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Another red line erased

Posted in Daniel Serwer - December 19, 2018 - 0 Comment

President Trump has apparently decided to withdraw US troops within 30 days from the one-third of the country they control with the help of allied Kurdish-led but partly Arab-staffed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in anticipation of a Turkish attack on the Kurds. This contradicts official statements of US policy, which claimed the troops would remain until Iranian forces were withdrawn. Pentagon and other officials are said to still be arguing against the decision to erase this red line.

If implemented, this withdrawal will leave a vacuum in northeastern Syria that the Turks, Syrian government with its Iranian allies, and various extremist factions will try to fill, while the SDF tries to hold the territory. A great deal will depend on which of these forces the Americans favor. If they plan to leave via Turkey, that will favor Ankara. I’d bet on that, because the Patriot sale approved less than 24 hours ago suggests a broader rapprochement with the Turks. If they go out by air or through Iraq, they might be able to help the SDF retain control. It is said the SDF are expected to continue to target extremists for American attack.

The outcome of this free-for-all is difficult to predict, though more than likely it will boil down to a fight between Turkey and the Syrian regime. That might end in a pact, with the Turks withdrawing in exchange for commitment from Damascus to crack down on the SDF, especially its Kurdish leadership. Alternatively, the extremists–ISIS or Al Qaeda–may end up with a de facto safe haven, only nominally controlled by the regime or Turkey. The SDF is unlikely to be able to hold its dominance for long without on-the-ground US support, even though they include some ferocious fighters.

Trump’s decision, assuming it holds, would be consistent with both his and President Obama’s assessment that Syria is not worth fighting for. But unlike Obama, Trump claims a firmly anti-Iranian stance. It is hard to square withdrawal from Syria with wanting to back Iran out of its regional efforts at power projection, unless the withdrawal is prelude to all-out war against Iran. Americans are not ready for that, but a president in domestic difficulty, including manifold legal troubles, might try it as a grand distraction. Woe if that is what is happening.

American withdrawal will deprive Washington of any diplomatic leverage in the chimerical Geneva talks on a political solution in Syria. But even with a US presence they weren’t going anywhere. The withdrawal will also limit US capabilities against extremists, especially once the SDF succumbs to Turkish and/or Syrian attacks.

Is this the right decision or the wrong one? Let’s put it this way: if the US was not going to commit itself to a serious rebuilding effort in eastern Syria, one that would provide a model of well-functioning governance for the rest of Syria, staying had little point. That project would have been a difficult and expensive one. Trump, like all his predecessors since 1989, has no stomach for “nation-building.” But if you want to avoid the resurgence of extremists, statebuilding is what is needed. Now it will be up to the Russians, Iranians, and Turks. Let’s see how well they do.

One consequence is apparent: Trump has demonstrated repeatedly that he takes strong positions and backs down from them quickly. Witness his almost simultaneous backdown on the closure of the US government due to the budget fight. Trump bluffs and caves. Those who thought Obama made a big mistake not enforcing the “red line” on chemical weapons in Syria should be screaming foul. But many of them won’t, because they are predominantly Republican. Another red line is being erased.

Tags : Democracy and Rule of Law, Iran, Russia, Syria, Turkey

The Middle East wants reform

Posted in Rory Coleman - December 13, 2018 - 0 Comment

On Tuesday the Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted the presentation of the latest Middle East Public Opinion poll by James Zogby. Polling was conducted in 10 countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey and Iran. Zogby, Co-founder and President of the Arab American Institute and Director of Zogby Research Services, presented a summary of the data and key points before a panel discussion that featured Paul Salem, President of MEI, Kate Seelye, Vice President of MEI, Alex Vatanka, an MEI Senior Fellow, and Steven Cook, Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Throughout the Middle East citizens expressed discontent with the policies of their governments. Only in the UAE did a majority of respondents indicate that their country was on the right track. This discontent spanned the rough divide opened by the Arab spring. Egypt and Tunisia both followed the “democratic track” after successful revolutions in 2011, but a majority of respondents there believe their countries to be on the wrong track, joining Iraq and Palestine as states with majority disapproval. In Egypt the drop included the military, whose confidence levels have fallen 50 points since 2013. Government reform was ranked 3rd overall in the list of political priorities, topping extremism, foreign enemies, health care, and personal rights. This contradicts a common narrative, which justified the failure of the Arab Spring by claiming that the people desired only improved economic and security conditions and cared little for political reform as long as those conditions were met. Downplaying the desire for reform may have been simply wishful thinking by authoritarian leaders in the region. The survey conveyed a sense of foreign policy pragmatism. Regarding Syria there was growing support for a national unity government with participation of Bashar al Assad. Regarding Iran, while majorities supported the Trump administration’s move to pull out of the nuclear deal, in every country except Tunisia and Egypt the majority believe that peace between Iran and the Arab world is “very possible” or “somewhat possible.” Eight out of ten countries, including Iran, held the majority view that it is important to bring Iran into a regional security arrangement with the Arab countries to help bring peace to the region. One exception to this pragmatism is the the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A growing majority in 5 out of 7 Arab states were opposed to a partnership with Israel, even if Israel returns occupied Palestinian lands and fulfills the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative. Palestinians themselves remained overwhelmingly prepared for peace with Israel if the refugee issue is solved and Israel returns to its pre-1967 borders, but a growing number believe the Israelis would never agree to those terms. Given the growing struggle between Saudi Arabia and Turkey for regional influence, the polling reflected just how close the competition is. Turkey surpasses the Saudis for favorability in Tunisia, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan and Iraq, and tightened the gap in Egypt. A majority of Arab countries view Turkey as playing a more positive role than Saudi Arabia in both Iraq and Syria. Public opinion of America has fallen in the region. The EU, Russia and China all fared better than America. The panel believed that this drop in opinion was largely due to the perception of the American government as inept. The polling indicates a continued sense of unrest in the region. With little faith in their own institutions, the people of the Middle East remain largely uninspired by the jingoistic foreign policies of their governments and continue to seek an end to costly civil wars, in order to focus on domestic reforms and economic improvement.

Tags : Arab Spring, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, The Middle East, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United States

Peace Picks December 10 – 16

Posted in Rory Coleman - December 10, 2018 - 0 Comment

Reflections on the Middle East in 2018 | Tuesday, December 11 | 12 pm – 1:30 pm | Middle East Institute and Arab American Institute | 1319 18th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here

The Middle East Institute (MEI) and the Arab American Institute (AAI) are pleased to host James Zogby (Co-founder and President, AAI and Director, Zogby Research Services) to reflect on his latest poll of perspectives from across the Middle East and North Africa. The report includes the opinions of 8,628 adults from eight Arab countries as well as Turkey and Iran on the current landscape of employment opportunities, confidence in governmental institutions, and the future of Palestine. The poll also assessed regional attitudes towards the U.S.’s role in the region, the Iran Nuclear Deal, the region’s refugee crisis, and the fight against extremism.

Joining James Zogby to discuss these findings are Nadia Bilbassy(DC Bureau Chief, Al Arabiya News), Steven Cook (Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies, Council on Foreign Relations), and Alex Vatanka (Senior Fellow, MEI).

The poll and resulting report were organized by the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The findings are available for use by the public on the website of Zogby Research Services.

The North Korean nuclear crisis and the US–Republic of Korea (ROK) military alliance dominate international coverage of the Korean Peninsula, but what about South Korea itself? South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s administration has reportedly clamped down on media outlets, restricted freedom of speech, and encouraged partisanship in the judiciary and civil service.

Is the ROK government on a path to limit freedoms in the South? Or is this all just politics as usual in a democracy with different rules from our own? Please join AEI for a discussion on the domestic politics of South Korea and their implications for the ROK, the US, and North Korea.

Agenda

2:45 PM
Registration

3:00 PM
Panel: Toward illiberal democracy? South Korea under the Moon administration

Panelists:
Jean Lee, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Tara O, Pacific Forum; Institute for Corean-America Studies
Joshua Stanton, One Free Korea

Moderator:
Nicholas Eberstadt, AEI

4:10 PM
Conversation: The open society and its enemies in Korea: Reckoning with the ironies of history

Participants:
Nicholas Eberstadt, AEI
Sung-Yoon Lee, Tufts University

5:00 PM
Adjournment

The world’s most violent conflicts are being fought within its most youthful populations. In the five countries that suffered nearly 80 percent of recent deaths from violent extremism, half of all people were younger than 22. The youth in these countries are also some of their communities’ most effective peacebuilders and best hopes for breaking cycles of violence. What does it take for these young leaders to overcome crisis, conflict, and displacement? Please join the U.S. Institute of Peace on December 12 for a streamed forum with thought leader and youth leader participants from USIP’s Youth Leaders’ Exchange with His Holiness the Dalai Lama as they share their expertise, discuss what it takes to build inner resilience and, crucially, examine how to strategically apply it to peacebuilding.

In the third year of the Exchange, USIP’s Generation Change program brought 27 youth leaders from 12 countries to Dharamsala, India, where they enhanced their peacebuilding skills through trainings in conflict management, leadership, and prejudice awareness and reduction. They engaged His Holiness the Dalai Lama on issues ranging from cultivating inner peace, building bridges across social divides, human rights and the refugee crisis, and youth leadership. By the end of the program, the participants had learned from and inspired each other, and returned home ready to redouble their efforts to reduce violence in their communities.

Speakers

Wadi Ben-Hirki
Founder, Wadi Ben-Hriki Foundation (Nigeria)

Jimmie Briggs
Executive Director, Leave Out Violence-U.S., (U.S.)

Meron Kocho
Member of Council, MESPO-Iraq (Iraq)

Maya Soetoro-Ng
Advisor, Obama Foundation (U.S.)

Gregg Zoroya
Editorial Writer, USA Today (U.S)

The West is searching for a response to Russia’s ongoing malfeasance, including its recent attack on Ukraine in the Black Sea and its just-revealed effort to “muck around” in U.S. 2018 midterm elections. These are the latest in a long sequence of transgressions on the part of the Kremlin, ranging from the invasion of Georgia, to the violation of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, to interference in the democratic processes of NATO member states, perhaps most dramatically seen in Putin’s assault on the 2016 U.S. presidential election. As a result, on both sides of the Atlantic, democratic values and institutions—and the trans-Atlantic alliance predicated upon them—are at risk.

On Dec. 12, Governance Studies and the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings will jointly co-host an event with the bipartisan Transatlantic Democracy Working Group (TDWG), featuring an expert panel that will discuss the threats emanating from Russia and elsewhere to security, democracy, and the trans-Atlantic alliance—and what the alliance can and should do about it.

Panel Speakers

Mary Louise Kelly, Host, All Things Considered – NPR

Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Senior Fellow and Director, Transatlantic Security Program – Center for a New American Security

Bill Kristol, Editor at Large – The Weekly Standard

Alina Polyakova, David M Rubenstein Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe

Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, Distinguished Fellow – The Atlantic Council

Organizing Democracy, a new book by Paul Poast and Johannes Urpelainen, argues that new democracies are more likely to flourish when they receive support from international organizations to help them provide public goods to their populations. This event will present the findings of Organizing Democracy, analyze the relationships between new democracies and international organizations in the cases of Ukraine and Libya, and explore policy implications for democracy promotion by the U.S. government.

FEATURING:

PAUL POAST, Co-Author, Organizing Democracy, and Assistant Professor, Political Science, University of Chicago

STEPHEN LENNON, Director, Office of Transition Initiatives, USAID

STEVEN GRINER, Director, Department of Sustainable Democracy and Special Missions, Organization of American States

AMANDA KADLEC, Policy Analyst, RAND Corporation

ADITI GORUR, Director, Protecting Civilians in Conflict Program, Stimson Center (Moderator)

The Trump Administration has implemented a wholesale shift in US policy in Jerusalem. From the moving of the US embassy and recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, to de-funding Palestinian hospitals in East Jerusalem, to the decision to close down the US Consulate General, to removing the brakes on East Jerusalem settlement activity, the policies playing out today in Jerusalem have profound implications locally, regionally, and in the geopolitically. Please join FMEP and the Carnegie Endowment for a discussion with Jerusalem expert Danny Seidemann examining these and related issues.

Speakers:

Daniel Seidemann is a practicing attorney in Jerusalem who specializes in legal and public issues in East Jerusalem. He has participated in numerous Track II talks on Jerusalem between Israelis and Palestinians and served in an informal advisory capacity to the final status negotiations as a member of a committee of experts commissioned by Prime Minister Barak’s office to generate sustainable arrangements in Jerusalem. He is the founder and director of Terrestrial Jerusalem, an Israeli nonprofit that that works to identify and track developments in Jerusalem that could impact the political process or permanent status options, destabilize the city, spark violence, or create humanitarian crises.

Michele Dunne is the director and a senior fellow in Carnegie’s Middle East Program, where her research focuses on political and economic change in Arab countries, particularly Egypt, as well as U.S. policy in the Middle East. She was the founding director of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council from 2011 to 2013 and was a senior associate and editor of the Arab Reform Bulletin at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace from 2006 to 2011. Dunne was a Middle East specialist at the U.S. Department of State from 1986 to 2003, where she served in assignments that included the National Security Council, the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff, the U.S. embassy in Cairo, the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. She also served as a visiting professor of Arabic language and Arab studies at Georgetown from 2003 to 2006.

Zaha Hassan is a Middle East Fellow at New America. She is a human rights lawyer and former coordinator and senior legal advisor to the Palestinian negotiating team during Palestine’s bid for UN membership (2010-2012). She is a member of Al Shabaka, the Palestinian Policy Network, and is a contributor to the Hill and Ha’aretz. Her political commentary and analysis has been published by the New York Times, CNN, Salon, the Oregonian, the Detroit News, and other outlets. She is the former cohost of the Portland, Ore.-based radio show, One Land Many Voices, on KBOO 90.7 FM.

Donald Trump’s announcement of intent to withdraw from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty constitutes another severe blow to a treaty-based system of nuclear arms and threat reduction. One last treaty governing formal, verifiable draw-downs of nuclear forces remains — the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Mr. Trump has vacillated wildly in his comments on the future of U.S. strategic forces, ranging from an expressed interest in deep cuts to significant arms build-ups. For now, he has declined Vladimir Putin’s offer of extending New START. Trump’s national security adviser, John Bolton, might be expected to seek withdrawal from New START, and he might well succeed, rather than to leave the decision of its extension and further reductions to the winner of the next presidential election.

Please join us for a discussion of our nuclear future with Nina Tannenwald, Director of the International Relations Program at Brown University, Jon Wolfsthal, Director of the Nuclear Crisis Group and Senior Advisor to Global Zero, and Lynn Rusten, Vice President of the Global Nuclear Policy Program at the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Our speakers will address the following questions: What role will norms play in our nuclear future? What role will treaties play, with specific reference to New START? Will we be entering a future of “arms control without agreements”? If so, what might this look like? Stimson’s Co-founder, Michael Krepon, will moderate our discussion.

8. Targeted Sanctions on Human Rights Abusers and Kleptocracies: Lessons Learned and Opportunities from the Global Magnitsky Santions | Thursday, December 13 | 9 am – 10:30 am | Center for Strategic and International Studies | 1616 Rhode Island Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here

Please join the Human Rights Initiative for reflections from U.S. Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD), the author of the Global Magnitsky Act. He will be followed by a panel examining the impact of the Global Magnitsky sanctions, opportunities to improve implementation, and how the sanctions fit within financial sector approaches to human rights and corruption. These sanctions enable targeted designations based on human rights abuse and corruption around the world, and have been imposed on officials and companies in a number of recent high profile situations, including Myanmar, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Nicaragua.

Keynote Speaker
U.S. Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD)

Panel
Robert Berschinski
Senior Vice President Policy at Human Rights First

Robert Peri
Director of US Sanctions at Citibank

Joshua White
Director of Policy and Analysis at The Sentry

Americans are increasingly skeptical that the U.S. role abroad benefits them economically at home. What will it take to bridge the divide between America’s foreign policy and domestic imperatives? Join Susan Glasser for a conversation with two former White House chiefs of staff on how to make U.S. foreign policy work better for America’s middle class.

This event will launch a new report, U.S. Foreign Policy for the Middle Class: Perspectives from Ohio — the first in a series of state-level case studies from Carnegie’s bipartisan task force on foreign policy for the middle class

William J. Burns is president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He previously served as U.S. deputy secretary of state.

Joshua Bolten served as White House chief of staff under president George W. Bush, and is currently president and CEO of the Business Roundtable.

Denis McDonough is served as White House chief of staff for president Barack Obama’s second term, and is currently a visiting senior fellow in Carnegie’s Technology and Internatinal Affairs Program.

Susan B. Glasser is a staff writer at the New Yorker, where she writes a weekly column on life in Trump’s Washington. She was a founding editor of Politicoand editor-in-chief of Foreign Policy Magazine.

Tags : Democracy and Rule of Law, Iran, Israel/Palestine, NATO, Nuclear weapons, Russia, South Korea, The Middle East, Turkey

Peace Picks: December 3 – 9

Posted in Tal Marom - December 3, 2018 - 0 Comment

An acute crisis has been unfolding in the Gaza Strip for over a decade. Its nearly 2 million residents live amid a man-made humanitarian disaster, with severe urban crowding, staggering unemployment, and a dire scarcity of basic services, including electricity, water, and sewage treatment. Three rounds of open warfare have devastated Gaza while placing Israelis under constant threat. Recent weeks have seen a sharp escalation in fighting, again illustrating the precarious balance of this situation. Moreover, the continued political and physical separation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank hinders Palestinian national development while making a two-state solution even more remote.

On December 3, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings and the Center for a New American Security will launch their new report, “Ending Gaza’s Perpetual Crisis: A New U.S. Approach.” The authors, informed by the deliberations of a high-level task force on the future of U.S. policy toward Gaza, argue that the United States should no longer accept the perpetuation of the current state of affairs in Gaza, given its moral, security, and political costs. They propose instead a route by which American policymakers can help bring an end to this continued state of crisis.

Speakers
Hady Amr
Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy

Natan Sachs
Director, Center for Middle East Policy

Ilan Goldberg
Senior Fellow and Director, Middle East Security Program at Center for a New American Security

Khaled Elgindy
Fellow, Foreign Policy & Center for Middle East Policy

Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen
Director, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Program at US Institute of Peace

Dennis Ross
William Davidson Distinguished Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

After the Ukraine crisis, Belarus has improved its image as a contributor to regional security. Part of this shift stems from greater cooperation with the West. This, along with Minsk’s selective non-compliance with Eurasian integration, however, brings closer scrutiny and potential pressure from Moscow. This panel will host a delegation of Belarusian analysts, organized by Pact and USAID, to offer a fresh examination of Belarus’s relationship with the West and with Moscow

Speakers
Vasili Kukharchyk
Country Director, Pact Belarus
Chief of Party, USAID BRAMA Activity

Kateryna Bornukova
Academic Director, Belarus Economic Research and Outreach Center

Yauheni Preiherman
Director, Minks Dialogue

How is the threat of terrorism defined in the East Asia Pacific? Who are the actors and what are their objectives? What are the technologies of terrorism and appropriate policy measures to combat the evolving threat? Moreover, how do individual states and the international community ensure that counterterrorism policies protect individual rights under the rule of law?

On December 4, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings will host distinguished U.S. and Asian counterterrorism experts to articulate the terrorist threat in East Asia and how it has evolved in the region. Panelists will also assess the mechanisms for protecting civil liberties and good governance under a counterterrorism strategy, as well as its implications for regional and international cooperation. This conference is part of the Asia Transnational Threats Forum, an interdisciplinary forum launched by the Brookings Korea Chair that harnesses the collective expertise of U.S. and foreign partners to tackle key strategic issues affecting all of Asia. The first event was on cybersecurity in Asia on June 2018.

Speakers
Jung H. Pak
SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy & Center for East Asia Policy Studies

Yeong Gi Mun
Director, National Counterterrorism Center of the Republic of Korea

Audrey Kurth Cronin
Professor of International Security, American University

Mayuko Hori
Chief Officer, Counterterrorism Cooperation Unit of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

Samm Sacks
Cybersecurity Fellow and China Digital Economy Fellow, New America

Joshua Geltzer
Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University

Zachary Abuza
Professor of National Security Strategy, National War College

James Baker
Visiting Fellow, Governance Studies

Ji-Hyang Jang
Senior Fellow, Asian Institute for Policy Studies

Jeffrey Feltman
Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy

The Middle East Institute (MEI) and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) are pleased to announce the 9^th Annual Conference on Turkey. The conference will bring together international policy makers and experts to discuss the challenges Turkey faces domestically and its relations with the Middle East and the West.

Speakers
Knut Dethlefsen
Representative to the US and Canada, FES

Gonul Tol
Director, Center for Turkish Studies at Middle East Institute

Mustafa Akyol
Senior Fellow, Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity at the CATO Institute

Abdullah Akyuz
Former President, Turkish Industry and Business Association

Sinan Ciddi
Executive Director, Institute for Turkish Studies at Georgetown University

Menderes Cinar
Professor of Political Science, Baskent University

Max Hofman
Associate Director, National Security and International Policy at Center for American Progress

The Honorable Serpil Midyatli
Member, State Parliament of Germany

Berkin Safak Sener
International Consultant on Employment, UN Development Programme

Semuhi Sinanoglu
PhD Student at Department of Political Science, University of Toronto

Amb. (ret.) Gerald Feierstein
Senior Vice President, Middle East Institute

… and others.

Over the past two years, the Atlantic Council’s Rebuilding Syria Initiative has worked to inform and advance transatlantic policy to foster a transition toward legitimate public order in Syria through economic reconstruction and stabilization. In this effort, we have pooled expertise from specialists to cover the many challenges of rebuilding Syria, including in political economy, development, infrastructure, civil society, law, and employment.

Lessons learned from these engagements are captured in the Initiative’s final report, “Rethinking Stabilization in Eastern Syria: Toward a Human Security Framework,” authored by Dr. Steven Heydemann.

The report finds that as the focus of the Syrian conflict narrows to the two remaining contested areas of the country, the presence of US forces on the ground gives the United States some leverage in shaping the closing trajectory of the conflict. In eastern Syria, the United States has an opportunity to use stabilization—a political endeavor to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict—to advance both short- and long-term interests.

Speakers
Dr. Steven Heydemann
Professor in Middle East Studies, Smith College

Dr. Tamara Cofman Wittes
Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution

Faysal Itani
Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council

Hudson Institute will host a timely discussion on the increasing risk that rapidly emerging advanced technologies pose to U.S national security. To explore these critical issues, Rep. Mike McCaul, Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, will deliver keynote remarks then engage in a moderated Q&A with Senior Fellow Arthur Herman, director of Hudson’s Quantum Alliance Initiative.

Competitor nations, such as Russia and China, have devoted significant resources in the areas of artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum information science, particularly quantum computing. A recent report from the bipartisan Commission on the National Defense Strategy for the United States warned that “U.S. superiority in key areas of innovation is decreasing or has disappeared [while] U.S. competitors are investing heavily in innovation.” Given their enormous promise for benefiting human kind, how should Washington respond to ensure U.S. military superiority while also promoting the peaceful use of AI and quantum technology?

A panel discussion will follow Rep. McCaul’s remarks with Dr. Herman, Aaron VanDevender from Founders Fund, Elsa Kania from the Center for New American Security, Andrew Kim from Google, and Hudson Senior Fellow Sorin Ducaru, a former senior NATO official for emerging security challenges.

Speakers
The Honorable Mike McCaul (R-TX)
Chair, Homeland Security Committee, House of Representatives

Aaron Van Devender
Chief Scientist, Founders Fund

Elsa Kania
Adjunct Fellow, Technology and National Security Program, Center for New American Strategy

Sorin Ducaru
Former Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, NATO
Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute

Arthur Herman
Senior Fellow and Director, Quantum Alliance Initiative, Hudson Institute

Andrew Kim
Senior Analyst, Public Policy and Government Relations, Google

Please join CSIS and the United States Naval Institute (USNI) for a Maritime Security Dialogue event featuring a conversation with the Honorable Richard V. Spencer, 76th Secretary of the Navy. He will be discussing the state of the Navy and Marine Corps and innovation in the naval domain.

Speakers
The Honorable Richard V. Spencer
76th Secretary of the Navy

Vice Admiral Peter Daly, USN (ret.)
Chief Executive Officer, US Naval Institute

John J. Hamre
CSIS President and CEO

The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a moderated conversation on Syria with Salman Shaikh, the founder and CEO of The Shaikh Group, and Ambassador Frederic C. Hof. Syria’s political process is at a standstill, with a constitutional commission still not formed and UN Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, soon to depart his role. With the conflict continuing to evolve and international attention shifting, new thinking is needed to tackle the Middle East’s most thorny issue: how to resolve the crisis in Syria.

Shaikh will discuss his lessons learned from many years of intensive Track II efforts on Syria and how they might be applied to designing more effective, alternative pathways forward; and Hof will expand on the implications and sustainability of the newly announced U.S. strategy in Syria and prospects for progress on the political track.

MEI’s senior fellow and director of the Countering Terrorism and Extremism program Charles Lister will moderate the conversation.

Speakers
Amb. Frederic C. Hof
Professor and Diplomatic in Residence, Bard College
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council

Salman Shaikh
Founder and CEO, The Shaikh Group

Charles Lister
Senior Fellow and Director, Countering Terrorism and Extremism Program, Middle East Institute

Tags : artificial intelligence, Asia, Counterterrorism, eastern europe, gaza, Israel, maritime, Palestine, Security, South Korea, Syria, The Middle East, Turkey

Midterms and foreign policy

Posted in Daniel Serwer - November 21, 2018 - 1 Comment

I gave a talk this morning at the Italian International Affairs Institute (IAI) on “The 2018 American Midterm Elections: What Do They Signify for the US and for Europe?” Here are my notes for the occasion, which I pretty much used as written:

It is a pleasure to be back at IAI, which has been kind enough to host my talks many times over the 25 years since I left Rome as Charge’ d’affaires ad interim of the American Embassy.
Let me start with some basics: the elections are “midterm” because they fall in the middle of a Presidential mandate. They are multiple, that is elections rather than election, because more than one institution is contested: all of the House of Representatives, about one-third of the Senate, and many governorships, state legislatures, and local positions.
They are also multiple in another sense: even elections for Federal offices in the US are run by the 50 states, not by the Federal government. While all the states elect members of the House from single-member districts with approximately the same population as well as two Senators (no matter what the population of the state), the rules governing who is eligible to vote, design of the ballot, polling procedures, opening times, counting, tabulating, and ultimately deciding the outcome vary quite a bit from state to state and even from county to county.
Quite a few of our states have trouble getting it all done, especially when the margins are narrow. There are still a few seats undecided.
Nevertheless, the general shape of the outcome is clear: Democrats have won control of the House of Representatives; Republicans have maintained control of the Senate, widening their margin by a couple of seats.
What does this mean for the future, especially for American foreign policy and relations with Europe, including Italy?
First thing to understand is that the election was not about foreign policy. The two biggest issues were health insurance for Democrats and immigration for Republicans. Trade, national security, nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, the Middle East, Iran, China, Russia and all the other issues IAI and I care about were virtually absent from the pre-electoral discourse.
It was vigorous and led to a high turnout by American standards: about 50% of registered voters. That will sound very low to you, but it is not low in the US, where about 60% turn out for presidential elections and midterms generally draw about 40%.
There are many reasons for this. Americans move frequently and die pretty much at the rate of everyone else. There is no national procedure for updating registration lists, and virtually no one unregisters when they move out of a community to another one. So some of the low turnout is a statistical artefact.
The resulting anomalies have led to Republican claims that there is a great deal of fraudulent Democratic voting in US elections. There is no evidence for that. To the contrary, the evidence demonstrates concerted efforts by Republicans in many states to suppress voting by their opponents with ID requirements, closing polling places, and other tricks of the trade.

The higher turnout this time around occurred among both Democrats and Republicans, but the Democrats have more to gain because their relatively young voter population normally turns out much less than the older Republican voter population.

What looked like a modest shift the day after the election turned into a considerable Blue Wave as more results are finalized. The shifts from the last midterms in 2014 are notable:

under 30, +11D to +35D
women, +4 to +19
Latinos, +26 to +40
Asians, -1 to +54
college grads, -3 to +20
independents, -12 to +12
single, +13 to +24
not white evangelical, +12 to +34

Rural areas voted heavily for Republicans. Suburbs, which have generally leaned Republican, turned bluer this time, mainly because of the votes of college-educated women.
In short: Americans are divided, perhaps more than they have been since World War II.
On one side, we have a modest, but bigger than normal for midterms, recovery of the Obama coalition, despite a House of Representatives gerrymandered in favor of Republicans and a Senate “map” that incidentally favored Republicans.
Some high-profile progressives like Beto O’Rourke—a challenger for Ted Cruz’s Senate seat in Texas—and Andrew Gillum—the black Democrat who ran for governor of Florida—lost, but their showings were respectable enough to make them serious future candidates.
On the other side, we’ve got a Trump-dominated Republican party, which will be more radical than in his first two years. Many of the relative moderates are not returning to Congress. The Republicans there will be whiter, more male, and more rural than before.
The big winners in this election were those who want America divided and immobilized. That includes Presidents Putin and Xi. America will be consumed for most of the next two years with the 2020 presidential election. The Mueller investigation and oversight hearings will increase the noise and divisiveness, perhaps even to the point of impeachment.
The Democrats, who are mostly moderates, have limited powers to influence foreign policy. Their main lever of power will be oversight: the power to convene House hearings and subpoena witnesses. The Senate will continue to rubber stamp Trump’s nomination of judges and ambassadors.
That said there has been considerable agreement in the current Congress between Democrats and Republicans on maintaining the foreign affairs budget and toughening up against China, Russia, and North Korea. There are disagreements on the Iran nuclear deal, which Democrats favor, and on the defense budget, which Republicans traditionally favor.
In the Middle East, we are likely to see a continued US effort in eastern Syria, some effort at rapprochement with Turkey, and Congressional pressure to stop the war in Yemen as well as sanction Saudi Arabia for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. The Administration will resist that pressure but may give in on Yemen, which would bring Washington into closer alignment with most Europeans.
It remains to be seen whether the consensus in favor of funding defense, development and diplomacy that existed in Congress since 2016 will be maintained. The Administration itself has signaled an intention to cut defense. Many newly elected Republicans will want to cut development and diplomacy. Democrats will defend both, but compromises should be expected. There is nothing popular about the foreign affairs budget in the US, though most Americans do favor continuing commitments abroad.
On NATO and the EU, I don’t think much will change. Trump has made it clear he thinks little of NATO and less of the EU. The Congress and the American people are more favorable to both and will try to insist on maintenance of the Alliance. Trump’s hostility to the EU will, however, find some resonance among protectionist Democrats and Republicans. The steel and aluminum tariffs seem destined to stay, at least for now.
Macron and Merkel notwithstanding, there are of course many in Europe who are sympathetic to their own version of Trump’s nationalism: make Italy, Hungary, Poland, or Denmark great again by blocking immigration, protecting domestic industries, rallying anti-minority sentiment, and undermining the rule of law. Berlusconi after all was an Italian invention.
I’m afraid the only thing that will sober some of Trump’s American supporters will be a major economic downturn, and even then they may prefer to blame it on someone other than the incumbent, most likely minorities, immigrants, Europeans, and terrorists.
That said, I think we have passed the moment I would call “peak Trump.” Even without a recession, most Americans—3 million more of whom voted for Hillary in 2016 and haven’t approved of Trump since—are now fed up. Unlike 2016, that majority has spread into red suburbs and states and mobilized more effectively. Democrats won the popular vote for Congress by about 7%. That could be a landslide in a presidential election.
Trump has a difficult road ahead. But that should be little comfort. If I had to guess, his fall might be at least as painful as his rise. He will resist accountability and transparency to the last.
Europe has a tremendously important role to play during the next two years. Merkel and Macron have already done great work in maintaining the vision of a united and liberal Europe. So long as Germany and France remain on that line, I can hope the rest of Europe and the US will eventually find their way back from ethnic nationalism.
But they and those of you who agree with that vision are going to have to do much more. Here are a few concrete suggestions:

• The NATO allies really do need to meet the 2% goal by 2024. Failing to keep on the tracks plays directly into Trump’s malicious hands. If they do so by joining together to form Macron’s European army, I have no objection.
• A negotiated resolution of the trade dispute is highly desirable. Even better would be returning to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which offered big economic benefits.
• The US and Europe need to hang together on Russia and China or hang separately as Ben Franklin said to his fellow revolutionaries. US gas supplies should help on the Russian front.
• On Iran, I see no hope of a US/EU accommodation so long as the US stays out of the nuclear deal. But I don’t really see how it can re-enter under this president. Some issues will have to wait for 2021, when discussing a follow-on deal will be needed anyway.
• On Syria, prospects are better. The US and Europe seem to be on the same wavelength in withholding reconstruction aid until there is a credible and irreversible political transition under way. That is the way to succeed, but pressures on Europe will be great.
• On Libya, the Americans are hoping Italy and France will work together to end the civil war and put the country back on a sustainable path.

There are lots of other issues, but the overall strategy should be this: hang together where possible, help each other out, and hope to get to 2021 in good enough shape to return to the trajectory most of us would prefer: a Euro-Atlantic community whole and free, though wiser and better, from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

Tags : China, European Union, Iran, Israel/Palestine, Libya, NATO, North Korea, Russia, Syria, Turkey, United States

Trapped

Posted in Daniel Serwer - October 18, 2018 - 0 Comment

Secretary of State Pompeo spent Tuesday in Riyadh, where he helped the King and Crown Prince shore up their claim that they knew nothing of the disappearance of Jamal Khashoggi from the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. The King’s ignorance may be believable. Mohammed bin Salman’s is not, if the Turkish claim is true that members of his security entourage were among the Saudis who assembled at the consulate the day Khashoggi was killed and left quickly thereafter. We’ll need to await the official results of the Turkish investigation to be sure of that.

But what we know already is that the US administration has chosen to back the Saudi monarchy to the hilt. It needs the Kingdom for its efforts to counter Iran, fight Sunni extremists, keep oil prices down in the runup to next month’s election, and deliver the Palestinians to a less than satisfactory peace agreement with Israel. Even an American administration less concerned about arms sales and Saudi investments in Trump real estate might hesitate to lower the boom on the Saudis.

President Trump is all in with the Kingdom. He insists on the presumption of innocence and echoes the possibility it was a “rogue operation,” underlining as well that Jamal was a Saudi subject, not a US citizen. Trump says he wants to know what happened, but he hasn’t backed the Khashoggi family call for an international investigation. His interest in protecting journalists from the wave of violence engulfing much of the world is minimal. They are, after all, just “enemies of the people.” He wants this whole thing to blow over as quickly as possible.

Many in Congress on both sides of the aisle are saying they won’t let it happen. Some are calling for the Crown Prince’s head to roll (figuratively, not literally). Others want sanctions, freezing or ditching of arms deals, an end to US support for the war in Yemen, or withdrawal of the US ambassador. Conveniently, there is none–the Deputy Chief of Mission is Charge’ d’affaires. It would not be wise to leave the embassy in the hands of anyone below that level, not least because good communication with the Saudis is vital no matter what Washington decides to do.

None of this is likely to happen anyway. Foreign policy is largely a presidential prerogative. Trump likes the Saudis, who gave him a rousing welcome on his first trip overseas (remember the sword dance?). He also needs them. Son-in-law Jared Kushner’s peace plan isn’t likely to float no matter what, but without the Saudi backing it is nothing. Pushback against Iran using what has come to be termed an “Arab NATO” is meaningless without the Kingdom out front. Ditto the fight against Sunni extremism. The Saudis delivered $100 million for reconstruction in the US-occupied area of eastern Syria the day Pompeo arrived in Riyadh. Oil prices could go to $100 and more just before the November 6 election if the Saudis let it happen. They threatened as much the day after the word “sanctions” was uttered in Washington.

The American administration is trapped by its own objectives into supporting the King and Crown Prince, trying to minimize the fallout from Jamal’s disappearance, and forging ahead to ensure that the Kingdom remains the linchpin of Gulf security. We could still see some movement in Congress, perhaps in favor of an independent international investigation. But neither the monarchy nor the president would want that to happen.

I knew and liked Jamal Khashoggi, who struck me as someone genuinely supportive of the governing system in Saudi Arabia while advocating more space for freedom of expression. Even if he were a complete stranger, I would find it hard to imagine how anyone would want to do him harm for what he wrote in the Washington Post and elsewhere. If the current Turkish-leaked reports are true, or anything like them, what happened is simply unacceptable and those responsible should be held accountable.

The Americans aren’t the only ones who have trapped themselves: the Saudis have too, in a system that is unable to tolerate even moderate criticism. I hesitate to say dissent because Jamal was far from qualifying as a dissident, even if he expressed doubts about the wisdom of some royal decisions. At least in public and in private conversation, he accepted the Saudi governing system but wanted it to open up. The women who have been imprisoned for organizing the protests against the ban on driving are of the same ilk. For all our sakes, I hope the Kingdom will use this tragedy, whatever its reality turns out to be, to reflect on what is truly needed for state security, and what measures taken in the name of security are not only wrong but may cause serious harm. The Americans should join them in that reflection.

PS: Here is the The Heat episode I participated in on this subject yesterday:

Tags : Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United States

peacefare.net

Tag: Turkey

Another red line erased

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