Tag: Turkey
Foreign policy is also made by omission
Secretary of State Blinken outlined Biden Administration foreign policy yesterday. Here is the short version:
- End the pandemic
- Rebuild the economy
- Protect democracy
- Treat immigrants humanely but reduce incentives for migration
- Revitalize relations with friends
- Slow climate change
- Lead in hi tech
- Manage the rise of China
All of this is to be done with two things in mind: benefiting Americans and mobilizing other countries to carry part of the burden.
Tony is also at pains to underline that all these foreign policy issues have important domestic dimensions and that diplomacy will come before military action. The former is not new and underlay Trump’s “America First” slogan, especially on trade issues. The latter isn’t new either, but it is diametrically the opposite of what Trump was inclined to do. He thought cruise missiles and drones could get the US out of Syria without any need for talking with anyone. He tried talks with the Taliban, but did not wait for them to succeed before withdrawing half the troops.
It’s hard for me to quarrel with much of what Tony said. But there are things missing, as Tony acknowledges. Often in international affairs, as in domestic politics, what is not said is as significant as what is said.
Apart from the mention of China and some other geopolitical threats (Russia, Iran North Korea), there is no mention at all of specific regions and little of specific countries. My friends in the Middle East and the Balkans should take note. You are not going to get all the attention you crave. This is a major change from the traditional diplomatic “tour d’horizon” and suggests a shift from the State Department’s traditional emphasis on bilateral relations, as represented in its “geographic” bureaus and accentuated in the transactional Trump Administration, to “transnational” issues represented in State’s “functional” bureaus.
Among the “transnational” issues, one important one is omitted: nuclear non-proliferation. This may reflect a realistic recognition that with respect at least to North Korea and perhaps even Iran the cat is out of the bag: we are not going to be able to convince them to give up their nuclear ambitions entirely. It may also reflect a desire to leave room for some of our friends and allies to respond in kind. We’ve long exercised a tacit double standard with respect to Israel’s nuclear weapons. We might be willing to do so for other countries like Japan or South Korea whose neighbors threaten them with nukes. Trump famously uttered this heresy out loud, but his departure doesn’t make the issue evaporate. Confidence in the American nuclear umbrella fades as Pyongyang acquires the capacity to nuke Los Angeles.
Of course the urgent in foreign policy often comes before the merely important. Tony knows he won’t be able to ignore Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the Palestinians, democratic backsliding in the Balkans, the coup in Burma, or the agreed withdrawal from Afghanistan, which the Administration needs to either confirm or postpone. This Administration’s minds and hearts are in the right place. But that does not guarantee success. They face a challenging global environment, not least from all the omissions.
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Stevenson’s army, March 4
The US government makes few Big Statements on foreign policy. Most common is the National Security Strategy Report, which previous administrations have issued just once in 4 years, usually in the second year. The language is anodyne; it’s hard to find anything to disagree with. But once issued, the documents become gospel, regularly quoted in interagency meetings as “proof” of what the President wants.
The Biden Administration is off to a fast start. Yesterday the WH issued “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.” Defense News has a good summary.
SecState Blinken also made a major policy speech. WaPo notes the highlights.
NYT reports secret order on drone strikes, said to be temporary pending review, reversing Trump policy delegating authority to operational levels. [Readers here may know that I have long favored the Hughes-Ryan model of presidential decision and congressional notification of drone strikes and offensive cyber operations.]
In other news, Germany is conducting FONOP in South China Sea.
FP says Biden is giving Turkey a “silent treatment.”
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Turkey ascendant, Europe at odds, Libyans need to be heard
Ten years after the 2011 revolution that overthrew Muammar al-Qaddafi, the Biden administration is facing renewed challenges in Libya. Buffeted by the other powers’ diverging geopolitical interests, including those of the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Russia, Libya will face enormous political, economic and security challenges in the foreseeable future. US diplomatic absence has left the country in turmoil and allowed the intervention of foreign powers.
On February 18, the Atlantic Council hosted a panel exploring the role of international actors in the post 2011 Libyan political landscape. Speakers and their affiliations are listed below:
Karim Mezran (Moderator): Director, North Africa Initiative, Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs, Atlantic Council
Steven A. Cook: Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow, Middle East and Africa Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
Anas El Gomati: Founder and Director, Sadeq Institute
Deborah K. Jones: Former United States Ambassador to Libya
Roberto Menotti: Co-Executive Director, Aspen Economic Strategy Group
The US Role in Libya
Jones predicted that Libya will ultimately take a backseat in the Biden administration’s foreign policy agenda. Instead, she expects Biden to focus on rebuilding alliances, handling the COVID-19 pandemic, and addressing climate change. To the extent that Biden’s foreign policy will intersect with the situation in Libya, it will likely be through a multilateral framework, such as NATO. Jones expressed optimism that the US will play a more assertive role in preventing destabilizing actions in Libya by external actors and will continue to play a role in counterterrorism. Ultimately, however, she cautioned that the US is no longer in a position to deliver decisive fiats through unilateral action in any arena in the world, including Libya.
European Tension Over Libya
Menotti argued that there is a “fundamental incoherence” in European policy vis-a-vis Libya. Despite the fact that European interests have always been most effectively pursued through collaboration, European action in Libya has remained fractured by national interests. These divisions are most clearly expressed through the competitive relationship between France and Italy in Libya, which has largely centered around strategic positioning over natural resources. However, Italy’s intervention in Libya can be characterized as tentative at best. Besides, there are sufficient resources in Libya for European countries to find room for mutual cooperation.
Regional Actors in Libya
Turkey’s intervention and stabilization efforts continue to be one of the defining regional elements of the conflict in Libya. However, the panelists disagreed about the prospects for these efforts. Jones remained confident that Turkey can remain a critical ally for the US in the Libyan arena, particularly given America’s diminished global standing and Turkey’s interest in reasserting itself internationally.
Other panelists acknowledged that Turkey’s military intervention has been surprisingly effective at stabilizing the situation in Libya. However, they were less optimistic about Turkey’s potential to act cooperatively with other international powers. Menotti noted that Turkey’s neo-Ottoman strategy has met the most success to date in Libya, suggesting that it will seek to further consolidate its position and influence there. Cook went further, arguing that Turkey and the US have increasingly diverged with respect to their goals and values. As a result, he expects that the US will struggle to find points of synergy with Turkey in Libya. Instead, America must expect to either oppose Turkey or get out of the way.
The UAE and the Gulf countries more broadly have also intervened in Libya in recent years. However, Jones, Cook, and Menotti agreed that the GCC has been an ineffective and destabilizing force in Libya, and they predicted that the Gulf countries will likely disengage from Libya in the near-term.
A Libyan Voice for Libya’s Future
While much of the discussion centered around the international forces at work in Libya, Gomati underlined the fact that the Libyan conflict is fundamentally about Libyans, no matter how many countries have sought to exert themselves in the power vacuum. The fundamental Libyan nature of this conflict has two important implications:
- The conflict will not be resolved until Libyans resolve the disputes over the country’s political direction, national character, and ideological tone. This debate revolves around the role of the military in political and civil society.
- European, American, and regional machinations cannot resolve these differences without the explicit buy-in of Libyans themselves.
While much of the ongoing discussions about Libya concern its international dynamics, we must not forget the voices of Libyans themselves.
To watch the event in full, please click here.
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Turkey has always lain between East and West
On 11 February, 2021 the Wilson Center held an event to discuss a new book by Onur Isci, Turkey and the Soviet Union during World War II: Diplomacy, Discord and International Relations. This book is a reinterpretation of Turkish diplomacy in World War II (WWII) and Cold War era and details the deterioration of relations between Turkey and Russia. Co-panelists Suzy Hansen and James Ryan discuss the relevance to the way the West views Turkey today.
Speakers:
Christian F. Ostermann (moderator): Director, History and Public Policy Program, Wilson Center
Onur Isci: Assistant Professor, Bilkent University
Suzy Hansen: Author, New York Times
James Ryan: Assistant Director, Center for Near Eastern Studies, NYU
Turkey abandoned World War II neutrality
Onur Isci discussed Turkey’s role in World War II. Where other scholars have argued that Turkey played and exploited its neutral position, Isci argues otherwise, noting that Turkey pursued survival rather than strategic positioning. The downfall of Turkey’s relationship with Moscow came when Turkey targeted a Soviet reconnaissance plane that crashed in March 1943. Fear of an imminent Soviet threat emerged at the forefront of Turkish politics, shifting Turkey’s focus towards strengthened Transatlantic partnership.
In response to a question that Ryan posed to Isci, he noted that Turkey was constrained by their neutrality and they ultimately paid the price for it. By amplifying their fear of the Soviet Union they chose a path that was no longer neutral in order to position themselves more closely with the West.
Looking to the Past in Discussing the Present
Ryan emphasized that the idea that Turkey has a natural alliance with the West, particularly with the United States, is a myth. This can clearly be seen today and will influence how Turkey’s future political and diplomatic choices play out.
Many Americans view Turkey during the Cold War as an adamant and strong Western ally. Hansen agrees that this is not the case. A focus on Turkey’s historic relationship with Russia is pivotal to the understanding of modern day events. Isci suggests that the recent declassification of many documents has allowed scholars to gain access to government archives from the post-WWII and Cold War era, drastically shifting knowledge on Turkey and it’s foreign policy. The relationship between Turkey and Russia has been tumultuous at many points over the last century, but both countries have been cautious. Even at points when tensions have been at their peak, they have never gone to war.
Isci, Hansen and Ryan all argued that the history of Turkey is neither black nor white. Viewing Turkey as either pro-West or pro-Russia is a mistake that fails to recognize the nuances of Turkish history and its relationship with both the West and Russia.
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Stevenson’s army, February 17
– FT says China is considering limiting rare earth exports to US. That could jeopardize F-35 program and other things, as CRS explains.
– FT also says Macron plans pullout from Sahel.
– NYT says Biden aides divided over Afghan policy.
– GMF sees tensions in Turkish-Iranian relations.
-DOD report finds evidence of white supremacists in US military.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, February 16
– CNN has a typical day.
– WSJ’s Seib says he’s blending economic and foreign policy.
– WSJ says DOD is going big on robotics.
-CNAS writer has good to-do list for SecDef Austin.
– Erdogan blasts US for support to Kurds.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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