Tag: Turkey
US withdrawal makes everyone in the Middle East recalibrate
I have long believed the US is overcommitted in the Middle East, given its declining interests in the region, and needed to draw down. I confess I did not anticipate how clumsily we would manage to do it. I also did not fully anticipate how others would react. The American withdrawal has set off a cascade of efforts at improving relations both within the region and with external powers, mainly China and Russia. Not all the improvements are in the US interest, but several are interesting.
First example: the Abrahamic accords. The Saudis, Emiratis, and Bahrainis have understood for some time that the American commitment to their autocracies was weakening. The failure of Washington to react to the drone attack on Saudi oil infrastructure in 2019 confirmed that perception. They needed to think about replacing Washington’s security guarantees, which in any event were aimed at external enemies, while the main threat is in these three countries increasingly internal. They have turned to Israel for the technology required to guarantee that their monarchies remain stable.
But, you may object, Saudi Arabia hasn’t yet recognized Israel, as the UAE and Bahrain have. On that, I only have anecdata, but it is compelling. Sitting in a business class lounge in Riyadh some 2+years ago, I found myself surrounded by 40-something males speaking Hebrew. They carried an unusual number of hard-sided cases. When I asked the Israeli next to me why I was hearing so much Hebrew in Riyadh, he smiled coldly and said: “If I told you, I would have to kill you.” I concluded they were techies carrying lots of electronics after providing assistance to Saudi internal intelligence agencies. I suspect Israel’s improving relations with Egypt have a lot to do with internal security as well, inaddition to President Sissi’s attitude toward the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas.
Second I would cite the response to Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter plane in 2015. It initially caused tension in the bilateral relationship, but Turkey had a problem: the US and NATO were not backing Ankara up and instead the Americans were beginning to ally with Kurds, whom President Erdogan regards as terrorists and mortal enemies. Soon Ankara was apologizing, relations between Ankara and Moscow were improving and Turkey was participating in the Russian-sponsored Astana process for ceasefire/surrenders of the Syrian opposition to the Assad regime. Russian and Turkish troops have even patrolled together in both Idlib and northern Syria, though the relationship remains parlous.
Third are the tentative efforts by Saudi Arabia and Iran to come to some sort of modus vivendi. This has included high-level meetings in Baghdad as well as trips to Tehran and Riyadh. The Saudis and Iranians have no territorial dispute and many symmetrical interests, including not allowing an adversary to rile their respective Shia and Sunni minorities and maintaining their theologically-based and increasingly nationalist autocracies. A mutual stand-down from bilateral tensions could benefit both.
Fourth is the at least partial resolution of a conflict internal to the Gulf Cooperation Council. The Saudis and Emiratis have essentially given up on their latest effort to bring Qatar to heel. Doha weathered the embargo and other sanctions better than the Kingdom and the Emirates anticipated, with assistance from Turkey, Iran, and the US, which wasn’t (yet) interested in abandoning its largest base in the region, Al Udeid. There was no point in continuing a fruitless campaign whose only real impact was to weaken the Gulf Arabs.
Fifth example: OPEC+. After a price war in 2020, the Saudis and Russians found common cause in maintaining higher oil prices, which are essential to both their national budgets. Riyadh and Moscow would prefer prices around $100/barrel, but they can’t push much above $70 or so because that would bring on unconventional sources in the US and elsewhere, especially in a low-interest-rate environment. So they are more or less content to leave prices where they have lingered for much of the epidemic, hoping that stronger growth later will bump up both interest rates and oil prices.
There are other examples: rapprochement between Turkey and the UAE, the UAE push for reconciliation with Syria, and Turkey’s sometime courting of Iran. The point is that US withdrawal is causing everyone to recalibrate and look for alternatives to American support that seems increasingly unlikely. I might like recalibration to push Israel into a more positive attitude toward Palestine, but that seems a bridge too far. Still, US withdrawal is getting the Middle East pregnant with possibilities.
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Parsing the Afghanistan quandary: humanitarian aid now, nothing more
The UN is anticipating that virtually the entire population of Afghanistan will soon require humanitarian assistance. The country’s economy is imploding. The new Taliban government is broke. The neighbors currying favor with the new authorities in Kabul are not traditional sources of aid: Pakistan, Iran, China, and Russia, not to mention Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekhistan, and Tajikistan. The UN and non-governmental relief organizations will be willing, but they depend on financing from the usual suspects: the US, the EU, Japan, and other developed countries. The one willing Gulf donor is presumably Qatar, which played a role in the negotiations between the US and the Taliban and now runs Kabul airport.
The humanitarian imperative is clear: provide the aid to those in need, no matter what the politics. Life with dignity is everyone’s right. But this is an odd situation: the Taliban just ousted the internationally recognized government, they have not fulfilled the minimal requirements the UN Security Council has levied, and the countries now expected to provide aid are those the Taliban spent twenty years fighting. American taxpayers, having just witnessed the humiliation of the US withdrawal, are now expected to ante up in ways that will make the Taliban regime sustainable?
The problem extends beyond humanitarian assistance. At least that can be done without putting cash in Taliban pockets. The Taliban will still benefit, as otherwise the burden of feeding the population would fall to them. But assistance with government expenditures, including so-called “early-recovery” and reconstruction, will directly help the Taliban to hold on to the power they gained by force, as will unfreezing of Afghanistan’s foreign currency reserves and allowing the Taliban to cash in the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights. The Taliban will be no less clever than the previous government in skimming off some percentage.
American interests in this situation need to be parsed. Collapse of Taliban rule and the likely subsequent civil war would be awful from Washington’s perspective. An Islamic State (Khorasan) takeover would be worse. The Americans want what the UNSC resolution specified: exit of those US citizens and supporters who want to leave, access for humanitarian relief, respect for human rights (especially those of women and girls), and an inclusive transitional government. The Taliban have already disappointed by naming a government of their own militants, including people linked to Al Qaeda. While it is early days, they have not demonstrated respect for human rights. Nor have they allowed the exit of more than a minimal number of people.
So do we discount the Taliban failures so far and go ahead with humanitarian relief? I’m afraid we don’t have a lot of choice, both as a matter of principle and pragmatic policy. Humanitarian relief may not save the Taliban government from collapse, but it is the right thing to do and could help to stave off civil war or an IS takeover. We should provide the funds with eyes wide open, trying to verify that access is unhindered and that food and other assistance flows to those in need and is not monetized or otherwise pocketed by Taliban-connected warlords.
There is an argument for at least partially unfreezing reconstruction assistance and Afghanistan’s hard currency assets, because that too could help prevent civil war or worse. Certainly the Taliban will try to extract hard currency with promises to fight the Islamic State. The Pentagon may be sympathetic to this argument. Here I would be far more cautious. The Islamic State is a rival of the Taliban: a jihadi group that wants to govern Afghanistan (and more). The Taliban have their own reasons for wanting to crush IS (Khorasan). I’d prefer to see them doing it for their own good reasons.
As for Al Qaeda, it is clear from inclusion of the Haqqani network, an Al Qaeda affiliate, in their government that the Taliban are not prepared to treat it as an enemy. There is still a question whether a government that includes Sirajuddin Haqqani as “interim” Interior Minister will allow the use of Afghan territory to plot or organize attacks on the US. It is arguable that it is better to have Al Qaeda in the tent pissing out than outside the tent pissing in. I wouldn’t buy it though: it really doesn’t matter that much where Al Qaeda plots its next attack against the US–9/11 may have been conceived while Osama bin Laden was in Afghanistan, but most of the plot was organized and conducted elsewhere. Wherever the Haqqani network helps Al Qaeda, the US interest is clear: weaken both.
Bottom line: Humanitarian assistance yes, but nothing more until it is clearer how the Taliban will govern and whether they will cooperate with those who target, or allow others to target, the United States. Hoisting their flag over the presidential palace in Kabul on 9/11 was not a good omen.
PS: What Ahmed Rashid has to say is always interesting:
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The Americans are out, but conflict will persist
Wisely, the Americans left Afghanistan at the beginning of the August 31 deadline, not its end. The 3:29 pm departure of the last flight from Kabul took off at 11:59 pm Afghanistan time, which is 7.5 hours ahead of Washington. Hanging on until the last moment would have invited another suicide bomb, a heat-seeking missile attack on a departing plane, or other spectacular move by ISIS Khorasan.
More than 120,000 people were evacuated, but hundreds of eligible people are known to have been left behind. The Biden Administration has pledged to continue to try to get people out. That should prove possible from regional airports or by land, but it will likely be done as covert action rather than in public. The Taliban have pledged to allow anyone out who wants to leave, but I wouldn’t believe that until we see it.
The UN Security Council passed a resolution today, with China and Russia abstaining. The resolution asks that the airport be kept open for both evacuations and incoming humanitarian assistance. The French wanted a “safe zone” around the airport, but they didn’t get it. Turkey and Qatar, both more inclined towards Islamist rule than many other countries, have been volunteering to keep it open with private companies, but the Taliban have not accepted that proposition yet. The UNSC resolution also formalizes international community demands that the Taliban not support international terrorism, respect human rights (in particular those of women and girls), and reach an “inclusive” political settlement.
None of that is likely without enormous international pressure. The main leverage derives from money, not legitimacy. The Taliban regard themselves as legitimate and most of the people of Afghanistan have no choice. What the Taliban need more than anything else to solidify their legistimacy is hard cash. Afghanistan’s assets abroad are frozen and the International Monetary Fund distribution of “Special Drawing Rights” (to obtain hard currency) have not been transferred. The Taliban are saying they will block poppy and opium production, which has been a main source of their income. Moscow is already calling on the IMF and World Bank to send reconstruction aid. The West will want to see conditions at least partly met first.
There is a real prospect fighting will continue in Afghanistan, not only between the Taliban and ISIS-K but also between the Taliban and their most vigorous opponents, especially in the Panjshir Valley. In addition, Taliban forces may not be as completely unified as they appeared when fighting the Afghan government. Falling out among revolutionaries is more the rule than the exception. Odds are we’ll see more than one violent conflict emerge in the aftermath of the American withdrawal.
That will not be good news for the people of Afghanistan. They have suffered mightily not just for twenty years since the American invasion but for more than 40. While it is commonly said that the Americans accomplished nothing, I think that simply isn’t true. While the American military assistance can be labelled a complete failure, civilian assistance enabled girls and women to get education, a mostly free press to flourish, health standards to rise, and civil society to emerge. Only time will tell, but my guess is the Taliban are in for a roughter ride than when they took over power in the 1990s. They will have difficult choices to make between brutal repression, their usual habit, and the kind of inclusion that could win popular support.
The Americans are well out of the picture, even if their chosen mode of departure was unnecessarily chaotic and destabilizing. President Biden deserves credit for abandoning a war that no longer made sense but also criticism for the failure to do it in an orderly way. The likelihood of stability in the aftermath is not high. The Americans are out, but conflict will persist.
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Turkey and Israel need to compartmentalize disagreements and cooperate
Not too long ago, Turkey and Israel had a good working relationship. That changed with the rise of Erdogan in Turkey and the increasing focus on Turkey’s intended leadership of the Islamic world. After 2010, the two countries no longer have diplomatic relations, and recently discussions of Eastern Mediterranean gas pipelines became a new potential stumbling block. However, these two countries are key US allies. The importance of their cooperation only increases now that the US is slowly withdrawing from the Middle East. A recent call between Israeli president Herzog and Turkey’s Erdogan could signal a new opening.
The Atlantic Council convened a panel of diplomats and academics to discuss these issues and their implications for the future. The experts saw potential for future cooperation, but this will depend on the states’ ability to understand each others security red lines, and to compartmentalize their relationship.
The speakers were:
Jonathan H. Ferziger
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Middle East Programs
Atlantic Council
Former Middle East Correspondent
Bloomberg
Amb. Mithat Rende
Former Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Turkey to the OECD
Prof. Brenda Shaffer
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Energy Center
Atlantic Council
Amb. Matthew J. Bryza (moderator)
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council in Turkey; Global Energy Center & Eurasia Center,
Atlantic Council
Defne Arslan (introduction)
Director, Atlantic Council in Turkey
Atlantic Council
How we got here
Bryza explained that Israel and Turkey had what amounted to a strategic partnership until relatively recently. He and co-panelist Rende lobbied at that time to realize an Israeli-Turkish gas pipeline. With the rise of Erdogan to power this all changed. His increased focus on Islamic solidarity drew him away from Israel, which he criticized for its treatment of Palestinian rights. The relationship reached a low point with the ‘Mavi Marmara Incident’ also known as the Gaza Flotilla Raid in 2010. Turkey was attempting to break the Israeli blockade on Gaza in Ferziger‘s words, by sending a shipment with aid to the enclave by boat. Israel responded by raiding the boat, leading to the deaths of nine Turkish nationals. Afterwards, Erdogan severed diplomatic relations.
In recent times, there have been cautious signs of improvements. Most notable is the call between Erdogan and Herzog on July 12. Ferziger reminded that Herzog’s role is largely ceremonial in Israeli politics, meaning that this shouldn’t be seen as a call on the highest level. Nonetheless, it does signal willingness on both sides for some level of communication.
Current disagreements
At the core of the bilateral strife are the Palestinians. Erdogan attacks Israel frequently and supports Hamas, whose leaders are often present in Turkey itself. This support for Hamas is an absolute red line to Israel. Shaffer believes that diplomatic initiatives are infeasible if a military presence of Hamas in Turkey remains. Some sort of civilian representation might be feasible, but no more than that. Furthermore, Bryza explained that Turkey’s rhetoric angers Israelis. Erdogan has moderated his comments recently, but with (potentially early) elections coming up, Bryza questioned if he will he be able to avoid nationalist rhetoric in his battle against right-wing rivals.
Israeli domestic politics also complicate the matter. Ferziger said that it is certain that Netanyahu will do whatever he can to paint reconnection with Turkey as a bad choice, while he privately is convinced that it is a good thing. The opposition will use Turkey’s ties to Hamas to make this diplomatic development very difficult.
Ferziger explained that the Hamas connection does help Erdogan, although not as much as one might think. He is popular in Gaza. But in the West Bank he is ‘banned’ and support for him is repressed by the Palestinian Authority. In East Jerusalem, PA control is not universal, meaning that this repression is less total. Nonetheless, Erdogan isn’t the only leader attempting to woo the Palestinians. Saudi Arabia is also engaging in humanitarian and development projects in Palestine. Alongside streets adorned with images of Erdogan, there are streets with those of Mohammed bin Salman. Moreover, Turkish attempts to become involved with the al-Aqsa mosque are met with resistance from Jordan, who currently operates it.
Rende underlined an issue from the Turkish perspective. There is a perception in Turkey that Israel supports the YPG and the establishment of an autonomous territory for the Kurds in Syria. Turkey rejects this as it considers the YPG a terrorist organization linked to the PKK. Shaffer believes that Turkish support for Hamas appears similar to Israel as Israel’s support to the YPG appears to Turkey. There is a need to understand from both sides that support for the Palestinians doesn’t have to equal support for Hamas and that support for the Kurds doesn’t have to equal support for the PKK.
The potential for future cooperation
Despite these issues, the panel generally appeared optimistic on the prospect of cooperation in other fields. The potential for establishing a natural gas pipeline was often mentioned in this regard. Turkey is the region’s only growing market for natural gas according to Rende. As Shaffer opined, connecting Israeli gas to Europe is most logical by attaching to the existing pipelines in Turkey. She explained that Israel is in doubt whether to attempt a gas pipeline through Greece or through Turkey. As Shaffer put it, there is an idea in Israel that it’s either good relations with Greece or with Turkey. But Turkey and Greece have more functional relationships with one another than Israel and Turkey. “There is no reason to be more Greek than the Greeks.”
The prospect of compartmentalizing their relationship was something some panelists were enthusiastic about. Shaffer suggested Turkey should deal with Israel as it does with China. The suppression of Uyghurs in China is completely unpalatable to the Turkish population, and yet Turkey is able to compartmentalize the relationship and engages with China extensively. Iran and Turkey too have tensions surrounding the Azeri population of Iran, which Erdogan has hinted in the past should be united with Azerbaijan. Despite these tensions, Turkey engages with Iran where necessary. Rende added that Turkey has huge differences with the US as well, but that doesn’t stop from cooperating fruitfully.
Shaffer hoped the US might attempt to steer Israel and Turkey more in that direction. The role of a superpower is not only to fight its enemies but to manage its allies. Obama and Trump have done a bad job at this according to her. Having Israel, Turkey, Cyprus, etcetera bickering is not good for the US.
Rende summarized his perspective neatly. Common grounds:
- Trade
- Tourism
- Energy/natural gas
- Defense industry/technology
- Agriculture/water
But the countries countries suffer from a lack of trust and confidence in one another. They must build these up slowly again.
Good steps towards this would be:
- Re-establish ambassadors
- Stop harsh rhetoric through the media
- Establish (ad-hoc) working groups and establish an agenda for cooperation
Watch the recording of the event here:
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Peace Picks | August 2-6, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
- Restoring a federal governance system in Sudan | Aug 2, 2021 | 9:00 AM EST | Chatham House | Register Here
The signing of the Juba Peace Agreement in October 2020, and a constitutional decree issued in March 2021 by the Chairman of the Sovereign Council, are both significant markers towards the restoration of a federal governance system in Sudan. Establishing a decentralized system of governance that bridges the development gap between the centre and the regions is a significant challenge. But it is hoped that the genuine devolution of power will support peace-building, result in more equitable distribution of wealth and resources, and amplify local priorities in Sudan’s regions.
At this event, panellists will discuss the implementation of a new federal governance architecture in Sudan, the establishment of structures that will ensure more equitable development across the country and priorities for local governance.
Speakers:
Hon. Adeeb Yousif
Governor of Central Darfur, Republic of Sudan
Anwar Elhaj
Researcher and Political Analyst
Dr. Mona Mohamed Taha Ayoub
Lecturer, Institute of Public Administration and Federalism, University of Khartoum
Dr. Louise Walker
Chargé d’Affaires, British Embassy in Sudan
Ahmed Soliman (Chair)
Research Fellow at the Africa Programme, Chatham House
- Turkey-Israel relations in a changing geopolitical landscape | Aug 4, 2021 | 8:30 AM EST | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Relations between Turkey and Israel have been historically low since a diplomatic rift in 2010, characterized by an atmosphere of mutual distrust and punctuated by recurring crises. Historically, as the United States’ two closest allies in the region, Turkey and Israel had enjoyed a close strategic relationship. Now, with changing regional dynamics in the form of the Abraham Accords, mutual concerns about the Syrian War and Iran’s role in the region, and the recent change in Israel’s government present new opportunities and environments for the two countries to engage in dialogue.
This panel will discuss the outlook for the relation between these two regional powers.
Speakers:
Jonathan H. Ferziger
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Middle East Programs, Atlantic Council
Former Bloomberg Middle East Correspondent
Amb. Mithat Rende
Former Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Turkey to the OECD
Prof. Brenda Shaffer
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Energy Center, Atlantic Council
Amb. Matthew J. Bryza (moderator)
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, Global Energy Center & Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
Defne Arslan (welcoming remarks)
Director, Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, Atlantic Council
- Enhancing security in the Black Sea: The future of security cooperation | Aug 4, 2021 | 10:00 AM EST | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Since Moscow launched its war on Ukraine in 2014, NATO has taken substantial steps to bolster security for its eastern members, particularly with a stronger presence in the Baltic states, Poland, and Romania. The NATO approach to security in the Baltic Sea has been comprehensive, as all NATO members in the region and other states recognize the dangers posed by a revisionist Kremlin. But NATO efforts along the southern flank, in the Black Sea region, are not as far along.
This panel will discuss NATO’s role in the Black Sea region and what security cooperation among these states will look like in the future.
Speakers:
Leah Scheunemann (welcoming remarks)
Deputy Director, Transatlantic Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
Alton Buland
Director, South and Central Europe, US Department of Defense
Dr. Can Kasapoğlu
Director of Security and Defense Research, The Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM)
Ambassador Elena Poptodorova
Vice President, Atlantic Club of Bulgaria
Dr. Harlan Ullman
Senior Advisor, Atlantic Council; Chairman, The Killowen Group
Irina Zidaru
Director General for Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania
Amb. John Herbst (moderator)
Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
- Why Tunisia’s democratic transition still matters? | Aug 4, 2021 | 10:00 AM EST | Chatham House | Register Here
Late on Sunday 25 July 2021, the 64th anniversary of the proclamation of the Tunisian Republic, the Tunisian president, Kais Saied declared he will assume the executive power in country, dismissing the government of the Prime Minster Hichem Mechichi and suspending the parliament. He also declared the suspension of the legal immunity of parliament members and taking control of the general prosecutor’s office.
Struggle over powers and mandates has been characteristic of the Tunisian political system over the past decade. Since the eruption of the Tunisian revolution in 2011, significant political progress towards democracy has been achieved. However, over the past year, Tunisia has witnessed disagreements over cabinet reshuffles and control of the security forces, complicating the efforts to handle a recent fierce COVID-19 wave, structural economic hardship and a looming fiscal crisis. Are the shaky political progress and the sluggish economic progress a threat to the nascent democratic transition in Tunisia? Or are the ongoing developments part of Tunisia’s democratization process?
The webinar will explore the factors that paved the way to the dramatic moment of the evening of 25 July 2021, assess the options for Tunisia’s democratic transition, and why this transition is still relevant in the first place.
Speakers:
Dr Laryssa Chomiak
Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House
Fadil Aliriza
Editor In Chief, Meshkal
Prof Daniel Brumberg
Director of Democracy and Governance Studies, Georgetown University; Non-resident Senior Fellow, Arab Center Washington DC
Aymen Bessalah
Advocacy and Policy Analyst, Al Bawsala
Dr Lina Khatib (moderator)
Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House
- A New Transatlantic Policy Approach Towards the Western Balkans | Aug 4, 2021 | 11:30 AM EST | CSIS | Register Here
As the Biden administration pledges to work closely with its European allies, new policy approaches, development tools, and dialogue mechanisms to revitalize transatlantic policy across the region are essential as these countries grapple with weak institutions, endemic corruption, democratic backsliding, and are increasingly influenced by strategic competition.
The panel will engage in an in-depth regional conversation that explores German policy toward the region and how the U.S. and Germany and the EU can achieve better policy outcomes in the Western Balkans.
Speakers:
MdB Peter Beyer
Coordinator of Transatlantic Cooperation, German Federal Foreign Office; Western Balkans Rapporteur, German Parliament
James O’Brien
Vice Chair, Albright Stonebridge Group
Heather A. Conley
Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic & Director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, CSIS
Paul Linnarz (opening remarks)
Director, Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung Office USA
- Tunisia’s Constitutional Crisis and Yearning for Democracy in Northwest Africa | Aug 5, 2021 | 10:00 AM EST | Arab Center Washington DC | Register Here
On July 25, 2021, Tunisian President Kais Saied fired the prime minister and suspended Parliament in what some have called a coup. The move followed nationwide protests demanding the premier’s resignation and the dissolution of the parliament as the coronavirus outbreak pushed the healthcare system to collapse and worsened economic conditions.
In light of these developments in Tunisia, site of the Arab Spring’s only democratic success story, Arab Center Washington DC is organizing a webinar to discuss the status of democratization in Northwest Africa, specifically focusing on Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and Morocco. Panelists will discuss the implications of President Saied’s move and its constitutionality, the state of democratization in the region and the impact of events in Tunisia, the role and interventions by regional powers like Egypt and Gulf countries, and policy recommendation to support democratic processes and governance reform across Northwest Africa.
Speakers:
Yasmina Abouzzohour
Visiting Fellow, Brookings Doha Center
Khaoula Ben Gayesse
Tunisian Journalist
Dalia Ghanem Yazbeck
Resident Scholar, Carnegie Middle East Center
- Pakistan’s National Security Outlook: A Conversation with Pakistani National Security Advisor Moeed Yusuf | Aug 5, 2021 | 11:00 AM EST | The United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
Since the country’s founding, Pakistan’s national security priorities have been largely defined by the realities of its geopolitical neighborhood. Now, with escalating violence in Afghanistan, intensifying competition between the United States and China, limited hopes for rapprochement with India, and the COVID-19 pandemic, Pakistan’s neighborhood is evolving — and Pakistan’s national security approach will have to evolve with it.
This discussion with Pakistan’s National Security Advisor Moeed Yusuf will look at what these developments mean for Pakistan’s national security outlook towards its neighbors and its relationship with the United States, as well as how the pandemic impacts Pakistan’s security and economic policy.
Speakers:
Dr. Moeed Yusuf
National Security Advisor, Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Hon. Stephen J. Hadley (moderator)
Chair of the Board of Directors, U.S. Institute of Peace
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No good options for Syria
The Assad regime is undertaking yet one more effort to suppress resistance in the southern Syrian city of Daraa. The brutality will no doubt be extreme, as it has been through more than 10 years of war against the civilian population. The question is Lenin’s: “What is to be done?”
Syria presents Washington with a quandary: American administrations from President Obama onwards find President Assad’s attacks on his own citizens odious and criminal, but they don’t see a risk to US national security that would justify putting American troops at risk to stop it. Once in a great while, Presidents Obama and Trump have used cruise missiles, which entail no risk to Americans, in response to Assad’s egregious use of chemical weapons, but without much effect.
American troops were sent to Syria, and remain there, to fight Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, not Assad. The Americans have sent lots of humanitarian assistance, but that does nothing to weaken or punish Assad. In fact, the portion of that assistance that goes through UN agencies via Damascus helps him a good deal. The Russians have been persistent in making it hard for aid to get to Syrian opposition-held areas from Turkey.
Anyone with even a modicum of human feeling would want to do more to save Syrian civilians from Assad’s depredations. So Josh Rogin and Andrew Tabler call for more, hoping an ongoing policy review will produce at least a special envoy. But a special envoy could be meaningless without a purpose, which Andrew would like to define this way:
a coherent political strategy, supported by the U.S. intelligence community, to isolate Assad and his regime’s facilitators and limit the malign influence of Iran and Russia.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-07-27/search-syria-strategy
How realistic is that?
More sanctions can be imposed–there is rarely a limit to those, but Assad and his enablers are not wanting to travel to the US or Europe and presumably know how to keep their finances under cover. The Syrian economy is already a shambles. Even if Assad is successful militarily, he will be unable to do any significant reconstruction. Iran and Russia already own him and will use their influence in ways the US and Europe consider malign.
The Americans can cause some discomfort to both by maintaining their small military presence in eastern Syria, which supports the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) there. But the Americans have been unable and unwilling to do much to stabilize the situation even where they are present, as that requires risk-taking they want to avoid. Hope that the SDF might develop into a serious military and political challenger to Assad seems to have expired quietly.
Just maintaining Assad’s current isolation requires a good deal of diplomatic heavy lifting. Some Arab countries–most notably Jordan and the United Arab Emirates–have wanted to ease up on Assad. To bolster its lagging economy, Jordan would like to open its border and allow trade with Syria. The UAE sees Assad as a bulwark against the Islamists that Abu Dhabi dreads and loathes. Greece, anxious to avoid another outflux of Syrian refugees, has sent its Ambassador back to Damascus as an “envoy.” Other Europeans may be tempted, or blackmailed, to do something comparable.
The UN political process for Syria, focused on a committee that is supposed to be writing a new constitution, is essentially moribund. Initiative for years has fallen instead to the “Astana powers” (Iran, Russia, and Turkey), none of which are prepared to push for a political solution. All three are relying on their military forces to get what they want in Syria. Iran gets a bridge to Lebanese Hizbollah as well as a new confrontation line with Israel, Russia gets its bases and a foothold in the Middle East, and Turkey gets to repress the Syrian Kurds, some of whom have supported insurgency inside Turkey.
I am not appealing for inaction, just highlighting how difficult it is to think of anything that can be done to affect the situation in a serious way. That is even before we come to discussing Biden Administration priorities, which include reentering the Iran nuclear deal, withdrawing at least some US forces from the Middle East, and refocusing on strategic competition with Russia and China while managing the challenges posed by North Korea, Venezuela, and other bad actors. Never mind the domestic priorities. Syria looks distant in Biden’s perspective.
So sure, a special envoy if you like, but what will s/he do? Talk is cheap, and not bad. But there are no good options for Syria.
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