Tag: Syria
Elections have consequences
Here are the speaking notes I prepared for today’s noontime presentation at SETA DC:
- It wasn’t free or fair, but Erdogan has won his gamble: he has not only the enhanced presidency but also a coalition majority in parliament. He in effect controls the judiciary and press as well.
- The opposition is fragmented and likely to prove no more effective than in the last few years, though its hostility to Syrian refugees will guarantee it some support.
- Turkey looks headed deeper into one-man rule, even if Erdogan fulfills his pledge to lift the emergency.
- It would be foolish to imagine Erdogan will suddenly become generous to his enemies, end his crackdown on over 100,000 alleged coup-plotters, break with the Russians, re-focus attention on fighting Islamic extremism and qualifying for EU membership, negotiate peace with Turkey’s Kurds, or patch up the alliance with the US.
- I wonder if he would even restrain his body guards from beating up demonstrators were he to visit the US again.
- The question is what the US should do about it? How do we make it through the coming years, possibly even a decade or more, with an erstwhile ally moving in a direction it is hard to like?
- The current occupant of the White House makes these questions more difficult than they would normally be. He is on the outs with Erdogan, but not over human rights or relations with Russia. Trump and Erdogan might agree entirely on those issues.
- But President Trump has continued to insist on supporting the Syrian Kurds and hasn’t proven much help on the extradition of Gulen, which are the two things Erdogan cares about the most.
- Ironically, the best approach is one Trump might find attractive: a transactional relationship that relies less on Turkey as an ally and more on its usefulness to the US.
- The most important aspect of that usefulness is geography. The Incirlik air base is important to U.S. operations throughout the Levant. So long as it remains available, we are going to have to try to improve relations with Erdogan, who fortunately gets real benefits from those operations.
- As Syria’s northern neighbor with a long common border, Turkey is hosts the largest number of Syrian refugees. The US has spent around $600 million to support them and needs to continue.
- The immediate crunch issue is the sale of F35s to Ankara, which Congress is trying to stop. What is needed is a compromise, one that ends Erdogan’s threat to buy Russian S400 air defenses while allowing the transfer of the F35s. Secretary Mattis is said to be working a deal of that sort. I can’t help but wonder whether a Patriot sale might also still be something Erdogan still wants.
- The question of the Syrian Kurds is next. The agreement on Manbij appears to be working so far and needs to be completed with reformulation of the town’s governing body and withdrawal of YPG forces east of the Euphrates.
- Much tougher will be the issue of prisoner releases: Ankara holds dozens of Americans, apparently hoping to trade them for Gulen. It is hard to convince Erdogan that Trump does not have the same power over Gulen’s fate that Erdogan has over the Americans Turkey holds.
- If, however, a court decides in favor of extradition, I doubt the Trump administration will stand in the way.
- This, I’m afraid, is how we will need to proceed: issue by issue, looking for trades we can reasonably do that Erdogan will find attractive. It will be a hard slog, one during which concern about human rights abuses will likely find little public expression.
- I nevertheless hope the Administration will make a strong case in private against Erdogan’s continued crackdown. All but the immediate coup plotters should be freed, Kurdish political leaders and journalists should be released and amnestied or pardoned, jobs should be restored.
- The strongest potential leverage the Americans have now on human rights is economic: Turkey is headed in a bad direction that will be made much worse if secondary sanctions against Iran are instituted.
- Relief from secondary sanctions could be traded for easing the crackdown, but Trump isn’t likely to do that. Erdogan will have strong incentives to surreptitiously violate the sanctions, which he did even during the Obama era.
- Erdogan has won. Trump is in power. Elections have consequences.
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Israel’s “center”
On Monday, the Brookings Institution hosted M.K. Yair Lapid, founder of the centrist Yesh Atid party, the largest opposition party in the Knesset. Lapid shared his views about current Israeli domestic and foreign policy, including its relationship with the US, as well as his vision for the country’s future. John R. Allen, president of the Brookings Institution, gave introductory remarks, and Tamara Coffman Wittes, senior foreign policy fellow at Brookings Center for Middle East Policy, moderated the discussion. Below, I discuss key takeaways from Lapid‘s remarks.
Foreign Policy Flashpoints
At a time when regional conflict threatens Israel’s relative stability, Lapid described how his country and the international community should approach Israel’s main foreign policy challenges to ensure future Israeli security. On the Palestinian front, Lapid stressed the importance of breaking the silence that has stalled negotiations on a two state solution since the Trump embassy move. A return to dialogue represents the only road to peace. A Palestinian Jerusalem, however, is off the table. Lapid stated that “Jerusalem is a capital; if someone came to DC and asked [the US] to share it with Mexico, they would refuse.” Lapid also criticized UNRWA, arguing that having a refugee agency solely for Palestinians allows Arab countries to maintain a false moral high ground in the conflict.
Lapid blamed Hamas for the recent killing of hundreds of protestors in Gaza by Israeli snipers, saying that the violent protests threatened national security. Although it is not at fault for the violence, Israel must work quickly to solve the humanitarian crisis; after all, Gazan sewage contaminates Israeli water. However, any Israeli efforts to solve the crisis must be predicated by Hamas’ fall from power, clearing the way for humanitarian aid to reach Gazan hands without funding terrorist activities.
Lapid also used national security to defend his country’s controversial position in the Golan Heights. In addition to their strategic importance in fending off the rising Iranian and Hizbollah threat, giving the Golan Heights back to Assad is simply not an option, as it would put 22,000 Jewish lives at risk. Similarly, opening the northeastern border to Syrian Arab refugees also represents an unacceptable security risk. Instead, Lapid called on the US to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Heights, arguing that this move would allow the US to send the message that it does not tolerate Assad’s human rights abuses.
Israeli-US Relations: Troubling Times Ahead?
While Lapid lauded the Trump administration’s goodwill towards Israel, he expressed concern that positive relations on the executive level are papering over fissures that will emerge after Trump leaves office. Chief among these is American Jewry’s increasing disinterest in Israel. Orthodox Jews in Israel have criticized American Reform Jews too much, causing them to feel alienated. Increasing anti-Israel discourse on US college campuses has prevailed over American Jews’ ties to their ancestral homeland. Lapid also linked heightened partisanship under Trump to the erosion of the bipartisan support Israel has enjoyed in the past. As a consequence, bilateral relations could deteriorate during the next democratic administration, leaving Israel more exposed than ever to national security threats from within the Arab world.
Careful Optimism: A Winning Call?
As he discussed his chances for beating Netanyahu in the next parliamentary elections, Lapid emphasized that Israelis are more hesitant about large political shifts than US voters. For that reason, Lapid argued that emphasizing satisfaction with the status quo while calling for gradual crackdowns on corruption and moving towards a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict will be a winning call in 2019. In addition, Lapid advocated for a move away from using empty rhetoric to avoid confronting issues head-on, saying that “we need a government that actually does stuff, not [one] that just eloquently describes the problem.” While his strategy of emphasizing continuation and subtle changes might mean that Yesh Atid does not differentiate itself enough from Likud enough to win in 2019, Lapid hopes that centrist success in Germany and France might bode well for Israel.
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Winners should stabilize, like it or not
Throughout the two-day Stabilization Symposium – held at the Elliott School of International Affairs on June 26-27, 2018 – panels were held to provide “Perspectives from the Frontlines,” sharing witness accounts from a conflict, or recently deconflicted areas, in which a stabilization framework is most likely to be implemented. The Symposium thus hosted a panel entitled “Perspectives from the Frontlines: Syria and Iraq.” Moderated by Moises Venancio, UNDP Regional Advisor for Iraq and Syria, the panel included:
Linda Robinson – Senior Policy Researcher, RAND
Katherine Krueger – Senior Advisor, Stabilization and Development, Creative Associates International
Aya Aljamili – Al Jazeera
Robinson emphasized how important effective coordination is for the success of stabilization on the ground. Different operating partners in Raqqa, Syria – probably different branches of the US government and NGO partners of the government organizations – have differing conceptions of what stabilization meant. This apparently delayed effective implementation. Robinson also stressed the need for government actors to bring non-government actors to the planning table early on if effective stabilization is to happen. Stabilization in Raqqa had been more successful than in some other cases thanks to better communication between partners; but more could be done to improve the process.
Asked how best to go about implementing stabilization, Robinson highlighted the importance of detailed community research. We need to look at the perceptions and priorities of every demographic group, not just local leaders, when determining what is best for a deconflicted region. Gathering such information is difficult when local populations are traumatized and hostile to foreign powers, as is often the case. This is why community outreach to build relationships and trust are important facets of a successful stabilization process.
Krueger pointed out the biggest obstacle to implementing stabilization in Syria: as an inherently political process, successful stabilization requires clearly defined political objectives. The American government has failed to provide such clear political objectives, leading to what Krueger called “stabilization lite.” Implementation is further complicated by the US struggle to find a satisfactory stabilizing intermediary on the ground, with American support for Kurdish troops proving particularly controversial with local Arab populations. She also pointed out how important continued American presence is to deterring radical groups such as ISIS.
In the same vein, Krueger reminded the audience not to forget about reconstructing Mosul and dealing with the huge number of internally-displaced people in Iraq. While the Iraqi elections were reassuring in their focus on corruption and the reduced role of sectarianism, international actors still have a lot to do to ensure that ISIS does not resurge in Iraq.
According to Aljamili, stabilization can only succeed in eastern Syria if a government is formed that not only provides basic services, but also unites disparate local communities under a common banner. According to the Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR), stabilization should function through cooperation with legitimate local actors. Unless the US succeeds in fostering a local government that satisfies the needs of both the Kurds and Arabs, stabilization efforts will flounder.
Because of this, Aljamili emphasized the need to take the time to work within communities, to ascertain what the population wants, before undertaking a stabilization process and “elite bargaining” that may run counter to popular desire. It is also essential to remember that Iraq and Syria are not one entity; even within each state, regions differ substantially, meaning that stabilization processes must be highly tailored to the region in which they are to be implemented.
During the Q&A portion of the panel, I asked whether – seeing the Turkish government’s apparent opposition to the creation of an autonomous Kurdish enclave in the north-east of Syria – stabilization in eastern Syria could function without American political support for the Kurds. To this, Aljamili answered that Turkey will at some point have to face the reality of a strong Kurdish political presence in northern Syria, whether that is as part of a negotiated settlement with Assad’s government or as an autonomous enclave for the foreseeable future.
Krueger said that two possible solutions exist for northern Syria. Maybe multi-sectarian local community rebuilding could occur with the consent of Assad and Turkey. Now that President Erdoğan has won a decisive victory at home, he may reopen negotiations with the PKK from a stronger negotiating position. The other solution would be an official deal between the PYD and the US, with Russia and the US then putting pressure on Turkey to accept the facts on the ground and some form of Kurdish autonomy in Syria, as Assad may be open to such autonomy in majority-Kurdish regions.
The bottom line: it is awkward to talk about an American-support stabilization process in Syria when President Trump has been advocating full American withdrawal. All three panelists emphasized the importance of the American presence in eastern Syria and in Iraq to not just stabilizing, but also rebuilding communities in these regions once the conflict with ISIS is over. Stabilization and peace-building are vital in the aftermath of the fight with ISIS, but the Americans may abandon the effort.
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Chemical weapons: how and who
The deployment of chemical weapons in Homs, Syria by the Assad regime in late 2012 ended a 20-year freeze on state employment of chemical weapons. Since then, the use of these weapons of mass destruction has exploded, with over 200 attacks reported in Syria alone, in addition to incidents in Iraq, Malaysia, and the United Kingdom.
One week before the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OCPW) meets to discuss multilateral methods to enforce accountability for users of chemical weapons, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) convened a group of chemical weapons experts to share their ideas for enforcing accountability for users of chemical weapons. Ahmet Üzümcü, Director-General of the OCPW, gave the keynote address before a panel moderated by Rebecca Hersman, Director of the Project on Nuclear Issues at CSIS, discussed the issue of chemical weapons proliferation. The panel included:
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance
Samantha Job, Counsellor for Foreign and Security Policy, British Embassy Washington
Nicolas Roche, Director of Strategic, Security and Disarmament Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Üzümcü detailed the successes of his tenure as OPCW Director-General, which included the elimination of 96 percent of declared chemical weapons stockpiles worldwide. He also delved into the challenges the OPCW faces in the coming years, emphasizing that increased chemical weapon attacks in Syria and elsewhere call for heightened international coordination to reinforce nonproliferation. However, Russia’s enabling attitude towards Syria’s chemical weapons use has actually eroded this norm. In recent years, Russia has vetoed UN Security Council resolutions to condemn Assad’s actions. Putin has also led a defamation campaign against the OPCW’s investigation methods. In the face of this challenge to the OPCW and its mission, the Director-General advocated for member states to give the organization the power to conduct investigations to identify the perpetrators of chemical weapons attacks.
Roche focused on France’s desire to combat chemical weapons use by strengthening multilateral institutions. He stressed the importance of international partnerships for information gathering and sharing, as well as the need for a stronger OPCW with the power to identify perpetrators of chemical weapons violence. In what could be seen as a slight to both the US and Russian behavior vis-a-vis international institutions over the last year, Roche emphasized that a multilateral regime for addressing the attribution gap in chemical weapons investigations is a greater good. France will move forward with multilateralism in combating the chemical weapons threat, regardless of who is on board.
Poblete agreed that multilateralism should be at the forefront of the fight against chemical weapons proliferation, but argued that bilateral negotiations between states should also play a role. International approaches fail when compromise becomes the enemy of the good. Poblete defended president Trump’s bilateral strategy with North Korea, repeating multiple times that the administration was well-informed going into the Kim summit. Trump’s failure to mention Kim’s chemical weapons program in the buildup or the aftermath of the meeting in no way indicated that dismantling North Korean stockpiles was off the table.
Job took the point about the need for multilateralism a step further, focusing on the critical role OPCW plays in strengthening the international norm against chemical weapons proliferation. Job emphasized the need to combat Russia’s attacks on the legitimacy of the Chemical Weapons Convention’s regulatory body, arguing that member countries should appoint permanent representatives to the OPCW to accomplish this goal. OPCW also needs increased funding to face the threat of chemical weapons attacks by non-state actors. Like Roche, Job also explicitly endorsed giving the OPCW the power to fill the attribution gap that currently exists in the prosecution of chemical weapons crimes.
Bottom Line: The international community is currently at a crossroads when it comes to dealing with the rejuvenated threat of chemical weapons attacks. Our European allies have already decided on the way forward: multilateralism. The United States is still welcome at the international negotiation table, but like with the JCPOA, France and other European powers will not capitulate to the US preference for bilateralism. The United States must present a united front with its allies on the chemical weapons issue, both for the sake of nonproliferation and for prevention of further erosion of American credibility in the current international framework.
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Less heat, more light
@JonEHecht tweeted yesterday:
Kelly: We need to do it for security, but the kids will be fine, don’t worry.
Trump: We’re only doing this cause Democrats made us do it.
Sessions: The Bible told us to do it.
Miller: Hell yeah we’re doing it.
Nielsen: We’re not doing it! Fake news!
The Administration has dug a deep hole for itself since early spring by separating “unlawful” immigrant children from their parents. It appears to be doing this not only for people who cross the border illegally, but also for those who present themselves to border officials seeking asylum, claiming a well-founded fear of persecution if they return to their homelands. The above justifications, while not quotes, are reflections of what different Administration officials have said to justify a policy most of the US views as inhumane and unjustified, even if a Republican plurality supports it.
The underlying political purpose is all to clear: President Trump is using the separation and detention of children as leverage to get Congress to pass an immigration bill that is consonant with his priorities: funding for the border wall, an end to family reunification (he calls that “chain migration,” aka what his wife did to get her parents into the US), and replacement of the visa lottery (which ensures diverse immigrants) with a new system of “merit-based” (i.e. as white as possible) immigration. These changes are unlikely to pass before the November election, but if they don’t the Administration will use immigration issues to mobilize turnout of its increasingly loyal base.
There is room for lots of debate on immigration, which has always been a sensitive issue in the US and elsewhere. But it is important to distinguish between those who come illegally into the US and those who come seeking refuge, either as refugees or asylum-seekers. Neither are unlawful immigrants: they are people seeking to avail themselves of humanitarian provisions in US and international law. There are also remarkably few of them who make it to the US. This year we may not take in more than half the 45,000 refugees that the Administration has set as a ceiling. This is a small fraction of the about 1 million legal immigrants to US admits yearly.
I know a number of Syrian asylum seekers who have been here for years. While their cases have not yet been adjudicated, let there be no doubt: each of them would be at risk if forced to return to Bashar al Assad’s Syria. The defected diplomats and the leaders of early non-violent demonstrations for democracy in Syria would be obvious targets for persecution. The day may come when they can return, but only to a Syria where democracy and rule of law have replaced the brutality of a cruel and unforgiving personal dictatorship. There is no sign of that on the horizon.
In the meanwhile, my Syrian friends and many others who are admitted as refugees or seek asylum in the US are benefiting our country enormously: they help us all to understand what is going on abroad, they work hard to support their families once they get work permits, they pay their taxes, and they enrich our cultural and social life. They are people trying to survive a period of exile that will surely last longer than they would like, but that redounds to our benefit.
The bigger immigration issue concerns people who cross the border illegally, often for economic reasons. I understand people who worry about that, but the number of unauthorized people living in the US has declined since the beginning of the Obama Administration (which coincided with the depths of the financial-crisis induced recession). And they are not responsible for a disproportionate share of crimes, which are committed more often by those born in the US. To talk of them as “infesting” the US, as the President did today, is an effort to mobilize the Republican base, not an effort to encourage a reasonable approach to a difficult issue. Immigration needs less heat and more light.
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Giving away the store for a photo op
President Trump today agreed to suspend US military exercises with South Korea during negotiations with the North and to provide Pyongyang with unspecified security guarantees in exchange for an equally vague commitment to denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. He and Kim Jong-un also got their photo op, which featured a stunning array of American and Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea flags.
The quid pro quo is clear: the US will be guaranteeing the permanence of one of the most brutal dictatorships on earth and reducing its commitment to its South Korean allies in exchange for some still-to-be-determined constraints on North Korean missile and nuclear weapons capabilities. The joint statement contains no reference at all to human rights issues or North Korean abductions, though it does refer to repatriation of the remains of prisoners of war and those missing in action from the Korean War. All you need to know about this deal is what the Republicans would be saying if President Obama had negotiated it.
Kim also got a lot from the photo op, which portrayed him as the equal of the President of the United States. The handshake was a de facto acknowledgement of North Korea’s nuclear power status, legitimizing both the regime and its acquisition of nuclear weapons. It will strengthen Kim both at home and abroad. Trump has no problem with that: he seems to relish relations with dictators and disdain democrats.
Trump will also benefit from the photo op, though less than Kim. He’ll use it to assert effectiveness in foreign policy, an arena in which the Administration has had absolutely no success and a number of significant failures, not the least at the G7 meeting in Quebec last weekend. The Atlantic alliance is a shambles, relations with European and Pacific allies and trading partners have been upended, and Russia continues its occupation of part of Ukraine as well as its marauding in Syria. America is more alone in the world, and less able to exert its will, than it has been in decades.
I don’t expect Trump’s supporters to understand or acknowledge this. Their enthusiasm for Trump is unconditional. I do hope that others can see through the photo op to what it really amounts to: Trump has given away the store in exchange for very little. He is a lousy negotiator. He put himself in the unenviable position of having no alternative to this premature and ill-advised meeting. The only hope left is that now some serious American negotiators will get busy making lemonade out of Trump’s lemons.
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