Tag: Syria
Rattled now, unglued next
Donald Trump this morning tweeted:
Russia vows to shoot down any and all missiles fired at Syria. Get ready Russia, because they will be coming, nice and new and “smart!” You shouldn’t be partners with a Gas Killing Animal who kills his people and enjoys it!
Mara Liasson on NPR nails just how dumb and inconsistent this bravado is: it gives the Russians ample notice (something Trump criticized Obama for doing), it compels Trump to enforce a red line (something he also criticized Obama for doing), and it ensures that the US will not be able to leave Syria anytime soon (as Trump has said he wants to do). If Trump now backs off, he looks weak. If he goes ahead, he gives Putin an opportunity to show the prowess of Russian air defenses.
Yesterday the White House spokesperson made clear that Trump thinks he can get rid of Special Counsel Mueller and is thinking about doing so. Monday’s FBI raid on the President’s personal lawyer/fixer, Michael Cohen, precipitated that forewarning, even though it was not requested by Mueller. Trump called the raid a “break-in,” though the search warrants were approved by Justice Department officials Trump appointed, as well as by a judge, who all had to agree that there was probable cause Cohen had committed a crime.
The President has met opponents who don’t yield to bullying. Putin and Assad are murderers, not schoolyard toughs or New York real estate rivals. It is pitiful to see a president of the United States all but pleading for Moscow’s cooperation, also in a tweet this morning:
Our relationship with Russia is worse now than it has ever been, and that includes the Cold War. There is no reason for this. Russia needs us to help with their economy, something that would be very easy to do, and we need all nations to work together. Stop the arms race?
The guy who was going to make America great again is trying to bribe Putin into submission and offering to back down on US military modernization. Putin isn’t likely to bite. Nor is Trump’s calling Assad an “animal” going to intimidate a man whose name means “lion.” He has already killed hundreds of thousands of Syrians and mauled many more.
The only real question about Trump at this point is when he becomes completely unglued. My guess is that the search of Cohen’s premises is not only related to his admitted payment of $130,000 in hush money to Trump’s porn star fling but that her account of a threat of physical harm has attracted the prosecutor’s attention. A prosecutor might well hope to find evidence of Cohen ordering up that threat in his office, home, or hotel room.
Hard to see where and how this ends, but we haven’t seen the worst of it yet. Trump is rattled now, unglued next.
PS: Here’s an interview I did last night for CGTN on the Syria situation:
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The missing ingredient
Syrian President Assad, thumbing his nose at the US, launched another major chemical attack Saturday, this time against Douma on the outskirts of Damascus, a year and a couple of days after the deadly Khan Shaykhun sarin attack last year. Assad has been using chlorine frequently over the past year. It is not yet clear which chemicals were used in Douma, but dozens died.
This attack attracted President Trump’s attention. First he blamed President Obama for not holding to his red line (actually he said for not crossing the red line, but the literate know he meant the opposite). Then he skipped golf after threatening that Assad would pay a BIG PRICE and blaming in part Vladimir Putin, the first time anyone can remember his criticizing Russia’s president by name.
Last year Trump launched 59 cruise missiles against the base from which the Khan Shaykhun sarin gas attack was launched. There was no serious or lasting impact, except for those unlucky enough to be at the base. It got back to operation quickly and chlorine, but not sarin, attacks continued.
Both Russia and Syria have denied Syria used chemicals on this recent occasion. Moscow issued a stern warning of “gravest consequences” if Syria is attacked. That presumably means US military intervention could precipitate Russian escalation. The Americans have already killed dozens if not hundreds of Russian mercenaries who attempted in February to cross the Euphrates to capture oil and gas fields American allies now control in eastern Syria. Moscow downplayed that incident. This time it is likely to retaliate with escalation of its own. Where that cycle would end is dreadful to contemplate.
I suppose the Americans will be tempted. But even if they double or triple the number of cruise missiles, it won’t make much difference. What was lacking last time around, and is likely to be lacking this time as well, is a viable diplomatic strategy for bringing the Syrian war to an end. Using military force without a political game plan is senseless.
The missing ingredient here is not force. It is diplomacy. The Americans should desist from another one-off with cruise missiles unless they have a serious diplomatic initiative in mind that would benefit from it. Assad is only going to yield at this point if the military balance is significantly altered and he fears he may be unable to hold on to power. It is difficult to imagine how the Americans could make that happen, though depriving Assad of his air force might make a difference.
The first step is to demonstrate unequivocally that the attack originated from Assad-friendly forces. That is not as difficult as it sounds, because only those forces fly airplanes. It is in any event not credible that the Syrian opposition–even its most extreme factions–use chemical weapons only against their own and never against Assad’s forces or their Iranian and Russian supporters. Once responsibility for this particular attack is established for all to see and hear, the Americans need to line up their allies and friends for a sustained campaign, with a political game plan Assad’s only way out.
If we are not willing to do that–and I doubt we are–maybe we had best do nothing beyond the usual condemnation. If we are missing the key ingredient to the secret sauce, force isn’t going to work.
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Syrian chessboard
Entering its eighth year, the civil war in Syria has developed into a serious regional conflict. What started as a popular uprising by the Syrian public against Bashar al-Assad’s authoritarian regime has become a struggle for power between external actors, including both regional heavyweights such as Turkey and major global powers like Russia. Today, the Syrian theater is a battlefield for the mostly opposing interests of these actors. This competition has obstructed any progress towards a peace settlement for Syria. Rather, the conflict of interest is perpetuating the Syrian ‘civil war,’ with dire consequences for the country and its population.
On April 2, the Wilson Center hosted a panel addressing the issue of outside powers and the future of Syria. Moderated by Aaron David Miller, Vice President for New Initiatives and Middle East Program Director at the Wilson Center, the discussion sought to break down the array of interests present in the Syrian conflict and the different roles that Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Israel have assumed. Paul du Quenoy, Associate Professor of History at American University of Beirut, Amy Austin Holmes, Associate Professor of Sociology at American University in Cairo, David Pollock, Kaufman Fellow at the Washington Institute and Director of Project Fikra, and Robin Wright, USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow, offered their perspectives as long-time analysts of Syria and the Middle East.
Paul du Quenoy argues that Russia’s primary interest is to maintain a presence in the Middle East through preserving the Moscow-friendly Assad regime. Following the Arab Spring in 2011, Russia felt marginalized and humiliated. The political changes in countries such as Libya sidelined Moscow in regional affairs and sparked fears that the wave of public protests and regime instability could even reach Russia. To protect its influence in the Middle East, Moscow thus intervened in the civil war in 2015.
Although Russia has achieved its core goal, the overall track record of its intervention has been meager, highlights du Quenoy. Moscow succeeded in stabilizing the Assad regime. However, it is now bogged down in a costly conflict requiring continuous military activities. Russian hopes for becoming the core facilitator of a lasting peace solution for Syria and a central actor in the profitable business of rebuilding the country have not materialized. Instead, Moscow has had to recognize its limited leverage. Since Russia’s strategic interests are tied to the survival the Assad regime, the despot can exert influence on Moscow’s agenda and even obstruct unfavorable Russian policies.
In contrast to Russia, Iran has been more successful at promoting its interests, says Robin Wright. Tehran’s Middle East policy is driven by a feeling of vulnerability. Against the backdrop of its Shia religious orientation, Iran “feels strategically lonely,” that is, it considers itself surrounded by a hostile Sunni camp. To cope with this adverse environment, Tehran seeks to project power beyond its borders. This undertaking of expanding Iranian influence in the Middle East has been mostly implemented through establishing a strategic corridor linking Tehran in the East with Beirut in the West. Syria is an integral part of this land bridge. Although its intervention in the Syrian conflict has been costly, Tehran considers its efforts to sustain the Assad regime a long-term strategic investment essential to Iranian national security.
According to Austin Holmes, Turkey likewise sees its national security at stake in the Syrian conflict. Ankara’s primary interest is to keep the Syrian Kurds—who maintain close relations with their Turkish brethren—at bay. Faced with an ongoing domestic Kurdish insurgency promoted by the PKK, Turkey wants to avoid the establishment of a Kurdish autonomous zone in northern Syria stretching all along the Syrian-Turkish border. In 2016, Ankara launched its first intervention in Syria dubbed ‘Euphrates Shield’ to prevent a connection of the Kurdish cantons of Afrin and Kobane. In January 2018, Turkey stepped up its military activities to further weaken the Kurds, launching operation ‘Olive Branch’ aimed at occupying Afrin. While Ankara succeed at taking over the Kurdish stronghold, the repercussions have been inimical. Holmes stresses that the Turkish attacks on the Syrian Kurds undermine the fight against ISIS and jeopardize the Kurdish governance project of ‘Rojava,’ which she views as seeking to establish democratic principles in northern Syria.
For Israel, the Syrian civil war has become an existence-threatening challenge, says David Pollock. In essence, the Israeli leadership has been preoccupied with its immediate, narrow interest of keeping the border with Syria secure, and has tried to stay out of the broader Syrian conflict. This approach translated into a threefold strategy: (i) securing the Golan Heights as a buffer zone, (ii) reducing the presence of and threats from hostile actors—including Hezbollah, the IRGC, other Iranian militias, and jihadists—near Israeli territory, and (iii) obstructing the transfer of advanced weapons to any of these actors. To achieve these goals, the Israeli air force has in the past conducted targeted air strikes. Israel has also engaged in intensive talks with Russia and has provided humanitarian assistance to populations in southeastern Syria to build strategic goodwill.
However, Pollock points out that Israel’s interests are eroding. Air strikes have merely achieved tactical successes and were unable to prevent Iran and its proxies from expanding their presence in Syria. Perception of a strategic threat is growing. Moreover, the United States remains disinterested in Syria and is unwilling to counteract Iranian encroachment. Israel therefore sees a need to intensify its involvement in the Syrian conflict to protect itself, and will most likely expand its military interventions in the foreseeable future.
Syria’s future looks bleak. The civil war has evolved into an open-ended confrontation among regional and international actors, which will continue to add fuel to the fire. Destruction and killing of innocent civilians will drag on. Unwilling to force an end to the conflict, the West should at least alleviate the human suffering that millions of Syrians both inside and outside the country endure.
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Stay, but not for long
March 29 President Trump declared:
We’re coming out of Syria, like, very soon. Let the other people take care of it now. Very soon—very soon we’re coming out.
He reiterated that sentiment Tuesday. Yesterday the White House confirmed that the troops will stay, at least for now. Apart from the question of who is really commander-in-chief, and whether President Trump has any idea what he is talking about, this ambiguity (or is it vacillation?) leaves us with important questions: should the troops stay or go? What should their goals be?
The only valid purposes for staying should be US national interests, in particular vital ones. Staying only if Saudi Arabia agrees to pay–a proposition the President has floated–violates this first principle. Foreign governments do sometimes pay part of the costs of deployed American forces, but only when the deployment (to Japan, South Korea, Germany, Italy, or Qatar for example) meets the criterion of being in the US national interest. American troops should not be for sale.
What American interests can be served by extending the US presence in Syria, now that the Islamic State has lost almost all of the territory under its control? I think there are three possibilities:
- Prevent resurgence of ISIS, which will continue its insurgency despite its loss of territory.
- Counter Iran’s presence and influence.
- Prevent allied Syrian Kurdish forces from aiding the insurgency inside Turkey.*
A continuing American presence in eastern Syria is not going to bring down President Assad or otherwise hinder his depredation of the Syrian people. It will not expel the Iranians or the Russians. The US hasn’t even been willing to counter Assad’s use of chemical weapons against civilians, never mind the extensive bombing of civilian targets and abuse of those who surrender to “reconciliation” agreements.
Weighing against the continued US presence are many factors: the risks to the small numbers of Americans (2000 or so) spread out over the large territory east of the Euphrates, the dubious legality and legitimacy of the operation (especially once ISIS has been pulverized), the likelihood that our presence will lead to mission creep in either military or civilian directions, and the costs and domestic political sustainability of the operation. The US troops have shown they are capable of defending themselves, having fended off a Russian mercenary attack weeks ago. But sooner or later, dozens or maybe hundreds will be killed or wounded. How long will an impatient president who promised to bring American troops home from the Middle East persist in keeping them there once that happens?
The troops will at some point be withdrawn. The question is what conditions can be created to allow that to happen without imperiling vital US interests.
First and foremost is some minimal stabilization before withdrawal, so that local people will have the means and the will to resist any ISIS resurgence. That is what is going on now. The key is not physical reconstruction, which will take years, but rather clearing mines and rubble as well as establishing a modicum of legitimate governance by and for local people. Here is a lengthy discussion of the issues involved in stabilization of both Iraq and Syria Monday at USIP:
If President Trump, as some have suggested, was talking about Saudi money for the stabilization process, that would make a whole lot more sense than selling our troop presence.
Countering Iran’s presence and influence is not going to be easy. They are on the winning side in this war. They don’t really have to come through the part of Syria US and allied forces control to be present and influential there. It seems to me the best we can do is try to negotiate withdrawal of the Shia militia forces Iran has deployed inside Syria, in exchange for US withdrawal of its ground forces. It might not work of course, especially as the President has already tipped them off as to what he wants. I thought he said he wasn’t going to do stupid things like that. But it might be worth a try.
It will be difficult, to say the least, to sever the tie between the Syrian Kurdish forces (PYD) with which the US has collaborated to defeat ISIS and the Kurds rebelling inside Turkey (PKK). The two organizations are closely tied ideologically and loyal to the same leader. But if the US wants to restore its relations with NATO ally Turkey, that is what it needs to try to do. The first step should be getting the PYD out of Manbij, a mostly Arab town west of the Euphrates, as Vice President Biden promised in the summer of 2016. The US Central Command is dead set against fulfilling that commitment, as it doesn’t want to abandon its Kurdish allies. But that’s why we have civilian control of the military.
The Turks should be able to live with PYD, or at least Kurdish, dominance of the area east of the Euphrates, but the Kurds as well as their Arab allies south will need at least continuation of US air support to prevent the area east of the Euphrates from falling to a revived extremist group, the Syrian armed forces, or Shia militias. As a former colleague pointed out to me yesterday, that is precisely what the US did in Iraq for more than a decade: it enforced a no-fly zone that effectively protected Iraqi Kurdistan from Saddam Hussein. During that time, Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds found a modus vivendi, at least until the Kurdistan referendum last year. The air support would most effectively be provided from Turkey, as it is today. Turkey would expect to receive from the PYD at the very least a verifiable pledge of non-assistance to the PKK, as well as assurances about allowing pluralism in their part of Syria.
The good options in Syria evaporated long ago. The best the US can do now is use its position there to meet limited but important national interests that will endure past the troops withdrawal. That will mean staying, but not for long.
*For those keeping score, here are Secretary of State Tillerson’s deadletter objectives:
1) ISIS and al-Qaeda must suffer an “enduring defeat” and Syria must never again become a platform for transnational terror organization that targets U.S. citizens;
2) Syria’s seven year-long civil war must draw to a close through a brokered diplomatic settlement;
3) Iran’s influence in Syria must be “diminished” and its “dreams of a northern arch…denied;”
4) The conditions should be created to allow Syrian refugees and internally displaced people to return to their homes;
5) Syria must be “free” of weapons of mass destruction.
I’ve watered down 1), eliminated 2), kept much of 3), eliminated 4) eliminated 5), and added Turkey and the Kurds.
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Peace picks, April 2 – April 8
- Cross-Strait Relations Under the Trump Administration | Monday, April 2 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Stimson Center | Register here |
Since the unprecedented phone call between President Trump and Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen in December 2016, the Trump administration’s approach to Taiwan has fluctuated. The latest twist came on March 16 when President Trump signed the Taiwan Travel Act. This law, which permits American officials to visit their counterparts in Taiwan and encourages high-level officials from Taiwan to visit the U.S., prompted a strong protest from Beijing. On the heels of the signing of the TTA, the U.S. sent two deputy assistant secretaries of state to Taiwan. Given these developments, where will relations between U.S., the PRC, and Taiwan go from here? Join us for a timely conversation between Bonnie Glaser, Director of the China Power Project at CSIS, and Yun Sun and Yuki Tatsumi, Co-Directors of Stimson’s East Asia Program. A light lunch will be served.
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- Syria and the Outside Powers: What They Want and Can They Have It? | Monday, April 2 | 1:30pm – 3:00pm | Wilson Center | Register here |
The Syrian civil war is many overlapping conflicts, including the competition and cooperation among outside powers vying to protect their interests, often at the expense of Syria’s sovereignty. What are Russian, Iranian, Turkish, Israeli, and American objectives in Syria, and can they achieve them? Join us as four analysts of Syria and the region address the issue of outside powers and the future of Syria. A conversation with Paul du Quenoy (Associate Professor of History at American University of Beirut), Amy Austin Holmes (Associate Professor of Sociology at American University in Cairo), David Pollock (Kaufman Fellow at the Washington Institute and Director of Project Fikra), and Robin Wright (journalist/author and USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow), with moderator Aaron David Miller (Vice President for New Initiatives and Middle East Program Director at the Wilson Center). There will be a webcast of this event.
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- Iraq and Syria: Views from the U.S. Administration, Military Leaders and the Region | Tuesday, April 3 | 10:00am – 2:30pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
With ISIS driven from its urban strongholds in Iraq and Syria, the urgent task of stabilizing the region – and preventing the return of terrorists – is underway. While Iraq and Syria face many internal challenges and tensions, Iran, Turkey, Arab Gulf State, the United States and Russia are advancing competing agendas. What are the stakes for Iraq, Syria, the region and the world as the struggle for leverage, stability, and reconciliation continues after ISIS? What is the U.S. role? Please join U.S. Administration and military leaders, senior Iraqi representatives and regional experts as they explore one of the most complex and consequential conflicts of our time.
On Panel 1 (10:00am – 11:00), A Pivotal Moment for Iraq – Amb. Fareed Yasseen (Ambassador to the United States, Republic of Iraq), Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman (Kurdistan Regional Government Representative to the United States), and Sarhang Hamasaeed (Director, Middle East Programs, U.S. Institute of Peace), with Amb. Alberto Fernandez (President, Middle East Broadcasting Networks) as moderator.
On Panel 2 (11:20am – 12:30pm), Entering the Post-ISIS Era: Iraq and Its Neighbors – Dr. Elie Abouaoun (Director, Middle East and North Africa Programs, U.S. Institute of Peace), Dr. Mark N. Katz (Professor of Government and Politics, George Mason University), Alireza Nader (Senior International/Defense Researcher, RAND), and Mona Yacoubian (Senior Advisor for Syria, U.S. Institute of Peace), with Kevin Baron (Founding Executive Editor, Defense One) as moderator.
On the Keynote Panel (1:30pm – 2:30pm), Fraught Terrain: Stabilizing Iraq and Syria After ISIS – Gen. Joseph L. Votel (CENTCOM Commander), Amb. Mark Green (Administrator, USAID), and Brett McGurk (Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, U.S. Department of State), with Stephen J. Hadley (Chair, Board of Directors, U.S. Institute of Peace) as moderator.
Network lunch will be held with box lunch provided; RSVP required.
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- The Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen | Thursday, April 5 | 2:00pm – 3:00pm | CSIS | Register here |
Labeled the worst humanitarian crisis in today’s world, the conflict in Yemen is entering its fourth year. To understand the impact the war is having on the Yemeni people, and the challenges it poses to policymakers, join us for a discussion with David Miliband (President and CEO, International Rescue Committee) which will be followed by a panel discussion with Barbara Bodine (Director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University), Peter Salisbury (Senior Consulting Fellow, Chatham House), and Abdulrahman Al-Eryani (International Economist and Development Specialist).
This event will be webcast live.
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- The Future of the JCPOA: Implications for the U.S., Its Allies, and Adversaries | Thursday, April 5 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |
The future of the Iran nuclear deal may soon be clarified. President Trump has asked Congress and our European allies for revisions to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by May 12, and in the meantime will be advised about how and whether to continue American participation in that plan by a significantly reorganized foreign policy team—including new leadership at the State Department, National Security Council, and CIA. Join a panel of experts to explore near-term U.S. policy options, and their international ramifications, with respect to the JCPOA. Including New America International Security Fellow Oubai Shahbandar; Hudson Institute Adjunct Fellow Michael Pregent; Heritage Foundation Policy Analyst Michaela Dodge; Foundation for Defense of Democracies Freedom Scholar Michael Ledeen; and Foundation for Defense of Democracies Senior Advisor Richard Goldberg.
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- Seeking Solutions for Somalia | Friday, April 6 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Brookings Institution | Register here |
Despite important progress through years of international counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and state-building assistance, peace and sustainable stabilization remain elusive in Somalia. Pernicious governance processes give continual lease on life to al-Shabab and other destabilizing armed actors. Improving governance and state-building—and subjecting Somalia’s governments and powerbrokers to accountability—are fundamental for conflict reduction and eventual stabilization. On April 6, Brookings Senior Fellow Vanda Felbab-Brown will brief her December 2017 fieldwork in Somalia and review key security and political developments. Landry Signé, a David M. Rubenstein fellow in the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative, will discuss how the persistence of bad governance, corruption, marginalization, and economic mismanagement have led to state failure and insecurity in the country. Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon will moderate the discussion.
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- Iran’s Sunnis Resist Extremism, But for How Long? | Friday, April 6 | 10:30am – 12:00pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
Iran, a predominantly Shia nation, has a substantial Sunni minority estimated at 15 million of its 80 million population. Politically and economically disadvantaged, these Sunnis receive relatively little attention compared to other minorities and are potential victims of radicalization as tensions flare between regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Atlantic Council’s Future of Iran Initiative invites you to a discussion of Iran’s Sunnis and the launch of a new paper, Iran’s Sunnis Resist Extremism, But for How Long?, by veteran journalist Scheherezade Faramarzi. Faramarzi, who has covered Iran and the Middle East for four decades, traveled in 2015 and 2016 to the southern Iranian province of Hormozgan on the Persian Gulf and also conducted interviews by phone and in person in the United Arab Emirates and with experts based in Europe. Also featuring expert on Middle Eastern and South Asian affairs Fatemeh Aman and Future of Iran Initiative Director Barbara Slavin as moderator.
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Fragile states pose security threats
State fragility is on the rise. In recent years, civil wars have proliferated throughout the world. In 2015, the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) reported 49 active intrastate conflicts, the highest number since 1991; likewise, casualties have increased consistently during the past 25 years. These developments are worrying. In contrast to most interstate conflict, civil wars are extremely difficult to resolve. Studies on intrastate conflicts since 1945 have shown that civil wars tend to last an average of about seven to twelve years, making their repercussions tremendous. As the brutal civil war in Syria exemplifies, the fallout includes humanitarian crises, the rise of extremist organizations, and regional political instability. Policy makers in the West must thus adopt more effective policies to stabilize fragile and failed states.
On March 19, the United States Institute of Peace hosted a high-profile panel discussing how the United States and the international community can address better the national security challenges stemming from state fragility. Nancy Lindborg, President of the US Institute of Peace, was joined by Ilan Goldenberg, Director of the Middle East Security Program at Center for a New American Security, and Kimberly Kagan, founder and President of the Institute for the Study of War. Joshua Johnson, host of NPR’s program 1A, moderated the discussion.
State fragility poses critical security threats. According to Nancy Lindborg, fragile states are characterized by the inability to provide basic public goods such as security and lack political legitimacy as governments typically exclude parts of their citizenry from participating in politics, the country’s social life, and the economy. As a result, fragile states suffer from weak institutions and are less able to manage shocks like disasters and conflict. In this respect, Ilan Goldenberg emphasizes that fragile states often require merely a spark to disintegrate. Collapsing states create serious security vacuums. As outside actors are concerned about losing political influence, they are incentivized to intervene. This generally exacerbates and perpetuates the conflicts already unfolding within failed states.
Syria is a prime example for this vicious dynamic. Goldenberg argues that the 2011 Arab Spring caused the disintegration of the Syrian state and ignited a domestic conflict, which has developed into a regional and international fight over influence in the Levant. Today, Syria is divided into five different zones of influence: a Jordanian-supported rebel pocket in southwestern Syria, the Iran-backed Assad regime in the center of the country, an al-Qaeda safe haven in the province of Idlib, a Turkish-controlled territory in the north, and a Kurdish canton that enjoys US support. Conflict erupts at the intersections of these “tectonic plates.” To pacify Syria, all involved parties must first agree on long-term political arrangements concerning these hotspots before a national reconciliation project can be launched. Goldenberg is however not hopeful that positive change will occur soon. Kimberly Kagan affirms this observation and stresses that the diverging interests of the foreign actors involved in Syria impede any peace progress.
To avoid more Syria-like scenarios, the United States must invest more effort in stabilizing fragile states and pacifying failed states. Given U.S. economic strength, Lindborg argues that Washington has a moral obligation to help fragile states. Support must thereby exceed simple humanitarian assistance and rather address the sources of fragility. Kagan highlights that moral obligations often align with political and security interests such as counteracting breeding grounds of terrorism. She thus advocates more US engagement in form of a balanced hard and soft power approach to help fragile states recover themselves and create situations whereby governance can return. Goldenberg adds that the United States also acts as a role model in addressing state fragility. If the US demonstrates leadership, other states follow suit.
However, Washington is currently unwilling to meets is obligation of providing stability around the world. Lindborg points out that US policies are too reactive. Although consecutive administrations have identified state fragility as a key security threat, they have only responded to crises after they had become far too problematic. The United States is in a state of “hunkering down” whereby Americans are “tired of playing world police.”
It is clear, however, that the United States and European states must tackle state fragility more proactively. While conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, or South and Central America often appear to be localized problems at first glance, they have critical repercussions on the political, societal, and economic situation in the developed world. The international refugee crises and its impact on European and US politics is evidence enough for this circumstance.
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