Tag: Turkey
Cold comfort is better than none at all
“Above all,” he says (at 18:49), “Iran must face a credible nuclear threat.” This is Prime Minister Netanyahu implicitly acknowledging, whether intentionally or not, Israel’s own nuclear weapons and stating against whom they are targeted. At the same time, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is making it clear that he intends to match Iran’s nuclear capabilities:
Turkish President Erdogan has made a similar pledge.
This raises the disturbing question: are we at the brink of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East? I had a look at this question last spring with two Middle East Institute interns. Our conclusion then was that the situation needs monitoring. I can say a bit more now.
Can a Saudi nuclear capability be blocked?
While it is rarely mentioned in public, an amped-up Saudi non-proliferation commitment is likely a key part of the Biden Administration’s current negotiations with Riyadh for a bilateral security agreement. That wouldn’t be a popular proposition on its own in the U.S. Congress. But if it comes with a Saudi commitment not to develop sensitive nuclear technology (especially enrichment, reprocessing, and weaponization), it might be more attractive on both sides of the aisle. American security relations with both Japan and South Korea, on which the press reports the Administration is modeling a possible agreement with the Kingdom, include de facto commitments not to develop nuclear weapons. West Germany’s entry into NATO included such a commitment as well.
But the US/Saudi negotiations aim primarily at formal normalization of Saudi relations with Israel, for which in exchange the Saudis want concessions to the Palestinians. The Crown Prince is sounding soft on that score. He wants improvement in the life of the Palestinians. Netanyahu is not going to find it easy to get his ultra-nationalist coalition partners to offer even that. Nor is it clear he wants to. A substantial non-proliferation commitment from Saudi Arabia could however sweeten the deal from Netanyahu’s perspective. He won’t want some future, less friendly, Crown Prince to wield nukes.
The Saudis have indicated they intend to upgrade their non-proliferation safeguards agreement with the IAEA. That is a good step in the right direction, but it falls short of the strictest arrangement known as an Additional Protocol. That is where the U.S. should want the Kingdom to arrive.
What about Turkey?
Erdogan already has American nuclear weapons in Turkey. Were he to push for Turkey’s own nukes, those might be withdrawn, as they really don’t serve much military purpose. But Ankara is taking risks these days in many directions, exercising its right to a far more independent foreign policy than in the past:
- Participation with Iran and Russia in managing the conflict in Syria.
- Purchase of Russian air defenses, even if now mothballed due to the American reaction.
- Mediation of the grain deal between Russia and Ukraine.
- Opposition to Finland’s and (still) to Sweden’s membership in NATO.
- Support for Azerbaijan’s military operation to take back Nagorno-Karabakh.
It would not be surprising if Erdogan concluded that nuclear weapons would be an appropriate bulwark for this more independent course.
Could Egypt be far behind?
Likely yes, as things stand today. President Sisi has stated that he wants Egypt to be like Germany: a great power without nuclear weapons. Neither Egypt’s economy nor its army are currently in a position to resist American and Israeli pressure against Egypt acquiring nuclear weapons. But if Riyadh and Ankara were to get them, Cairo would want to follow suit. When would then be the question.
Iran sets the pace, but might stop short
Israel’s nuclear weapons, which have existed for more than 50 years, did not ignite an arms race. Iran’s nuclear capabilities, which have been advancing rapidly, could well do so. Israel kept its nuclear program behind a (sometimes thin) veil of secrecy. Iran is unable to hide its progress, as even hindered IAEA inspections provide a good deal of transparency. If Tehran decides to build a nuclear weapons, the world is going to know it, sooner rather than later. Ignoring that development would be difficult for both Saudi Arabia and Turkey. In the Middle East, Iran is the nuclear pace setter.
But Tehran might stop short of full weaponization. Its own national security is the reason. If Iran gets nuclear weapons, the slightest doubt in Israel about whether a missile is being prepared for launch with a nuclear warhead could lead to Armageddon. It would be far wiser for Tehran to make it clear that it has stopped short of weaponization. Being a few weeks from becoming a nuclear power would give Iran most of the benefits of becoming one without all of the risks.
That is cold comfort. But cold comfort is better than none at all.
Security trumps democracy in the Middle East
Prime Minister Netanyahu is proceeding with his takeover of Israel’s judiciary branch. This is despite objections from massive protests as well as the US government. The State Department has nevertheless announced that US security assistance to Israel will continue. It is “ironclad.”
No surprise
This should surprise no one. The only real leverage the US has is security cooperation. But President Biden, like his predecessors, has deemed it vital to the US, not only to Israel. If you believe that, you don’t want to use it as leverage. Besides, how long would it take for domestic politics to overcome a decision to interrupt security cooperation with Israel?
Israel faces no immediate threat from its Arab neighbors. The Iranian threat is real, but that is another reason the Americans won’t want to interrupt security cooperation. It would significantly relieve pressure on Tehran. The rhythm of US-Israel cooperation for a possible attack on Iranian nuclear facilities accelerated noticeably last year. The US wants to maintain military pressure on Iran, not relieve it.
Consequences
What the Americans don’t do has consequences. Netanyahu’s coup against the judiciary is going to make it easier for his right-wing ultra-nationalist coalition partners to pursue their goals. They seek permanent Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and Jerusalem. With the Supreme Court now limited in when it can intervene, legislation that de facto accomplishes that end is not only possible but likely. That will deal the death blow to the already moribund two-state solution.
The Palestinian Authority may cry foul but will remain quiescent. Palestinians will not. Israel is already facing an armed rebellion on the West Bank, where this year more than 160 Palestinians have been killed. It could face attacks from Gaza and perhaps Lebanon, but none of that will change the strategic picture. Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem will be relegated to third class non-citizenship in a one state reality. Palestinians inside Israel proper already are relegated to second class citizenship.
The Saudi reaction
Netanyahu hopes the Saudis will ignore the Palestinian reality and make their peace with Israel, as the Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco have already done. He could be right. Mohammed bin Salman may tell the world that the Palestinians are the central issue for the Arab world, but four years ago he told American Jewish leaders that the Palestinians need to take what they can get and make their peace with Israel.
This is where the US does have some cards, but it is unlikely to play them. Netanyahu, hoping for an agreement with Saudi Arabia, is pressuring Washington to give MbS what he wants: a civilian nuclear deal and a security guarantee. Biden understandably hesitates about both. US law requires the Administration to get an agreement that its civilian nuclear technology would not be used for enrichment or reprocessing. That the Saudis aren’t likely to accept. Congress would be unlikely to approve a security guarantee. In any event, the Saudis won’t be anxious to give a rabidly nationalist Netanyahu government the satisfaction of a peace agreement. So that seems a bridge too far under current circumstances.
Security suffices
I was asked on Al Hurra last night whether security was a sufficient basis for US relations with Israel. The answer is yes. It has been the basis for American relations with other Middle Eastern countries for decades. Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Turkey know they have to listen to American lectures on democracy and human rights. But they also know those values will not interfere with security cooperation.
Where the Israeli departure from democracy will have a real impact is on American Jews, who are devotees of individual rights. A poll recently found “about three-quarters of Americans, including 80% of Democrats and 64% of Republicans, would choose a democratic Israel that’s no longer Jewish, over a Jewish Israel without full citizenship and equality for non-Jews living under its authority.” But that won’t matter, because Christian evangelical support for Israel will more than compensate for any loss among America’s Jewish population. Security trumps democracy in the Middle East.
Stevenson’s army, July 13
I’ll be away for several days and unable to curate the news. Here are a few items for today:
– F16s to Turkey may depend on F35s to Greece.
– WSJ says several Russian officers have been “detained”
– Here’s the list of amendments still up for action by the House on the NDAA
– RollCall says House appropriations committee allows first pay raise since 2009
– Dan Drezner ponders why Biden’s low approval
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, July 11
– NYT sees Biden playing the long game to restore balance in US-China relations
– WaPo tells how Biden at al. got Erdogan to agree to admit Sweden to NATO
– US today said Turkey would get F16s [It’s curious that the Biden people aren’t — yet — claiming credit which they probably deserve.]
– SAIS Prof Mary Sarotte says German model won’t work for Ukraine in NATO
– Ed Luttwak also has an analysis of the Ukraine war.
– House Rules Committee is deciding which of 1400 amendments will be allowed for House NDAA debate. DOD weighs in with SAP [statement of administration policy] on items already in the bill.
– I was struck by Peter Beinart’s discussion of Israel’s long term options, and especially by Finance Minister Smotrich’s 2017 master plan as well as his recent comments.
– I was dismayed by the Gallup poll showing a further deep drop in US confidence in higher education.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Syria is in good company in the Arab League
The Arab League decided yesterday in Cairo to readmit Syria. The League had suspended Syria’s membership in response to its violent crackdown on demonstrators in March 2011. President Assad will presumably attend the May 19 Summit in Riyadh. This comes on top of several bilateral normalization moves, including by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
Conditions aren’t likely to be fulfilled
The readmission is supposedly conditional. Though I’ve been unable to find the official statement, press reports suggest the conditions include allowing humanitarian assistance and return of refugees, clamping down on Syria’s burgeoning Captagon drug exports, and the beginnings of a political process called for in UN Security Council resolution 2254.
I’ll be surprised if much of that comes to pass. Assad could and should have done all those things long ago. Preventing humanitarian assistance, blocking return of refugees, financing his regime with drug smuggling, and blocking any transition are all part of his strategy. Readmission to the Arab League is unlikely to change his behavior, which aims at restoration of his personal authority on the entire territory of Syria.
Fighting abates but conflict continues
That is still far off. The mostly Islamist remains of Syria’s opposition control parts of northwestern Syria while Turkish troops control several border areas, where they have pushed hostile Kurdish forces farther east and south. Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces control a large part of the east, with support from the U.S. Damascus requires Iranian and Russian support to maintain sometimes minimal control over the west and south. Israel continues to bomb Syria pretty much at will, to move Iranians and their proxies away from its border and to block military supplies to Hizbollah in Lebanon.
None of these conflicts is settled, but fighting has abated from his heights. None of the forces involved has the will and the wherewithal to change the current situation. Assad no doubt hopes that normalization with the Arab world will solve his economic problems and enable him to mount the effort required to regain more territory. He may negotiate to regain territory from Turkey in exchange for promises to clamp down on the Kurds. He’ll wait out the Americans, who aren’t likely to want to remain in Syria much longer.
Autocracy restored
If Assad is successful in restoring his autocracy, he won’t be alone in the Middle East. It is a long time since the Arab Spring of 2011. Tunisia’s fledgling democracy is gone, as is Egypt’s. Bahrain’s democratic movement was snuffed out early. Yemen’s and Libya’s “springs” degenerated into civil war. Sudan is headed in the same direction. Iraq has suffered repeated upheavals, though its American-imposed anocracy has also shown some resilience. Saudi Arabia has undertaken economic and social reforms, but driven entirely by its autocratic Crown Prince. The UAE remains an absolute monarchy.
Only in Morocco and Qatar have a few modest reforms survived in more or less stable and relatively open political environments. They are both monarchies with a modicum of political participation. Though Qatar allows nothing that resembles political parties, there is limited room for freedom of expression. Morocco is a livelier political scene, but the monarchy remains dominant whenever it counts.
America has already adjusted
The Biden Administration has already adjusted. It is treating democratic values as tertiary issues with any Middle Eastern country with a claim to good relations with the US. There is no more talk of Saudi Arabia as a rogue state. Washington is silent on the restorations of autocracy in Egypt, Tunisia, and Bahrain. The Americans want to see negotiated solutions in Yemen, Libya, and Sudan. Those are more likely to restore autocracy, or something like Iraq’s power-sharing anocracy, than any sort of recognizable democratic rule.
The Americans are not joining the Syria normalization parade. They are not blocking it either. Washington no doubt figures the conditions are better than nothing. We’ll have to wait and see if that is true.
Stevenson’s army, April 19
– Discord docs say Egypt paused on arms to Russia after US pressure.
– Tucker Carlson used altered docs.
– Russia claimed only 1% of faked profiles caught.
– Saudis & UAE buy Russian oil.
– US will sell F16 equipment to Turkey
– Ukraine war changed IMF.
–China is retaliating against US companies
– Politico lists likely contenders for top military jobs.
– Bob Gates says US needs to be much better at strategic communications.
– Researchers say partisan media works.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).