Tag: Syria
All eyes on Russia
On Friday, a large convoy of tanks and military vehicles flying Syrian and Russian flags arrived at the Nasib-Jaber crossing into Jordan, marking the return of regime control over Syria’s strategic southern border for the first time in five years. Hours later, Al Jazeera reported that opposition fighters agreed to a cease fire with Russian negotiators representing regime forces in Dera’a Province. The story is familiar. Rebel forces will give up their heavy weapons and civilians in Dera’a will return to living under Assad’s rule, while fighters who refuse to surrender are transported to the last remaining opposition strongholds: a small area of Idlib Province and a thin sliver of land east of the Golan Heights.
One key aspect, however, differentiates this cease fire from its predecessors in Homs, Aleppo, and Eastern Ghouta: Russian military police will administer the newly-recaptured areas in an attempt to encourage the 320,000 Syrians displaced by the offensive to return to their homes. While largely symbolic, continued Russian influence on the ground, even after fighting ceases, represents another step in Russia’s evolution from one of several powerful players to the key actor in the Syrian conflict. The message is clear: Moscow will control how this conflict ends. Past inaction indicates that the US cannot do anything about it.
This development is particularly troubling at a time when US president Trump is angling to score a big win with President Putin at their summit in Helsinki on July 16, with Ukraine and Syria at the top of the agenda. In an April 9 interview with the Washington Post, King Abdullah II of Jordan argued that isolating the two conflicts would not lead to any significant progress on either issue. Instead, he said, the US must deal with the Russians on Syria and Ukraine simultaneously and “horse-trade.”
The problem is that Trump does not have a horse to trade in either case, making prospects for Russian deescalation in Syria or Ukraine unlikely. On the Syrian front, Trump has already made his intentions clear. He wants to remove the 2,000 US special forces headquartered in At-Tanf as soon as possible. Withdrawal would open the door for Assad to take back eastern Syria, as the US represents the driving force behind the fragile alliance that holds the area.
Trump has already shown his cards. His attitude during the southern Syria offensive demonstrates that Trump will not stand in Putin’s way if push comes to shove in eastern Syria. Further, Trump’s behavior at the G7 summit, where he argued that Crimea rightfully belongs to Russia and argued for Putin to be allowed back into the group, indicates that US sanctions imposed against Russia in retaliation for the invasion of Ukraine could be up for negotiation, for little to nothing in return.
Trump has weakened his position in recent months at a time when Putin has significantly strengthened his. This means that the US delegation will go into Helsinki with barely any of what Trump, of all people, should know is necessary: leverage. Putin will likely get what he wants in Syria: US troop withdrawal. In exchange, Trump will get no more than vague pledges to curb human rights abuses in Syria as well as the Iranian presence. He may also get a nonbinding agreement to deescalate in Ukraine.
All parties will leave the summit satisfied; Trump will have his tweetable win, while Putin will solidify his status as kingmaker in Syria and Ukraine. This result will continue to erode US credibility on the Arab street. US popularity in the Arab world is at a nadir after “nation building” turned Iraq into a failed state, Assad’s chemical weapons use was met mostly with military silence, and Jerusalem was given to Israel on a platter. Betrayal in Syria will only further damage American interests in the region, which are already hanging by a thread.
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Tighten your seatbelts
We are in that car crash moment: we can see the collision coming but can’t stop the vehicle or predict precisely the outcome. Only this time there is more than one crash coming:
- President Trump’s nomination of a Federalist Society-certified conservative to the Supreme Court pretty much guarantees that abortion will be a key issue in November’s Congressional election. To whose advantage that will be is not clear. But whether Judge Kavanaugh is approved before the poll, or especially if confirmation is delayed until afterwards, his apparent inclination to overturn Roe v. Wade will push women towards the Democrats and men towards the Republicans.
- In the foreign policy community, everyone is holding their breath for the NATO Summit in Brussels tomorrow and Thursday. Trump has been hyperventilating about Europe’s failure to spend more on defense, even as many of the allies have been raising their expenditures in order to meet the 2024 NATO target of 2% of GNP and to increase the Alliance’s odds against an increasingly aggressive Russia. If Trump repeats his dissing of the G7 last month in Canada, the Europeans will conclude the Alliance is dead.
- Next Monday Trump meets President Putin in Helsinki. Speculation is rife that he will hand Syria and perhaps also Crimea to Putin, in return for essentially nothing. If either happens, it will cause worldwide repercussions, the former because US withdrawal from Syria will strengthen Iran (Russian promises to restrain Tehran should be ignored entirely) and the latter because every would-be breakaway minority will be encouraged by US acceptance of Russia’s annexation.
- A bit further along on the time horizon is the escalating trade war with China, which is causing a lot of distress in the US, both because Trump’s tariffs raise prices to US producers and consumers of Chinese goods and because Chinese retaliation is hitting US exports hard. The tit-for-tat tariffs with Canada, Mexico, and Europe are also damaging, though the stock market isn’t yet feeling the pain. It will eventually, as the inflationary impact of the budget deficit, the tax cut, and the tariffs pushes the Fed to raise interest rates.
- The dialogue with North Korea about its nuclear program has degenerated into a diatribe, with Pyongyang accusing Secretary of State Pompeo of gangster-like behavior for insisting on quick denuclearization, rather than the long-term, phased (and likely never completed) process the North Koreans favor. No telling whether or when Trump will be back to threatening fire and fury, but it is already clear that his classic bait and switch tactic–he doesn’t seem to have mentioned quick denuclearization during the Singapore summit–won’t work with Kim Jong-un.
Trump will be in London Thursday evening and Friday, meeting with a Prime Minister teetering on the brink as she tries desperately to rescue the United Kingdom from the worst impacts of Brexit, which Trump supported. He’ll be flying everywhere, so as to avoid what are predicted to be massive protests.
Then he’ll spend the weekend in Scotland at one of his own golf clubs. We can hope he’ll spend some time with the briefing books, especially the ones that detail Russian interference in the US election and Moscow’s role in nerve agent murders in the UK. But I wouldn’t bet on it.
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Bad assumptions make bad policy
The Post recently published Jamal Khashoggi’s “It’s time to divide Syria.” A few assertions that Khashoggi made jump out as pertinent examples of biases and assumptions that can often be found in Western media reports about Syria. Here are a few examples of this:
To bring about a permanent peace in Syria, the southern part of the country must be protected. Victory for Assad there is not a complete solution so much as it is a pause. The territories governed by Assad are ruled by fear and a loss of hope for prosperity.
Assad has been responsible for the murder of hundreds of thousands of his own people. He has chemically attacked his compatriots and will go down in history as one of the cruellest and bloodiest despots in modern history. This can lead people to assume that he has managed to stay in power only by keeping the population under his control in a constant state of fear and oppression. It is this assumption – that Assad’s dictatorship commanded little or no popular support – that led international actors, particularly regional powers such as Turkey and Qatar, to believe that Assad’s regime would collapse quickly in 2011.
They were ultimately proven wrong. Syrian sectarian tensions, as well as the government’s historical use of clientelism and patronage to foster elite support, provided Assad with broad support from some ethnic minorities in Syria – particularly his own group, the Alawis. In addition, many non-minority Sunnis see Assad as the sole source of stability in the country. Judging and condemning Assad for the way in which he has treated his people is justified and right. It is, however, a tenuous and possibly counter-productive justification for intervention, particularly if we repeat the mistakes of Iraq in failing to properly plan for the aftermath.
The United States should propose partition in Syria. Assad can keep what he controls, and the rebels can form local governments and establish a new entity. With international recognition and support, it would be possible to hold elections for local councils [and] curtail radicalized individuals […].
Portraying Islamist and jihadist rebels as “radicalized individuals” makes them sound like a few bad apples within a more moderate rebel ensemble. Yet broad swathes of the Syrian opposition are radical, with the salafist Ahrar al-Sham or the jihadist Tahrir al-Sham among the largest and most effective opposition groups in Syria today. These are not just individuals but unavoidable strategic actors, determined power players, who will have a role to play in Syria for years to come.
The ideological composition of the opposition, and its fragmented nature, mean that distinguishing between “radical” and “moderate” elements is near-impossible. Curtailing radical groups would not only require more military power than any international actor is willing to currently provide, it would also require a level of insight and decisiveness in determining who needs to be curtailed and who should participate in governing a new Syria that no foreigners currently possess.
The assertion that we can – and should – eliminate radical elements of the opposition also underestimates the support these groups command within the population. American hostility and distaste for radical Islam clouds the fact that for many Syrians, particularly those who are Sunni Arabs, these groups are a viable and even desirable alternative to Assad’s rule. Many also see them as a necessary evil to counter creeping Iranian influence in Syria, a sort of counter-Hezbollah that will fight fire with fire.
What would Khashoggi recommend if his elected local councils installed radical Muslims in power? More generally, Western commentators should not assume that radical elements in Syria will be “curtail[ed]” by the Syrian population once it votes.
Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State will always be threats, but they will likely be rejected by the local Syrian community if there are international and regional forces supporting Syrian aspirations for moderate civilian rule.
Many Syrians want peace and stability more than they want “moderate civilian rule;” many fear that a transition to a more democratic form of government would prove a new source of chaos and instability, as it was in Iraq after 2003 and Egypt after 2012.
The assumption that democracy is something people inherently yearn for has plagued Western interpretation of Middle Eastern political crises for decades. It was particularly visible during the “Arab Spring” uprisings of 2010-11, when news organizations such as The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal heralded the popular desire for democratic rule in the region.
Of course there are large numbers of local activists and citizens who call and hope for more popular representation and participation across the Middle East; but assuming this a basic and widespread concern for everyone is misleading. Not because they are inherently attached to strongman rule or too passive for civic participation, but because democracy is for many a privilege that comes after security and prosperity. If foreign powers intervened in Syria assuming that its citizens are on the same page as they are about what Syria should look like post-civil war, they could be in for a big surprise.
We should stop making assumptions and generalizations that we can’t back up with evidence. Western powers have too often intervened in Middle Eastern politics – often with destructive consequences – because of false assumptions and an inflated belief in the obviousness and infallibility of their liberal and democratic values.
The United States could do a lot to help the Syrian population today: more humanitarian assistance to the displaced Syrians in the South, and more political support to ensure that Syrian Kurdish interests are represented in negotiations about the future of Syria, for instance. For productive American involvement in the Syrian conflict to happen, however, it can’t be obscured by flashier plans based on misleading statements; they may sound more appealing, but are not grounded in reality. Accurate information should be a prerequisite, not an afterthought, of American foreign policymaking in the Middle East.
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Peace Picks July 8 – 15
You can find more events for the upcoming week here
1. A Vision: Ukraine – 2030: Sustainable Development Doctrine | Tuesday, July 10, 2018 | 1:30 pm – 3:00 pm | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Ukraine has made significant progress on ambitious economic and financial reforms in recent years. Steps have been taken to intensify the fight against corruption and boost economic growth across a range of sectors. However, much work is still needed for Ukraine’s economic development and improvement of the socio-economic situation. In addition to focus on specific reforms and bolstering investor confidence, strategies for long-term sustainable development must also be considered.
At this event, Mr. Serhiy Taruta, Member of Parliament, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, will present a paper, entitled Ukraine 2030, a vision which lays out a framework for the strategic direction of Ukraine’s long-term development. This will be followed by a discussion on the challenges and opportunities for Ukraine’s sustainable development will be discussed.
Speakers:
Moderator: Ambassador John Herbst, Director – Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
Mr. Serhiy Taruta, Member of Parliament, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
Dr. Anders Åslund, Senior Fellow – Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council; Independent Member, Supervisory Board, Ukrzaliznytsia
Dr. Vira Nanivska, Policy Research Director, Collegium Anna Yaroslavna: East
Dr. Edi Segura, Chairman of the Board, The Blezyer Foundation; Partner and Chief Economist, SigmaBleyzer
Ms. Michelle Small, Director, Head of the Washington DC Representative Office, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Mr. Morgan Williams, President, US-Ukraine Business Council
2. Elections in Zimbabwe: Autocracy and Stasis, or Democracy and Change? | Tuesday, July 10, 2018 | 3:00 pm – 4:30 pm | National Endowment for Democracy | Register Here
Since the Movement for Democratic Change’s founding in 1999, Zimbabwe has been going through a protracted struggle for democratization. An entrenched incumbent, fortified by a strong political-military network, has met aspirations for democratic improvement with strong resistance. This network, however, underwent a serious rupture last November when former allies effectively deposed its long-serving leader, Robert Mugabe. The new president, President Emmerson Mnangagwa, has scheduled general elections for July 30, 2018. The upcoming polls present new political dynamics and a heightened level of anticipation both within and outside Zimbabwe. In his presentation, Dr. Alex Magaisa will consider the struggle to achieve greater democratic accountability in today’s Zimbabwe. He will assess preparations for the approaching elections and discuss the prospects for democratization, including possible post-election scenarios and the roles of the military and the international community. Comments by Dr.Alexander H. Noyes will follow.
Speakers:
Moderator: Natalie Kay, Program Officer, Southern Africa, National Endowment for Democracy
Alex Magaisa, Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow, National Endowment for Democracy
Alexander H. Noyes, Senior Associate (Non-Resident), Africa Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies
3. July 15 Coup Attempt: Two Years Later | Wednesday, July 11, 2018 | 11:00 am – 12:30 pm | Turkish Heritage Organization
Please join the Turkish Heritage Organization and the Global Policy Institute on July 11 for a panel discussion on the second anniversary of the July 15 coup attempt that took place in 2016. Since this critical event in Turkey’s recent history, the country has witnessed profound changes within both its foreign and domestic politics. Our distinguished guests will discuss how the coup attempt shaped present day Turkey and the potential implications regarding U.S.-Turkey relations.
Speakers:
Moderator: Deniz Karatas, Global Policy Institute
Abraham Wagner, Adjunct Professor of International and Public Affairs & Senior Research Scholar, Columbia University
4. Future of US-Turkish Relations After Erdogan’s Victory | Wednesday, July 11, 2018 | 12:00 pm – 2:00 pm | Endowment for Middle East Truth | Register Here
Join EMET on Capitol Hill as we host Congressman Gus Bilirakis, FDD scholar and former Turkish parliament member Dr. Aykan Erdemir, the pro-Kurdish opposition US representative of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), Giran Ozcan, and EMET’s Director of the Kurdistan Project, Diliman Abdulkader. The panel will be moderated by EMET founder and President Sarah Stern. Our panel will analyze the implications of the June 24th Turkish elections called by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Leading Turkey since 2002 with the Justice and Development Party (AKP), internally Erdogan has tilted state institutions to further solidify his position, he has targeted political opposition groups, academics, journalists, and the Kurdish minority all while labeling those speaking against his rule as “terrorists.” Erdogan has distanced himself from his short-lived “zero problem with neighbors” policy as he has made more foes than friends in the region. He has threatened Greece with military action while continuing to have a foothold in Northern Cyprus. His incursions into Syria targeting US-backed Kurdish forces has created a diminishing of relations with the United States. Under Erdogan, Turkey has pivoted towards Russia by purchasing Russian missiles incompatible with NATO defense systems. The panel will examine the outcome of the elections, what Turkey’s future holds under Erdogan and how this will affect US-Turkish relations.
5. Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent After the Fall of the Caliphate | Wednesday, July 11, 2018 | 12:00pm – 1:45pm | Foreign Policy Research Institute | Register Here
In 2014, the United States stated its intention to “degrade and destroy” ISIS. Since then, a diverse array of forces has worked tirelessly to liberate key territories in Iraq and Syria from ISIS’s Caliphate. Now, in the summer of 2018, ISIS’s Caliphate largely has been dismantled as a territorial entity. However, the group is far from destroyed, and its ability to maneuver is much improved as it reverts to an insurgency. What’s more, there is very little to prevent yet another non-state armed group from retaking the very same lands that ISIS once held. Accordingly, American diplomacy, military strategy, and intelligence collection likely will focus on Iraq and Syria for many years to come. Thus, the question for policymakers is how the U.S. can prevent non-state armed groups from regaining a territorial foothold, further destabilizing these territories, and ultimately threatening U.S. interests in the region. Relatedly, the question of what to do about the likes of al-Qaeda and ISIS even if they do not hold territory remains equally pressing.
“Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent After the Fall of the Caliphate,” a special issue of Orbis: FPRI’s Journal of World Affairs (Summer 2018) and the subject of this panel, seeks to provide a framework for thinking about the threat of terrorism emanating from the Fertile Crescent now that ISIS’s Caliphate is being undone and to provide concrete policy recommendations to establish a tenable politico-economic status quo.
Speakers:
Tally Helfont, Director of Program on the Middle East, Foreign Policy Research Institute
Samuel Helfont, Assistant Professor, Naval War College, Monterey
Barak Mendelsohn, Associate Professor, Haverford College
Assaf Moghadam, Adjunct Associate Professor, Columbia University
6. Next Steps on North Korea: Denuclearization and Building a New Relationship | Thursday, July 12, 2018 | 9:00am – 10:30 am | Korea Economic Institute of America | Register Here
With the historic first meeting between a sitting U.S. president and the leader of North Korea now complete, the difficult process of negotiating North Korea’s dismantlement and building a new relationship between the United States and North Korea begins. What are the key steps the United States and North Korea need to take to achieve the goals of the Singapore Statement? What is the role of South Korea as the process moves forward? What challenges beyond denuclearization are there for building new U.S.-North Korea relationship?
Please join the Korea Economic Institute of America and the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy for a discussion of the key next steps in dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program and moving towards the new relationship called for in the Singapore Statement.
Speakers:
Moderator: Jenna Gibson, Korea Economic Institute of America
Patrick Cronin, Center for a New American Security
Katrin Katz, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Kim Seok Hwan, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy
Kim Yong Hyun, Dongguk University
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This is not a loyal American
President Trump, noting that Putin is KGB, says he’s fine:
I might even end up having a good relationship [with Mr Putin], but they’re going ‘well, president Trump, be prepared, president Putin is KGB’, this and that…Do you know what? Putin’s fine, he’s fine, we’re all fine, we’re people. Will I be prepared? Totally prepared – I have been preparing for this stuff my whole life, they don’t say that.
Even the conservative Heritage Foundation, one of the organizations that helped assemble the list of his possible Supreme Court nominees, is warning that Trump is wrong:
Things to remember before
@realDonaldTrump travels to Europe: -Russia is the aggressor—Ukraine is the victim -Crimea belongs to Ukraine -NATO & US troops in Europe serve our national interests -Europeans must spend more on defense -Putin’s track record shows he can’t be trusted
Meanwhile, Secretary of State Pompeo is in Pyongyang, trying to turn a vague one-page statement from the Singapore summit into a serious plan for denuclearization of North Korea. That would require first an inventory of their nuclear and missile programs as well as years if not decades to dismantle them. There isn’t much chance it is really going to happen. Kim Jong-un is continuing to expand his missile and nuclear capacities, even as Trump was announcing that the danger has passed. There is no record of the North Koreans telling the truth about their strategic weapons, which they regard as guaranteeing the survival of their regime.
As if that were not enough, the US kicked off its trade war with China today, provoking the anticipated (and permitted under international rules) retaliation. So US exports to China now face more serious barriers, while the price of imports from China to American consumers will rise. Both moves hurt core Trump constituencies: agriculture and manufacturing. The trade war also means that China will not maintain strong sanctions on North Korea.
On the home front, the Administration will fail to meet a court-ordered deadline to reunite migrant children with their parents, as it appears to have no idea which children belong with which parents. Even when it succeeds, it hopes to hold even asylum-seeking parents and children together in prison, not free them pending court hearings (for which most asylum-seekers in fact do appear). To boot, EPA Administrator Pruitt has finally resigned. He faced 15 or so ethics investigations, most due to his use of public office for private gain. That is the textbook definition of corruption, though no doubt he’ll drag out the proceedings and eventually be pardoned.
While Trump addresses adoring crowds that cheer his bravado, the United States is declining rapidly in the world’s estimation, especially among America’s friends. Our European allies are girding themselves for the upcoming NATO summit, where Trump is expected to make it clear he has little regard for them (as he did at the recent G7 meeting). They in turn will do everything they can to maintain the nuclear deal with Iran, straining the Alliance further. Trump has abandoned America’s friends in southern Syria, putting Israel and Jordan at risk. His move of the US embassy to Jerusalem has effectively killed any hope of progress with the Palestinians for the foreseeable future.
Relative American power was bound to decline as other countries prosper and acquire more advanced technology. Trump is accelerating that process by abandoning allies, cozying up to adversaries, weakening America’s moral standing, and damaging America’s exporters as well raising prices for its consumers. The President has visited golf clubs more than 100 times while in office but has not once visited US troops in a war zone. What more evidence do we need that he is not a loyal American?
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Stabilization again
During the Stabilization Symposium on Tuesday, a panel consisting of Frances Brown (Fellow – Carnegie Institute), Ciara Knudsen (Policy Planning Staff, Office of the Secretary – Department of State), Katherine Donahue (Office of Transition Initiatives – USAID), and Colonel Joe Holland (Chief, Stability and Humanitarian Engagement Division, J-5 Global Policy & Partnerships – Department of Defense) discussed avenues for building peace and stability in post-conflict situations, using the Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR) as a blueprint.
According to Brown, three key obstacles make it complicated to transition from conflict to peace: defining success, measuring progress, and governmental organization. The SAR states that post-conflict stabilization is inherently political, allowing the US to better confront the first challenge. Specifically, it provides the US government with the flexibility to candidly judge whether the legitimate political actor on the ground wants peace and stability, making it possible for interventions to succeed. This mindset would have been crucial in Afghanistan, where large sums were poured into stabilization efforts that derailed because president Karzai’s government was not on board.
Brown argued that the SAR also allows the US to adopt more realistic measures for success in stabilization operations. In Afghanistan, cherry-picked stories were used to evaluate US peace building efforts, causing onlookers in Washington to mistakenly believe that the success of three, US-implemented district councils was indicative of the state of affairs in the country as a whole. Brown expressed confidence that the SAR’s emphasis on a coordinated, cross-government strategy for stabilization will make US implementers more accountable to each other, increasing the likelihood that future interventions will adopt more accurate measures of success.
Knudsen used her experience with the Defeat ISIS Campaign to critique the SAR’s inapplicability to situations where short-term, cosmetic interventions will not work because no legitimate on-site actors exist. ISIS has systematically destroyed entire communities’ physical and social infrastructure by reducing cities to rubble, planting IEDs, assassinating tribal leadership, and leaving sleeper cells behind in liberated areas.
These conditions breed a climate of fear and distrust in target communities, making it nearly impossible to find actors who enjoy the legitimacy to inspire the unity necessary to accomplish stabilization. Thus, stabilizing institutions in destroyed cities like Mosul and Raqqa will require meaningful, long-term engagement. Knudsen argued that the SAR does not recognize that most conflict situations call for more than quick, low-budget interventions to develop lasting peace.
Donahue struck a more positive tone than Knudsen, praising the SAR for being realistic and encouraging swift governmental interventions to stabilize conflict zones. The SAR’s declaration that stabilization is an iterative process falls directly in line with the philosophy OTI uses for its intervention strategy. According to Donahue, this will give the US government the flexibility to behave more like OTI, allowing it to mobilize quickly instead of getting bogged down in crafting grand strategies that often do not apply to the situation on the ground. Instead, the SAR strategy centers around learning on the go, recognizing that moving quickly and being correct at the 80% level is more productive than shooting for 100% effectiveness and failing because of inaction.
During his assignment to Kirkuk in the Iraq War, Holland was responsible for facilitating provincial reconstruction teams in the area. In what was indicative of the broader White House strategy at the time, military officers were under the impression that the Department of Defense was spearheading stabilization efforts in Iraq. Little interagency coordination occurred as a result. This military-centric approach led to planning gaps, causing stabilization attempts to end largely in failure. Iraqis remained employed for a snapshot in time, so communities slid back into conflict following US withdrawal. The SAR’s emphasis on interagency coordination represents a building block for future stabilization success, opening the door for long-term, sustainable development by legitimate regional partners after US troops end the mission.
The Bottom Line: The SAR is promising, but it has limits and presents little more than a framework to guide future US stabilization efforts in conflict regions. While this general blueprint will give US actors on the ground considerable flexibility in crafting case-specific strategies, the SAR’s desire for quick, low-cost interventions ignores that most conflicts are multidimensional and can only be solved by long-term stabilization initiatives. Reluctance to commit significant time and resources to stabilization means that future US peace building efforts will likely fail, or that the US will avoid intervening in these situations altogether.
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