Tag: Syria
Ukraine and Iran will make Syria harder
Ukraine may seem far from Syria. But it is not. Nor is Iran. What happens in Ukraine won’t stay in Ukraine. What happens in Iran as well as Ukraine will affect the now more than decade-old war in Syria, through geography, markets, diplomacy, and politics.
The fighting and sanctions will hamper Russia in Syria
The Russians have been fighting insurgency in Syria since 2015, primarily with air power but also with some troops on the ground. The effort is not large, but Ukraine will take priority. Sanctions will severely limit Russian financial resources. This could affect not only military resources but also willingness to invest in reconstruction. The state-owned companies that might take such a risk are not going to have the cash to do it.
In addition, Russian relations with Turkey, the US, and possibly Israel will be strained. Cooperation with Turkey is important in northwest Syria, where Turkish troops and proxies are in control. Cooperation is important with the US in northeast Syria, where American troops are supporting the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. Israel depends on Russian restraint when its aircraft attack Iranian forces and shipments inside Syria.
Moscow will have little reason to segregate the diplomatic and deconfliction issues in Syria from Ukraine. A weakened Russia may well seek pressure points in Syria to respond to international pressure in Ukraine.
Iran will be emboldened
Russia and Iran both support the Assad regime in Syria, but they also compete for influence there. Assuming the Iran nuclear deal revives, Tehran will have a lot more money with oil at around $100/barrel. Some portion of that will find its way to military and financial support for Assad. Even if the JCPOA remains moribund, Iran will find itself strengthened in Syria relative to Russia. It will try to use that strength to embed itself more strongly into the Syrian regime, in particular its security forces (which have grown closer to Russia in recent years).
An emboldened Iran will be less likely to compromise on Syria issues than a weakened Russia, but Moscow has the vital veto in the UN Security Council. Tehran might be even more inclined than Russia to shut off vital cross-border humanitarian assistance to Syrians, but in the end Moscow will decide.
The West’s stake in Syria will increase
The Ukraine war increases the West’s stake in Syria. Abandoning its anti-regime fight there would raise serious doubts about American and European resolve to continue support for Ukraine. Credibility isn’t everything, but it is something. The Biden administration had already tacitly recommitted the US to its continuing presence in northeast Syria supporting the Kurds and allied Arabs, if only to avoid a second Afghanistan debacle and to continue the counter-terrorism fight.
Net net
Syria has not been going anywhere anyway. The UN-sponsored constitutional talks are stalled, humanitarian relief is falling short, terrorism threats are growing, and accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity is limited for now to gathering of documentation and the German courts. Russian weakness, Iranian strength, and Western resolve are going to make things harder, not easier.
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What happens in Ukraine won’t stay in Ukraine
Here are the speaking notes I prepared on the Balkans and Middle East for this noon’s event on “What’s Next for Russia, Ukraine, and the World?” It featured Johns Hopkins/SAIS faculty:
Balkans
- American policy since the end of the Cold War has aimed at “Europe whole and free.” That isn’t going to happen so long as Putin or someone of his ilk rules Russia.
- Serbia claims neutrality, but its current leadership advocates a “Serbian world” akin to Putin’s “Russian world.” Belgrade also refuses to sanction Moscow. De facto Serbia is siding with Russia.
- That puts Bosnia, Kosovo, and NATO member Montenegro at risk from Serb irredentism.
- The line between democracies and autocracies will therefore also be drawn through the Balkans unless Belgrade changes its inclinations.
Countering Russian ambitions and Moscow’s Serb proxies needs higher priority:
- Deployment of an additional 500 EU troops to Bosnia is a good first step. But more are needed. The UK should augment that deployment. The US should beef up the military presence in Brcko and move some troops to northern Kosovo .
- The EU should tell Serbia that continued adherence to neutrality in Ukraine will result in a halt to the EU accession process.
- The US, UK, and EU should end bilateral and multilateral assistance to Republika Srpska and threaten likewise to Serbia.
Middle East
In the Middle East, the situation is more ambiguous. The interests at stake are less compelling and US policy more accepting of autocracy:
- Syria backs Russia and Iran is attempting the Chinese straddle (for peace but against Ukrainian membership in NATO). Egypt, the UAE, and other small Gulf monarchies are ducking for cover. Saudi Arabia so far has decided to enjoy high oil prices.
- Israel has backed Ukraine, but cautiously to avoid Russian retaliation against its interests in Syria and domestic political complications. Turkey has also backed Ukraine, less cautiously.
- Ultimately, the Middle East will go with the flow. If Russia is successful, no one in the Middle East will refuse to maintain diplomatic relations with a puppet government in Kyiv.
- OPEC+ will gain traction and Russian inroads in the Middle East will expand.
- But if Russia fails, the Middle East countries, democracies and autocracies alike, will claim they supported Ukraine, even if OPEC+ suffers irreparable damage.
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Stevenson’s army, February 3
In class on Monday we talked about non-papers, the documents used in interagency meetings and international diplomacy to allow ideas to be offered as suggestions rather than demands or promises. They are useful because they don’t create a paper trail of concessions if the end result is a compromise. [Congress has a similar approach, saying “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.”]
Now we have an actual example. The US response to Russia’s demands on Ukraine was in the form of a non-paper. A Spanish newspaper got a copy and has the story and a downloadable copy here. BEWARE: if you have a security clearance, you are not supposed to access or copy a classified document [Confidential in this case] on an unclassified device.
In other news…
– US special forces conducted a raid in Syria overnight. Biden says it killed a terrorist leader.
– NYT’s David Sanger suggests US may be pushing Putin too far over Ukraine.
– SFRC ranking member Risch is releasing a report critical of the US witrhdrawal from Afghanistan, due to be posted on his SFRC website.
Today is the day Austin & Blinken will be giving classified briefings to House & Senate on Ukraine. Watch for comments/leaks afterward.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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What terrorism tells us about northeast Syria
Former Syrian diplomat Bassam Barabandi sounds the alarm about support for Kurdish governance in northeast Syria:
In Syria, people differ dramatically on the attack the Islamic State carried out in Hasakah last week. Those affiliated with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) believe that Turkey was behind it. Pro-Turkey Syrians believe that the battle was a ploy serving SDF. Opposition not affiliated with SDF or Turkey believes the regime is behind the attack. Anti-imperialists think the US remote-controls ISIS. Regime supporters blame Turkey, the SDF, the US, the Gulf States and NATO.
What is clear
Some things are clear. US and British commandos managed the anti-ISIS operations and partook in them, exposing SDF weakness and the likelihood it is infiltrated. ISIS has the ability to surprise. That raises many questions about how the terrorists got past checkpoints in large numbers, with their weapons. Northeast Syria is just not a priority for the Arab opposition. It is keen on nothing but continuing to receive funds from donors; it did not even issue a statement condemning ISIS or calling for civilian protection.
No Arab voice in the northest has publicly condemned the terrorist attack. There are several reasons:
- SDF has failed to build trust with the Arab majority.
- Failure of the SDF to eliminate, or provide protection from, terrorist sleeper cells.
- Lack of leadership by elders, groups of elders, leaders of local councils.
All are fearful of their interests at home or in the countries where they live. Their real influence doesn’t go beyond the boundaries of their homes.
The missing ingredient
None of the international actors in the northeast have an interest in dealing with heavyweight Arab leaders. Those who claim to be representing Arabs and other local populations know that they are in their positions only so long as they have no real weight or influence. This has led to the Arab majority feeling marginalized.
Marginalization promotes instability. All powers – the Assad regime, Russia, Iran, terrorists – are working to fill the void. They make promises of a better future if the Arabs cooperate against the Kurds and the Americans. Fortunately, the population does not trust these countries or the terrorists. The local Arabs for years have raised their complaints with Amerrican and Western officials at every meeting. They still hope that the international coalition will be more positive in dealing with them, despite the SDF’s behavior.
Nearly a year ago, the SDF announced it had released the ‘less dangerous terrorists’ upon a request from local leaders, elders and others. Now we need to know who those elders were. Who came forward with those demands? Who submitted lists of names? Who claimed to represent the people of Deir Ezzor, Raqqa and Al-Hasakah? Their identities should be published.
Arab leadership is needed
All the projects of restoring stability, governance, building social peace, and the international initiatives aimed at enhancing Arab-Kurdish communication are useless in achieving real, longterm stability if it does not address the local political questions. They may be good for building the region’s economy, creating jobs and establishing infrastructure, but the principal problems are political—not the lack of services. None of the projects will achieve the essential goal of restoring stability to the region and fighting terrorism.
A new social contract between Kurds and Arabs is needed, one that achieves political, economic and social balance. This will require genuine elections, at least among Arabs, to produce real political leaders who can run their communities and bear responsibility. Otherwise, the northeast will remain unstable. The regime, Russia, and Iran will take advantage of the situation. The Arabs and Kurds of the northeast will miss the opportunity created by the presence of the international coalition forces.
Everyone would benefit
The Americans – including politicians, lawmakers, and think tanks, even those run by Arabs – want to establish a Kurdish entity with special status (an independent region or a federalist unit). They exaggerate the strength of SDF in all fields (military strength, protecting minorities, economy, social service, promoting democracy, and equal representation). The reality is different. More than 60% of the SDF are Arabs. They represent the largest number of dead and wounded during the battles to liberate the region from ISIS. Continuing with the illusion that the Kurds are responsible for the defeat of ISIS is unrealistic.
The Assad regime, not the Syrian people, persecuted the Syrian Kurds for the last 60 years. No one should believe that Assad will give the Kurds their political rights. Neither political pressure nor oil will be persuasive. It would be a dangerous misadventure for which Arabs and Kurds will pay its price. Real decisions should be taken to enhance stability by empowering serious Arab leaders—for the sake of all parties.
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Stevenson’s army, January 21
– WSJ says US allows Baltics to transfer arms to Ukraine.
– FT says Taliban threatens Pakistan.
– Oath Keepers were armed for insurrection.
– Fred Kaplan analyzes Biden’s Ukraine gaffe.
– NYT says US special forces bombed a dam in Syria on “no hit” list. Senior officials had denied attack.
– In FA, SAIS prof Hal Brands says US is overstretched militarily.
– More on CIA assessment of Havana Syndrome.
– China demands end to foreign FONOPs.
On the 80the anniversary of the Wannsee conference,NYT remembers. I’ve been to the place where the meeting occurred. Here are the minutes of the meeting.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Make Putin watch his back
Alexander Vindman is the former National Security Council official who gave vital incriminating testimony in Trump’s first impeachment. He blew the whistle on the President’s phone call with President Zelensky of Ukraine, in which Trump sought dirt on then candidate Joe Biden. Now a doctoral student at SAIS, Vindman has interesting, if discouraging, things to say about Russian intentions with respect to Ukraine:
Not a lot of good options in Ukraine
Vindman believes Russia is likely to invade Ukraine, with the aim of keeping Ukraine in its sphere of influence and making it a failed state, one that cannot offer a democratic model for those who want to escape Moscow’s tentacles. Sanctions he thinks won’t have much more impact than in the past, because Russia has hardened its economy against them. In addition, Putin controls a $620 billion sovereign wealth fund, and China will help cushion the blow.
The best military hope lies in NATO countries. The US could station more troops in NATO countries near Ukraine. They, especially those on the eastern front that Russia threatens, could in turn train the Ukrainians and perhaps deploy troops and equipment to help the Ukrainian army defend against attack.
But Putin is vulnerable elsewhere
Vindman ignores Putin’s vulnerabilities beyond Ukraine. One of these was dramatically apparent in Kazakhstan over the last few days, when protesters challenged President Tokayev. The protests quickly turned violent. Tokayev sought Russian help to protect vital installations and ordered his forces to shoot to kill.
The Russians did not send a big force–supposedly only 2500 troops–but Putin is also saddled with defending his annexation of Crimea, besieged Belarusan President Lukashenko, secessionist provinces in Georgia, and the homicidal Syrian President Assad, not to mention maintaining Russian forces in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The Russians are also active through proxy forces in Libya and the Central African Republic. They are building bases in half a dozen African countries. Russian empire-building is reaching further than even Moscow’s Soviet-era ambitions.
A crisis in any one of these places could bring a halt to Putin’s ambitions in Ukraine.
Including at home
Putin is also vulnerable at home. While he has acquired de facto autocratic powers, he is less popular than once he was. Corruption is his Achilles heel. The Kremlin has murdered one potential rival and poisoned, then imprisoned, another. A free and fair election could well do Putin in, so he won’t allow that. He also faces local ethnic and religious minority resistance to his increasingly nationalist and chauvinist rule.
If the Americans want to protect Ukraine, they will need not only to beef up its defenses and undermine Russia’s economy, but also figure out how to exploit Putin’s political and military vulnerabilities beyond Ukraine.
Make Putin watch his back.
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