the social media campaign intended to influence the election in favor of Donald Trump.
The President is now golfing to get ready to meet with “not my enemy” Vladimir Putin in Helsinki tomorrow. Trump intends to start the summit one-on-one, with only interpreters. That way he can say whatever he wants about what transpired, as the interpreters won’t leak. While he has said he would ask about interference in the US election, Trump has also repeated Putin’s earlier denials, indicating he believes them. I don’t know anyone else in Washington who does.
Trump is fresh from London meetings during which he offended the Queen, supported the Prime Minister’s leading rival, and claimed immigration was ruining both Europe and the US. That followed on a NATO summit at which he trashed America’s allies, then (falsely) pretended that they had yielded to his will on military spending. Today he even responded to a question about America’s worst enemy by saying the EU is a foe. This is Putin’s wet dream: the United States split from Europe and in particular from its militarily strongest ally.
Where and when does this nightmare end? Not in Helsinki, where Trump will likely serve up Syria on a silver platter, asking only that Moscow promise to get he Iranians out, or at least off the Israeli border. Putin will promise, the Americans will bail, but neither Russia nor Iran will feel any pressure to fulfill any commitment Putin has made. Their attacks on the agreed de-escalation zones in Syria, and Trump’s abandonment of the rebel forces in the south, tells you all you need to know about how Moscow, Damascus, and Washington are approaching Syria these days. Moscow and Damascus are trying to win. Washington doesn’t care about losing. Once the Americans are gone from Syria, Iran and Russia will be free to do as they like.
The only good news is that Trump might be boxed in on Ukraine. While he has personally expressed the view that Crimea should belong to Russia because people there speak Russian, the Administration and Congress seem solidly opposed to any compromise on Ukraine before withdrawal of Russian forces. Trump will have a hard time promising Putin relief from Ukraine-related sanctions if the Congress stands its ground. That said, any indication of indifference towards the Russian annexation of Crimea will be a big win for Putin, even if the sanctions remain in place for now.
Of course Trump will declare the Helsinki summit a great success, one much more successful than any previous meeting with an American president. People will be saying it was the best summit EVER!
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Putin’s pet
President Trump is on his way to a meeting Monday with Russian President Putin. Along the way, he is doing precisely what Putin most wishes for.
First Trump trashed NATO. That’s the alliance Putin loves to hate. Trump not only criticized the allies for failing to meet the 2024 2% target for defense spending, he also fired a salvo at Germany for importing gas from Russia. Sitting next to him when he did that at breakfast were Secretary of State Pompeo, Ambassdor to NATO Hutchison, and Chief of Staff Kelly. All looked stunned, but Kelly did not bother hiding his discomfort. The White House spokesperson put him in his place by claiming he was disappointed in the breakfast offerings.
Then last night, in an interview that became public while he was at dinner with Prime Minister May in London, Trump compounded the felony. He not only blasted his host for not favoring “hard” Brexit and allowing immigrants to damage the “fabric” of British society, but also attacked the mayor of London for being soft on terrorism. The racist tone of these remarks is apparent to anyone who listens. The “special relationship” between the US and UK hasn’t known a lower moment in the past 100 years.
Then this morning we read that Trump is preparing to cut a “deal” on Syria in which Putin promises something he can’t deliver: withdrawal of the Iranians and their proxies from Syria’s border with Israel. In return, the US would withdraw from Syria, something Trump has promised publicly he would do, leaving the Kurds to cut a deal with Assad. This is an idea Netanyahu is pushing, along with relieving Russia from US and European sanctions.
The next shoe to drop will be Ukraine. Trump believes Crimea rightfully belongs to Russia, since people speak Russian there. Never mind that many people throughout Ukraine speak Russian, as well as Ukrainian. He may accept the Russian annexation, thereby putting a big smile on Putin’s face and completing an extraordinary week for the Russian president: NATO undermined, the UK/US relationship weakened, Syria won, and Crimea absorbed. What else could go right?
The pattern is clear: Trump is Putin’s pet president doing precisely what Moscow wants. The only real question is why.
I have favored the view that money is the main reason. Trump’s real estate empire, about which he cares more than anything else, is heavily dependent on Russian investment and purchases of condos. Putin could turn off the flow of rubles in an instant. No wealthy Russian would buck the president, who gets to decide which oligarchs prosper and which don’t. Trump’s finances wouldn’t survive a month without Moscow’s support.
But it is also possible that Trump himself was recruited long ago. He hired people for his campaign who were Russian intelligence assets. Special Counsel Mueller has already indicted some of them. Trump’s visit to Moscow in the late 1980s, when it was still the capital of the Soviet Union, has raised questions. The Republican attempt yesterday in Congress to discredit the former chief of FBI counter-intelligence operations, Peter Strzok, suggests how desperate they are to stymie an investigation that has already gotten to one degree of separation from Trump.
But the Congress is also beginning to react appropriately to Trump’s surrender of American interests to Putin. It has passed a strong resolution in support of NATO and against concessions to Putin on Ukraine. Republican discomfort with Trump’s “national security” tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico, and the European Union is starting to show. The trade war with China is causing a lot of heartburn in the Middle West and other areas of the country the Republicans need to keep on their side.
But Putin is still making Trump sit and beg. He is Putin’s pet.
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