Tag: Syria
Stalemate isn’t very ispirational
A post about why I haven’t been writing a post is odd, but here it is.
Reason one:
I’m working on a book. It focuses on a particularly strong set of international norms that have achieved global legitimacy despite frequent controversy. For more than 85 years, the world has accepted the recommendations of a non-governmental group with no legal authority as definitive. Why and how does that happen? The norms in question protect you and me from ionizing radiation. More on that as the work progresses.
Reason two:
I’ve pretty much exhausted what I have to say about the two wars I am most interested in. Syria’s multi-sided war reached stalemate a couple of years ago. The Russians, Turks, Americans, Israelis, and Iranians all lack the will to push harder against their adversaries. All can live with the present situation, at least for a while. The Syrian regime lacks the capacity to do what it wants: exert its control over the entire country.
The Ukraine war is not so much stalemated as grinding on, with the Russians consolidating control over some areas and the Ukrainians winning back others. Ukraine’s acquisition of better artillery and Russia’s prevention of Ukrainian agricultural exports via the Black Sea are the two big deciding factors at the moment. Russia’s army has proven inept at best, but its navy still controls the sea, despite the sinking of its flagship. In the meanwhile, civilians suffer. Watch the video above.
Reason three:
Stalemate also characterizes the Balkans. Serbian President Vucic and Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti are both unwilling to take the steps required to normalize relations between the two countries. Even smaller agreements and their implementation are not moving ahead rapidly. In Bosnia, Serb and Croat leaders have frozen the legislative and electoral processes, in order to gain political advantages for their ethnic nationalist political parties. Croatia and Serbia are doing nothing to help improve the situation. Even people who know a lot about the Balkans do not have a lot of ideas what to do, though they do have some good ones.
To make matters worse, EU member Bulgaria is still preventing North Macedonia from starting the process for EU accession. There, too, the problem is ethnic nationalist claims to history and language. Stalling North Macedonia also stalls next-in-line Albania, which in turn demoralizes Bosnia and Kosovo.
Reason four:
The Iran nuclear talks are also stalled. The ostensible reason is US refusal to remove the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from its sanctions lists, but my guess is that the IRGC is none too happy with the prospect of return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Tehran is now much closer to having the material it needs for nuclear weapons than when the agreement was signed in 2015. Why go backwards? Tehran has improved its sanctions evasion, oil prices are high, and Israeli military action would rally Iranians to defend a government that many of them dislike.
Not much to be said
But there are moments when there isn’t much to be said. We need to hope diplomats are trying to resolve all these stalemates in a positive way. The best we can do is await developments, publishing whenever a decent idea comes across the neurons. Stalemate isn’t very inspirational.
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Stevenson’s army, May 14
– Erdogan signals opposition to NATO membership for FInland and Sweden, which requires unanimity.
– CNN says IC is reviewing failure — except by State’s INR — to foresee strength of Ukrainian resistance.
– WaPo says US may have violated promise against 3d country transfer of Russian aircraft.
– WSJ says US has cut some Syria sanctions.
– Macron wants Zelensky to make concessions.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Prospects for real peace in Syria: not good
The sixth pledging Conference for the Future of Syria and the Region met in Brussels yesterday and today. On the margins, Baytna, a Syrian organization committed to empowering civil society, hosted a discussion (Peace in Syria: possibility or fantasy?) assessing the prospects for a real, sustainable peace. Not good, in two words.
Justice and accountability
The UN Commission of Inquiry and its Independent, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IMMM) as well as the use of universal jurisdiction to prosecute war criminals in Germany are important tools. But they have not produced substantial results. Only a few political prisoners have been freed, out of well over 100,000. So far the accused are a few small fry. There will be a great deal more to do once the opportunity arises.
A political transition is vital. Justice goes beyond accountability, especially for women. A broader framework of rule of law and security is needed.
Failure to hold people accountable in Syria has encouraged Russian abuses in Ukraine. Impunity for Bashar al Asad has taught others that they can escape accountability.
The economy
The situation today is disastrous. The overwhelming majority of Syrians are poor and in need of assistance. That is partly due to international sanctions. Once real peace arrives, a strong central authority will still be needed to manage the economy. When the time comes for lifting of sanctions, the international community needs a plan to do it expeditiously. [I missed some of the presentation on the economy, so apologies for that].
Rights and government
Syria needs radical political decentralization. The constitution should limit the powers of the presidency. Elected local authorities should control education and some taxation authority. The government needs to respect the social, cultural, and political rights of minorities. We can learn from the recent constitution in Tunisia, which instituted decentralization as a principle of the state. The existing provisions for decentralization in Syria are not adequate.
Social cohesion and peacebuilding
Local actors are key. They have a deep understanding of how things really work at the community level. We need to understand their political and social agendas and respond to their context and priorities. Funding should be flexible and accessible, aimed at strengthening civil society organizations that set their own priorities, regardless of who the local authorities are. We should not create or impose risks on Syrians trying to meet local community needs.
On the pathway to peace, an audience member suggested Syrian representation is an issue. It is not enough just to exclude those “who have blood on their hands.” Inclusiveness has hampered negotiations. The course of the war in Ukraine suggests helping Syrians to defend themselves might help. Only the Syrian people will be able to remove the regime and rebuild civil society. It’s a long road. We need to invest in people inside Syria who will make a difference.
As my Arabic is miserable, I missed most of the discussion. But the bottom line was clear enough: prospects for real peace in Syria in the short run are not good.
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Stevenson’s army, March 15
– WaPo notes that Russia’s mercenary Wagner forces are now in 18 African countries.
– New Covid cases force multiple lockdowns in China.
– Politico reports DOD proposal to send more trainers to Ukraine was rejected in December.
– FT says Russia’s tactics in Ukraine look like Syria playbook.
– NYT says Russia is using missile with good decoys.
-GZero looks at Belarus role.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, March 7
– NYT says US has approached Venezuela about buying oil.
– WaPO says US is planning in case there is a Ukrainian govt in exile.
– WSJ says Russians are recruiting Syrians for Ukraine war.
– K St Lobbyists for Russia out of luck.
– Politico has more on the interagency fight over trade policy
– A student told me of Treasury Oct 2021 report on sanctions policy.
– Amy Zegart analyzes effects of Ukraine info ops.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Ukraine and Iran will make Syria harder
Ukraine may seem far from Syria. But it is not. Nor is Iran. What happens in Ukraine won’t stay in Ukraine. What happens in Iran as well as Ukraine will affect the now more than decade-old war in Syria, through geography, markets, diplomacy, and politics.
The fighting and sanctions will hamper Russia in Syria
The Russians have been fighting insurgency in Syria since 2015, primarily with air power but also with some troops on the ground. The effort is not large, but Ukraine will take priority. Sanctions will severely limit Russian financial resources. This could affect not only military resources but also willingness to invest in reconstruction. The state-owned companies that might take such a risk are not going to have the cash to do it.
In addition, Russian relations with Turkey, the US, and possibly Israel will be strained. Cooperation with Turkey is important in northwest Syria, where Turkish troops and proxies are in control. Cooperation is important with the US in northeast Syria, where American troops are supporting the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. Israel depends on Russian restraint when its aircraft attack Iranian forces and shipments inside Syria.
Moscow will have little reason to segregate the diplomatic and deconfliction issues in Syria from Ukraine. A weakened Russia may well seek pressure points in Syria to respond to international pressure in Ukraine.
Iran will be emboldened
Russia and Iran both support the Assad regime in Syria, but they also compete for influence there. Assuming the Iran nuclear deal revives, Tehran will have a lot more money with oil at around $100/barrel. Some portion of that will find its way to military and financial support for Assad. Even if the JCPOA remains moribund, Iran will find itself strengthened in Syria relative to Russia. It will try to use that strength to embed itself more strongly into the Syrian regime, in particular its security forces (which have grown closer to Russia in recent years).
An emboldened Iran will be less likely to compromise on Syria issues than a weakened Russia, but Moscow has the vital veto in the UN Security Council. Tehran might be even more inclined than Russia to shut off vital cross-border humanitarian assistance to Syrians, but in the end Moscow will decide.
The West’s stake in Syria will increase
The Ukraine war increases the West’s stake in Syria. Abandoning its anti-regime fight there would raise serious doubts about American and European resolve to continue support for Ukraine. Credibility isn’t everything, but it is something. The Biden administration had already tacitly recommitted the US to its continuing presence in northeast Syria supporting the Kurds and allied Arabs, if only to avoid a second Afghanistan debacle and to continue the counter-terrorism fight.
Net net
Syria has not been going anywhere anyway. The UN-sponsored constitutional talks are stalled, humanitarian relief is falling short, terrorism threats are growing, and accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity is limited for now to gathering of documentation and the German courts. Russian weakness, Iranian strength, and Western resolve are going to make things harder, not easier.
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