Tag: Tunisia
The pot is boiling once again in North Africa. Sudanese President Bashir, in power since 1993, is under arrest and his country under de facto martial law. Algerian President Bouteflika has resigned after almost 20 years in power. Libyan General Haftar is trying to take Tripoli by force. The smart money is betting he will bog down in a stalemate with opposing militias from Western Libya.
Not everyone is in turmoil. Morocco and Tunisia, which both embarked on political reforms in the wake of the Arab Spring, are at least for now continuing in that direction. Egypt’s President and former Field Marshall Sisi has restored its military dictatorship, cracked down hard on both Islamist and secular opposition, and embarked on some economic reforms.
Less visible in all these countries is the role of the Gulf potentates. The United Arab Emirates has backed both Sisi and Haftar, hoping to they will eradicate Islamists from their polities. Qatar has backed the Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. The Saudi-led coalition fighting against the Houthis in Yemen has used mercenary Sudanese troops, thus indirectly supporting Bashir. Iran has backed the Houthis but has not engaged heavily in North Africa, since there are few Shia there. Tehran’s interests are much stronger in Syria and Iraq.
American engagement in North Africa has been sporadic and targeted mainly against violent Islamist extremism, especially in Libya and more indirectly in Egypt. President Trump has said Libya is Europe’s problem, which makes a lot of sense since Spain, France, and Italy all have strong stakes in North Africa due to migration as well as oil and gas supplies. The problem is that the Europeans have found it hard to combine their efforts. Instead they compete for influence and undermine each other. It is unlikely that they will find a way to use their considerable clout to good effect.
The result will likely be that the North Africans will be left to find their own way. That might not be the worst of all possible worlds, even if it is fraught with risks. Libya’s downward spiral after its 2011 revolution does not suggest much indigenous capacity to manage without international help. But Libyans have always resisted it and are now vitiating the latest UN efforts to unify its state structures and begin the process of recovery from civil war.
Sudan and Algeria have better prospects. Their revolutions have so far been mostly nonviolent (apart from the force the police and military have indulged in). Nonviolent revolutions have a much higher probability of generating peaceful and democratic outcomes. But in both places the strong role of the military runs the risk of a detour to autocratic rule, as in Egypt. That is a contingency the demonstrators will have to guard against, so as not to fall into the Sisi trap.
The trick is to bring the pot to boil, but not let it boil over. If it does, extremists will exploit the situation. North Africa is not immune to Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and more localized jihadist organizations. Derna in Libya, where the US marines fought “on the shores of Tripoli,” has seen several revivals of extremists since Qaddafi fell, though Haftar for now seems to have things there under control. Tunisia has likewise generated lots of foreign fighters for the extremists, despite its so far successful political transition.
Let’s keep an eye on this pot.
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The Arab Center for Washington DC hosted a panel discussion April 4 about “Algeria’s Protests and the Prospects for Change.” The panel included Marina Ottaway, Middle East Fellow at The Wilson Center, Geoff D. Porter, president of North Africa Risk Consulting Inc., Hugh Roberts, Edward Keller Professor of North African and Middle Eastern History at Tufts University, and Sara Yerkes, Middle East fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Roberts spoke about the unanimity and uniformity of the Algerian protests demanding the ailing president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, step down. Six Fridays of protest passed so far in a friendly manner: people chanting the slogan “the system must depart.” Although the president has resigned, it is much harder to get the entire system to leave, as it would be impossible to import a new one. Elements of the system should be preserved, Roberts said, but unfortunately the protesters have not yet come to this conclusion.
According to Roberts, the protests were successful in large part due to support from groups like National Organization of Mujahideen (veterans), lawyers, judges, school teachers, and some radical political parties. Most importantly, Gaid Salah, vice minister of defense, who was appointed by the resigned president and supported him in the past, has also aligned himself with the uprising. The military will try to convince ex-President Liamine Zerwoual, known for his integrity and transparency, to run the transitional period. Failing to do so, it could be hard to legitimize the presidency with the people.
Ottaway note that Algeria was widely viewed as immune to the 2011 Arab Spring. Eight years later that was no longer the case, as Algerians took to the street and high-level officials around the president sacrificed him. It is however still unclear whether the opposition can force a new system. The outcome of the uprising in Algeria will be determined not by how soon elections are held, but by how successful the regime’s opponents are in moving from protest in the street to becoming participants in the transition. Protesters need to remain in the streets to put pressure on the regime, while also organizing to become effective political players. Tunisia offers an example of a slow transition with broad-based participation that led to real change. By contrast, Egypt embarked on a much faster process with narrow participation, resulting in an entrenched militay.
Yerkes gave an overview of the effect of the Algerian protests on neighboring countries, mainly Morocco and Tunisia. Morocco said it “will not interfere or comment” on the Algerian protests. Morocco hopes the new Algerian government will reach an agreement regarding the Western Sahara conflict. Morocco is also worried it could be next, as most North African presidents have either been ousted or run away. While Moroccans favor the Algerian protests, the government would rather see the situation return to normality. In Tunisia, there is a big worry the insecurity will affect the Western border between the two countries, which was once a harbor for terrorists. Tunisia won’t be able to handle chaos in Libya and in Algeria. Tunisia’s president has not said a word about the Algerian protest movement, but he would like to see his country’s “successful spring” being replicated elsewhere.
Porter argues the political structure of Algeria has not changed since independence. There are four elements that make it unique:
- War veterans are held in high esteem but have lost their connection with young people.
- The military does not know where its role starts and ends, and whether it is a political actor or only a guarantor of stability.
- People have a kind of blind trust in the military reflected in the slogan “Army and the people are brothers.”
- Rule of law is uncertain.
Bottom line: the government is emphasizing the importance of consensus at this critical juncture, but the reason for the current situation is lack of consensus, in particular on a new president. Where this crossroads will lead is still unclear.
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Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a panel discussion March 19 about religious authority in the Middle East and its implications for US policy. The panel included Courtney Freer, Research Fellow at Middle East Center, Annele Sheline, Zwan Postdoctoral Fellow, Sharan Grewal, Fellow at Center for Middle East Policy, andYusuf Sarfati, Director of the Middle Eastern and South Asian Minor Program.
The following cases are a synopsis of studies showing the magnitude of religious authority in different Middle Eastern countries.
Turkey
Sarfati pointed out that though a layman, President Erdogan some Turks see him as commanding religious authority. His authority comes from a combination of his public performance of piety, charisma and his status as a graduate of an Islamic school, in addition to being leader of an Islamist party. At the same time, there is a wide segment of the society that does not trust him as a religious authority. There are many other outstanding religious figures who are not as well ranked as Erdogan but have gained trust as religious authorities such as Mehmet Gomez and Hayrettin Karaman, among others. Fethullah Gulen and Abu-Bakar Al Baghdadi are the least trusted and generally viewed negatively in Turkey. Unlike many other Muslim countries, religious authority in Turkey is confined to its borders and not influenced by religious authorities in Arab countries. Many Turks don’t approve religious leaders and show skepticism of religious authority. Official Islam and political Islam overlap. People believe in Islamism and support a state religion as two sides of the same coin.
Tunisia
Founded by Sheik Rachid Ghannouschi, Grewal argues that the Islamic party the Ennahda (Renaissance) has been the primary Islamic political party in Tunisia. It became a dominant political player after 2011, performing well in elections, but it is not widely seen as an authority in religious matters. Despite their linkage with and dependence on the Tunisian state, traditional religious authorities like the grand mufti and Imam of Zaytuna mosque have substantial popularity. Surprisingly, the Islamic State continues to wield considerable religious authority in Tunisia, even while domestic Salafi-Jihadis groups like Ansar-al Sharia do not.
Morocco
Sheline stated that the King Mohammed VI is considered the highest religious authority. This status reflects a taboo against questioning his authority as the Commander of Faithful. He has succeeded in establishing his religious credentials through state messaging. The King’s authority goes beyond the religious sphere. He bolsters Morocco´s soft power and strengthens strategic relationships with key allies. In the context of the war on terror, a demonstrable heritage of moderate Islam is a valuable commodity. Following 9/11 the government supported Sufism in hopes that it could serve as a counterbalance to extremist forms of Salafism. The palace’s promotion of moderation contributes to its liberalizing image while maintaining security and stability, making it an ideal partner in the eyes of the US and EU. The US should support the King’s initiative to promote moderate Islam without making it public, as that could undermine his religious standing.
Saudi Arabia
Freer asserted the most trusted religious leaders are among the official religious establishment. Shaykh Saad Bin Nasser Al-Shethri, who serves as advisor to the Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman is the most trusted. Also, Abdullah Al-Sheikh, the head of the Permanent Committee for Islamic Research and Issuing Fatwas, enjoys wide religious authority. Consensus exists among nationals and non-nationals due in part to the official state religious narrative. It holds considerable sway in the religious sector and society more broadly. The more institutionalized indigenous religious influence is, the more likely constituents are to adhere to their authority. While in other Middle East states, religious groups have mobilized support through their provision of social services, the Saudis do not, because of the welfare system in place. The wealthy rentier status of Saudi Arabia negates the effects of income levels on opinions about religion and religious authority.
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I’ve been slow to write my impressions of Doha, where I spent four days last week after four days in Riyadh the week before (my impressions there are reported here). It’s fitting though that I should publish on Qatar the very day that its soccer team won the Asian Cup, defeating Japan 3-1 after triumphing in the semifinal 4-nil over arch-nemesis United Arab Emirates (in addition to beating Saudi Arabia).
The Qataris are riding high, at least in their own estimation and not only on the soccer field. They have more than survived what they term the blockade by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt imposed in June 2017. After an initial panic that emptied grocery stores, cut off family and other personal ties with compatriots, and caused a sharp fall in central bank reserves, the Doha government triggered a successful emergency response planned since the 2014 flare-up of their frictions with the Saudis and Emiratis.
The costs have been high, but the plan stabilized the situation and enabled Qatar to take advantage of its natural gas-derived wealth to make alternative arrangements and also begin to stimulate domestic production to replace imports. People recount the story of flying in 3000 cows for milk production with smiles on their faces. Saudi food supplies, which dominated the market before the “blockade,” are no longer missed.
Relations with Iran and Turkey have improved. Turkey is often credited as having prevented a Saudi invasion early in the Gulf crisis by deploying 3000 troops. The massive US air base at Al Udeid is seldom mentioned, but Qataris clearly treasure their close relations with Washington. Outreach around the world to other countries has grown. Qataris regard the Gulf crisis as a “blessing in disguise,” a phrase heard repeatedly. It compelled Qatar to diversify and strengthen its ties around the world.
The result is pride and allegiance, including (from my limited contact) among the 90% of the population that is expats. Qataris and foreign experts think the government has done well and that the country’s star is rising. Portraits of the Emir, once ubiquitous, are still much in evidence, despite government instructions to remove them. World Cup 2022 preparations are said to be going well. Criticism of labor conditions on the many construction projects has declined, as accidents have proven much less common than some had predicted. The $6-7 billion of direct World Cup spending is only a drop in the bucket, as the government is building another $200 billion or so in new infrastructure. That’s on top of already lavish spending over the last two decades.
The ideological underpinnings are not, of course, democratic. Qatar is an autocracy that does not permit political organizations of any sort. But a lot of people we talked with are convinced that the traditional system of tribal consultations enables the top to hear from the bottom and the bottom to register its discontents. There is talk of elections this year or next for a newly empowered Shura Council, which now issues legislation on behalf of the Emir. But there are also concerns that elections will give the largest tribes dominance that the current system does not permit, thus reducing the diversity of voices and narrowing the political base of the monarchy.
Why did tiny, non-democratic Qatar support the Arab Spring and in particular the Muslim Brotherhood? The most common answer is that Doha supported the political forces it thought Egyptians, Syrians, Yemenis, Tunisians, Libyans, and others wanted. It has dialed back on that support and blocked private financing of radical groups, monitored by the US Treasury.
Doha claims to be a strong supporter of economic and military integration through the Gulf Cooperation Council, whose work has been disrupted. But Qataris want to conduct an independent foreign policy, not one dictated by Saudi Arabia or least of all by the UAE, which is believed to still resent Qatar’s choice to remain independent and not join the other sheikhdoms. Bahrain is the paradigm for what the Qataris do not want: a country forced to follow in the Kingdom’s footsteps wherever it goes.
What about Al Jazeera, the TV news channels that spare only Qatar and not its Gulf neighbors from criticism? Qatar’s neighbors view Al Jazeera Arabic in particular as promoting rebellion and extremism. At least some Qataris are willing to contemplate modifications in editorial policy, but all assume Al Jazeera is not going away, as the Saudis and Emiratis would like. Though said to be privately owned, it is under the government’s thumb and can be reined in when and if need be.
At times in Doha and Riyadh, I felt I was in a hall of mirrors: both claim leadership in modernizing the Arab world, both see the Gulf conflict as a struggle over what one Saudi termed “seniority” in the region and many Qataris termed Saudi/Emirati “hegemony.” In both Saudi Arabia and Qatar these days conservatism is bad, diversity is welcome, dialogue and consultation are promoted, and freedom to organize political activity is restricted. These are absolute monarchies with the deep pockets required to buy their way into the 21st century.
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Bahrain, Democracy and Rule of Law, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United States, Yemen
On Tuesday the Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted the presentation of the latest
Middle East Public Opinion poll by
James Zogby. Polling was conducted in 10 countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey and Iran. Zogby, Co-founder and President of the Arab American Institute and Director of Zogby Research Services, presented a summary of the data and key points before a panel discussion that featured
Paul Salem, President of MEI,
Kate Seelye, Vice President of MEI,
Alex Vatanka, an MEI Senior Fellow, and
Steven Cook, Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Throughout the Middle East citizens expressed discontent with the policies of their governments. Only in the UAE did a majority of respondents indicate that their country was on the right track. This discontent spanned the rough divide opened by the Arab spring. Egypt and Tunisia both followed the “democratic track” after successful revolutions in 2011, but a majority of respondents there believe their countries to be on the wrong track, joining Iraq and Palestine as states with majority disapproval. In Egypt the drop included the military, whose confidence levels have fallen 50 points since 2013.
Government reform was ranked 3rd overall in the list of political priorities, topping extremism, foreign enemies, health care, and personal rights. This contradicts a common narrative, which justified the failure of the Arab Spring by claiming that the people desired only improved economic and security conditions and cared little for political reform as long as those conditions were met. Downplaying the desire for reform may have been simply wishful thinking by authoritarian leaders in the region.
The survey conveyed a sense of foreign policy pragmatism. Regarding Syria there was growing support for a national unity government
with participation of Bashar al Assad. Regarding Iran, while majorities supported the Trump administration’s move to pull out of the nuclear deal, in every country except Tunisia and Egypt the majority believe that peace between Iran and the Arab world is “very possible” or “somewhat possible.” Eight out of ten countries, including Iran, held the majority view that it is important to bring Iran into a regional security arrangement with the Arab countries to help bring peace to the region.
One exception to this pragmatism is the the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A growing majority in 5 out of 7 Arab states were opposed to a partnership with Israel, even if Israel returns occupied Palestinian lands and fulfills the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative. Palestinians themselves remained overwhelmingly prepared for peace with Israel if the refugee issue is solved and Israel returns to its pre-1967 borders, but a growing number believe the Israelis would never agree to those terms.
Given the growing struggle between Saudi Arabia and Turkey for regional influence, the polling reflected just how close the competition is. Turkey surpasses the Saudis for favorability in Tunisia, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan and Iraq, and tightened the gap in Egypt. A majority of Arab countries view Turkey as playing a more positive role than Saudi Arabia in both Iraq and Syria.
Public opinion of America has fallen in the region. The EU, Russia and China all fared better than America. The panel believed that this drop in opinion was largely due to the perception of the American government as inept.
The polling indicates a continued sense of unrest in the region. With little faith in their own institutions, the people of the Middle East remain largely uninspired by the jingoistic foreign policies of their governments and continue to seek an end to costly civil wars, in order to focus on domestic reforms and economic improvement.
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Arab Spring, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, The Middle East, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United States
1. Tunisia: Justice in Transition | Tuesday, October 2, 2018 | 9:30 am – 11:30 am | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
Please join the Carnegie Middle East Program for a screening of the documentary, Tunisia: Justice in Transition. The film tracks the trajectory of Tunisia’s Truth and Dignity Commission, established in 2013 to address the crimes of the Ben Ali and Bourguiba regimes. It includes interviews with victim’s families, human rights activists, and political actors to explain the Commission’s rocky path over the past five years.
Following the screening, Sarah Yerkes will moderate a discussion on the status of transitional justice in Tunisia today with one of the film’s creators, Ricard Gonzalez, and Salwa El Gantri.
Speakers:
Salwa El Gantri is the head of Tunisia Office for the International Center for Transitional Justice. She is an expert in gender and transitional justice, and has more than twelve years of experience in the democracy, human rights, and transitional justice fields.
Ricard Gonzalez is a journalist and political scientist. He has worked as a correspondent in Washington, DC, Cairo, and Tunis for El Mundo, El País, and Ara.
Sarah Yerkes is a fellow is a fellow in Carnegie’s Middle East Program, where her research focuses on Tunisia’s political, economic, and security developments as well as state-society relations in the Middle East and North Africa.
2. Is Russia Becoming Central Asia’s Near Abroad? | Tuesday, October 2, 2018 | 4:00 pm – 5:30 pm | Wilson Center | 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20004 | Register Here
Russia’s relationship to Central Asia has always been distinctive and ambiguous, in contrast to its attitude toward both Ukraine and the Caucasus. Only in the twentieth century did it develop a deep sense of mission there, and then only at the hands of a small number of ideologues.
Today, Central Asia is fast recovering its traditional regional spirit, which increasingly impacts its former imperial ruler. As this happens, Russia, while remaining a force to be reckoned with in Central Asia, is also becoming an object of Central Asian geopolitical and cultural influence. Hence the notion of Russia as Central Asia’s “near abroad.”
The talk will be a Distinguished Speaker Lecture with S. Frederick Starr, Founding Chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program and a Professor at John Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.
3. China’s Alliance with North Korea and the Soviet Union: A Conversation with China’s Leading Historians | Thursday, October 4, 2018 | 3:30 pm – 5:00 pm | Wilson Center | 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20004 | Register Here
The Wilson Center’s History and Public Policy Program will be hosting China’s three leading diplomatic historians for a discussion about the history and present day relevance of China’s Cold War-era relations with North Korea and the Soviet Union.A Misunderstood Friendship: Mao Zedong, Kim Il-sung, and Sino-North Korean Relations, 1949–1976, co-authored by Dr. Zhihua Shen and Dr. Yafeng Xia, is the first book-length history of the China-DPRK relationship to appear in English. Shen and Xia draw on previously untapped primary source materials to offer a unique account of the China-North Korean relationship, uncovering tensions and rivalries that shed new light on the ties between these two Communist East Asian nations. They unravel the twists and turns in high-level diplomacy between China and North Korea from the late 1940s to the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, and reveal that the tensions that currently plague the alliance between the two countries have been present from the very beginning of the relationship.
Mao and the Sino–Soviet Split, 1959-1973: A New History, co-authored by Dr. Danhui Li and Dr. Yafeng Xia, synthesizes over 20 years of research on the subject by the authors and offers a comprehensive look at the Sino-Soviet split from 1959, when visible cracks appeared in the Sino-Soviet alliance, to 1973, when China’s foreign policy changed from an “alliance with the Soviet Union to oppose the United States” to “aligning with the United States to oppose the Soviet Union.”
The authors will be joined by commentator Dr. Gregg A. Brazinksy and moderator Dr. Christian Ostermann
Speakers:
Zhihua Shen is the director of the Center for Cold War International History Studies at East China Normal University, Shanghai, and the author of a number of major Chinese-language works on Cold War history.
Danhui Li is Professor of History at Institute for Studies of China’s Neighboring Countries and Regions, East China Normal University, editor-in-chief of two academic journals: Lengzhan guojishi yanjiu (Cold War International History Studies), and Bianjiang yu zhoubian wenti yanjiu (Studies of Borderlands and Neighboring Regions). A leading authority on CCP’s external relations during the Cold War, she has published extensively on Sino-Soviet relations and Sino-Vietnamese relations during the Indochina War (in Chinese, Russian and English).
Yafeng Xia is Professor of History at Long Island University in New York and Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Studies of China’s Neighboring Countries and Regions at East China Normal University in Shanghai. A former Wilson Center fellow and public policy scholar, he is the author of numerous books on Chinese Cold War history.
Gregg A. Brazinsky is professor of history and international affairs at The George Washington University. He is the author of Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry during the Cold War (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2017), and of Nation Building in South Korea: Korean, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2007).
4. LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media (DC Launch) | Thursday, October 4, 2018 | 12:00 pm – 2:00 pm | New America Foundation | 740 15th St NW #900 Washington, D.C. 20005 | Register Here
In an age of livestreamed terrorist attacks and viral misinformation, a new pocket-sized battleground has emerged.
Through the weaponization of social media, the internet has transformed war and politics. Terrorists livestream their attacks, “Twitter wars” produce real world casualties, and viral misinformation alters not just the result of battles, but the very fate of nations.
In their new book LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media, authors Peter W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking study what social media has been doing to politics, news, and war around the world, drawing upon everything from historic cases to the latest in AI and machine intelligence. They track dozens of conflicts in every corner of the globe, studying the spread of YouTube battle clips, a plague of Nazi-sympathizing cartoon frogs, and even enlist in a digital army themselves.
Join New America for a conversation moderated by Anne-Marie Slaughter, President and CEO of the Foundation, with the authors as they tackle the questions that arose during their five years of research: What can be kept secret in a world of networks? Does social media expose the truth or bury it? And what role do ordinary people now play in international conflicts?
5. Yemen’s Path Forward | Thursday, October 4th, 2018 | 1:00 pm – 4:00 pm | Middle East Institute | 529 14th St NW Washington, DC 20045 | Register Here
Three years into Yemen’s civil war, the country continues to see severe humanitarian devastation, widespread food insecurity, and lack of economic access, against the backdrop of an increasingly complex geopolitical environment. An intensification of fighting in Hodeidah and elsewhere in the country has added to the human costs of the conflict and threatens to become catastrophic. Increasingly, Yemenis are war-weary and anxious to see progress on the UN-led negotiating process intended to end the fighting and restore the peaceful transition interrupted three years ago.
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a half-day conference to assess the priorities for ending the conflict and scenarios to move forward. This conference will convene two panels and a keynote address to assess urgent priorities and potential pathways forward for Yemen.
Speakers:
Bruce Abrams assumed duties as deputy assistant administrator in USAID’s Middle East Bureau in January 2017. His portfolio includes USAID programs in Yemen, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, the technical support team and the Middle East Regional Platform. Abrams joined the Middle East bureau after serving as deputy mission director in USAID Zimbabwe.
Sama’a Al-Hamdani is an independent researcher and analyst focusing on Yemen. She is currently a visting fellow at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS) at Georgetown University and a research fellow at the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies (SCSS). Al-Hamdani is also the director of the Yemen Cultural Institute for Heritage and the Arts (YCIHA), a nonprofit based in Washington DC dedicated to Yemeni arts and heritage.
Marcia Biggs is a special correspondent for PBS NewsHour, for whom she has recently won a Gracie Allen Award, a First Place National Headliner Award, and a New York Festivals World Medal. Her expertise lies in the Arab world, with over a decade of experience in the Middle East, five years of which were spent living in Lebanon. Most recently, she became one of the few television journalists to cover the crisis in Yemen, which she did in a four part series for PBS, “Inside Yemen.”
Ambassador Ahmed Awad Bin Mubarak assumed his duties as the ambassador of the Republic of Yemen to the United States in August 2015. Formerly, Ambassador Bin Mubarak was the director of the presidential office and chief of staff. Prior to taking up his appointment as the director, Ambassador Bin Mubarak was appointed on January 2013 secretary general of Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference (NDC), leading a team of over 120 staff facilitating the mediation process among the participating 565 delegates, and providing technical assistance to NDC working groups.
Amb. (ret.) Gerald Feierstein is director for government relations, policy and programs at MEI. He retired from the U.S. Foreign Service in May 2016 after a 41-year career with the personal rank of career minister. As a diplomat he served in nine overseas postings, including three tours of duty in Pakistan, as well as assignments in Saudi Arabia, Oman, Lebanon, Jerusalem, and Tunisia. In 2010, President Obama appointed Amb. Feierstein U.S. Ambassador to Yemen, where he served until 2013. From 2013 until his retirement, Amb. Feierstein was principal deputy assistant secretary of State for Near Eastern affairs.
Latifa Jamel is the chairperson of Justice for Women and Children. Originally from Taiz, she is a Yemeni journalist and political activist. She served as board members in Yemen Aid, International Council of Rights and Freedoms, and Yemeni American Coalition. She previously worked as an academic advisor and head of Social Studies department in local schools within Taiz.
Timothy Lenderking is the deputy assistant secretary of state for Arabian Gulf affairs in the Near East Bureau at the U.S. Department of State. He is a career member of the senior Foreign Service. Lenderking served previously as the deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, from 2013-2016. He served as the director of the Pakistan office at the Department of State from 2010-2013. From 2008-2010, Lenderking completed two tours in Baghdad, the first as the senior democracy advisor at the US Embassy, and the second as the policy advisor to LTG Charles Jacoby, Commanding General of Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNF-I), based at Camp Victory.
6. The Limits of Punishment: Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism | Friday, October 5th, 2018 | 10:30 am – 12:00 pm | Brookings Institution | 1775 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
In countries where jihadi groups have gained control over territory and populations, states face the challenge of dealing with individuals accused of association with those groups. Governments have too often responded in heavy-handed ways, penalizing broad segments of local populations suspected of having supported the group, often on the basis of thin or non-existent evidence. Such excessively punitive and dragnet approaches risk backfiring by exacerbating local grievances, conflating victims with perpetrators, and laying the groundwork for future violence.
On October 5, the Foreign Policy program at Brookings and the United Nations University’s Centre for Policy Research (UNU-CPR) will present a discussion of alternative strategies and justice issues for countries affected by jihadi violence. Experts will present the findings of three fieldwork-based case studies of Nigeria, Somalia, and Iraq, which analyze these states’ approaches to accountability and rehabilitation of Boko Haram, al-Shabab, and Islamic State affiliates. Panelists will also discuss the potential application of transitional justice tools; conditional amnesties; defectors programs; and disarmament, demobilization, and rehabilitation approaches to transitions away from conflict in such settings.
Panelists will include Lana Baydas, an independent human rights expert; Vanda Felbab-Brown, senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings; and Cale Salih, research officer at UNU-CPR. Landry Signé, a David M. Rubenstein Fellow in the Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion. After the program, panelists will take questions from the audience.
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Bourguiba, China, Civil War, Democracy and Rule of Law, Extremism, North Korea, Russia, Social Media, Soviet Union, Syria, Tunisia, United States, Yemen
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