Tag: Turkey
Stevenson’s army, June 30
WSJ says China wants to “tame” wolf warrior image.
Gen Miller warns of deteriorating situation in Afghanistan.
NYT says Kabul airport is key, explains role of Turkey.
Journalist says US defeat in Afghanistan was foreseeable.
The House voted Tuesday repeal both the 1991 Gulf war AUMF and the 1957 authorization for troops in the Middle East to fight communism.
The 1957 measure, part of the “Eisenhower Doctrine,” was the subject of my Harvard senior thesis, so attention must be paid.
SAIS prof Frank Gavin discusses the tensions between economic and security policies.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Two does not a trend make, but there is hope
Two so-called populist, definitely corrupt, would-be autocrats have fallen: Trump and Netanyahu. What are the prospects for others of their ilk?
- Indian President Narendra Modi has declined markedly in popularity, mainly due to COVID-19. The epidemic is beginning to ebb in India and he doesn’t face an election until 2024, so it is impossible to predict his fate.
- Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban is in a less comfortable spot. The epidemic has hit Hungary hard and tanked its economy, but he is offering lots of goodies in advance of next year’s parliamentary elections. His party is still strong, but the opposition is more united than in the past.
- Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro is in worse shape, due to the virus and the economy. If former President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva returns to the hustings, Bolsonaro could be in big trouble come next year’s presidential election.
- Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is not in much better condition. Turkey was already in economic trouble before the epidemic, which has hit hard. The opposition, not fully unified, is gaining on him but the presidential election is still far off: June 2023.
- And for the sake of my Balkan readers, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic looks to be in good shape for next year’s presidential election, as the opposition is fragmented and he moved quickly to secure Chinese and Russian vaccines. Nor is there much hope of seeing the back of Bosnia’s Serb President Milorad Dodik, who has lost some traction but likely still has enough grip to hold on in next year’s polls. Both are enjoying lots of Russian financing and protection while Europe and the US twiddle their thumbs, uncertain what to do.
The already autocrats are in better shape:
- Chinese President Xi Jinping has done likewise and has no limit on how long he can serve.
- Russian President Vladimr Putin is holding his own, despite COVID-19. In any event, he is already eliminating any serious opposition to his hold on power in the next presidential election, which isn’t due until 2024.
- Iranian Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini is firmly in charge. The presidential election Friday includes no “opposition” or even bona fide moderates. Repression and cooptation have won the day.
- Syrian President Bashar al Assad has survived a decade of both moderate and extremist rebellion. He is now nominally in charge of perhaps 40% of Syria, but his regime is tattered and in desperate need of rebuilding.
- Belarusan President Alexander Lukashenko is weathering massive demonstrations and depends for his survival on Putin, whose efforts to jail or otherwise eliminate any serious opposition Lukashenko imitates.
- Min Aung Hlaing, Myanmar’s coup leader, is trying to do likewise, despite persistent demonstrations.
President Biden has devoted his week in Europe to rallying the G7 to the cause of demonstrating that they can deliver for citizens better than the autocracies. Next week he’ll do the same with the broader audience of NATO allies before confronting Putin. The American economy is reviving rapidly if somewhat sporadically. The G7 has committed itself to a billion vaccine doses for poorer countries, improved public health preparations, and worldwide infrastructure efforts to counter China’s Belt and Road.
I don’t really have much hope that the autocrats will fall, even if Biden demonstrates unequivocally the superiority of liberal democracy. That’s not how the world works. Autocrats are autocrats in order to prevent that outcome. But the fall of a few more populist and corrupt would-be autocrats is certainly not out of the question. The world would be a lot better off if their citizens opted for true democracy. Two does not a trend make, but there is hope.
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Stevenson’s army, June 12
CRS has new study of China’s PLA.
WSJ tells how FBI captured the ransom Bitcoin.
WSJ says Turkey is key to Afghan pullout.
In FP, SAIS prof Edward P. Joseph discusses Balkan policy.
DOD announces security assistance to Ukraine.
NYT has special anniversary report on Pentagon papers. Here’s online link. Haven’t seen a hard copy.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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The Alliance needs its members to get tough
In advance of the upcoming NATO Leaders Meeting, it is a timely to discuss the Alliance as a political forum and its future cohesion. NATO’s strength and resilience derive from Allies’ shared committment to the values and spirit of the Washington Treaty, namely the principles of democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law, and the development of peaceful international relations. As NATO grapples with a challenging security environment, it must also confront erosion of democratic norms within some member countries, which undermines NATO unity. On April 27, 2021, The Center for Strategic and International Studies convened a panel to discuss prospects for NATO cohesion in light of a changing strategic environment. Speakers and their affiliations are listed below:
Ambassador Muriel Domenach: Permanent Representative of France to NATO
MdB Omid Nouripour: Foreign Policy Spokesperson for the German Green party.
Rachel Ellehuus (Moderator): Deputy Director of the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program
Heather A. Conley (Introductory Remarks): Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic
Values and Principles Define NATO
One consistent theme of the panel was the centrality of democratic values and ideals for defining the character of the NATO alliance. Ambassador Domenach noted that a lack of ideological and political cohesion across NATO member countries is a detriment to Alliance structure. The increasing failure to agree on basic norms of good governance and democratic rule intensifies tension and undermines meaningful cooperation. Moreover, the failure to agree on basic values undermines the material ability of NATO and its member nations to engage in its core functions of deterrence and defense in two ways. First, ideological rifts are particularly significant in the context of NATO’s organizational structure, which requires unified decision-making. When any one country can block actions by the group, schisms within the group become increasingly problematic. Second, lack of ideological cohesion in NATO undermines credibility because it decreases the likelihood that NATO will be able to act decisively against its enemies.
Nouripour similarly argued that ideological divisions among NATO members has material implications for security. He pointed to Turkey’s current attempts to play the US and Russia off of one another. The most significant manifestation of this strategy of straddling with ideological opponents has been the purchase of the Russian-made S-400 air defense system. However, Ankara has recently discovered that the black boxes in the S-400 will not allow them to target Russian planes. In essence, then, a NATO ally has ceded its air defense sovereignty to Russia.
Ellehuus pointed out, however, that NATO has not always relied on, or succeeded based on, ideological uniformity. In fact, at the outset NATO included members such as Portugal that did not at the time share the same democratic values as many of the other members. She argued that this might indicate that value cohesion is not necessarily crucial for NATO. However, both Nouripour and Domenach agreed that ideological cohesion is more critical now than it was in the early days of NATO. Nouripour argued that democratic backsliding and the rise of disinformation campaigns and other attempts to actively weaken democracies dictates that a stronger emphasis be placed on maintaining democratic values.
Compelling Good Behavior
One clear weakness of the NATO structure that emerged out of this panel’s discussion is the difficulty that the organization has in compelling good behavior from non-compliant member states. Domenach pointed to suggestions about creating a code of conduct or reviewing compliance with fundamental NATO values. Ellehuus similarly pointed to two proposed articles that would require NATO allies to 1) refrain from politically motivated blockages of NATO business, and 2) to report any interactions with third countries that might affect the security of allies.
However, she also acknowledged that these changes were highly unlikely to pass in any meaningful form, largely because non-compliant members can and most likely will veto any attempt to pass these measures. She also argued that the North Atlantic Council is a valuable forum through which to air disagreements and negotiate solutions. Recent attempts by the NATO Secretary-General have proven fruitful in this regard.
Nouripour disagreed with this assessment to some extent. While he agreed that NATO is unlikely to pass meaningful reforms that allow it to police the conduct of member states, he similarly found the prospect of the North Atlantic Council and the NATO Secretary-General negotiating compliance to be unlikely. Instead, he argued more in favor of direct bilateral and multilateral engagement to push for democratic values. Given the constraints of NATO as an organization, he believes that states acting on a national basis can perhaps create greater leverage with member countries. Ellehuus ultimately agreed that national power might be an effective mechanism through which to encourage compliance
Therefore, while NATO faces a variety of internal and external threats to its political and ideological cohesion, member states are stepping up in innovative ways to tackle the new threats of the 21st century.
To watch the event in full, please click here.
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Stevenson’s army, April 22
– Centcom seeks carrier to cover Afghan withdrawal.
– Taliban spreadsheet lists allied violations of ceasefire.
– US gives Iran list of possible sanctions relief.
– DOD investigating possible Russian directed energy attacks on US troops.
-Trial balloon: NYT says Biden will label Armenian killings “genocide.”
– NYT has its tick-tock on refugee numbers snafu.
– WaPo details Kerrry’s work on climate. Says he flies commercial.
– House passes bill to limit Saudi arms sales.
– SFRC bill would give more details on executive agreements.
– Frank Hoffman analyzes 3 defense budget options.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
And then more:
– This is peak hearing season in Congress, and a good time to catch up on defense and foreign policy issues. For example, look at D Briefs column yesterday. You can also locate hearings at the regular LOC site.
– SFRC approved a bipartisan bill to counter China.
– Politico has State’s ambassadorial bid list along with an explanation: the countries not listed may be ones slated for political appointees.
The document is a snapshot and could change, of course. But if a country is not listed, it’s likely for one of two reasons: the post is currently occupied by a member of the Foreign Service and that person won’t rotate out until after 2022; or it’s being reserved for Biden to give to a campaign donor or another political ally.
– Chevron opposes Myanmar sanctions.
– Chad rebels prepared for war in Libya.
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Advice from the classics for Washington, Beijing, and Moscow
Alexandros P. Mallias, Ambassador of Greece to the United States ( 2005-2009) writes:
Secretary of State Tony Blinken, a fine diplomat and a seasoned top national security official, followed the footsteps of several American Presidents. During his first trip in Europe, he paid an important and much anticipated visit to NATO’s Headquarters in Brussels. The top American diplomat reiterated the Biden’s Administration strong commitment to NATO, while expressing the expectation that the allies will remain committed to cope with the three main challenges/threats as reflected in NATO’s reports and joint declarations. Is that so?
The response is neither easy nor linear. Let’s elaborate:
- The unprecedented though foreseeable rise of China’s capabilities. China is a privileged commercial, economic, trade, shipping, financial, and investment partner for NATO’s European allies. She is also an indispensable enabler in addressing climate change and the COVID pandemic. A Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, swiftful rising China is a global antagonist and potentially a strategic challenge for American interests. China has been a major concern issue for Congress and the top foreign policy priority, with important domestic parameters, for the Obama, Trump, and Biden Administrations.
China’s Asian-Pacific claims and interests as well as its global designs are supported by political, economic and increasing military capabilities, yet under a “soft power” cover. It is increasingly difficult to draw a clear line among cooperation, engagement and deterrence. Economic, energy, trade, and financial interdependence are the basic characteristics of China’s bonds with her leading global partners. It is now more difficult for the United States alone to prevent by coercive measures China’s ascent to primacy.
The 2500 years old “Thucydides trap” syndrome is now becoming a useful tool of analysis when examining US-China relations. Washington runs the risk of eventually projecting the image of a hegemon, like the city of Athens. But America’s soft power is colossal and global, much stronger than coercion. If hard power towards China and pressure on allies are the best policy option, then the probable product is a brotherhood of non-willing allies. A third powerful pole has already taken shape opposing US policies, including politico-military rapprochement among China, Russia and others .
2. Russia’s assertiveness and come-back policy under President Vladimir Putin, which includes prestige, self-confident power politics, and territorial ambitions. Russia, a big power, is today an important energy, trade, tourism and economic partner for many NATO allies, with whom it sided in the fight against international terrorism. Russia is also a key player albeit a hard power antagonist in Eurasian affairs.
The Russian Federation, also a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, is focusing on the European theater of energy, political, and military operations as well as on the greater Middle East (MENA).
Notwithstanding justified and legitimate opposition and apprehension among NATO allies and the European Union, Russia considers itself a shareholder of European cultural heritage, from the Atlantic to the Urals. But Russia’s invasion, occupation and annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing aggressive moves against Ukraine , in violation of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the Paris Charter for a New Europe are illegal. The status quo in Crimea cannot be tolerated. Russia has undermined its own role as an important stakeholder in European security and cooperation. US, NATO policies and EU sanctions are justified.
Notwithstanding the Russian Federation’s important fossil fuel resources, its economic and military capabilities at this stage may not sustain its superpower aspirations. A framework of a “principled (value based) cooperative engagement” is possible. Russia’s desire to become a big power player in Eurasia, MENA, and beyond should be matched by the Kremlin’s attachment to the principles and purposes of the UN Charter and the fundamental principles and values of the European legal, political and security post cold-war commitments and architecture.
There is a basic prerequisite before engaging with Russia. It pertains to NATO’s credibility, cohesion, and deterrence capability. Russia has managed to establish–against NATO’s interests–strategic defense procurement agreements and unprecedented confidential bonds with Turkey, a NATO member. The S-400 issue is a serious “intra muros” challenge undermining NATO diplomatically and politically. It is not an issue to be dealt with simply between Washington and Ankara. Further to Turkey’s provocative and aggressive policies against Greece and Cyprus, it poses a credibility problem for NATO as a whole and seriously affects Alliance security. It has to be addressed as a priority issue in order to preserve NATO’s credibility, restore intra-Alliance confidence, and revive the indivisible collective security axiom.
3. Preventing, countering and deterring hybrid threats. Often, the sources of these attacks directed against NATO members and institutions are also related or correlated to Moscow and Beijing. But it would be naive to attribute them solely to NATO’s two global antagonists. Cyberspace is the most difficult theater of operations for an undeclared global confrontation. More so, if associated with the possibility of rogue or failed states, authoritarian leaders, and non-state actors (terrorists, secessionist groups, etc.) getting access to nuclear weapons systems and/or long range ballistic capabilities. This is the 21st century nightmare scenario.
“Reset” global politics, starting with the UN Security Council
There is nothing new in stating that the world is characterized by power politics, rivalry between states and the promotion of state interests. Synergy is partial, alliances challenged, while the ecumenic symmetry is rather elliptic. The bipolar world order collapsed \; today, superpower monopoly is challenged. We should be in search of a new world order.
The Biden-Harris Administration’s much anticipated “reset” of multilateral diplomacy has a name: international cooperation, in particular within the United Nations and the Security Council. Multilateralism is the prerequisite for restoring the efficacy of the collective international security system: securing, shaping and reshaping the problematic world order.
It is a common secret that the United Nations is today unable to discharge its mission; synergy is missing among the five Permanent Members (P5) of the Security Council. The antagonism and conflict among the five stem both from a different hierarchy of values, attachment to human rights issues included, mostly though for geopolitical and economic reasons.
Attachment to the principles and purposes enshrined in the United Nations Charter has eroded. As long as the Security Council is unable to operate and act as mandated by the Charter, it will be impossible to reach the necessary consensus to prevent and counter threats against peace, stability, and security. The “veto” power prerogative should not be synonymous with idleness and inertia. The “zero sum game” equilibrium point cannot become the world order power equilibrium.
At times the United Nations Security Council was considered to be the refuge of the weak or the haven for weaker UN members. Now it is the indispensable condition for the P5 in resetting and restoring the much wanted world order.
In their legitimate search for common ground, the United States may wish to test the waters by hosting a ‘closed door retreat” of the P5 at Ministerial or Head of State level. Such a move could display of the American “smart power” (hard+ soft + principles and values) in reshaping the world order. Coping with the pandemic, climate change, and unity in fighting against terrorism could figure as the starting point of the agenda.
Engagement, negotiation, leadership: get advice from the Classics
What lessons can we draw from the ancient Greek classics that are relevant today? I refer to war and peace prototypes: Athens, Sparta, and Corinth were the three key city-states at the origins of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides’ History of that War remains by far the most complete handbook on strategy and tactics, on peace and war, on alliances and hegemony, on the cleavage between principles and interests, might and right, on negotiating of truces and treaties and definitely on leadership. We often use a famous quote from the Melian Dialogue:
…since you know as well as we do that right is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.
Thucydides refers also to the argument used by the Athenian ambassadors warning the Spartans not to start the war by saying:
….Consider the vast influence of accident in war before you start it. For a long war as it continues for the most part ends in catastrophe… It is a common mistake in going to war to begin at the wrong end, to act first and wait for disaster to negotiate…
Many scholars argue that we already move in the footsteps of the Peloponnesian War. I earnestly hope that the Athenian message will not be ignored by Moscow, Beijing or Washington.
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