Tag: Tunisia
The pandemic weakened the weakest governments and social groups
The Middle East Institute June 15 hosted a seminar discussing the impact of COVID-19 on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This was in collaboration with the recently released 6th wave of the Arab Barometer, an expansive regional survey. Using the results from this survey and analysis from the Brookings Doha Center, the panel assessed the pandemic’s effects on the region and the perceived efficiency of government responses. As the survey was held in three rounds throughout 2020-2021, the Arab Barometer could also register changes over time. Bottom line: the pandemic exacerbated the region’s existing problems and the hardest hit were the most vulnerable communities (refugees, the poor, and women).
The speakers were:
Yasmina Abuzzuhour
Visiting fellow
Brookings-Doha Center
Salma Al-Shami
Senior research specialist
Arab Barometer
Shala Al-Kli
Non-resident scholar
MEI
Deputy regional director
Mercy Corps
Karen Young (moderator)
Senior fellow and director, Program on Economics and Energy
MEI
Exacerbating existing problems
Shahla Kli COVID has worsened existing issues, particularly for IDPs and refugees. She highlighted two of these structural weaknesses in particular:
- Lack of institutionalization: This is manifested in weak healthcare systems and social welfare programs. COVIC pushed these to their limits. Furthermore, some countries (such as Syria or Lebanon) lack well-structured recovery and vaccination plans, exacerbating and lengthening the crisis.
- Unemployment/the ‘youth bulge’: Problems in the labor market abound in the MENA region. Many of its youthful populations work in informal, day-to-day jobs. This is particularly true for migrants and refugees. Often these jobs disappeared during lockdowns. Conversely, many poor citizens and migrants had no choice but to continue working despite the pandemic, potentially falling ill themselves.
Public opinion
Salma al-Shami outlined the relevant results of the Arab Barometer on this topic. The Barometer gathered data on seven countries (Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) due to financial and access constraints. She summarized the findings in five main points:
- Concern for COVID is still high in these countries, but it is significantly higher among women than among men.
- The loss of education for children and increased cost of living were the the number one and two concerns. In Jordan some 140 days of education were lost according to UNESCO, and even more in Iraq.
- Public opinion on government response to COVID varies with the assessment of the healthcare system and inflation control. If these are positively rated, the government’s response also tends to be. This is the case in Morocco and Tunisia for example, while Lebanon and Iraq lack such public confidence. Morocco was also the only country where significant relief packages were deployed. Some 49% of respondents in that country indicated they received some form of aid, where that number didn’t top 20% in any of the other countries.
- Concerning vaccines, there is still some hesitancy. Where trust in government is high, so is the willingness to take a vaccine, as in Morocco which has already seen an exemplary vaccine rollout compared to its neighbors. However, in Jordan, Algeria, Iraq, and Tunisia, only 35-42% indicate they are willing to take a vaccine. Abouzzouhour added that in Jordan conspiracy theories surrounding the vaccines are rampant, and that the government is often not the public’s primary source of information.
- The survey data also indicates that COVID has exacerbated issues of income inequality and unemployment. Few respondents indicated they lost their jobs because of COVID-related lockdowns, although many did experience a temporary job interruption. Women and migrant labor in general suffered greater consequences.
Government responses
Adding to the statistics related to government response to COVID, Abouzzouhour commented that governments overpromised and underdelivered. The first wave saw major lockdowns and task forces with health experts, leading to a comparatively strong performance. However, the initial best cases (Tunisia and Jordan) failed to follow through on their success because they favored opening up for their economies. Additionally, relief packages and strong vaccination drives often faltered, despite government promises. In general, countries that previously underinvested in healthcare (as a percentage of their GDP) suffered high mortality rates.
Two interesting cases emerged from her story. Once again, Morocco was underlined as a strong performer in vaccination compared to its neighbors. Algeria is less clear-cut. It has some of the lowest infection rates in the region. However, its mortality rate is comparatively high, indicating that case numbers are likely underreported more than in other countries. Algeria was also criticized for failing to set up significant relief packages, despite the nation’s hydrocarbon resources.
Watch the recording of the event here:
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Ten years of Arab protests but little change
Almost ten years have passed since the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi sparked mass protests in Tunisia, sparking regime change and brutal civil wars across the Arab world. While most consider the initial uprisings in 2011 an abject failure for the cause of democracy in the region, the resurgence of mass protests over the last two years in Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria and elsewhere demonstrate that the Arab Spring continues to smolder. The Wilson Center convened a panel of scholars to address the future for a region destabilized by ten years of civil unrest.
Rami Khouri: Former Public Policy Scholar; Director of Global Engagement, American University of Beirut, columnist, Agence Global Syndicate, USA, and The New Arab, London and Nonresident Senior Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School
Marina Ottaway: Middle East Fellow, Former Senior Research Associate and Head of the Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Ziad Abu-Rish: Co-Director, MA Program in Human Rights and the Arts, Bard College; Co-Editor, Jadaliyya
Merissa Khurma, moderator: Program Manager, Middle East Program
The genie is out of the bottle
Rami Khouri, Marina Ottaway and Ziad Abu-Rish all concurred that mass protests were a “new normal” for the Middle East that should be expected throughout the region into the future.
Khouri points to several factors that prompt citizens across the region to protest their governments. The economic situation has become dire for many citizens of Arab states. The middle class has all but disappeared and most governments are no longer able to provide basic necessities for their citizens. Citizens are overwhelmingly turning to civil society for support. COVID-19 has increased inequality regionwide. MENA is the only region that is overwhelmingly authoritarian and adept at suppressing discontent. The resulting clash between the desperation of the citizenry and repression will lead to more mass protests until one side finally gives way.
The speakers concur that the same economic factors that stir discontent can also deprive protests of their strength. Abu-Rish notes that fatigue from economic deprivation has caused a lull in the Lebanese protests after the explosion. Arab governments understand this, and thus are playing a war of attrition against protestors.
Solidarity has grown through shared strife
Rami has noticed another new phenomenon created by a decade of protests – a cross-cutting sense of national identity. Ottoway echoed this sentiment, explaining that as protestors from different walks of life interact with each other, they realize that they are protesting for the same set of basic human needs and are able to overcome their ideological differences. But she cautions that not all Arabs share the same principles of citizenry; some are happy to live under authoritarian leaders if doing so grants them security and privilege.
But opposition needs leadership
Ottaway and Abu-Rish were less optimistic about the prospects of democratization and liberalization in the Middle East than Khouri. The protestors, while they are united in the belief that the status quo must be changed, have competing visions about what should replace it. Ottaway also notes that, historically, change almost always occurs from the top down. The decentralized nature of the protests means that protestors will find it difficult to persuade policymakers that change is needed. She points to Tunisia, Sudan, and the American civil rights movement to argue that change only occurrs because there are leaderships within the opposition that persuaded the ruling elites to make changes.
To watch the event in full, click here.
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Covid crackdowns and mobilization
“Government responses to the new coronavirus are disrupting civil society all over the world. But while government measures are dramatically restricting civic space, the global crisis is also catalyzing new forms of mobilization.” On May 20, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a discussion on “Global Civil Society and the Pandemic.” The discussion was moderated by Thomas Carothers and featured three other guest speakers:
Thomas Carothers (Moderator): Senior Vice President for studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Yousseff Cherif: Deputy Director of Columbia Global Centers, Tunis
Maureen Kademaunga: Doctoral Researcher at the Human Economy Research Program, University of Pretoria, South Africa
Janjira Sombatpoonsiri: Associate Fellow at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA)
Vijayan MJ: Independent researcher and writer, Research Collective, New Delhi, India
Current context
In his opening remarks, Carothers touched on the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s current research on the state of civil activism throughout the world. There are conflicting narratives. On one hand, there has been a trend toward governmental restriction on the role and function of civil society. On the other hand, a new generation of dynamic, fluid, and tech-savvy civil activists has emerged despite increasing state restrictions.
Carothers believes that the COVID-19 pandemic intensifies this dualism within civil society. Many governments throughout the world have implemented state lockdowns and have increased restrictions on freedom of movement, freedom of association, and freedom of speech. Carothers views the current period as “the most restrictive period in living memory for civic activism.” Despite this fact, Carothers highlights that the COVID-19 pandemic creates an enormous need for citizens to engage, respond, and find ways to improve governmental responses to the virus.
Changing roles
Cherif highlights new roles the COVID-19 pandemic has created for civil society groups in Tunisia. Many organizations have shifted their work from democracy promotion and governance to combating COVID-19. This includes aiding hospitals, distributing masks, and cleaning public spaces. In places where the government has proven to be inefficient or too weak to act, civil society groups have continued the work of government and have led COVID-19 relief initiatives. Although the Tunisian government has shown interest in working with these groups during the pandemic, Cherif believes that future cooperation remains unlikely.
Kademaunga believes that the government of Zimbabwe has utilized the COVID-19 crisis to justify further restrictions on civil society groups. Government human rights abuses against civil society groups in Zimbabwe are increasing. Simultaneously, these groups continue to increase their efforts in assisting the government of Zimbabwe in the provision of essential services during the current lockdown.
Vijayan states that civil society groups in India quickly changed their agendas at the start of the COVID-19 crisis. During the initial stages of the pandemic, civil society groups took charge when the Indian government remained absent. Indian civil society groups have been more efficient than the Indian government in devising a plan of action.
Transformation of activist means
Cherif observes that the COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically increased the online presence of civil society groups on various digital platforms throughout the Arab world. Civil society groups have utilized webinars as spaces for new online discussions. Notably, some have started to increase their educational initiatives online.
Kademaunga predicts that the shift towards online platforms post-COVID-19 will harm those in rural areas who do not possess widespread digital access. Previously, in Zimbabwe they accounted for the majority of civil society participation. Kademaunga stressed that this changing dynamic will foster heightened inequality between rural and urban areas. Ultimately, those within urban centers will dominate the agenda making processes for civil society groups.
A pivotal moment for legitimacy
Cherif regards the COVID-19 pandemic as pivotal to how ordinary citizens view the legitimacy of civil society groups. Previously, the majority of Tunisians viewed civil society groups as unfavorable and distant from the rest of society. Due to their integral role in providing support during the current crisis, these groups have gained legitimacy and favorability.
Kademaunga believes that the COVID-19 pandemic will bring about a major change in the perception of civil society society groups in Zimbabwe. Traditionally, the government of Zimbabwe has fueled negative discourse against civil society groups. However, the role of civil society groups in providing aid amid the COVID-19 pandemic disproves negative stereotypes that portray these groups as being in opposition to the interests of general citizens.
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Consensus is hard
Following elections in September and October, Tunisia is having difficulty forming a government. Presiding is a populist president without a political party who has in the past proposed radically overhauling the entire system, abolishing political parties, and creating a form of direct democracy.
On February 19, the Middle East Institute hosted a panel discussion on “The State of Tunisia’s Democratic Transition and the Power and Perils of Consensus Politics.” The discussion featured four speakers:
Daniel Brumberg, director of Democracy and Governance Studies at Georgetown University and a senior non-resident fellow at POMED,
Sharan Grewal, an assistant professor of government at the College of William & Mary,
Mohamed-Dhia Hammami, a scholar at Wesleyan University in the College of Social Studies and Government, and
Sabina Henneberg, a postdoctoral fellow in the African Studies Program at SAIS.
William Lawrence, a visiting professor of political science and international affairs at American University, moderated
Current context
Hammami attributed the difficulty of forming a government to the fragmented parliament and the president, whose lack of party affiliation contributed to the disarray. President Said designated Elyes Fakhfakh as the new prime minister because of Ennahda’s inability to gain enough votes to form a new government. Fakhfakh excluded Heart of Tunisia from his coalition because of Nabil Karoui’s corruption cases, scandals, and lobbying with the Israelis. Ennahda withdrew its support from Fakhfakh to call for a government of national unity. A new parliamentary election would be risky. President Said thus invited UGTT, which is a labor union with political legitimacy, to act as a mediator between Fakhfakh’s government and opposing parties.
Consensus politics
Brumberg indicated that social, ideological, political, and geographical divisions in the society show Tunisia’s divisions. Identity politics reflect concern of exclusion, make a majoritarian system difficult. For a diverse group to achieve consensus, parties have to postpone difficult issues, such as economic reforms, the need for a supreme court, and security reforms. Brumberg believes that there’s no alternative to deal with Tunisia’s pluralistic structure other than reaching a consensus. If Tunisians were to move beyond the consensus, to deal with the issues that have been postponed and approach a majoritarian system, it could be troubling for the entire state.
Grewal added that consensus politics was important from 2011 to 2014 during the establishment of the constitution. The transition to democracy should be done only once rules are set. The national unity government in 2015 continued the transition, thus postponing divisive issues. The parties thereby escaped blame for failed policies and avoided bringing back the polarization that plagued 2012-13.
Henneberg attributed the 2012-13 polarization to Ennahda’s inexperience, insecure domestic context, and the rise of opposition to the Egyptian Islamist government. She agreed that Tunisia required an inclusive consensus to write a successful constitution. This resulted in the establishment of the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet to overcome the polarization.
Ennahda’s concerns
Hammami argued that Ennahda is in favor of sustaining consensus politics, which helps it to survive. Ennahda’s support for including Heart of Tunisia in the parliament was due to the lack of consensus to pass political, security, and economic reforms. Grewal noted that Ennahda also has concerns about Fakhfakh, who might repolarize politics.
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Tunisia looks for a government
Nine years after the revolution, although the Tunisian government brought effective democratic change, little economic or social progress has been made. In October, Kais Said, a political newcomer, won the presidential election with 73% of the vote, beating Nabil Karoui, who was previously jailed for corruption. Ennahda won the parliamentary election and selected Habib Jemli to be prime minister-designated. However, on January 10, Habib Jemli stepped down as he failed to win a vote of confidence.
On January 14, Carnegie Endowment for International Studies hosted a discussion on the topic of what Tunisians are expecting from their new leaders and what will happen if those expectations are not met. The discussion included three young Tunisians: Amir Ben Ameur, a social activist who advocates for youth development and democracy, Aymen Abderrahmen, a program coordinator in the Leadership Division at IREX, and Oumayma Ben Abdallah, a human rights research and Tunisia analyst. The discussion was moderated by Sarah Yerkes, a fellow in the Carnegie Middle East Program.
Why the government failed to form
Abderrahmen explained the political system in Tunisia and emphasized that Tunisians are sick of the replication of political phases. They lack trust towards the previous government because it failed to fulfill its reform and anti-corruption promises. They also believed that the government was too weak to deliver economic reforms.
Abdallah attributed the failure to the lack of administrative transparency, parliamentary consensus and participation, and detailed reform guidelines. Ameur blamed lack of transparency and the lack of common ground between Jemli and rival parties. He pointed out the government’s failure to tackle real problems. Corruption galvanized doubts among Tunisians.
Remedies
Ameur thinks Tunisia needs a government with greater accountability. The government should bring out detailed, grassroot reforms in a long-term vision. Tunisians need more confidence in government despite current hardships . Abdallah wants more transparency and conviction. She also noted that since the current parliament is fragmented, the new/proposed government should result from political consensus.
To fix unemployment, the government needs a clear strategy for social and economic reform. Abderrahmen noted that the government has recently publicized some plans, but further work in this direction is needed.
Enthusiasm for the transition
All three guests indicated that Tunisians feel deprived of dignity because revolutionary demands were not met. Ameur claimed that young people still have some hope for the government because launching another revolution would be a devastating move. He and Abdallah acknowledged that Tunisia is overall a free country, but economic challenges are still severe. Politicians need to fulfill their promises.
Why the President won
Abderrahmen noted that President Said didn’t try to cater to young people. People were not voting for Said, but against Karoui. Ameur underlined that the younger generation likes Said because he made no promises. Although other candidates had more political and government experience, people were not confident in them as they previously failed to deliver. Abdallah is concerned that since the president ran as an independent, he has no parties backing him, which will make it hard to tackle corruption problems.
The next government
Abderahmen hoped to see another election so that different parties may come up with a consensus. Ameur expressed a desire to have more young people lead the government. Abdallah was not enthusiastic about a new election, which can generate political risks. Instead of presenting a new election, it is urgent to find solutions to economic and social problems.
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Good election, big challenges
On October 29 the Middle East Institute (MEI) and Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) hosted an event entitled “Observations from the Tunisian Election.” Tunisian Ambassador Fayçal Gouia delivered the opening remarks and participated in the panel discussion. Georgetown Professor and North Africa specialist William Lawrence moderated the discussion. Panelists included Jeffrey England, deputy director of the Middle East and North Africa program at the National Democratic Institute (NDI), Patricia Karam, Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa division of the International Republican Institute (IRI), Sarah Yerkes, Middle East Fellow at the Carnegie Institute for International Peace, and Thomas Hill, senior program officer for North Africa at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP).
England emphasized that the joint election observation undertaken by NDI and IRI demonstrated several positive aspects of the Tunisian election. Despite the fact that the July 25 death of former President Essebsi required the election to be held sooner than originally planned, it was peaceful and administered professionally. England also highlighted that the Parliamentary and Presidential debates that were held for the first time are evidence that the democratic system continues to mature. He noted that while there are lingering questions about turnout in the election, there was a larger pool of voters in both rounds than expected. England felt that because President Kais Saied does not belong to a political party he may be better able to hold the parties in Parliament to account.
Karam agreed that the election observation demonstrated several positive developments but noted that Tunisia should amend several aspects of its electoral framework prior to the next election, including campaign finance regulations, media rules, and the interaction between the judicial and electoral systems. Polling shows a crisis of confidence in politicians, growing dissatisfaction with the democratic experiment, and the sense that Tunisian political parties lack a clear vision for economic reform. This dissatisfaction is particularly deep among Tunisian youth, with preliminary data showing that youth turnout in the election may have been as low as 16%. Karam believes Tunisians voted for Saied because they prioritized stability in government, even if it comes with older, more conservative ideas.
Yerkes argued that while Saied received 70% of the votes, giving him a strong mandate, the incarceration of his opponent Karoui during the election was a significant flaw in the democratic process. She believes the election was unquestionably free but does not think it was fair. Karoui’s incarceration highlighted the need for Tunisia to implement a system for absentee voting. The electoral law allows prisoners to vote but there is currently no mechanism for them to do so, meaning that Karoui was unable to vote for himself.
Several panelists agreed that Tunisia’s economy was the key issue in this election and will play a key role in the future of its democracy. Gouia stated that job creation and delivering economic reform will be the first priority of the new administration. England asserted that while the electorate’s main concern was revolution in 2011 and identity in 2014, now people want to see results, particularly on economic issues. Hill argued that the Tunisian social contract has shifted so that graduates expect the government to create jobs for them rather than being entrepreneurial. England agreed, stating that the economic problems cannot be solved before the next election. He felt that the government should focus on developing a long-term plan to reform the economy and attempt to reframe the people’s expectations so that they understand that economic change will take time.
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